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ABSTRACT 
 
My thesis focuses on three related research themes. First, to provide academic 
rigour to the assertions of the Nyberg Report (2011) that the Irish banks were 
characterised by both groupthink and herding in the lead up to the recent 
financial crisis. The Nyberg Report was commissioned by the Irish government 
to provide explanations for the causes of the Irish financial crisis. In particular 
my thesis explores whether the board of Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo) was 
characterised by groupthink tendencies and whether the other Irish banks 
looked to emulate Anglo’s strategy.  
Second, my thesis will develop a theoretical model which identifies 
characteristics associated with the increased vulnerability of a board to a poor 
decision process1. In particular the model will focus on the interplay between 
normative and informative influences on decision process and how these can 
and do interact with director skill levels. Five research questions are developed 
and my theoretical model of VPDP is applied to the Irish bank case study. 
Information will be gathered through a process of semi-structured interviews 
and an analysis of existing literature, official reports and annual financial 
statements.  
Third, a series of recommendations are made which are derived from the model 
itself and are intended to reduce the likelihood of boards pursuing a poor 
decision strategy and in increasing the likelihood of a robust boardroom 
challenge.      
 
                                            
1
 For ease of reference the model which I have developed in chapter 6 will be referred to as “my 
model of VPDP”.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Recessions related to financial crises are protracted affairs that have long and 
deep lasting effects on asset prices, output and employment. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) analysed eighteen post Second World War financial crises and 
concluded that on average real house prices decline 35% whilst equity prices 
collapse by 55%. Ireland‘s financial crisis which began in 2008 stands out as 
being particularly severe, and the 7.25% contraction in Irish GDP in 2009 was 
the largest experienced by a developed country since the Great Depression 
(Kinsella and Leddin, 2010). The IMF (Laeven and Valencia, 2013) noted that 
Ireland holds the undesirable position of being the only country that features 
among the top ten of costliest banking crises across the three measurement 
criteria it assesses, namely; fiscal cost, increase in debt levels and output loss. 
The collapse of the domestic Irish banking sector created the greatest challenge 
to the Irish state since it was founded in 1922 (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012). 
The major responsibility for the Irish financial crisis lies with the directors and 
senior management of the Irish banks themselves (Honohan, 2010).  
Given the impact that financial crises have had historically, and the severity of 
the Irish crisis in particular, my thesis intends to make a contribution by studying 
the Irish banking crisis with a view towards developing a better understanding of 
the decision process in boards generally and to make recommendations to 
reduce the likelihood of poor decision outcomes in corporate boards. The focus 
of my thesis is, however, not a detailed analysis of the causes of the financial 
crisis but rather is dedicated to understanding and identifying vulnerabilities to a 
poor decision process within corporate boards. The recent financial crisis 
generally, and the Irish case study specifically, provide the lens for which to 
undertake my research. The intention is that my research can make a 
contribution in the field of corporate governance and in particular in relation to 
decision making in corporate boards. The consequence of such a contribution 
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to corporate decision making will not be limited to financial but relevant for all 
institutions. I recognise that the recent financial crisis highlights the impact that 
poor decision making by financial institutions can have on the wider economy 
and, as such, improving decision making in financial institutions is of particular 
societal interest. There are, it is submitted, three areas where my research can 
make a contribution. First in respect of the findings of the Nyberg Report (2011) 
which attributed the failure of the decision making processes within the Irish 
banks to groupthink and herding (ibid, p. 99)2. Groupthink occurs when there is 
a pre-mature consensus seeking in decision making and the importance of 
group cohesion and the preservation of the relationship within the group are 
deemed more important than the decision making process itself. Groupthink 
results from a series of what has been termed “normative social influences”, 
where social pressures are put to bear on individual members to conform. 
Herding between groups relates to “informational influences”, and occurs when 
a group follows the behaviour of another in the belief that they have superior 
information, subordinating their own private information in favour of the signals 
which they receive from others. Herding is therefore not a primary consequence 
of social pressure to conform, but rather the reaction to signals received from 
other actors which are seen as having superior information.  
Although the Nyberg Report observed groupthink and herding, it does not 
provide a detailed review of the literature, nor does it provide evidence to back 
                                            
2
 The Irish Government set up their own enquiry into their banking crisis which took the form of 
two scoping reports (Honohan, 2010; Regling and Watson, 2010) followed by the establishment 
of a Statutory Commission of Investigation (Nyberg, 2011). The purpose of the Commission was 
to “provide answers on why a number of institutions, both private and public, acted in an 
imprudent or ineffective manner, thereby contributing to the occurrence of the Irish banking 
crisis” (ibid, p. 1). The report was prepared by Peter Nyberg, a Finnish national with a 
background in financial regulation and was published in March 2011.  A detailed analysis of the 
findings of the Nyberg Report (2011) can be found in Appendix 1.  
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up this assertion. This is, of course, understandable. The Nyberg Report is not 
an academic document and is not expected to provide such a rigorous analysis 
of the literature3. Moreover Nyberg (2011), when concluding that the Irish banks 
suffered from groupthink, appeared to reach his conclusion from a more intuitive 
analysis of the information rather than a more rigorous process of identifying 
antecedents and symptoms of Janis’s groupthink. Nyberg told me in interview: “I 
did not go into the details of the elephant [of groupthink]. I just seemed to 
recognise that it had the essentials ... I never really had the time to go deeper 
into looking into the exact hypothesis that would fit in. It was not strictly 
speaking a scientific effort, like the one you are trying to do, it was more trying 
to structure information and draw conclusions4.”  
Hart (1994) warns that the concept of groupthink can, and has been, abused 
and that the term is often used “loosely and indiscriminately as a symbolically 
powerful pejorative label to stick on any controversial episode of organizational 
action or public policy-making” (ibid, p. ix). In light of this and Nyberg’s 
comments about how he measured groupthink, there is an opportunity for me to 
provide a more rigorous test of the groupthink construct as it may apply to the 
Irish banks and to Anglo Irish in particular.   
                                            
3
 As an illustration, the Nyberg Commission only has two references with respect to groupthink, 
from Janis (1982) and Baron (2005) whilst the review of the literature that follows analyses over 
fifty different academic papers in this area. It is very possible that a more extensive review was 
undertaken, but this is not evidence in the report or supporting documentation. 
4
 Although the Nyberg Report does not go through the systematic process of identifying each of 
the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink, it does provide a number of observations 
resulting from the data gathered and interviews undertaken which will be used in this chapter to 
provide supporting evidence to the proposed propositions. Indeed, the Nyberg Commission 
accessed approximately 200,000 documents from authorities, financial institutions and other 
sources and conducted 140 interviews with 120 individuals (Nyberg, 2011, p. 10). 
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My thesis will provide a detailed review of the literature of the phenomena 
detailed above with a view towards providing a much more robust and thorough 
analysis of both groupthink and herding. Evidence will be gathered through a 
process of semi-structured interviews and an analysis of existing literature, 
official reports and annual financial statements.  
Second, the Nyberg Commission observed the existence of both herding and 
groupthink, but did not develop the concept of how such phenomena might 
interact and interconnect as described above. Further, the Commission does 
not discuss alternative explanations to herding and groupthink which may have 
contributed to the Irish banks’ decision processes. My thesis will explore 
alternative explanations which might account for the behaviour of the Irish 
banks in the lead up to the financial crisis. The review of the literature related to 
these alternative possible explanations allowed me to develop a theoretical 
model which identifies characteristics and vulnerabilities associated with a poor 
decision process. A poor decision process is defined as a decision which could 
have been avoided which results in a lower value to the firm in the present or 
future.  
The development of this model is particularly relevant given the failure of many 
bank boards in the lead up to the crisis, particularly with respect to the lack of 
adequate boardroom challenge. A number of research questions will be 
developed and the model will be applied in relation to the poor decision process 
undertaken by the Irish banks, and Anglo Irish Bank in particular, in the lead up 
to the crisis The model will further highlight the vulnerabilities to a poor decision 
process on three different levels; 1) in respect to vulnerabilities to an initial poor 
decision process, 2) in respect to the ratification of that decision process by the 
collective board of directors, and 3) in respect to the risks of emulation of a 
flawed strategy by competitors increasing systemic risk.  
Third, the Nyberg Commission focuses on the causes of the Irish banking crisis, 
and does not in any way comment, nor does it suggest, possible reforms to 
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prevent poor decision making processes in the future. This thesis intends to 
make a contribution to the literature in this area. The global financial crisis has 
highlighted failures in corporate governance (see for example (Ahrens et al., 
2011; Diplock, 2012)). Governance failures have occurred despite a 
strengthening in governance rules and regulations in the lead up to the crisis. 
My thesis will argue that there needs to be a much greater implicit awareness of 
psychology when enacting reforms to combat phenomena such as groupthink in 
corporate boards. Recommendations are made within my thesis which 
addresses the behavioural aspects of corporate boards.   
Finally, I recognise that there a number of unanswered questions arising from 
this thesis. Can my model of VPDP be applied more broadly in relation to other 
case studies? Is groupthink and related phenomena common in the corporate 
boardroom? How can identified reforms be implemented? As such, my thesis 
concludes with a summary of areas for further research.  
The order of my thesis is as follows: The starting point is the identification of the 
Irish case study as an opportunity to learn (Stake, 1995) and in particular the 
comments by Nyberg (2011) that the Irish banks suffered from both herding and 
groupthink in the lead up to the crisis. Chapters 2 is devoted to the review of the 
literature on corporate governance, whilst chapter 3 discusses the literature on 
groupthink, herding and related phenomena which may have contributed to the 
decision making process of the Irish banks in the lead up to the crisis. Chapter 4 
discusses my research methodology and methods. Chapter 5 provides some 
context to the Irish financial crisis and the background to the Irish banks and 
Anglo in particular. In chapter 6, drawing from the literature review, I develop my 
model of VPDP and identify five research questions which I can then apply in 
the field. Chapter 7 is devoted to my research findings, and the application of 
the five research questions to the Irish case study. Finally chapter 8 includes my 
concluding discussions, policy recommendations and areas for further research 
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Chapter 2: Review of the relevant literature on Corporate Governance  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter 1, I identified failures in corporate governance in the lead up to the 
crisis and positioned my research with respect to making a contribution in the 
area of corporate governance reform. Although I made the link between 
corporate governance failures at financial institutions and the cause of the 
financial crisis, I recognise that the significant body of literature which highlights 
other primary causes of the financial crisis. Stiglitz (2012) focuses on the rising 
global inequality between rich and poor in Western economies, Gamble (2009), 
and Posner (2010) both identify flaws in the Anglo Saxon mode of capitalism, 
Skidelsky (2010) focuses on what he sees as an intellectual failure of the 
economics profession, and Rajan (2011) highlights the global saving imbalance 
particularly between the US and China as being a key cause of the crisis. Other 
commentators focus more narrowly and identify specific causes of the crisis; 
Tett (2009) identifies the role that credit default swaps played in the crisis as 
being critical, Krugman (2008) highlights the role that the shadow banking 
played in the crisis, Shiller (2008) focuses on the housing bubble, Danielsson 
(2008) concentrates on the failure of bank risk models, Cairns et. al (2009) 
highlights regulatory failure, Stein (2013) the role of narcissist leadership, Silver 
(2012) the failures at the rating agencies and Arnold (2009) on failures related 
to accounting practices. 
All this literature adds to the understanding of the causes of the global financial 
crisis and is complementary to the research stream which I have identified 
related to corporate governance failures associated with the crisis. This thesis is 
not however intended to be a rigorous and in depth analysis of all the factors 
contributing to the causes of the crisis. Rather it focuses on the identified failure 
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related to governance failures in financial institutions and in particular the poor 
decisions which many financial institutions made in the lead up to the crisis. 
Further, the research into corporate decision making in the area of corporate 
governance is not limited to decision making in respect of the crisis but has 
wider and broader implications for general decision making in any board 
context.  
This chapter analyses the relevant literature related to corporate governance. It 
starts by setting the parameters of the research boundaries for this research 
and in defining the term “corporate governance”. From this follows a discussion 
on agency theory as a conceptual framework underpinning corporate 
governance reforms. A review is then made for the rationale for director 
independence and how governance codes have developed to stress the role of 
the independent NED. Governance failures related to the financial crisis are 
then discussed with particular emphasis on the lack of adequate boardroom 
challenge. The chapter also includes a discussion related to the criticisms 
levelled at current corporate governance research, a review of existing models 
which link board attributes to firm performance and a discussion on the 
literature on diversity and how it relates to corporate boards. 
  
2.2 Research Boundaries 
First, it is necessary to provide the research boundaries for this chapter. My 
thesis is concerned exclusively with the structure and circumstances of Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance characterised by the separation of ownership and 
control and where a single board of directors dominate. 
This contrasts to the distinct model which has evolved in Continental Europe 
and has spread to countries such as Japan. In this model, ownership structure 
is concentrated rather than dispersed, and responsibilities for management and 
leadership are arranged into two separate boards. A review of the differences 
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between these two governance structures is however considered outside the 
remit of this thesis. The primary focus of my thesis will be on UK corporate 
governance and the UK Corporate Governance Code. The focus of my 
research is the Irish bank case study and as such it is important to understand 
the Irish governance structure. Ireland shares a legal history with the UK and 
the two countries share almost identical legal framework in both commercial 
and corporate law (Lynch Fannon, 2011), Furthermore, Ireland had no separate 
code setting out Corporate Governance conduct in the lead up to the financial 
crisis. Rather Ireland had adopted the UK Corporate Code of Conduct for all 
listed Irish Companies. However, in light of governance failures in Irish banks 
following the financial crisis the, Ireland implemented changes in their 
governance rules. In 2010, the Irish stock exchange, whilst still recognising that 
“the UK Corporate Governance Code has set the standard for corporate 
governance internationally”5, introduced six additional supplementary provisions 
which apply to all listed Irish companies. In addition to this, Ireland introduced 
its own separate corporate governance code for credit institutions and 
insurance undertaking6.  
 
2.3. Definition of Corporate Governance 
There is no one accepted definition of the term “corporate governance”. Daily et 
al. (2003) define corporate governance as the determination of the broad uses 
to which organisational resources will be deployed and the resolution of 
conflicts amongst the myriad of participants in organisations. Solomon (2013) 
similarly provides a wide definition, defining corporate governance as the 
                                            
5
 Refer to the url http://www.ise.ie/Products-Services/Sponsors-and-Advisors/Irish-Corporate-
Governance-Annex.pdf for a copy of the Irish corporate governance annexure.  
6
 A more detailed analysis of Irish corporate governance codes can be found in chapter 8.  
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system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which 
ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders 
and act in a socially responsible manner in all areas. These two broad 
definitions have as their basis the principle that companies are accountable to a 
wide and varied group of actors and as such governance needs to take into 
consideration factors that affect not only to its direct stakeholders but society as 
a whole. In other words they assume a socially orientated perspective on 
governance.  
Bainbridge (2012), in contrast, defines corporate governance in a much more 
narrow sense as the institutional structures, legal rules, and best practices that 
determine which body within the organisation is empowered to make particular 
decisions, how the members of that body are chosen, and the norms that 
should guide decision making. Further, one of the most well recognised, and 
indeed narrow, definitions of corporate governance is provided by the Cadbury 
Report (1992) as the system by which companies are directed and control. This 
definition was adopted when the UK Governance Code was first published in 
2003 and remains in the current version of the Combined Code (2014). The 
narrow definition of corporate governance as identified in the Combined Code 
complements this thesis which is focussed on micro decision making within the 
context of corporate boardrooms.  
Researchers (for example Sun et al. (2011) and Stanton (2012)) however 
recognise the interplay between the macro environment and the implementation 
of effective corporate governance and that factors such as general business 
ethics, corporate awareness and societal values and the general mind-set and 
attitudes in a particular culture will influence corporate governance 
effectiveness. Indeed, this relationship between the micro decisions at board 
level and the macro level in which boards operate will be discussed in detail in 
the chapter 3. The emphasis of this research is, as highlighted above, on micro 
issues and recommendations for effective corporate governance reforms which 
  
24 
 
will positively affect decision making within individual boards with the resultant 
knock on effects in the broader macro environment.  
Finally, on the issue of why corporate governance matters, the OECD (2004) 
highlights the importance of effective corporate governance in helping to 
provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the functioning of a market 
economy and will result in a lower cost of capital and encourage firms to use 
resources more effectively hence underpinning economic growth. The Walker 
Review (2009) specifically highlights the importance of strong corporate 
governance in financial institutions and that such failures can impact other parts 
of the economy in ways which are both interconnected and pervasive and can 
give rise to public interest externalities and moral hazard of a kind far greater 
than other types of institutions.   
 
2.4 Why a Board of Directors? 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) puts the board of directors right at 
the forefront of corporate governance when it states: ”Every company should be 
headed by an effective board which is collectively responsible for the long-term 
success of the company” (ibid, section A, p. 5). Corporate governance therefore 
has as one its core underpinning the belief that group decisions making is 
superior to that of an individual, and that a corporation should be governed by a 
board of directors rather than by an individual. This theoretical underpinning is 
based on the belief that for there to be effective oversight of an organisation, 
what is required is the collective knowledge and deliberation of a group rather 
than that of a specific individual (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Indeed research 
supports this assumption and has highlighted that overall group decision 
making is superior to decisions made by individuals and that in particular where 
evaluation of complex problems is concerned, there is clear evidence that the 
performance of the group will be superior to that of the average group member 
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(see for example Hill (1982), Surowiecki (2010) and Bainbridge (2002) and 
(2012)).  
Langevoort (2000) and Marchesani (2005) both identify three distinct roles for a 
board of directors: First to monitor the company’s management on behalf of 
shareholders, second to support the management in the development of 
strategies, and third as a resource gathering role with the board acting as a 
bridge between the board and its external environment. Both these academics 
recognise that the main role of the board is in the monitoring of management for 
the benefit of shareholders, therefore reducing agency costs arising from the 
separation of ownership and control which characterises corporations in the 
Anglo Saxon model of corporate governance.  
 
2.5 Agency Theory 
The recognition of the conflict between management and owners of a firm dates 
back to the writing of Adam Smith (1863) who observed that managers, as 
agents for shareholders, will not be as vigilant in pursuing the interests of 
shareholders as if they were the owners themselves. As Smith wrote in Wealth 
of Nations: “The directors of such [joint stock] companies being the managers 
rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot be well expected, 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own … Negligence 
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management 
of the affairs of such a company” (ibid, p. 264-265).    
Berle and Means (1932) were the first to identify the distinct feature of the 
separation of ownership and control in US corporations whilst Prais (1976) 
highlighted that a similar structure of ownership and control operated in the UK. 
Agency theory was thus developed to provide a framework of how an 
organisation characterised by such a separation of ownership and control can 
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be effectively governed (see Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983)).  
Agency theory is thus a control based principle which assumes that managers, 
by virtue of their understanding and experience within an organisation, are seen 
to have an advantage over the firm’s owners who are largely removed from the 
day to day operational aspects of the firm. Managers who control the firm, have 
by virtue of this control the potential to pursue actions which benefit themselves, 
but not the firm’s owners, and this necessitates mechanisms designed to 
protect shareholders as owners of the firm.  
This shareholder protection is achieved initially through the internal mechanism 
of the board of directors monitoring management performance and decisions for 
the benefit of the shareholders and, in case such internal mechanisms fail, 
through the external mechanism of the market for corporate control. The 
external mechanism of changes in corporate control is typically activated when 
the internal mechanism for controlling and monitoring management has failed. 
The role of monitoring of the management for the owners is therefore seen very 
much as the key criteria of agency theory.  
Agency theory has been described as having a “dominant grip” (Huse (2005) 
and Roberts et al. (2005)) on corporate governance research. Daily et al. (2003) 
ascribes the popularity of agency theory to two factors. First, it is a simple 
theory in which large corporations are reduced to two participants – managers 
and shareholders – and the interests of each are assumed to be both clear and 
consistent, and second, the notion of humans as self-interested and will put 
their own interests above all else is well understood and established7.  
                                            
7
 Agency theory contrasts with stewardship theory which, rather than seeing directors as being 
self-interested and opportunistic, has as its core the belief that directors interests are often very 
closely aligned with that of shareholders and that there are often situations where the interests 
of shareholders and directors are closely correlated. In direct contrast to agency theory, 
stewardship theory would suggest that control of a corporation should be centralised in the 
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Just as the UK Code of Conduct (2014) puts the directors right at the heart of 
corporate governance, agency theory relies very heavily on the board for the 
efficient functioning of a corporation. Fama and Jensen (1983) describe the 
board as the “apex of the firms’ decision control system” (ibid, p. 311), and it 
therefore follows that the board of directors are “the ultimate internal monitor 
whose most important role is to scrutinise the highest decision makers within 
the firm” (Fama, 1980, p. 294).  
In summary, the primary duty of the board of directors is to serve this monitoring 
function (Dalton et al., 1998). The overwhelming emphasis in governance 
research has been on the efficacy of the various mechanisms to protect 
shareholders from the self-interest of management and the dominant theory 
applied to achieve this has been agency theory (Daily et al., 2003).  
 
2.6 Rationale for Director Independence 
To be effective monitors of management, the directors entrusted with such a 
role need to be sufficiently independent from management to adequately protect 
the interests of shareholders. The logic being that independent directors will do 
a better job monitoring management than insiders would do who are closely 
aligned to the CEO and are therefore more susceptible to the normative social 
influences (discussed in detail in the next chapter).  
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the incentive for independent directors to 
monitor manager is a desire for such directors to build up a reputation as 
experts monitors: “Our hypothesis is that outside directors have incentives to 
develop reputations as experts in decision control. Most outside directors of 
                                                                                                                                
hands of the firms’ executives. A debate as to the relative merits of agency versus stewardship 
theory is, it is submitted, outside of the boundaries of this thesis. Rather this thesis has focused 
on corporate governance initiatives and developments resulting from the accepted agency 
principle that NEDs are tasked with inter alia, the role of monitoring management on behalf of 
shareholders.  
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open corporations are either managers of other corporations or important 
decision agents in other complex organisations. The value of their human 
capital depends primarily on their performance as internal decision managers in 
other organizations. They use their directorships to signal to internal and 
external markets for decision agents that (1) they are decision experts. (2) they 
fully understand the importance of diffuse and separate decision control, and (3) 
they can work with such decision control systems. The signals are credible 
when the direct payments to outside directors are small, but there is substantial 
devaluation of human capital when internal decision control breaks down and 
the costly last resort process to an outside takeover is activated.” (ibid, p. 315) 
Campbell et al. (2009) draw upon the field of neuroscience to rationalise why 
independence is critical for long term good decision making processes. They 
argue that decisions are made largely through unconscious means such as 
pattern recognition and emotional tagging and that these processes make for 
quick effective decisions, but can be distorted, in particular by self-interest. This 
unconscious bias to favour decisions which are in our own self-interest, can 
distort decision making processes by allowing us to make decisions which have 
self-interest at heart without appreciating the effect that such self-interest has 
had on the decision process8. Campbell et al. (2009) suggest that the way to 
avoid this unconscious bias is to involve someone else in the decision process 
that has no appropriate attachments or self-interest and that this person would 
be well placed to challenge thinking, force a review of logic and possibly even 
champion a solution that might be contrary to the self-interests of existing group 
members.    
                                            
8
 The  argument that Campbell et al. (2009) presents with respect to self-interest creating an 
unconsciously bias in decision processes is consistent with the theory of ethical fading 
(Bazeman and Tenbrunsel, 2013) and wilful blindness (Heffernan, 2012) as possible 
explanations for ethical indiscretions in organisational settings. It follows that if the decision 
process is affected by unconscious biases that the outcome can lead not only to a poor decision 
process but also the potential for an unethical decision process. 
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Langevoort (2000) maintains that managers left to their own devices tend to 
develop biased constructions of a firm’s strategic position and can become 
overconfident and heavily invested in their own beliefs and therefore disinclined 
to seek out information that might disprove their existing views. Langevoort 
emphasises the tendency for overconfidence to develop in a group setting and 
the introduction of independent directors can dampen this overconfidence.  
Overconfidence is common to the normative social influences of groupthink and 
group polarisation9. Independent directors could help to reduce overconfidence 
and therefore decrease the likelihood of both groupthink and group polarisation 
occurring. Langevoort concludes that only by giving formal power to a more 
objective group of outsiders, can the insiders be forced to expose their biases 
and to take dissonant views more seriously. Again this view is supportive of the 
role of external or independent directors as important monitors of executive 
directors.  
Finally, Hall (2007) argues that increasing the number of independent directors 
is about encouraging the psychological attributes of independence of mind. It is 
the willingness to be open and critical and, as much as possible, an awareness 
of the biases in thinking that are the qualities that independence can bring.  
In summary independent directors can, and should, reduce the cognitive biases 
associated with group decision making. Specifically independent directors 
should reduce some of the symptoms associated with poor decision making and 
reduce group cohesion, group homogeneity and a strong social identity or in-
bias of the group all symptoms associated with phenomena such as groupthink, 
group polarisation, de-individuation, herding and susceptibility to epistemic blind 
spots.  
                                            
9
 A detailed discussion of both phenomena and the common linkage of overconfidence can be 
found in chapter 3.  
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2.7 The development of NED independence in the context of UK Corporate 
Governance reforms 
There are two distinct areas in which the roles and responsibilities of directors 
are set out; first through law and the enactments of the Companies Act, and 
second through a series of government initiated Reports which has led to 
creation of a combined Code of Corporate Governance. The UK Companies Act 
2006 is enshrined in law and carries both criminal and civil liabilities penalties 
for non-compliance in certain circumstances (for example for fraudulent or 
reckless trading by directors as per Section 993 of the Act). In contrast the 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2014) (the “Code”) is “soft” law as 
there are no legal consequences for non-compliance with the disclosure 
obligations imposed.  
The Companies Act applies to all incorporated entities10 whereas compliance 
with the Code is only required for UK and overseas registered companies with a 
premier listings in the UK 11 . The Listing rules require such companies to 
disclose in their annual reports the extent to which they have complied the Code 
and to give reasons (if any) of any non-compliance; in other words a “comply or 
explain” model. A company would therefore be in compliance with the listing 
rules if it has not complied with the Code but had provided reasons for non- 
compliance. This “comply or explain” model is intended to give corporations 
flexibility to the extent that the directors feel that the Code is relevant to the 
corporation’s specific circumstances. However at the same time the 
                                            
10
 Although there are numerous exemptions applied depending on the size of the company and 
whether it is a public or private. 
11
 The intention of the Cadbury Report (1995) was that the Combined Code would apply to all 
large companies regardless of whether they were listed or not. However, as Davies (2012) 
notes the restriction to listed companies arose because the listing rules provided a convenient 
enforcement mechanism and not because this defines the companies for whom such rules are 
most appropriate.     
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requirement to explain non-compliance gives the code a greater weight than a 
recommendation which the company can simply reject without explanation12.    
The Code recognises the importance of the board of directors as the company 
decision making body. Indeed, the first principle of the Code states that: “Every 
Company should be headed up by an effective board, which is collectively 
responsible for the success of the company” (2014, section A1).  The Code 
(2014) goes on to state that “The board should set the company’s strategic 
aims, ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place for 
the company to meet its objectives and review management performance. The 
board should set the company’s values and standards and ensure that its 
obligations to its shareholders and others are understood and met” (ibid, section 
A1). 
In contrast, it would be difficult to glean any similar understanding of the 
importance of the board from a reading of the Companies Act (Davies, 2008). 
The Companies Act 2006, s. 154, does require all public companies to have two 
directors and private companies one, but it leaves the determination of the role 
of the board very largely to the company’s constitution, which is controlled by 
the shareholders. As such, the Companies Act makes no differentiation 
between executive and non-executive directors, nor does it define or require 
NED independence. Indeed the board’s position in company law is deeply 
ambiguous (Davies, 2008). The reason for this is that the Companies Act 
covers both corporations with a clear separation between ownership and also 
smaller organisations where the employees are also the owners13. For small 
companies where there is no such schism between ownership and control many 
of the corporate governance rules and regulations recommended by the Code, 
                                            
12
 For a discussion on the effectiveness of the comply or explain approach see Arcot et al. 
(2010) who find that there is high levels of compliance with the Code, a view shared by Davies 
(2008) who argues that the comply and explain mechanism has changed corporate behaviour.  
13
 Indeed, the majority of companies governed by the Companies Act are indeed small 
organisations where no such schism exists between ownership and control.  
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which have at their core the need for directors to monitor management on 
behalf of shareholders, are not appropriate14. Corporate governance reforms 
and in particular the role of the independent NED are, as a result, focused on 
the Code not the Companies Act.  
If one goes back to the first part of the 20th century the NED was no more than a 
figurehead, employed to promote the profile of the company and described as a 
“decoration on a Christmas tree”. Typically NEDs joined the board meeting 
several times a year in return for a fee (normally one guinea) and a free lunch. 
Indeed Samuel (1933) referred to such directors as “guinea-pig directors”.   
The first attempt, however, to highlight the potential benefits of NEDs came 
from the report of the Company Affairs Committee of the CBI (otherwise known 
as The Watkinson Report) which was published in 1973. This was followed by 
the Cadbury Report (1992) which further strengthen codes with respect to NED 
dependence. The Hampel was a failed attempt by management to win back 
some of the ground that had been conceded to the Cadbury Committee 
(Davies, 2012).  
The primary importance of the monitoring role NED was, however, reaffirmed 
with the publication of “The Review of the role and effectiveness of non-
executive directors” in 2003. This report is commonly referred to as the Higgs 
Report in reference its author Sir Derek Higgs. The Higgs Report was a reaction 
                                            
14
 This thesis intends to make a contribution to the process of decision making in boards, 
whether for large or small companies but the focus of this research is on the decision making in 
large financial institutions characterised by a separation of owners and managers. As such, 
emphasis is placed on the role that NEDs play in the monitoring of management on behalf of 
shareholders. This is not to say that many of the recommendations reached in this thesis do not 
apply to small companies but the focus is on the decision process in large organisations 
characterised by a schism between ownership and control.  
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to the Enron fraud and represented the equivalent UK response to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) which was passed in the US. Most of the members 
of the Enron board were deemed “independent” directors according to the then 
standards of the US stock exchange requirements. It was, however, 
subsequently disclosed that all of the independent directors had financial 
relationships with the CEO or the company itself – some of them were 
representatives of charities that received significant donations from Enron or 
acted as consultants serving the company.  As a result, both the New York 
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ (the two main exchanges in the US) tightened 
up the definitions of independence. Furthermore the passing of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002) further strengthened the significance of, and reliance on, the 
independent director and the act was seen as a form of codification with respect 
to independent outside directors (Zhao,  2011).  
In July 2003 the UK Financial Reporting Council approved new draft of the 
Combined Code which retained almost all of Higgs's recommendations – 
including those listed above. It was the Combined Code (2003) and then (2006), 
with the emphasis on independent NEDs monitoring management on behalf of 
shareholders described above, which underpinned corporate governance in the 
run up to the financial crisis of 2007/2008.  
The Combined Code (2006) included a number of provisions which highlighted 
the role of the NED director. Section 1 of the 2006 Code highlights the dual role 
of the NED as one of monitoring and the provisions of resources when it notes 
that “non-executive directors should constructively challenge and help develop 
proposals on strategy.” The emphasis in the Combined Code is very much 
focused on the monitoring function of NEDs. A summary of the relevant codes 
as they related to NEDs are summarised below15: 
                                            
15
 I refer here to the 2006 Code as this was the relevant Code in the run-up to the crisis.  
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• Code A.3 set outs the need for NEDs to be independent and the criteria 
recommended to assess independence. Further provision A.3.2 noted 
that all companies in the FTSE 350 should have a majority of NEDs on 
the board. The rationale for these provisions being that if the NEDs are 
independent of executive directors, and in the majority, they are less 
likely to be dominated by and more likely to challenge the executive 
directors, A majority of independent NEDs will also in theory reduce the 
risk of high levels of cohesiveness related to groupthink (discussed in 
detail in the following chapter). 
• Code A4 highlighted that the majority of directors from the nominations 
committee for board appointments should be independent NEDs. The 
rationale for this provision is to reduce the likelihood of “an old boys 
network” prevailing in boards. The benefits of diversity in the context of 
the corporate board are discussed later in this chapter.  
• Codes A.4.4, A.4.5, A.5.1, A.5.2, schedule B (ii) are all codes which 
emphasised the skills and effort required by an NED to fulfil his/her 
responsibilities. High levels of functional and firm specific skill levels by 
NEDS are important as they can reduce informational pressure to 
conform (herding) and are discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
• Code A7.2 focused on the term for which NEDs should serve and that 
any NED which serves for more than six years should be subject to a 
particularly rigorous review particularly as to how this relates to NED 
independence. Again, this provision is concerned with the impact of 
groupthink tendencies on a board over time. A board which is 
characterised by high levels of cohesiveness and amiability (which can 
be associated with longevity) is more vulnerable to groupthink tendencies 
(discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
• Code B.1.3 recommends that remuneration for NEDs should not include 
share options. This is intended to reduce the likelihood of greater levels 
of cohesiveness and increase NED independence and perspective as 
there is less financial aligned with executive directors.  
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• Codes B.2.1 and C.3.1 highlighted the role that the independent NED 
should play in the remuneration and audit committees. Again the 
principle being that these are important decision making committee 
related to the board and would benefit from the input of independent 
NEDs who can challenge and monitor the board16.  
In summary, UK corporate governance evolved so as to recognise the 
importance of NEDs as an effective tool for safeguarding the interests of 
shareholders in the belief that the presence of such independent directors are 
an indicator of good governance (Marchesani, 2005)17. In the UK  there was 
what has been described as a “fetish devotion” (Bainbridge, 2012) to the 
importance of director independence in corporate governance legislation in the 
lead up to the financial crisis  
2.8 Corporate Governance Research into the link between Director 
Independence and Board Performance 
If independent boards are so desirable then there should be a clear statistical 
correlation between measures of board independence and corporate 
                                            
16
 Since the financial crisis the UK Corporate Governance Code has further strengthened 
further the provisions related to NEDs. The UK Combined Code (2014) includes; provision A.4.2 
which states that the chairman should hold meetings with NEDs without executive directors 
present, A.4.3 is a requirement that should a NED resign he needs to provide a written 
statement setting out his reasons for resigning which are circulated to all members, B.3.2 which 
requires greater disclosure on the terms and appointment of NEDs and the expected time 
commitments  
17
 Although there are/were subtle difference in the definitions of independence between the US 
and UK, fundamentally the two jurisdictions were very much aligned in the lead up to the crisis 
with respect to the importance of director independence and the role that such directors should 
play in the monitoring of management on behalf of shareholders.  
 
  
36 
 
profitability. The greater independent oversight of management should, in 
theory, result in better board processes and decisions, translating into better 
financial performance. Ezzamel and Watson (1997) did find that independent 
directors were positively associated with profitability amongst a sample of UK 
firms whilst Baysinger and Butler (1985), in a study of 266 US corporates, found 
that firms with more outside members realised higher returns on equity 
concluding that there was a positive relationship between outside directors and 
firm performance.  
However, these findings are the exception rather than the rule. Research 
studies have failed, in the main, to find a systemically significant relationship 
between board independence and financial performance. Dalton et al. (1998) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 54 empirical studies of board composition, and 
found no meaningful relationship between board composition and financial 
performance therefore concluding that such finding provides little support for 
agency theory. Finkelstein et al. (2008) also argue that the benefits of 
independence are illusory. For the year 2000, they analysed the returns for all 
S&P 500 firms in the US and compared the results of the upper and lower 
quartiles in performance in terms of board independence and found that there 
was no significant differences between the number of independent directors 
between upper and lower quartile performers. Further, they analysed the 
“rogues’ gallery” of firms in the index (Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, 
Quest Communication and Tyco) and found that these firms had what they 
termed “stellar credentials” in terms of director independence.  
Bhagat and Black (1999) conducted a comprehensive study of board 
composition over a ten year period and found “no convincing empirical support 
for the conventional wisdom that large company boards should consist 
predominately of independent directors” (ibid, p. 54). Indeed Bhagat and Black 
even made the case to suggest that there is evidence to suggest that firms with 
boards with large NED majorities perform worse than other firms whilst Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996) identified a negative relationship between corporate 
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performance and greater outside representation on the board. Other studies 
have found inconclusive evidence that board composition affected performance 
(Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) and Fields and Keys (2003)).  
Commentators have attempted to explain the lack of such a correlation in a 
number of ways. One possible explanation is that corporate governance, and 
board composition in particular, simply does not actually matter (Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2001)) but this is very much a minority view and, it is submitted, not 
a credible explanation. How can one assume that there is no correlation 
between the composition of directors charged which affecting complicated 
strategic decisions and firm performance? Further, if corporate governance 
does not matter then why did banks operating in the same geographical area, in 
the same markets with the same regulator have such very different outcomes in 
how they performed? This can only be explained in terms of differences in the 
way that these organisations were run (Walker and Britain, 2009).  
Langevoort (1998) argues that measurement problems with how we define 
independence plagues empirical work in this area, and that if we could truly 
identify independent directors more precisely then perhaps we could find the 
correlation between performance and composition. Marchesani (2005) contends 
that such studies often adopt unsophisticated and different definitions of what 
constitutes independence which can skew results and make it difficult to make 
intra study comparisons. This point is shared by Fisch (1997), who argues that 
many such studies rely on superficial criteria in classifying directors as 
independent rather than attempting to understand the extensive personal and 
business relationships which directors hold.  
Furthermore, Marchesani (2005) highlights the difficulties that such studies 
have with respect to endogeneity in that firm performance is influenced by 
action taken by previous directors and past performance is a factor that 
influences the choices of subsequent directors. Indeed, research has shown 
that independent director appointments are more likely following poor 
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performance firms, see for example Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), Gilson 
(1989) and Kaplan and Minton (1994). Research results will be adversely 
affected by corporations that have performed badly and have increased the 
proportion of independent directors to their boards. Finally, Pettigrew (1992) 
argues that inherent difficulties in separating out such endogenous factors 
influencing a company’s performance makes it “very difficult to establish” (ibid, 
p. 170) the link between firm performance and board composition.  
Another reason why researchers have struggled to find a relationship between 
board independence and firm performance is that many of the studies were 
undertaken in periods where the benefits of independent boards, and in 
particular the ability of NEDs to provide a necessary “brake” to high risk 
strategies, was not recognised. There is a time lag, and the benefits of 
independence only became apparent during the crisis of 2007-2008. Indeed, it 
was the many of the firms who showed exceptionally growth and strong stock 
performance in the lead up to the financial crisis that suffered the most in the 
crisis as their high risk and levered strategies unfolded. Two obvious examples 
of this are The Royal Bank of Scotland and Anglo Irish Bank18. The benefits of 
board independence, and in particular the ability of independent NEDs to 
provide some caution and challenge to an executive board, is greatest in times 
of high risk and growth. There will, however, be a time lag when the benefits of 
such independent advice are reflected in firm performance.  
In summary, studies have failed to show the link between independence and 
governance because of a number of issues relating to measurement and timing 
of the studies undertaken. The results do not however disprove the value of the 
independent NED. Rather, it is submitted, they raise questions as to the validity 
of the research undertaken.  
 
                                            
18
 For a detailed analysis of this refer to Beltratti and Stulz (2009).  
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2.9 A review of models which link board attributes to financial 
performance 
The section of chapter 2 is devoted to a review of existing models which look to 
link board attributes to financial performance. This is of particular relevance as it 
is an important building block for the development of my model of VPDP which I 
present in chapter 6. The first step in this review process is the selection of 
models for such an analysis. Five different models have been identified as 
relevant. These are the models of Zahra and Pearce (1991), Forbes and 
Milliken (1999), Hillman and Dalziel (2003), Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) 
and McNulty et al. (2013). These models were selected for the following 
reasons: 
1) The first four of the models highlighted above were published in the highly 
rated journal The Academy of Management Review, a 4 star journal, whilst 
the article by McNulty et al. (2013) was published in the 3 star journal 
Corporate Finance: An International Review19. Four of these models are 
extremely well cited; Zahra and Pearce (1991) has 1619, Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) 1107, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 1058 and Sundaramurthy 
and Lewis (2003) 568 citations20.  
2) The Zahra and Pearce (1991) and Forbes and Milliken (1999) papers are 
both described as seminal (Huse, 2005; Payne et al., 2009) and form the 
basis for other models which have been subsequently presented (see for 
example Minichilli et al., 2012; Payne et al., 2009; Van Ees et al., 2009; 
Zona and Zattoni, 2007).  
                                            
19
 The Association of Business Schools in their article “Academic Journal Quality Guide” notes 
that a 4 star journal is of world elite quality, whilst a 3 star journal is research which is highly 
regarded. See 
http://www.myscp.org/pdf/ABS%202010%20Combined%20Journal%20Guide.pdf.   
20
 Number of citations as at 02/02/2014 per Google Scholar. The McNulty et al. paper was only 
published in 2013 and not surprisingly has only six citations as of 02/02/2014.  
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3) The Hillman and Dalziel (2003) model is of particular interest in that it 
highlights the assumption that actors always make rational decisions, as 
presumed by agency theory. In the following chapter I will, however, 
highlight the literature which argues that decision processes are not always 
rational and are heavily influenced by powerful psychological forces 
resulting in.  
4) The Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) model provides an interesting 
comparison in that it is the only model which I have identified which explicitly 
recognises, within the graphic of the model itself, the role that groupthink 
can play in board decision processes and for that reason alone is worthy of 
review.  
5) The McNulty et al. (2013) model specifically looks to understand financial 
risk during the credit crisis. It was the lack of appreciation of financial risk 
that led to the poor decision processes by the banks during the crisis itself, 
and as such this model has significant relevance. It is also the only one of 
the five selected models which has been tested in the field through a 
questionnaire addressed to CEOs. In contrast, the other four models are 
purely theoretical. 
It is recognised, however, that the selection of these models can be criticised as 
being self-selected with an inherent researcher’s bias given that I will be 
presenting my own model later in this thesis. These five models are not 
presented as a panacea of all models linking board characteristics to firm 
performance and/or a poor decision process. Other models identified which look 
to link board attributes to financial performance include Judge and Zeithaml 
(1992), Minichilli et al. (2012), Payne et al. (2009), Van Ees et al. (2009) and 
Zona and Zattoni (2007). An extensive search of the literature did not, however, 
reveal any published or available research which would challenge the originality 
of the model I will present in the chapter 6 of my thesis.  These five models are 
described below in sequential date order with a view to providing the reader 
with an understanding of how they are constructed. 
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2.9.1 Zahra and Pearce “Board of Directors and Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model” (1989) 
Zahra and Pearce’s model identifies four board attributes which are key to 
company performance, namely: board composition, characteristics, structure 
and process. They stress that these four attributes should be viewed as highly 
interrelated. To illustrate this, the composition of the board, and in particular the 
mix between executive and NEDs, will impact on the characteristics of the 
board. By this they refer to the age, educational background, values and 
experiences of directors. The characteristics of the board will, in turn, impact the 
board structure, in particular the number and types of committees, committee 
membership, the flow of information among the various committees, board 
leadership and patterns of committee membership.  Finally this will flow through 
to the decision process of the board, the formality of board proceedings and the 
extent to which the board is involved in evaluating itself.  
The model recognises the contingent nature of the relationship between board 
variables and the company’s performance, and that these relationships are 
influenced by both internal and external contingencies. Zahra and Pearce 
identified three different types of external contingencies: the environment and 
industry in which the firm is operating, and the legal requirements of its 
jurisdiction. Internal considerations identified as affecting the relationship 
between board variables and firm performance are: the type of ownership, the 
phase of the company’s life cycle, the complexity of internal operations and the 
style and preferences of the CEO.  
The authors observe that few studies have incorporated these internal and 
external contextual variables into their research, but that these contextual 
factors are critical in affecting board performance: “One should not expect the 
same board committees or organization to exist in different industries, across 
different phases of the company life cycle, or in different countries. Therefore to 
understand how board structure relates to performance, scholars should pay 
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attention to these and other contextual variables” (ibid, p. 322).  As a result they 
argue that research results are open to speculation and different interpretation. 
They conclude that to minimise misleading interpretations, researchers should 
look to examine the moderating effects of contextual factors.  
Figure 2.1: Zara and Pearce’s model 
 
The representation above shows the external and internal contingencies, and 
the four board attributes linking into the three board roles and then impacting on 
corporate financial performance. The model highlights that the impact a board 
of directors can have on a company’s performance can occur either directly or 
indirectly. Direct impact would be achieved through the association of a direct 
relationship between board attributes, such as the composition of the board, 
and company performance. The direct route is depicted in the model through 
the dashed lines. Most empirical studies have focused on the direct effect of 
board attributes on company performance primarily through the use of large 
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archival data sets looking to create a relationship between such inputs and 
board performance (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004).   
The indirect route reflects the effect of board attributes on the board’s 
performance in its three roles, which in turn influence company performance. 
These are depicted by the solid lines. The indirect link takes into account the 
interrelationship between the board variables, the contingencies that influence 
boards (both internal and external) and the influence that directors exert on 
senior management initiatives. In effect, the indirect route looks to split the link 
between the composition of the board and the corporate performance through 
an intermediate process.  
Zahra and Pearce identified four variables (board composition, characteristics, 
structure and process) but as the figure above reflects, they argue that only 
three of these (all except board composition) will have an impact on board roles 
and board performance through the indirect route: “We believe that board 
characteristics, structure, and process exert a significantly stronger influence on 
board roles and company performance than board composition. Past research 
has yielded contradictory findings and suggests at most a modest level of 
explanatory power. Consequently, the model omits a direct link between 
composition and board roles” (ibid, p. 310)21.  
Zahra and Pearce favour the indirect route and encourage more research into 
this area: ”The bulk of past empirical research has also been devoted to 
examining the direct effects of board attributes on corporate financial 
performance. Little attention has been given to the systemic and social 
components of organizational performance in the model. Future research, 
                                            
21
 It does appear slightly contradictory that the authors do not consider that board composition is 
significant enough to impact board roles and (albeit indirectly) board performance but consider 
that board composition can however directly impact board performance as the graphic 
illustration of their model highlights.  
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therefore, should explore the indirect link among board variables and the 
systemic and social components of company performance”(ibid, p. 308).  
2.9.2 Forbes and Milliken “Cognition and Corporate Governance: 
Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making 
Groups” (1999)  
Forbes and Milliken (1999) observe that boards are elite, episodic decision-
making groups that face complex tasks relating to strategic decision making. 
NED board members, in particular, are not involved in the implementation of 
their decision processes and as such their output is cognitive in nature. These 
factors, taken together, Forbes and Milliken argue, “suggest that the 
effectiveness of boards is likely to depend heavily on social-psychological 
processes, particularly those pertaining to group participation and interaction” 
(ibid, p. 195). The impact that human behaviour can have on firm performance 
is explicitly recognised in Forbes and Milliken’s model in the identification of the 
impact that group cohesiveness and cognitive conflict play in affecting board 
performance.  
Further, Forbes and Milliken argue, like Zahra and Pearce, that there is a need 
to understand the intervening processes which link board characteristics to firm 
performance, and that the influence of board demography on firm performance 
may not be as simple and direct as many past studies presume but rather more 
complex and indirect. Forbes and Milliken criticise research which is based on 
the argument of parsimony, and which focuses on explaining what the impact of 
demography is, without necessarily trying to determine why demography 
operates in an observed way. This is consistent with the approach which I have 
adopted in this thesis which is concerned with trying to understand the “black 
box” of board processes and the consequence of intervening processes on 
decisions.  
Forbes and Milliken’s model focuses on two factors which will determine board 
effectiveness and firm performance. First, board task performance which is 
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defined as the ability of the board to perform its control and service task 
effectively22. Second, the authors identify the board’s ability to continue working 
together, as evidenced by the cohesiveness of the board. In effect, Forbes and 
Milliken identify a “task” and “maintenance” criteria for defining effectiveness23.  
Forbes and Milliken identify three board processes that will influence a board’s 
task performance, namely: effort norms, cognitive conflict and the board’s use 
of its knowledge and skills. Effort norms relate to the level of effort and the 
amount of time directors devote to their task and as such are an individual-level 
construct. Forbes and Milliken also highlight that directors must have the 
necessary skill levels which they see as being a two stage process. First is the 
requirement of broad functional skills and expertise, and second is the need for 
firm specific knowledge and skills. In other words, directors will need to have the 
necessary levels of base expertise going into the job but then also need to 
acquire firm specific knowledge in order to be effective. However, Forbes and 
Milliken recognise that individual effort levels are also influenced by group 
norms and pressure, and that the culture of the collective group will influence 
the effort norms of individual directors.  
                                            
22
 This is a slightly narrower definition of board effectiveness as provided by Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) who include strategy in addition to the criteria of service and control noted above. 
However, this may be a moot point as the function of strategy could conceivably be included in 
the definition of “service” provided by Forbes and Milliken. Arguably the more fundamental 
difference in the models relates to the overt inclusion in the Forbes and Milliken model of 
psychological factors and how they affect decision processes.  
23
  Like Zahra and Pearce, Forbes and Milliken identify an intervening construct between board 
characteristics and firm performance. However, Zahra and Pearce identified the board roles of 
service, strategy and control as being the intervening construct between board characteristics 
and firm performance whilst Forbes and Milliken have identified board task performance and 
maintenance criteria.  
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Forbes and Milliken define cognitive conflict as task-oriented differences in 
judgement among group members (ibid, p. 494). They recognise that cognitive 
conflict can have both a positive and a negative impact on firm performance. On 
the positive side, cognitive conflict will result in the consideration of more 
alternatives increasing the quality of strategic decision making, particularly in 
uncertain environments. On the negative side, cognitive conflict can arouse 
negative emotions reducing the ability of group members to communicate and 
participate in group decisions, and therefore negatively impacting the decision 
process.  
Forbes and Milliken further note that board cohesiveness can have a direct 
impact on firm task performance and overall firm performance, and that there is 
a curvilinear relationship between cohesiveness and a firm’s task performance. 
Both the control and service functions of boards require extensive 
communication and co-operation between board members which must involve a 
certain level of trust, and inter-personal relationships all associated with 
cohesiveness. However, very high levels of cohesiveness can lead to 
groupthink and to poor decision processes. In other words, cohesiveness can 
be a positive leading to better communication and co-ordination, but very high 
levels of cohesiveness can lead to groupthink which will be negatively 
correlated to firm performance.  
Forbes and Milliken draw on the research of Bernthal and Insko (1993), 
highlighted previously in this thesis. Bernthal and Insko differentiate between 
two types of cohesion; task orientated and socio-emotional. Task orientated 
cohesion is cohesion which focuses on the performance of a specific task and is 
considered to be positive performance. Socio emotional cohesion, on the other 
hand is the type of cohesion identified by Janis (1972), and relates to the 
emotional attachment that members have to the group itself and to its 
preservation. This type of cohesion can, as Janis highlighted, adversely affect 
firm performance.  
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Forbes and Milliken argue that cognitive conflict can help to prevent the 
emergence of groupthink in cohesive groups by fostering an environment 
characterised by task-oriented focus, and a tolerance of multiple viewpoints and 
opinions. Cognitive conflict will then allow boards to benefit from the positives 
associated with cohesiveness (greater levels of trust, communication and co-
ordination) but at the same time reducing the type of cohesiveness associated 
with groupthink24.  
Forbes and Milliken focus on two means of achieving cognitive conflict. First, 
they argue that diversity within the boardroom can increase cognitive conflict. 
However at the same time such diversity can reduce communication and the 
effective collective pooling of directors’ knowledge and skill. This reflects the 
“double edged” sword of diversity which is discussed in detail later in my thesis.  
Second, they focus on the proportion of outsiders on the board as a means of 
increasing cognitive conflict: “The presence of outsiders is also likely to 
enhance the levels of cognitive conflict on the board, because outsiders share 
significantly fewer expectations with management and are liable to think more 
freely with regard to the firm’s goals and the range of alternatives available to it” 
(ibid, p. 499). At the same time, Forbes and Milliken recognise that a greater 
number of outsiders could reduce firm specific knowledge, which could impact 
on firm performance. This highlights once again the constant trade-offs and 
counter balances that these models present.  
Forbes and Milliken provide three core hypotheses which form the basis of their 
model. These are summarised below:  
Proposition 1: Board effort norms, cognitive conflict and the use of knowledge 
and skills will be positively related to board task performance. 
                                            
24
 Indeed, the title of Bernthal and Insko’s (1993) paper was “Cohesiveness without Groupthink 
The Interactive Effects of Social and Task Cohesion”. 
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Proposition 2: Cognitive conflict will be negatively related to board 
cohesiveness. 
Proposition 3a: Board cohesiveness will be related in a curvilinear manner to 
board task performance. 
Proposition 3b: The relationship between cohesiveness and board task 
performance will be moderated by cognitive conflict – that is, cohesiveness will 
be less likely to detract from board task performance when the board has a high 
level of cognitive conflict.  
 
Figure 2.2: Forbes and Milliken’s model 
 
 
 
The illustration of the model clearly shows how board characteristics (including 
the directors’ skill levels) feed into the three identified board processes, which 
then impact the performance of the control and service task of directors, and 
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ultimately the firm performance. The curvilinear impact of cohesiveness is 
reflected in the model as it relates to cognitive conflict reflecting that greater 
levels of cohesiveness will reduce cognitive conflict, and impact task board level 
outcomes. However, at the same time, a cohesive board which communicates 
effectively can result in greater synergy of ideas and trust, and this can have a 
positive impact on the task performance of the board. This is reflected by the 
direct link between cohesiveness and task performance as represented above.  
Finally, the processes identified above are interrelated and will affect each 
other. High effort norms, for example, can lead to more intense participation by 
board members which can stimulate cognitive conflict which in turn can lead to 
better decision processes and mitigate the likelihood of groupthink occurring.  
 
2.9.3 Hillman and Dalziel: “Boards of Directors and Firm 
Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence 
Perspectives”  (2003) 
Hillman and Dalziel’s (2003) model attempts to explain the relationship between 
boards and performance with reference to agency and resource dependency 
theories.25  Hillman and Dalziel refer to the concept of “board capital” when 
describing the contribution of the board. Board capital consists of a) human 
capital such as experience, expertise and reputation, and b) relational capital 
which relates to the network of ties to other firms and external contingencies. A 
company with high levels of board capital will have the necessary experience 
and expertise to monitor management effectively. Further, high levels of board 
                                            
25
 Agency theory has been described in detail previously in this thesis. Resource Dependency 
theory is grounded in sociology and organisational doctrine and views boards as “important 
boundary spanners that make timely information available to executives” (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989, p. 297). The board is thus a provider of resources such as advice, counsel and 
legitimacy.  
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capital will allow directors to provide the company with the necessary advice, 
contacts and resources26. Board capital can be seen as an alternative way of 
expressing the concept of board competence. This leads to the first of the 
model’s propositions which is: 
1a) Board capital is positively associated with the provision of resources 
(resource dependency theory) 
1b) Board capital is positively associated with monitoring (agency theory) 
The model then explores the incentives that board members have both to 
monitor and provide resources to the firm. Hillman and Dalziel focus on equity 
compensation as an incentive that will positively affect the relationship between 
board capital and increase both monitoring and the provision of resources. The 
argument raised by Hillman and Dalziel is that if directors are incentivised 
through the payment of equity, this will ensure his/her alignment with 
shareholders, and also increase the motivation to monitor management on 
behalf of shareholders. Further, board members who share in the upside of the 
firm’s performance are more likely to make their own connections available to 
the firm so that equity compensation motivates the board to utilise the important 
capital they possess. Further building blocks for their model are therefore: 
Proposition 2a: Board incentives will moderate the relationship between board 
capital and monitoring. 
Proposition 2b: Board incentives will moderate the relationship between board 
capital and the provision of resources. 
Proposition 3a: Board equity compensation positively affects the relationship 
between board capital and monitoring. 
                                            
26
 This is consistent with Forbes and Milliken’s assertion relating to the importance of the board 
having the necessary level of functional and firm specific knowledge.  
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Proposition 3b: Board equity compensation positively affects the relationship 
between board capital and the provision of resources.   
The authors draw on the research of Westphal (1999) to argue that close social 
ties with directors will increase levels of trust and co-operation and enhance the 
propensity of management to seek advice from NEDs on strategic issues. The 
greater the level of trust, the greater the likelihood that management will be 
comfortable seeking and taking advice from NEDs. Westphal (1999) claims that 
the primary inhibitor to seeking advice is the perceived effect it could have on 
the advice seeker’s status, and that asking for advice can be seen as an 
indicator of lack of confidence and ability. Concerns about a loss of status will, 
therefore, inhibit the propensity for management to seek help. However, as 
personal relationships increase and trust is built up, this will increase a sense of 
security amongst NEDs reducing this perceived risk related to status.  
At the same time, Hillman and Dalziel recognised that increased trust and 
closeness between directors could reduce the effectiveness of monitoring, 
hence creating a trade-off between agency and resource dependency theories. 
In other words, an over-emphasis on the importance of providing resources and 
advice to the firm (resource dependency) will result in a weakening of the 
monitoring of the firm by directors (agency theory). Therefore, their final 
hypothesis was:  
Proposition 4a: Board dependence negatively affects the relationship between 
board capital and monitoring. 
Proposition 4b: Board dependence positively affects the relationship between 
board capital and the provision of resources.  
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Figure 2.3: Hillman and Dalziel’s model 
 
The illustration of the model above shows clearly that equity compensation has 
a positive effect on both monitoring and the provision of resources, whilst board 
dependence has a positive impact on the provision of resources but a negative 
impact on the ability of the board to monitor. Hillman and Dalziel conclude that 
boards that are highly cohesive with strong friendship and high levels of trust, 
can result in an increase in a firm’s performance. This improved performance is 
achieved by executives in such an environment being more willing to seek and 
take advice from NEDs whom they trust. Further, although greater levels of 
cohesiveness could, in isolation, reduce monitoring, effective monitoring can be 
achieved through equity incentives. In other words, the counterbalance to 
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greater levels of cohesiveness and the resulting lack of monitoring, is equity 
incentives which will provide NEDs with the motivation to fulfil their monitoring 
responsibilities. The model, therefore, suggests an integration of both resource 
dependency and agency theory and that “board independence is not the 
panacea for effectiveness it is thought to be” (ibid, p. 393).  
In summary, Hillman and Dalziel (1993) argue that director equity compensation 
will allow the successful integration of both resource and agency theory, and 
that this will allow the firm to benefit from the resources and contacts that 
directors bring to the firm. Further, equity incentives will, in the authors’ opinion, 
ensure that directors will also be effective monitors of management.  
The Hillman and Dalziel model assumes that actors will act rationally and that 
psychology does not play a part in decision processes, and that equity 
incentivisation is sufficient to ensure adequate monitoring by NEDs of 
executives. In contrast, providing such incentives could potentially further align 
NEDs to executives, reduce independence and increase cohesiveness. 
Cohesiveness is closely associated with groupthink and related phenomena 
which reduce rather than increase the likelihood of high levels of monitoring. 
Indeed, I intend to stress the behavioural factors which affect decision making, 
and that biases, such as confirmation biases leading to epistemic blind spots, 
are more likely when actors have high financial incentives. The effectiveness of 
NEDs to monitor management will be affected by a number of powerful 
psychological factors identified in my literature review, and equity incentivisation 
will not always be sufficient to counter such forces. This would particularly be 
the case in a scenario where an entity is characterised by the normative, 
informative and contextual influences on decision processes highlighted in my 
model.   
Further, Hillman and Dalziel’s model does not take some of the contextual 
factors particularly associated with speculative bubbles which would affect the 
monitoring function. Indeed, this thesis will focus on the case study of Anglo 
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Irish, a bank which undertook a myopic and leverage bet on commercial 
property with catastrophic results. Both the executive and NEDs of Anglo had 
high levels of equity ownership (Nyberg, 2011, p. 27), a cohesive board with 
no/little challenge from the NEDs27.  
Hillman and Dalziel’s concept of greater equity incentivisation leading to greater 
levels of monitoring has received no support in the legislature. The Cadbury 
Report (1992) recommended that NEDs should not take part in share options as 
this could compromise their independence, although it allowed such NEDs to be 
paid in shares. This recommendation is reflected in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2014) which notes that remuneration for NEDs should not 
include share options or other performance-related elements, and that such 
type of payment could be relevant to ascertaining NED independence (para 
D.1.3). There are, to my knowledge, no calls for reforms resulting from the crisis 
itself which are suggesting greater NEDs incentivised through equity 
compensation.  
In conclusion, Hillman and Dalziel‘s model of alignment of agency and resource 
dependency theories through equity incentives, assumes that actors are fully 
rational and fails to take into account the fact that decisions can be made in 
environments which are characterised by strong normative and informative 
pressures for conformity, as we saw in the lead up to the financial crisis.  
Moreover, the model does not recognise the role that context plays in affecting 
decisions.  
 
 
 
                                            
27
 This statement is discussed and evidenced in great detail later in this chapter.  
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2.9.4 Sundaramurthy and Lewis: “Control and Collaboration: 
Paradoxes of Governance” (2003) 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, like Hillman and Dalziel above, recognise that there 
is a tension between control and collaboration (reflected by agency and 
resource dependency theories28). They argue that an overreliance on either 
control or collaboration can create a re-enforcing cycle that will lead to 
organisational decline.  
Sundaramurthy and Lewis provide two separate theoretical models. First, a 
model which assumes a scenario in which collaboration is stressed over control, 
and second a model which assumes a reversal of these features so that control 
is stressed over collaboration. Within these two separate models, the authors 
then review two scenarios which they term a “high performing” and a “low 
performing” cycle. In effect the authors consider four different scenarios:  1) 
collaboration over control in a high performing cycle 2) collaboration over 
control in a low performing cycle 3) control over collaboration in a high 
performing cycle and 4) control over collaboration in a low performing cycle. 
These are described below. 
                                            
28
 Hillman and Dalziel (2003) refer to the conflict between resource dependency theory and 
agency theory whilst Sundaramurthy and Lewis refer to the conflict between agency theory and 
stewardship theory. It is, however, submitted that resource dependency theory and stewardship 
theory are “cut from the same cloth” and indeed resource dependency theory is intrinsically 
linked to stewardship theory. Resource dependency refers “directly to the ability of the board to 
bring resources to the firm” (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, p. 385). Stewardship theory has a basic 
assumption that management and the company are aligned and that managers are seen as 
stewards of the firm who are working for the best interests of the firm. This theory assumes a 
collaborative approach which “stresses managers’ tendencies to be collectively oriented and 
intrinsically motivated. As stewards, managers may identify with the firm and internalise its 
mission” (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003a, p. 398). A consequence of a collaborative 
approach is that board members will make their resources and contacts available to the 
company. 
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2.9.4.1 Collaboration over Control in a high performing cycle 
A high performing cycle is often characterised by the existence of collective 
efficacy and a strong identity with the firm. This can create an environment of 
complacency, and expectation, leading to entrenchment of ideas and an 
inability to adapt. The authors contend that the consequence of a highly 
collaborative approach is that the group will become more cohesive and that 
groupthink will occur resulting in a strategic persistence and lack of flexibility 
that will result in a poor decision process.  
An extended period of prosperity can reduces a firm’s motivation to 
comprehend the causes of success, raising the likelihood of faulty attributions 
(Lindsley et al., 1995; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Cohesive teams may 
attribute their success to their own efforts even if past successes were due to 
accidents of timing. Taking credit for past successes then creates 
overconfidence further reducing the incentive to question the cause of 
performance.  
Sundaramurthy and Lewis highlight that such success and confidence build 
further cohesion, high levels of trust and a strong “in group” bias, all symptoms 
of groupthink. Members become less receptive to any criticism and members 
act as mind guards exerting pressure on those whose opinions contradict the 
majority view: “Over time, the governance team’s increasingly rigid mental 
maps, constricted information flow, and high collective efficacy induce 
complacency and entrenchment … Groupthink, along with the related defences 
it spurs, allows the board and management to bask in past successes and 
increase their collaboration, rather than recognize the need for change and 
greater control. This reinforcing cycle fosters strategic persistence or ‘the 
paradox of success’. ”.(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003, pp. 400–402).  
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In summary, the authors have identified a scenario where a firm is seen to be 
as very successful and is characterised by an environment where collaboration, 
cohesiveness and confidence are high, complacency sets in and executives 
overestimate their abilities. As the group becomes increasingly cohesive, it 
becomes more susceptible to groupthink, less receptive to feedback and 
criticism, less flexible and more rigid in the way that it operates. This ultimately 
leads to poor decisions being made and inevitably to failure.  
 
2.9.4.2 Collaboration over Control in a low performing cycle 
In this scenario, Sundaramurthy and Lewis describe a situation which combines 
high levels of collaboration, cohesiveness and groupthink in a low performance 
cycle. In such a circumstance, board members remain committed to their failing 
course of action, and fail to act decisively to change strategy: “Groupthink 
exacerbates faulty attributions, threat rigidity, and escalating commitment to a 
failing course of action, eventually resulting in failure” (2003, p. 402). The 
authors cite research from Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) that in times of poor 
performance, cohesive teams often exacerbate managerial entrenchment and 
commitment to a predetermined strategy.    
Sundaramurthy and Lewis further cite research from Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) in relation to their Prospect Theory which highlights that, if faced with a 
loss making situation, rather than accept the loss as a sunk cost, actors are 
more likely to take greater levels of risk given natural tendencies for an aversion 
to loss. Sundaramurthy and Lewis are highlighting a scenario almost identical to 
that described by Whyte (1993) with respect to his prospect polarisation theory 
discussed previously in this thesis.   
In summary the authors make two propositions:  
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Proposition 1a: Firms with a history of high performance and a predominant 
emphasis on collaboration will experience reinforcing cycles that foster strategic 
persistence. 
Proposition 1b: In a low-performance context, firms with a predominant 
emphasis on collaboration will experience reinforcing cycles that foster 
organizational decline. 
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Figure 2.4: Sundaramurthy and Lewis model of re-enforcing cycles of 
collaboration   
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The representation of the model reflects the central part which groupthink and 
associated high levels of cohesiveness plays in creating an environment which 
fosters strategic persistence leading ultimately to a poor outcome.  
 
2.9.4.3 Control over Collaboration in a high performing cycle 
In this scenario Sundaramurthy and Lewis focus on a board environment in 
which control (agency theory) dominates. They argue that an overemphasis on 
the control function will create tension and distrust leading to a suppression of 
information and a lack of co-operation between board members.  
In the high performance cycle, the authors argue that distrust resulting from an 
overemphasis of control would suppress stewardship, create board polarisation, 
and encourage myopic behaviour which would result in strategic persistence 
leading to a downward spiral of performance. The authors argue that the effect 
of high levels of distrust on high achieving board members would be for board 
members to reduce their desire to collaborate, and to engage in more self-
serving behaviours, and to become increasingly withdrawn and resistant. This 
then leads to a polarisation and isolation amongst board members: “Managers 
may attempt to isolate themselves from the source of their frustrations, 
increasing their emotional distance from the board and external monitors … 
polarized groups become immersed in their own activities, fragmenting 
understanding of outsiders’ demands and insiders’ operations into different 
‘thought worlds’ that are difficult to integrate. This challenge intensifies as 
directors and executives become overconfident in successful times and less 
likely to seek and consider others’ advice” (2003, p. 405).  
Over time, polarisation and isolation of group members will lead to myopic 
behaviours. This leads to isolation, reduces access to divergent opinions and 
better quality information leading to a poor decision process: “As directors and 
executives become more polarised and myopic, the firm will have greater 
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difficulty responding to environmental changes in a timely and effective manner” 
(2003a, p. 406).   
 
2.9.4.4 Control over Collaboration in a low performing cycle 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis explain that a low-performance cycle will be 
characterised by low levels of self-efficacy and close monitoring and distrust 
which will further exacerbate low confidence levels. This will create an 
environment in which managers are less likely to discuss problems with other 
managers as this might be seen as a sign of weakness and a perceived lack of 
ability (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Westphal, 1999). Further, managers 
are less likely to seek inputs from outside board members for fear of being 
viewed as incompetent (Jones and George, 1998; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
2003a). As performance declines, Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) argue that 
further divisions and fractions will occur in organisations creating “we/they” 
distinctions and as the threat of dismissal rises, focus on protection of power 
and the existence of “political turf wars” (ibid, p.406).  
Further, Sundaramurthy and Lewis describe a self-fulfilling prophesy where 
organisations faced with a downward performance cycle and an 
uncertain/unstable environment manage this risk by increasing and further 
emphasising the control function, intensifying distrust and exacerbating the 
situation, creating a “pathological spiralling relationship” (ibid, p. 407). In such a 
downward spiral, management will focus attention on defending their prior 
actions rather than trying to find alternative solutions.   
In summary, Sundaramurthy and Lewis identify a scenario in which the control 
function is overemphasised in both a high and low performance cycle leading to 
an environment characterised by distrust. In the high performing cycle 
environment this leads to group members becoming polarised and can lead to 
myopic decision processes given asymmetric information and a lack of 
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collaboration. In the low performing cycle, the lack of trust and low confidence 
levels leads to poor communication, as directors are concerned that asking 
questions and sharing information could be seen as a signal of incompetence. A 
self-fulfilling spiral then occurs when the response to poor performance is an 
increase in the control function, which then increases levels of mistrust and poor 
communication. This is depicted below:   
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Figure 2.5: Sundaramurthy and Lewis’ model of re-enforcing cycles of 
control  
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2.9.5 McNulty, Florackis and Ormrod “Boards of Directors and 
Financial Risk during the Credit Crisis” 2013 
McNulty et al.’s (2013) model describes the effect of board attributes on 
financial risk taking into consideration the recent financial crisis. This model is 
presented in light of evidence gathered from the results of a questionnaire 
completed by 141 CEOs of companies in the UK. The survey was conducted in 
2008 and was undertaken with a focus on companies outside the financial 
sector. The model presented by McNulty et al. (2013) draws very heavily from 
earlier work from Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Forbes and Milliken (1999) in 
identifying four key hypotheses which are noted below: 
Hypothesis 1: Boards characterised by high effort norms will be less likely to 
engage in excessive financial risk taking. 
Hypothesis 2: Boards characterised by relatively high levels of cognitive conflict 
will be less likely to engage in excessive financial risk taking. 
Hypothesis 3: Boards who use their knowledge and skills to a high degree will 
be less likely to engage in excessive financial risk taking. 
Hypothesis 4: The (negative) impact of cognitive conflict on financial risk is less 
pronounced in cohesive boards.  
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Figure 2.6: McNulty et al.’s model 
 
The representation of the model above reflects the strong influences of the 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) and the Forbes and Milliken (1999) models. The 
board processes identified above namely: effort norms, cognitive conflict and 
use of knowledge and skills are identical to those used by Forbes and Milliken, 
as is the inclusion of both the impact of cognitive conflict and cohesiveness on 
board processes. Further, the model recognises the importance of context in 
affecting firm-level outcomes, consistent with Zahra and Pearce (1989) and 
indeed uses the exact same language “Internal and External Contingencies” as 
was introduced by Zahra and Pearce.  
The McNulty et al. (2013) model is similar to that which I am intending in that it 
looks to combine the emphasis of context from Zahra and Pearce and the 
impact of psychology as stressed by Forbes and Milliken. Another similarity is 
that their model is tested in the field, albeit through a series of questionnaires, 
whilst I have conducted interviews. What follows below is a discussion of the 
four hypothesis in light of McNulty et al.’s questionnaire findings: 
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Hypothesis 1 stated that that if boards were characterised by high effort norms 
they would be less likely to engage in excessive financial risk taking. The survey 
results found support for this hypothesis. High effort norms were identified by 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) as a key attribute affecting board performance, the 
principle being that if board members do not put in the necessary time and 
effort, they will be underprepared and unable to contribute effectively. Indeed, 
the Walker Report (2009) recognised the need to create a minimum effort level 
amongst NEDs when it recommended that NEDs of FTSE 100 finance 
companies should dedicate a minimum of 30-35 days each year to each 
directorship and that the chairman of such entity should dedicate about two 
thirds of his/her time to the entity (recommendation 3 and 7 of the Report) .  
The principle that high effort levels will result in board members who are better 
prepared, with more relevant information and who are less likely to accede to 
information pressures to herd, is consistent with the model which I will propose 
in chapter 6. As my model will highlight, an unprepared director would be more 
susceptible to informational pressures to conform which could have the knock 
on effect of making the board more cohesive and confident. This would then 
increase normative pressures on decision processes. Normative pressures 
include a greater risk of group polarisation resulting in a more risky decision 
process29.  
Hypothesis 2 above stated that boards characterised by relatively high levels of 
cognitive conflict will be less likely to engage in excessive financial risk taking. 
Again, the results from the questionnaire were supportive of this hypothesis. 
                                            
29
 My model does not explicitly mention “high effort levels” but rather will refer to the functional 
and firm specific knowledge of directors. However, it is submitted that a director’s firm specific 
knowledge will be a function of the effort level that directors put into the firm and that the 
concept of “high effort levels” as highlighted by Forbes and Milliken (1999) and McNulty et al. 
(2013) are recognised (indirectly) in my model.  
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McNulty et al.’s research finding that boards characterised by high levels of 
cognitive conflict and higher levels of boardroom challenge are less likely to 
engage in excessive risk taking (and a poor decision process), is consistent with 
the conclusions from my review of the literature which identifies observable 
characteristics, such as high levels of cohesiveness and homogeneity as factors 
which might reduce cognitive conflict.   
Hypothesis 3 stated that boards that use their knowledge and skill to a higher 
degree will be less likely to engage in excessive risk taking. McNulty et al. 
(2013) found no support for a correlation between firms who use their 
knowledge and skills and the level of risk taking by financial boards in the lead 
up to the crisis30. The authors offer no reason or explanation as to why this 
might be the case. However, it is submitted that a potential reason for this could 
relate to the fact that the questionnaires were directed just at CEOs, and their 
                                            
30
 The paper measured the use of knowledge and skill of the firm by the results of a 
questionnaire answered by the CEO. Relevant questions relating to the use of knowledge and 
skill in the questionnaire being: 
1. NEDs use their skills and knowledge to contribute to board tasks. 
2. The executives seek to fully involve the board in any strategic process and decision. 
3. The board is appropriately involved in the company’s strategy. 
4. NEDs actively participate at board meetings to the best of their ability. 
5. When an issue is discussed, the most knowledgeable people on that subject generally 
have the most influence. 
6. Tasks on this board are generally delegated in a way that ensures the best fit between 
assigned task and each director’s knowledge. 
McNulty et al. (2013) measured change in financial risk by focusing on corporate 
liquidity in particular cash positions and considered that a firm’s financial risk policy was 
low risk if a relatively high level of liquidity/financial slack was maintained throughout the 
crisis period.  
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answers to the relevant questions may also be subject to self-serving biases 
particularly in relation to CEOs with a directive leadership style. Moreover, 
CEOs answering the survey might believe that they are using their knowledge 
and skill and yet still be unaware that they are influenced by these powerful 
psychological forces that impact decision processes. In other words, CEO’s 
answering the questionnaire may not have been consciously aware of how 
these normative pressures to conform had affected the decision process.  
Hypothesis 4 stated that cognitive conflict on financial risk is less pronounced in 
cohesive boards. McNulty et al. (2013) found support for this hypothesis and 
concluded that although board cohesiveness alone did not affect financial risk 
directly, it affected it indirectly through the variable of cognitive conflict. Boards 
that were cohesive had lower levels of cognitive conflict but greater levels of risk 
taking, and that cognitive conflict as a result was less pronounced in cohesive 
boards. 
The conclusion that cohesiveness leads to lower levels of cognitive conflict, and 
that the absence of cognitive conflict can result in greater levels of risk taking, is 
consistent with the model which I will propose which will highlight the inter-
connection of the observable attributes, including cohesiveness that leads to the 
greatest risk of a poor decision process. In summary, the findings from the CEO 
questionnaire can be reconciled back to the model of poor decision processes 
which I will present.  
 
2.9.6 Summary 
The purpose of this section of this chapter was to review and analyse existing 
and well established models that link board characteristics to firm performance. 
Five separate models were identified for this analysis and the justification for 
their selection was provided. These models do not represent an exhaustive list 
of comparable models but rather an excellent cross-section of published 
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research from which to review the intended model which I will present. Although 
the selection of these models can be criticised as being self-selective, a 
comprehensive review of the related literature did not identify an existing model 
which would challenge the originality of my proposed model which focuses on 
the way in which normative and informative influences can combine together to 
affect a board’s decision process. My model of VPDP which is presented in 
chapter 6 will include a discussion of how it can be differentiated from the 
models identified, and discussed, above.  
 
2.10 The Global Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance 
The UK is acknowledged as “a world leader on corporate governance reform” 
(Solomon, 2013, p. 47) but despite this, many UK and Irish financial institutions 
failed spectacularly in the crisis. These failures are an enigma in that they 
occurred despite the strengthening of the concept of director independence 
since the Cadbury Report in 1992. Independent boards should result in more 
effective monitoring and better quality decision making and yet widespread 
failures in such governance occurred failures occurred despite a strengthening 
of NED independence.  
Failures in corporate governance related to the crisis are widely recognised. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
commissioned a fact finding study to understand the causes of the financial 
crisis in 2009 in which it concluded that “the financial crisis can be, to an 
important extent, attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance 
arrangements” (Kirkpatrick, 2009, p. 2).  
This view is shared by the US Commission into the financial crisis: “We 
conclude dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at 
many of the systematically important financial institutions were the key causes” 
(Angelides et al., 2011, p. xviii). The report went on to note that their 
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examination “revealed stunning instances of governance breakdowns and 
irresponsibility (ibid, p. xviii). The Association of Certified Chartered 
Accountants concluded that “the credit crunch can be viewed in large part as a 
failure in corporate governance” (Moxey and Berendt, 2008, p. 1). Further, the 
International Corporate Governance Network’s statement on the crisis also 
recognised that failures in corporate governance were at the heart of the crisis 
and concluded that “enhanced governance structures should therefore be 
integral to an overall solution aimed at restoring confidence and protecting us 
from future crises (ICGN, 2008, para 1.2). The World Bank (Ard and Berg, 
2010) concluded that: “If there is one lesson from the current crisis it is that 
corporate governance matters. The central irony of the governance failures in 
this crisis is that many took place in some of the most sophisticated banks 
operating in some of the most developed governance environments in the 
world.      
Zhao (2011) links the failure in governance specifically to failures of the 
independent NED in monitoring management: “The current financial crisis 
provides strong evidence that our endeavours in decades to promote board 
independence failed to either stop management from taking too much risk or 
curb the spiral increasing of executive remuneration” (ibid, p. 116).  
Indeed, significant emphasis has been placed in both the “popular” press and in 
academic literature as to the role that “greedy” executives played in the crisis, 
highlighting the level of remuneration received and their incentive to “keep 
dancing as long as the music was playing” (see for example Cassidy (2009) and 
Stiglitz (2010)). Less attention, particularly in popular literature, has been given 
to the failure of NEDs, who accounted for more than half of the board and 
whose incentive was not primarily financial but rather, as Fama and Jensen 
(1985) highlighted, to maintain and build their reputational capital. In other 
words, independent NEDs failed in their role of monitoring the executives and in 
providing the necessary “hand-brake” against excessive risk taking by 
executives.  
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Sonnenfeld (2002) argues that perhaps the most important determinant of a 
good board is the capacity for board members to challenge assumptions and 
beliefs. He observes: “I am always amazed at how common groupthink is in the 
corporate boardroom. Directors are, almost without expectation, intelligent, 
accomplished, and comfortable with power. But if you put them in a room that 
discourages dissent, then they nearly always start to conform” (ibid, p. 111). 
Sonnenfeld argues that boards need to create and foster a culture of open 
dissent where dissent is not seen as disloyalty and that silent board members 
should be probed for their opinions and that good boards must even have a 
“good fight” now and then. Further, Forbes and Milliken (1999) argue that 
conflict will prevent groupthink by fostering an environment characterised by a 
tolerance of multiple viewpoints and opinions. 
Harrington (2010) in an extensive study of over 1200 investment clubs in the US 
found that high performing clubs were characterised by significant more dissent 
than low performing clubs and that the vast majority of votes in low performing 
clubs were unanimous when a member’s proposal to buy or sell a stock was 
voted on. In contrast, members of high performing clubs are more likely to 
openly debate each other’s ideas so that fewer of their votes pass without 
dissent. Low performing clubs almost never allowed their member’s proposals 
to fail whilst high performing clubs did so routinely. Although investment clubs 
are different in nature to board rooms this research does highlight the 
importance of dissent to high quality decision making.  
This failure of NED’s to monitor management was, however, recognised in the 
UK Select Committee on Treasury (2009) when it concluded: “The current 
financial crisis has exposed serious flaws and shortcomings in the system of 
non-executive oversight of bank executives and senior management in the 
banking sector. In particular, the evidence shows that many non-executive 
directors—in many cases eminent and highly-regarded individuals with no 
shortage of experience in the business and banking worlds—failed to act as an 
effective check on, and challenge to, executive managers. Too often non-
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executive directors in the banking sector have operated as members of a 'cosy 
club' rather than viewing their role as being that of providing effective checks 
and balances on executive members of boards (ibid, para 151).”  
The Walker Report (2009) was set up to review corporate governance in the UK 
in light of the failures in the lead up to the financial crisis. The Walker Report 
(ibid, p. 12) sets out the process by which board decisions should be 
implemented, namely: 
1) presentation by the executive of a proposal,  
2) a disciplined approach of challenge of the proposal,  
3) a decision on the policy or strategy to be adopted,  
4) full empowerment of the executive to implement the agreed strategy. 
 The report notes that “The essential ‘challenge’ step seems to have been 
missed in many board situations and needs to be unequivocally clearly 
recognised and embedded for the future” (ibid p. 12).   The Report further 
recognises the pressure to conform within boardrooms and that this can reduce 
board challenge: “the pressure for conformity on boards can be strong, 
generating corresponding difficulties for an individual board member who 
wishes to challenge group thinking. Such challenge on substantive policy issues 
can be seen as disruptive, non-collegial and even as disloyal. Yet without it, 
there can be an illusion of unanimity in a board, with silence assumed to be 
acquiescence.” (para 4.3). An illustration of the lack of a boardroom challenge 
can be seen in three of the UK’s highest profile bank failures during the crisis, 
namely Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), HBOS and Northern Rock.  
RBS represents the most costly of UK bank failures with the UK government 
required in October 2008 to inject £45.5 billion of equity capital into the 
organisation. In an attempt to understand and learn from the mistakes made at 
RBS, the Financial Services Act produced in December 2011 a report titled 
“The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland”(FSA, 2011). This extensive report 
covering 450 pages analysis the failures at RBS covering the period from the ill-
fated acquisition of Dutch bank ABN AMRO to when the Bank of England was 
  
73 
 
required to bail out RBS (the “Review Period”). Included in the Report is a 
chapter on “Management, governance and culture”. 
The Report found no evidence of any procedural failures in the governance of 
the RBS board and indeed the FSA Supervisory team responsibly for RBS had 
formed a positive view of RBS’s high level corporate governance arrangements 
(para 588). The Report therefore concluded that there was no evidence of a 
procedural failure of governance at RBS Board level during the Review Period. 
In other words, the RBS Board had ticked all the necessary boxes with respect 
to adherence with corporate governance best practice. 
However the Report did recognise that, although there was no evidence of 
formal governance failings, the fact remained that the RBS Board were 
ultimately responsible for a sequence of decisions and judgements that resulted 
in its failure. The Report highlighted a few areas where the RBS board failed. 
These included remunerating, and hence incentivising, the then CEO to focus 
on increases in revenue and growth rather than on capital, liquidity and asset 
quality and also a siloed approach to risk management which meant that the 
bank was slow to assess the overall risks that the bank was running (para 592). 
Additionally the Report also stressed the lack of boardroom challenge at RBS 
(ibid, para 592). The Report noted that: “The Review team was able to identify 
little significant disagreement on major issues during the Review Period in a 
Board containing tough and experienced individuals with successful track 
records. Clearly constant disagreement would have been debilitating for a 
board, but some divergence from consensus would not have been unhealthy” 
(ibid, para 593).  
In particular the Report focused on the RBS acquisition of ABN AMRO, 
identified as a critical strategic error in RBS’s failure (ibid, para 227). It 
highlights that the acquisition was not well thought out, nor were the risks fully 
assessed and that the due diligence process was inadequate (ibid, para 594-
600). However in this respect, the Report observed that: “During interviews with 
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the Chairman and other board members, it was indicated that, while the 
assumptions and plans were discussed on a regular basis at no stage did any 
Board member proposes that we should not proceed. One former Board 
member reflected, with hindsight, that there was an element of ’group-think’ in 
the Board’s decision to acquire ABN AMRO and that, to his knowledge, no 
Board member ever said that he or she was worried about the deal. In the 
opinion of the Review Team, it is very difficult to reconcile this approach with the 
degree of rigorous testing, questioning and challenge that would be expected in 
an effective board process dealing with such a large and strategic proposition.” 
(ibid, para 599).       
Specifically with respect to the lack of RBS NED challenge, the Report noted 
that: “A number of RBS’s non-executive directors told the Review Team during 
interviews that they had been able and prepared to challenge the executive. 
However, when asked, they gave few clear examples of proposals from the 
CEO or executive management during the Review Period which were 
substantially amended as a result of Board challenge.” (ibid, para 612) 
RBS provides an excellent case study highlighting an organisation which had 
complied with corporate governance codes and yet its failure was attributed to 
governance failures including a lack of challenge from its NEDs.  Stephen 
Hester became CEO of RBS once the bank had been rescued by the UK 
government. Hester, however, provides a very useful insight into the need for 
dissent and challenge and the role that psychology can play in such a process 
when he commented: “Helping the company succeed does not always mean 
saying, yes, to the chief executive, it can mean a challenge, constructive 
challenge, but I have to tell you, I am not sure this is an issue of process. I think 
it is, unfortunately, an issue of humans and their behaviour” (House of 
Commons, 2009, Q. 1977). In other words, good corporate governance is about 
human behaviour and culture and less about “ticking the boxes” of the 
Combined Code.  
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HBOS, like RBS, needed to be rescued during the financial crisis31. In 2013 the 
UK Government published, as part of the Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards a report on the failure of HBOS, titled: “An accident waiting 
to happen”: The failure of HBOS (Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards, 2013).  The report concluded that the board was entirely responsible 
for the failure of HBOS: “The losses were caused by a flawed strategy, 
inappropriate culture and inadequate controls. These are matters for which 
successive Chief Executives and particularly the Chairman and the Board as a 
whole bear responsibility” (ibid, para 134). In preparing the report the 
Parliamentary Commission interviewed a number of HBOS executives. The lack 
of a challenge to boardroom was identified as a key weakness in HBOS’s 
demise.  
Sir Ron Garrick was the senior Independent director of HBOS from 2004 until 
the take-over by Lloyds Banking Group in 2009. In his written evidence to the 
banking standards he noted that: “Having a full day meeting (away from the 
office to avoid distractions) to discuss the plans gave the HBOS Board plenty of 
opportunity to challenge divisional plans and gain a greater understanding of 
the strategy and risks. In all of the discussions I do not recall any major 
challenge to the growth strategy from either the Board or senior management.”  
Peter Hickman was not a main board director but had the title “Group Director of 
Risk” at HBOS reporting directly to the then CEO, Andy Hornby. In his written 
evidence to the Banking Standard Commission he noted that “On the basis of 
the board meetings I attended and other discussions, I was not aware of any 
contrary views [with respect to the aggressive asset growth policy] being 
expressed” (Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 2012a).  
                                            
31
 HBOS was taken over by Lloyds Banking Group but the UK government was required to 
inject capital in the combined group to bolster capital as a result of losses suffered by HBOS in 
commercial property and exposures to sub-prime assets.  
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Finally, Peter Cummins was a main board director at HBOS in charge of 
commercial lending an area which was to experience significant losses in the 
crisis in relation to lending against over-valued commercial properties. In 2012, 
the UK Financial Services Authority fined Cummins £500 000 and banned him 
for life from working in the financial services industry. In his oral evidence before 
the Treasury Commission the following exchange was recorded between 
Cummins and Rory Philips QC: 
“Rory Phillips: “Was there any point when the board said to you: “No hang on 
a minute?”    
Mr Cummings: No.” (Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 2012b,  
Q. 1345) 
Northern Rock was another UK Bank that failed in the crisis, requiring it to be 
fully nationalised by the UK government32.  The House of Commons Treasury 
Committee produced a report titled The Run on the Rock (House of Commons 
Treasury Committee, 2008) in January 2008 to report on the cause of the 
bank’s collapse. As with RBS and HBOS, the report found that the directors 
were responsible for the bank’s demise with the report highlighting the failures 
of the Chairman and NEDs in particular: “The non-executive members of the 
Board, and in particular the Chairman of the Board, the Chairman of the Risk 
Committee [an NED] and the senior non-executive director, failed in the case of 
Northern Rock to ensure that it remained liquid as well as solvent, to provide 
against the risks that it was taking and to act as an effective restraining force on 
the strategy of the executive members.” (ibid, para 31) (italics added).   
A CEO and a board with low skill levels is more likely to make a poor initial 
decision/recommendation - the starting point of the model itself. Therefore low 
                                            
32
 Indeed Northern Rock were the first UK bank requiring a bank bailout and also the first retail 
bank run on retail deposits in the UK for over 150 years when retail depositors queued to take 
their funds out of the bank in the week beginning September 14, 2007.  
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functional and firm specific skill level will exacerbate the likelihood of a poor 
decision process.   
A further impact of the lack of skill relates specifically to the gatekeepers in the 
board, namely the NEDs. If NEDs do not have the necessary knowledge and 
expertise, they are more likely to rely on, and accede to, the judgement of the 
executive directors and to herd. Herding is a result of informational pressure 
when group members squelch their own information in the belief that others 
have superior information (see for example (S. E. Asch, 1955) or (Robert J 
Shiller, 2008)). One of the driving forces for such a decision is a belief that there 
is asymmetry of information and that some board members have superior 
information. The belief that certain members have superior information comes 
from a perception of a relative lack of knowledge compared to other actors. This 
may occur because of a lack of functional and firm specific expertise or a lack of 
access to relevant information (or indeed a combination of all of the 
aforementioned).   
This point is well illustrated by Finklestein and Mooney (2003). They interviewed 
thirty two board members for their seminal research paper. One of the 
respondents highlighted the link between informational asymmetry and the lack 
of boardroom challenge related specifically to the specific director’s lack of 
timely access to information: “I often get the board packet the night before I 
leave for the [board] meeting so I don’t have enough time to fully understand the 
issues. As a result, I am less likely to challenge what’s going on and more likely 
to defer to the CFO.” (p 104)   
A NED who has low firm specific and functional knowledge is more likely to 
accede to the opinion of the executives on the board. The consequence of this 
being a board that will be more cohesive, with fewer boardrooms challenges. 
This lack of dissent can then lead to higher levels of confidence amongst 
executives who interpret the lack of a challenge as a sign of confidence. Low 
firm and functional skill levels amongst NEDs will lead to higher levels of 
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cohesiveness, less board challenge leading to increased levels of confidence.  
Indeed, the lack of functional and firm specific knowledge of NEDs was 
highlighted in the Walker Report (2009) as an important contributing factor in 
explaining governance failures in the UK banking sector in the build up to the 
financial crisis.  
A very similar picture of a failure of NED challenge is revealed in a review of the 
Irish bank failure. The Nyberg Commission (2011) also highlighted a lack of a 
challenge from NEDs and in particular with respect to Anglo Irish Bank and Irish 
Nationwide (para 2.10.2 and 2.5.11 respectively.) Overall the Commission 
concluded that “On [Irish] Boards there appears to often have existed a 
collegiate and consensual style with little serious challenge or debate”(para 
5.24). Further and related to this lack of challenge the Nyberg Report (2011) 
specifically highlighted the lack of expertise of the NEDs in the Irish banks as a 
contributing factor towards their lack of boardroom challenge (ibid, p. 49)33.  
The evidence from the various inquiries into the failures of the UK and Irish 
banks, as noted above, all highlight the responsibility of the board and in 
particular NEDs and their inability to challenge management’s strategies. These 
boardroom failures, however, took place in an environment of increased focus 
and attention on corporate governance codes.  
 
2.11 Criticisms of corporate governance research  
The contradiction as to why improved corporate governance codes, principles 
and structures could not have prevented the widespread failures in corporate 
governance has renewed and strengthened calls for a fundamental change in 
how we approach “the dismal science” (Pitelis, 2004) of corporate governance. 
Diplock (2012) claims that there is a need for “a paradigm shift in thinking” and 
                                            
33
 This lack of board expertise is explored in greater detail later in this thesis.  
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that corporate governance reform is “one of the biggest post-financial crisis the 
world faces” (ibid, p. 239).  Ahrens et al. (2011) argues that the recent financial 
crisis was a huge natural experiment which has “exposed gaps in our 
knowledge of corporate governance and should lead to a rethink of the central 
principles of corporate governance”.   
Indeed, I have identified widespread criticism of the way in which researchers 
have approached research into the field of corporate governance. This criticism 
is levelled in two specific areas. First, those that have questioned the value of 
existing corporate governance research and in particular the legitimacy of using 
large data sets to make sweeping conclusions about board effectiveness 
without understanding the dynamics of individual boards. Second, those 
researchers that have called for greater recognition and awareness of the 
psychological and behavioural factors that affects boards when recommending 
governance reforms.  These criticisms are discussed below.  
Roberts et al. (2005) have questioned the relevance of trying to assess the 
impact of director independence on performance through the use of statistics 
and in particular the use of large sets of publicly available information which are 
removed from the reality of how individual boards might operate. “Whilst 
researchers remain wedded to the testing of theoretical models and 
assumptions against large quantitative data sets, they remain at considerable 
distance from the objective of their inquiry and, as a result, are inevitably 
obliged...to make huge inferential leaps. In our view, for theory to ‘go behind the 
backs’ of practitioners (Giddens, 1984) is to risk irrelevance or worse” (ibid, p. 
20).   
Huse (2005) argues that researchers often default to using large data sets in 
research as a path of least resistance and that “doctoral students and scholars 
in tenure track positions have preferred research using easily available data 
sets and methods that can be evaluated by journal reviewers through well-
established validity concepts” (ibid, p. 66). However in Huse’s views these 
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studies tell us very little about what really happens in boardrooms, how 
relationships between directors are formed, how CEO’s engage with external 
directors and how inter director relationships effect decision making.  
Ahrens et al. (2011) observe that “no matter how we put it corporate 
governance research is not satisfactory” (ibid, p. 313). The authors focus on the 
strong incentives for academics to publish “marginal articles” plagued with 
unclear and inconsistent measurement problems and performance goals and 
asks: “What will the next generation of corporate research bring? Will we see 
another 5-10 000 published papers with as little value added as in the past two 
decades? Or will corporate governance research mature to generate more 
useful results?” (ibid, p. 322).  
Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) observes that archival based studies looking at 
large sets of data comparing information such as the ratio of inside to outside 
directors, the number of board members and director share ownership have 
dominated corporate governance research. Gabrielsson and Huse  analysed all 
the articles on corporate governance between 1990-2002 that had been 
published in six highly rated journals, namely; Academy of Management 
Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management, Strategic 
Management Journal, Journal of Management and Governance and Journal of 
Management Studies. In total they review 127 published articles on corporate 
governance. Their analysis revealed than in 91 of the 127 articles (72%) 
archival data was primarily used to generate research findings whilst 27 (21%) 
had collected data from questionnaires and only 5 studies data was collected 
from direct interviews34.   
It is submitted that one possible contributing factor accounting for the paucity of 
direct interview research is the difficulty in securing access to bank board 
                                            
34
 The balance of the research was a combination of both questionnaires and the use of archival 
data. 
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members, and in particular the inability of researchers to observe bank boards 
in operation. That is, access to the “black box” of bank boardrooms has been 
restricted.   
Furthermore, Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) noted that only 13 articles (5%) 
focused on the field of behavioural economics. The authors concluded that 
research into boards was at a crossroad and that: “Frustrated by weak and 
ambiguous findings, scholars have emphasized the need to critically question 
the models and theories that so far dominate the field …However, despite these 
calls, there have been few alternatives to develop alterative research 
directions.” (Ibid p. 23). Gabrielsson and Huse urge for more research into the 
behavioural aspects of boards and governance.   
Gabrielsson and Huse’s article was written in 2004, and I have been able to find 
very little evidence of greater emphasis of such research since that date leading 
up to the financial crisis. A possible explanation for the lack of behavioural 
focused research is that corporations were perceived to be doing extremely well 
in the lead up to the crisis and a need to search for a new emphasis in 
governance research was perhaps considered unnecessary. The crisis itself, 
however, has highlighted the importance of the field of behavioural economics 
generally 35  and specifically in relation to corporate governance failures as 
highlighted by the Walker Report (2009). It is anticipated that there will be more 
research in this area (such as that which I am undertaking) going forward as 
Ahrens et al (2011) have urged. However interview based research which looks 
to observe and understand the “black” box of the inter reactions and dynamics 
of specific boards will, it is submitted, continue be restricted by lack of access to 
both board directors and to board meetings.   
                                            
35
 For example, Robert Shiller has been jointly awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2013 
for his work in the field of behavioural economics and in particular in relation to the relevance of 
behavioural economics in the context of the credit crisis.  
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Indeed, Daily et al. (2003) argue that the real challenge facing researchers is 
gaining access to the type of information that will truly enhance our 
understanding of the effectiveness of governance mechanism, and that involves 
a better understanding of how boards operate. Finkelstein et al. (2008) further 
suggest that the emphasis on empirical data focused research is wrong and that 
a simple count, using large data sets, of insiders versus outsiders is irrelevant 
and that the focus should be on the interactions among board members and 
how this influences their effectiveness in fulfilling the key roles and counsel for 
monitoring. In their view, one should not look at the effectiveness of board 
independence in such a one dimensional and sterile way by simply looking at 
the number of independent directors at various companies and from that, 
making broad judgements about board effectiveness. Research focus on the 
number of independent directors as the proxy for board effectiveness is 
misguided. 
In summary, researchers have focused too much on trying to understand board 
effectiveness by reviewing the inputs (such as number of independent directors) 
and then trying to make assumptions about outputs (such as financial 
performance) whilst ignoring the “black box” of what actually happens in the 
boardroom itself. An alternative approach to corporate governance research 
must be one focusing on the behavioural aspects of boards and the relative 
dynamics between the various actors in a specific boardroom setting.  
The Walker Report (2009) explicitly recognised the role and understanding of 
the role that human behaviour plays in more effective corporate governance 
and that rules and regulations are inadequate: “Improvement in corporate 
governance will require behavioural change in an array of closely related areas 
in which prescribed standards and processes play a necessary but insufficient 
part” (ibid, p. 9). The Walker Report includes in Appendix 4 a section on the 
“Psychological and behavioural elements in board performance” which was 
prepared for the report by an independent think tank. Interestingly, this “sub-
report” made two recommendations to the Walker Report. First that there 
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should be a full independent psychological assessment of the board focusing on 
aspects of behaviour, experience, knowledge, and motivation and second, that 
all NEDs should be trained in the area of group dynamics. Neither of these two 
suggestions however, forms part of the thirty one suggestions that the Walker 
Report recommends. This perhaps highlights that legislators are more aware of 
the need to take psychological factors into consideration when discussing 
corporate governance, but also that more work is needed to move such 
recognition from the appendices to core recommendations. A full discussion of 
recommended reforms is discussed later in this thesis. 
Hall (2007) notes that despite the developments in the field of cognitive and 
social psychology and recent developments in the field of neuroscience, 
corporate law has made little progress in incorporating behavioural principles 
into the understanding of corporate decision making. The assumptions 
underlying corporate law and corporate governance are based on the principle 
of rationale decision making and do not recognise that psychological factors 
affect rationale decision processes. 
Langevoort (1998) highlights how the rationale actor has come “to dominate 
predictions about how normal persons and groups will respond to legal 
incentives” (ibid, p. 1499). Langevoort’s observation is linked to the wider 
debate as to the relevance and applicability of the efficient market hypothesis in 
economic models and whether economic decisions are made as a result of 
rationale behaviour alone rather than being influenced by human psychology 
and that economic decisions are not always rationale.   
Sun et al. (2011) argues that corporate governance frameworks and reforms 
are better addressed by multidisciplinary studies, more holistic thinking and 
greater levels of contextual understanding: “Many people tend to examine 
corporate governance issues narrowly in terms of rules, institutions, positions, 
actors, behaviours and activities within a particular corporate governance 
framework ..rather than reflexively of understanding what lies behind the 
  
84 
 
appearance of structure and action constructed by certain beliefs, values, 
cultures, ideologies and social conventions, and why and how structure and 
action have been formed in the first place. Thus, although some technical 
issues might have been addressed and corporate governance improved the 
fundamental problems indiscernible by traditional static and mechanistic modes 
of thinking are still there and little touched.” (ibid, p. 18) 
Cox and Munsinger (1985) highlight how cognitive and psychological factors 
can impact the effectiveness of legislation when trying to ensure independence 
of mind in the boardroom. They argue that even if NEDs are economically 
independent of the firm and are free from any financial conflict of interest, it 
does not necessarily follow that they will be efficient monitors of management 
and guardians of corporations’ best interests. NEDs are still susceptible to in 
group biases.  
Cox and Munsinger (1985) stress the social influences on individuals in a group 
setting and in particular the strength of the attraction of the group and the high 
value that group members place on membership. It is the enhanced self-esteem 
which is derived from being a member of a select group contributes toward 
board cohesion and conformity within a board. A 1995 Korn/Ferry36 study of 
U.S. board members highlights this fact. In the survey, outside directors were 
asked “what was the most important factor in deciding whether to join a 
board?”. The majority of answers received were not the soundness of the 
balance sheet, or the opportunities for directors to make a contribution, but 
rather the identity of other board members. It was the attraction to others that 
was the most important factor in deciding to join a board.  As Cox and 
Munsinger (1995) note: “The reward is non-monetary, prestige, influence, and 
pleasure associating with other successful people, to work with others that they 
admire and want to work with and get better acquainted. These preferences are 
                                            
36
 Survey unseen, cited by Dallas (1997).  
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a manifestation of the inherent drive for affiliation and companionship which 
motivates people to seek identity with a group” (ibid, p. 94).  
Further, such cohesion and resulting conformity can become stronger over time 
as the shared perception of mutual agreement enhances mutual attraction and 
creates even more conformity. Cox and Munsinger conclude that: “Taken 
together powerful psychological forces are at work within the boardroom, 
creating a cohesive, loyal, conforming in-group that will support its membership” 
(ibid, p. 99). Cox and Munsinger (1995) are highlighting the risk of groupthink in 
group boards and that psychological factors, and in particular the attraction to 
the group, will affect decision making even if directors are technically 
“independent”.  
Maharaj (2008) argues that attention to the behavioural characteristics of board 
members has the potential to reduce a groupthink mentality on boards. He 
argues that it is ironic that academic research in corporate governance has 
focused on improving and implementing formal rules and regulations whilst the 
board of directors have been treated as a black box with little understanding of 
how board actual function. He concludes that “formal rules and regulations are 
inadequate, they have little effect upon decision making by board members” 
(ibid, p. 72). 
Sonnenfeld (2002) similarly argues that we need to focus not only on formal 
rules and regulations but how we manage the social structure of boards: “We’ll 
be fighting the wrong war if we simply tighten procedural rules for boards and 
ignore their more pressing need - to be strong, high functioning work groups 
whose members trust and challenge one another and engage directly with 
senior managers on critical issues facing corporations” (ibid, p. 104). Dallas 
(1997) also calls for board reform to recognise the impact of social influences 
on boards composed of both independent and executive directors and that was 
it required is “an understanding of the social psychology of groups” (ibid, p. 
104).  
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The Group of Thirty (G30) is a private, non-profit body composed of senior 
representatives of the public and private sector and also academia. In 2012 
they published a paper titled “Towards Effective Governance of Financial 
Institutions” (G30, 2012) as a contribution to the debate of how to achieve 
effective governance in financial institutions. The steering Committee that 
produced the paper included a former Board of Governor from the Federal 
Reserve Bank, a Former US Comptroller, a senior advisor to Citigroup, and the 
author of the Walker Report (2009) - Sir David Walker a former chairman of 
Morgan Stanley.  
The G30 concluded that governance at financial institutions was not the sole 
contributor to the global financial crisis, but it was a significant contributing 
factor and that effective governance can help to prevent future crises from 
occurring or at least mitigate their impact. The report focused on the need to 
focus on behavioural aspects of boards and concluded that: “Behavior appears 
to be key and a focus on the right behaviour means a shift from the ‘hardware’ 
of governance (structures and processes) to the ‘software’ (people, leadership 
and values” (ibid, p13).  The paper recommends a focus on the culture and 
values within organisations starting with the board of directors and working its 
way through the organisational structure. The paper concludes that that good 
governance is imbedded in the organisational fabric (ibid, p. 14) and it 
encourages regulators to broaden their perspectives to include a review of the 
people and culture of regulated entities (ibid, p. 15).  
 
2.12 Diversity Research 
The lack of adequate diversity in the boardroom of financial institutions in the 
lead up to the crisis has been identified as a contributing factor to the crisis  
(see for example Lagarde (2010), Rost and Osterloh (2008), Desvaux et al. 
(2007), Kristof (2010) and The Walker Report (2009)). Given this, a discussion 
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of the literature on the impact of diversification in the context of the corporate 
board is considered appropriate.  
Williams and O’Reilly (1998) identify three different theories underpinning 
diversity research; social categorisation, similarity attraction (or homophily) and 
informational/decision making theory. Social categorisation theory (Turner et al., 
1987) argues that individuals have a desire to maintain high levels of self-
esteem and to do this they must compare themselves to others. In order to do 
this effectively, individuals first define themselves and others through a process 
of self-categorisation and classify actors into “out” and “in” groups. In-groups 
are considered more trustworthy, and individuals seek to maximise interaction 
with in-group members and to view out-group members with distrust. Groups 
then look to drive out or remove individuals who don’t conform to the in-group 
(see for example (Schneider, 1987) and (Bantel and Jackson, 1989)).  
Similarly attraction theory argues that individuals who are similar in 
backgrounds and share common experiences naturally enjoy interacting with 
each other. Similarity theory is imbedded in the principles of homophily (see for 
example (McPherson et al., 2001)) and the view that when individuals can 
chose who to interact with, they will chose those who are similar to themselves. 
Kanter (1993) refers to a process of “homosexual reproduction” in the workforce 
whereby top management look to hire others who are similar to themselves. 
Dissimilarity, however, often results in group processes and performance losses 
including less positive attitudes of the group, less frequent communication and a 
higher likelihood of turnover from the group.  
Finally, information/decision making theory is based on the concept that 
individuals in diverse groups may have access to information networks outside 
their work group and that this added information will enhance group 
performance. Increased information enhances the ability of the group to 
generate both more creative and accurate solutions to problems. Further, 
diverse groups offer more creative solutions and show a greater inclination for 
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critical thinking and provide a greater variety of perspectives which will help to 
trigger “kaleidoscope thinking” and combat groupthink (Ramirez, 2000).  
Williams and O’Reilly (1988) contend that social categorisation and 
similarity/attraction theory argue for the benefits of homogeneity in group 
process but that informational theory, on the other hand, makes the opposite 
prediction and highlights the benefits of diversity achieved through increased 
skills and access to more information.  
Indeed, diversity has been seen by researchers as being a “double edged 
sword” (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Diversity will increase the level of sources 
and information at the group’s disposal (informational diversity) but at the same 
time diverse groups are more likely to be less integrated, have higher levels of 
conflict, higher group turnover and lower levels of integration (related to the 
theories of social categorisation and similarity attraction).  
This double edge to diversity is directly related to the curvilinear relationship 
between cohesiveness and firm performance as discussed earlier in this 
chapter with respect to Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) model. Cohesiveness can 
improve trust and co-operation leading to better communication and co-
ordination of ideas and to better decision processes. However too much 
cohesion increases the vulnerability to groupthink where the cohesion and 
collegiality of the group outweighs the quality of the decision process itself. 
There is, therefore, also an inverse relationship between diversity and 
cohesiveness. The more diverse a board, the less likely that it will be cohesive. 
This inverse relationship may however weaken over time and a diverse group 
can become increasingly cohesive as the group bond strengthens and a sense 
of group identity develops.  
Langevoort (2000) argues that the key to an effective board is maintaining a 
balance so that the most productive boards are those that have enough 
diversity to encourage the sharing of information and the active consideration of 
alternatives, but at the same time are not so diverse that the board struggles to 
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function effectively and harmoniously. Diversity benefits decision processes by 
enhancing cognitive conflict and spurring greater debates and varied skills and 
experiences will increase the range of information and bring different 
perspectives or mental models to discussions (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
2003). However boards that are too diverse are often characterised by high 
levels of socio-emotional conflict and a lack of co-operation and communication 
between group members (Amason, 1996). The key it seems is balance, getting 
boards that are cohesive but not too cohesive and boards that are diverse but 
not too diverse.  
However in the context of a corporate boardroom there should be a tendency to 
emphasise the informational benefits of diversity over the negatives outcomes 
associated with high levels of diversity. The rational for highlighting the 
informational advantage of diversity is that the boardroom is different from a 
number of other group settings in three areas.  
First, unlike many other group settings, executive directors have often worked at 
the organisation for some time, progressing through the ranks to the position of 
a board executive. As such, many executives often know each other for a 
period of time and would have worked together for long hours for a common 
cause, which would encourage higher levels of cohesion. Indeed, boards that 
have worked together for long periods are likely to experience lower levels of 
cognitive conflict37 and reduced diversity as they are more likely to develop a 
shared understanding of the issues and a stronger in group bias. In contrast, 
board members who have only served together for a short time period are likely 
to have more diverse perspectives on issues (Forbes and Milliken, 1999).  
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 Horwitz and Horwitz (2007) define cognitive diversity is defined as the degree to which team 
members differ in terms of expertise, experience and perspective which will achieve true 
diversity rather than surface level demographic diversity which may not necessarily result in 
“true” diversity. 
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Second, the selection of new group members are made by the group itself 
(through the nominations committee) and as research has highlighted there is a 
natural homophilic bias to select those that are similar to themselves (Byrne et 
al., 1966).  
Third, there is significant status and prestige associated with board membership 
(Korn/Ferry International, 22nd Annual Board of Directors’ Study 24, 1995 cited 
by Dallas (1996)). The status and importance of being a part of such a 
prestigious group can increase cohesiveness and collegiality (Janis, 1972). 
Group boards are, in summary, characterised by a natural gravitation towards 
homogeneity and related cohesion.  
Research findings which have highlighted the negative impacts of diversity are 
often the result of laboratory based research which relies on groups of 
University students often bought together at short notice, in a laboratory 
controlled and task specific experiment. This is a very different group setting to 
that of a corporate boardroom emphasising the importance of context.  
Van der Walt et al. (2006) and Carpenter and Westphal (2001) highlight that the 
benefits of diversity need to be viewed in the context of the type of industry in 
which a firm is operating, and that greater diversity may be appropriate in 
turbulent environments characterised by strategic complexity38.  Diversity and 
variety of perspectives can contribute when decision processes are complex 
and where there is no one obvious solution. However, in very stable and less 
complex environments, the negatives associated with diversity can outweigh the 
positives. It is when decisions are complex that the group will benefit from 
diverse opinions, in less complex environments the benefits that diversity 
provides are not necessary and the decision process itself does not demand 
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 The point made by Van der Walt et al (2006) is consistent with the recognition of the industry 
type as an important external contingency affecting firm performance in the Zahra and Pearce 
model discussed previously.  
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diverse viewpoints 39 . It is submitted that the finance industry is complex, 
unpredictable and volatile. Banking is therefore an industry which would benefit 
from a broad perspective of views in the solving of complex problems.  
In summary, the risks in corporate boardrooms relate to the propensity for the 
board to have too little diversity and the associated risks, identified in my model, 
relating to vulnerabilities to a poor decision outcome. Although Langevoort 
(2000) highlights that boards should look for a balance between diversity and 
cohesion, it is extremely difficult to maintain this balance as the propensity in a 
boardroom will be a natural pull away from diversity and cognitive conflict 
towards collegiality, groupthink and related phenomena. This implies that 
managing diversity in the context of the boardroom is not a static process but 
needs to be reviewed dynamically over time.  
In the UK, diversity in the boardroom has been encouraged. The Cadbury 
Report (1992) made recommendations that there should be a formal selection 
process for NEDs which would not only re-enforce the independence of NEDs 
but make it evident that they were appointed on merit and not through any form 
of patronage (para 4.15). The Higgs Report (2003) further highlighted the lack 
of diversity of UK directors, a consequence of what it highlighted as 
inadequacies in the selection process.  
The Higgs Report undertook a comprehensive survey of NEDs and observed 
that almost half of the NEDs surveyed for the review were recruited through 
personal contacts or friendships. Only four per cent had had a formal interview, 
and one per cent had obtained their job though answering an advertisement 
(ibid, para 10.5). The Higgs Report recommended improvements to the 
nomination committee (recommended previously by the Cadbury Report) by 
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 Similarly, in a straightforward decision process the risks of groupthink leading to a poor 
decision process are diminished. That is not to say that groupthink might not occur, but the risk 
of a poor outcome in a straightforward decision process is diminished.  
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insisting that the nominations committee should consist of a majority of 
independent NEDs and also be chaired by a NED. The theory being that if the 
nominations process is controlled by independent directors, this would reduce 
the likelihood of a perpetuation of an old boys’ network as highlighted by Kanter 
(1993).  
The effectiveness of the recommendation that independent NEDs are in the 
majority in the nominations committee relies not only on the directors being 
independent, but also on the NEDs being diverse. If the majority of NEDs on the 
nomination committee are not diverse, then the selection process is still at risk 
of homophilic selection. In other word, it may not be sufficient that the 
nomination committee is dominated by independent NEDs if those NEDs are 
themselves not diverse or distinct from the executive directors and there is still a 
risk of homophilic selection.  
The Higgs Report, however, highlighted the lack of diversity of NEDs, noting 
that they are typically white, male, nearing retirement age with previous 
experience working at a public company. The Report observed that there were 
less than twenty NEDs on FTSE 100 boards under the age of forty five and that 
only six per cent of NED posts are held by woman (para 10.21 and 10.22). The 
Higgs Report called for further work to be done to encourage greater diversity in 
the boardroom, the result of which was the subsequent Tyson Report (2003). 
The Tyson Report noted that many boards lacked a diverse range of skills, 
experiences and perspectives that could help them address the challenges 
confronting their companies” (ibid, p. 6) and highlighted the benefits of diversity 
identified above with respect to informational advantages highlighted above. 
The Report highlighted research by Milliken and Martins (1996) which showed 
that groups that are more diverse in skill or knowledge have a greater potential 
to generate more high-quality solutions to problems than less diverse groups. 
The Report did recognise some of the negative associations relating to 
diversity, namely lower levels of cohesion, less trust and higher turnover but 
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concluded that these negatives could be mitigated through training as to the 
benefits of diversity (ibid, p. 7).   
The Tyson Report made three recommendations intended to increase diversity 
amongst NEDS. First, a more rigorous and transparent NED selection process 
in which companies should broaden their searches to include sources of talent 
that they have overlooked in the past. Second, more evaluation and training of 
NEDs which in more diverse boards would encourage a greater sense of trust, 
cohesion and communication. Third, the encouragement of more research into 
the benefits of diversity and transparent measurements of diversity, such as the 
creation of a diversity index highlighting in a transparent way diversity which 
exists within individual corporations40. Further the Tyson Report focused very 
much on the benefit of cognitive diversity. This represents a change from the 
Higgs Report which highlighted surface level demographic diversity.  
Despite the focus provided by both the Higgs and the Tyson Reports on the 
need for greater diversity in corporate boardrooms, this lack of diversity was 
identified as a contributing factor in corporate governance failings leading up to 
the credit crisis. The UK Treasury Select Committee on the Banking Crisis 
observed: “If boards consisted of people who read the same newspaper, went 
to the same universities and schools, and have the same prejudices and views 
to sit around a board table, you do not get diversity of view and input” 
(Committee, 2009 para 150). Rost and Osterloh (2008) argue that one of the 
main reasons for bank failures in the lead up to the financial crisis was the 
increased homogeneity of boards and the lack of diversity on boards and 
different viewpoints which led to herding and groupthink. The Association of 
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 There is, however, no evidence that such a diversity index is being used by UK corporates.    
  
94 
 
Chartered Accountants also argues that diversity avoids groupthink on boards 
and specifically encourages greater representation of woman on boards41.  
Perhaps the reason why calls from the Tyson Review went unheeded was the 
fact that such a call was being made at a time of a significant market bubble 
where stock market prices continued to rise and where market participants 
could have pointed at increased profitability, despite a lack of diversity, as 
evidence that there was no reason to change the status quo of existing and 
successful boards. Ironically, it is exactly in times of success, and in particular in 
periods of bubbles, that there is the greatest need for diversity in the boardroom 
and for alternative views to be put forward and for strategies to be challenged.   
One of the issues in the literature in this area is how to define diversity. A 
common distinction made by researchers is on readily observable attributes 
such as race, gender, or nationality. Other less observable forms of diversity are 
less visible underlying attributes and relate to technical abilities such as 
education, functional backgrounds, tenures and social networks. Most of the 
research on diversity and its effects on performance are focused on observable 
diversity (Erhardt et al., 2003)42.  
It is, however, submitted that it is the unobservable cognitive diversity that will 
benefit boardroom decision processes through the different perspectives, ideas 
and knowledge that such cognitive diversity brings to the boardroom.  
Different types of diversity are however not mutually exclusive. Ethnic diversity, 
for example, might be associated with difference in underlying attributes such 
as education or social networks. One of the questions that needs to be 
addressed is whether there is a direct relationship between the observable and 
the non-observable forms of diversity. In other words, does observable diversity 
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 See http://www2.accaglobal.com/databases/pressandpolicy/unitedkingdom/3421213.  
42This is not surprising as it is much easier for researcher to analyse observable diversity.   
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lead to cognitive diversity? This discussion is particularly relevant in the debate 
as to whether gender diversification leads to cognitive diversification in the 
boardroom.  
A number of countries have looked to address diversity in the boardroom by 
focusing on gender. Norway has introduced a quota system which required the 
boards of public companies to have at least 40% of women directors. France 
has introduced legislation in parliament requiring that women constitute 50% of 
the board of directors of publicly listed companies by 2015. Spain has a 
requirement that any privately owned company awarded a public contract must 
have women accounting for at least 40% of its directors. Finally, Iceland has 
adopted legislation that requires publicly owned companies and public limited 
companies with more than fifty employees and boards of more than three 
members to have at least 40% of each gender.   
The Walker Report (2009), whilst recognising the need to improve diversity and 
the gender imbalance on boards, commented that “it would be unrealistic to 
expect to reduce the present unfortunate gender imbalance by ‘parachuting’ into 
boardrooms as NEDs women without executive board and senior executive 
experience elsewhere” (para 3.6). The Walker Report’s observations about the 
paucity of women directors contributed towards a 2010 government initiative to 
appointment Lord Davies. Davies’s remit was to look into the reason why there 
were so few women on boards and to make recommendations as to what the 
government could do to increase the proportion of women on UK corporate 
boards. The result was the publication in May 2011 of the report Women on 
boards (Davies, 2011).  The report observed that in 2010, women made up only 
12.5% of the corporate boards of FTSE 100 companies, up from 9.4% in 2004, 
a rate of increase considered too slow. The report cited research linking greater 
levels of women on boards to improved firm performance (Joy et al. (2007), 
Desvaux et. al (2007)) and that female directors enhance board independence 
(Fondas and Sassalos, 2000). The report did not, however, mention any of the 
research which found a negative correlation between gender diversity and firm 
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performance and did not discuss any of the potential negative implications for 
gender diversification (discussed below). Rather the Report appeared to take as 
a given the benefits of gender diversity. 
The Davies Report however did not recommend a quota for women directors in 
the UK citing the results of a survey it undertook in which only 11% of the 2654 
respondents were in favour of a gender quota. Rather, the Report 
recommended that boards develop and encourage boards to disclose a policy 
concerning diversity and how this policy might be measured. The Report 
recommended that the Financial Reporting Council amend the Corporate Code 
of Governance to require listed companies to include their gender policy in their 
annual accounts. This recommendation has been implemented in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2014). The approach adopted in the UK with 
respect to addressing gender diversity by ensuring greater disclosure and 
transparency of gender policies, is very much in line with the underlying 
philosophy in the UK with respect to governance generally and the underlying 
“comply or explain” philosophy43.  
Rost and Osterloh (2008) make an interesting suggestion to achieve this 
balance between diversity and cohesion highlighted by Langevoort (2000). They 
argue that in radically changing environments, such as that experienced in the 
lead up to the crisis, individuals with no management backgrounds and women 
were highly underrepresented. The authors argue that in such uncertain 
environments women and non-experts make far better market forecasters than 
incumbent male experts. This conclusion as to the relative ability of different 
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 Ariely (2013) however argues that the principle of disclosure, albeit in the context of a conflict 
of interest, can have the opposite of the intended affect. He argues that the act of disclosure 
can give actors the freedom to do what they liked but at the same time they can do so without a 
conscious. This argument may question the effectiveness of the “comply or explain” philosophy. 
However, a further debate on this philosophy is outside the remit of this thesis.   
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actors to make forecasts was drawn from the results of a survey they undertook 
at the time that the harbingers of the financial crisis was obvious, but the full 
extent of the crisis was unknown44. The survey sample was 479 students at the 
University of Zurich from various fields of study (experts were deemed those 
studying finance whilst non-experts were those studying a totally unrelated 
subject.) The students were required to make forecasts as to the future stick 
price of the Swiss Bank, UBS and the study found that both women and non-
experts were better at forecasting the stock returns of UBS than expert males. 
It is submitted that it is difficult to read too much into the actual results of this 
study. A student studying finance at University is not necessarily an “expert” in 
the field of finance45 and predicting a bank’s stock price does not equate to the 
type and complexity of decisions that boards of financial institutions are often 
required to make. Despite these reservations, the authors make some very 
interesting observations about how “criss-cross” theory may be applied to 
achieve balance in the boardroom and second why experts made poor 
decisions in the lead up to the crisis.   
Rost and Osterloh (2008) recognise the importance of balance in the 
composition of boards. Boards that are too diverse can suffer from poor 
communication and lack of co-operation between actors, whilst boards that are 
not diverse enough, are vulnerable to groupthink and a one dimensional 
approach to seeking solutions to problems. To create a balance in the 
composition of boards, they suggest that boards should include what they refer 
to as “criss-cross individuals”, that is, individuals who can be classified as both 
part of a majority and a minorities according to different identified classifications.  
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 The survey was conducted in 2008.  
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 There is an old saying that may be appropriate in this circumstance which is that “a little bit of 
knowledge is a dangerous thing”.  
  
98 
 
The authors focus on gender and expert knowledge as two key factors in 
shaping board compositions and then identify four different possible 
permutations; 1) men who are experts, 2) men who are non-experts, 3) women 
who are experts and, 4) women who are non-experts. Rost and Osterloh then 
argue that the majority of boards are both men and experts and that the 
greatest conflict to such a board will be the inclusion of women who are non-
experts, a combination which reflects the greatest potential conflict on both the 
basis of gender and level of expertise. In contrast, they argue that the potential 
to provide a balance between conflict and cohesiveness is achieved by 
including in the board either a male that is a non-expert or a female who is an 
expert. In their view, a balance is in effect achieved through including actors 
that both conform and conflict with the boardroom norm of men who are 
experts.   
Rost and Osterloh’s solution to achieving a balance between diversity and 
cohesiveness is an interesting one. It might be that classifying individuals into 
distinct categories of experts and non-experts and male and female, and then 
deciding the composition of the board on that basis, is too simplistic and one 
dimensional. What this research does, however, highlight is the need for boards 
to consider the composition of their board with a view towards achieving a 
balance between cohesiveness and diversity. Further, it highlights that gender 
diversification, in isolation, may be insufficient to achieve true cognitive 
diversity. This is a point discussed in greater detail later in this chapter and in 
chapter 8.  
Rost and Osterloh draw on behavioural economics, and in particular the works 
of Kahneman and Tversky (1986) and (1981), to argue that experts are prone to 
make mistakes due to bounded rationality. For example behaviour is affected by 
representativeness, or availability, and that in order to render complex problems 
manageable humans have an inclination to predict uncertain events in the 
future by looking at a small portion of data and from those inferring 
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conclusions46. Experts faced with making a decision in the future are therefore 
at risk of relying unduly on past experiences and do not consider other 
alternatives widely enough. Further, behaviour is affected by anchoring 
adjustments where individuals use a past event or trend as a reference point to 
influence upcoming decisions. Experts given their experience are more at risk of 
being influenced by anchors which, in a market characterised by high levels of 
growth and new era thinking, might result in future decisions being anchored, or 
influenced, by an environment in which asset prices were inflated. The 
consequence being an increased risk of future decisions being poorly made.  
The counter argument to this presented by Rost and Osterloh above is that 
experts will have extensive experiences often spanning long periods of time and 
different environments. Experts are therefore, it is argued, less likely to take 
current market conditions into account as an anchor when making future 
decisions. Rather, non-experts are more vulnerable to biases such as anchoring 
and availability biases, given the wider and broader set of data and experiences 
available to them.  
It is submitted that the important point in this debate is not whether experts are 
more susceptible to such biases than non-experts, but rather that both sets of 
actors are vulnerable to inherent biases but given their different experiences will 
be affected in different ways. This highlights two important points. First, it 
reconfirms the importance of diversity in a group setting and that different actors 
will be influenced by different past experiences and that this will ensure that 
there is a diversity of experiences and ideas combining to make decisions. 
Second, it highlights the importance of psychology and behavioural economics 
in decision processes - a point central to my thesis.   
A research stream looking at gender differences has focused on behavioural 
differences between men and women. Ricciardi (2008), for example, observes 
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 This is commonly known as an “availability bias”.  
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that woman worry more than men and that this impacts their decision process. 
Individuals that worry show a higher intolerance to uncertainty and a lower 
tolerance to risk resulting in underperformance in good times and 
outperformance in bad times47.   
The link between greater levels of worrying and lower risk tolerance has also 
been made by Shiv et al. (2005) who undertook a series of experiments with 
individuals incapable of feeling emotions due to brain lesions. The results 
showed that those that had this form of brain damage took more risks than 
those in the “normal” control group. The conclusion drawn was that as the brain 
injured subjects were incapable of experiencing worry, anxiety and fear, this 
resulted in them being more inclined to accept risks and less likely to exhibit 
loss averse behaviour.   
Further, Jionakopolos and Bernasek (1998) concluded from a 1989 study in the 
US that single women show more risk aversion in financial decisions than single 
men. Other studies that have concluded that men take more risks than woman 
in the field of finance include Karabenick and Addy (1979) and Sorrentino et al. 
(1992). Rost and Osterloh (2008) also highlight how gender differences in 
worrying will effect risk decision processes and that the reason why women 
worry more than men is unclear, and that it might be a result of different 
socialisation processes or it might be inbuilt, that is “nature versus nurture”.   
Another behavioural difference related to gender that researchers have 
highlighted is in relation to confidence levels. Overconfidence has been 
highlighted as an important characteristic associated with poor decision 
process. Barber and Odeon (2001) found that in areas of finance, men are more 
confident than women. This conclusion was drawn from analysing trading data 
from over 35000 households from a large US brokerage firm over a five year 
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 Indeed as highlighted previously, banks that outperformed in the lead up to the crash were 
the hardest hit in the crash itself (Beltratti and Stulz, 2009).  
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period. The authors used trading as a proxy for confidence with the theory being 
that the more confident an individual is the more likely he/she is to trade. The 
study found that the average turnover rate for men was one and a half times 
higher than it was for women. Interesting higher trading levels by men actually 
resulted in lower performance levels. This highlights the point that we are 
generally overconfident about our abilities and that we tend to overestimate the 
precision of our knowledge and abilities  (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982).  
Other research which focused on gender differences highlighted that 
overconfidence can be task related and that differences in confidence are 
greatest in tasks perceived as being in the male domain. Finance has 
historically been a male dominated industry (Beyer and Bowden, 1997). Men 
are therefore more likely to feel confident than women do in financial matters 
(Prince, 1993). Overconfident investors believe more strongly in their own 
beliefs and valuations and concern themselves less about the beliefs of others 
(Barber and Odean, 2001). If men are more confident that women in financial 
matters, then this overconfidence can, as highlighted previously, be a significant 
contributing factor in a poor decision processes particularly in difficult tasks with 
low levels of predictability. The behavioural differences related to gender which 
academics have highlighted with respect to risk taking and overconfidence 
provide strong arguments for the inclusion of more women in boards to provide 
more balance in the risk profile of boards, something which was clearly absent 
in many financial institutions in the lead up to the crisis.  
In addition to the research highlighted above, there is a strong body of research 
which highlights the benefits of gender diversity (see for example Burke (1997), 
Bantel and Jackson (1989), Huse and Solberg (2006) and Pearce and Zahra 
(1991)). However, there are also research findings which question the benefit of 
gender diversity. Tannen (2001) found that woman feel intimidated and 
uncomfortable in groups and are thus less willing to offer ideas. Further men 
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can get impatient with such reluctance and that this can further reduce group 
effectiveness48.  
Research by Kanter (1993), Kent and McGrath (1969), Clement and Schierneck 
(1973) have all shown that single sex groups outperform mixed sex groups. 
Alagna et al. (1982) in a study of all male versus mixed medical students, found 
that mixed sex groups reported higher levels of conflict, interpersonal tension, 
and lower levels of cohesion, findings consistent with the theories of social 
categorisation and similarity attraction highlighted above. O’Reilly et al. (1989) 
found no significant direct or indirect relationship between gender diversity and 
group performance. Shrader et al. (1997) investigated the relationship between 
the percentage of female board members and two accounting measures of 
financial value (return on assets and return on equity) and found a significant 
negative relationship between the percentage of woman on the board and firm 
value. In contrast, however, Carter et al. (2003) found a positive relationship 
between woman and minorities on the board and firm value49.  
This is quite clearly a difficult subject without a clear definitive answer. The 
solution perhaps lies in a discussion of nature versus nurture. Are woman 
different because of inbuilt or genetic differences or is this a result of 
experiences which have shaped views? Are woman, for example, inherently 
more risk averse than men or this a function of the role in which they have 
historically had in society? Are woman that have had just as much exposure to 
the field of finance as men going to be as confident as men in their decision 
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 Related to this finding is the research by Konrad et al. (2008) who found that it takes a critical 
mass of at least three woman on a board to affect change. The presence of three or more 
woman not only improves their own board experiences but also enhances the contributions that 
woman will make on boards as they are not isolated and are not treated as outsiders. 
49
 The lack of consensus in finding a direct relationship between demographics (in this case 
gender) and firm performance amongst academics has been discussed earlier in this chapter.  
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process? Does gender diversity automatically provide an organisation with 
greater cognitive diversity? Or is the answer to the nature versus nurture 
question that it is a combination of both nature and nurture which determines 
attributes (Shenk, 2010)? This is an ongoing academic debate which is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  
Indeed it could be argued that the emphasis on gender for the purposes of 
boardroom diversity is misleading and misguided. Instead, perhaps the focus 
should be on cognitive diversity looking to highlight individuals that can bring 
diverse perspective and different information bases into discussions. Gender is 
often used as a proxy for cognitive diversity and gender and cognitive diversity 
are often correlated. Hillman et al. (2002) for example found that female (and 
Afro-American) directors are more likely to come from non-business 
backgrounds and are more likely to hold advanced degrees than white males in 
a 1997 study of Fortune 100 boards.  
The argument, however, could be made that gender will not always provide 
cognitive diversity and just because a board candidate is a woman, it does not 
automatically follow that she provides the necessary cognitive diversity that a 
board desires. A woman NED that has the same educational and work 
background as existing directors may not provide cognitive diversity just 
because of her gender. Rather than focusing on gender, directors should be 
seen as a “bundle of attributes” (Ruigrok et al., 2007) and more sophisticated 
measures aimed at highlighting cognitive differences in board members should 
be employed in the search for boardroom diversity rather than relying solely on 
crude and easily identifiable measures such as gender or nationality. 
It is however submitted that on balance the arguments favour a focus on gender 
diversification as a means of achieving cognitive diversity in the corporate 
boardroom. The positives to such an approach point to the possibility of 
inherent inbuilt gender differences which will bring different attributes to 
boardroom discussions, such as a natural risk aversion in women. Women are 
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also less likely to be part of the “old boys” network often associated with all 
male boards and as such gender is a good proxy for less observable but 
important types of diversity.  
A sole focus on gender diversification may however lull boards into the false 
sense of security that boards they have achieved true cognitive diversity when 
in reality they may have just appointed a woman to the board that provides 
little/no cognitive diversity compared to existing board members. This would 
occur when a women board member has identical networks, skills and work 
experiences as that of existing members. Finally the emphasis on appointing 
women may pressurise boards into gender tokenism. If female directors are 
chosen merely because of tokenism, their impact is likely to be minimal (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2004). Overall, however, the conclusions drawn in this thesis are 
that greater gender diversity should be encouraged but not seen as the 
panacea for achieving true cognitive diversity (as highlighted by Rost and 
Osteloh (2008)).   
In summary, cognitive diversification is an important characteristic that should 
be encouraged in the composition of corporate boardrooms. Such diversity can 
improve the quality and creativity of decision making and reduce the 
possibilities of groupthink, group polarisation and de-individuation from 
occurring. There is a natural gravitation towards homogeneity on group boards 
and a prestige associated with being a board member that accentuates the 
need for diversity in this particular group setting. Diversity will reduce cohesion 
of the type associated with highly homogenous and cohesive boards, increase 
cognitive conflict and boardroom challenge and, improve the quality of 
information and decision making processes. Increasing the number of women 
on boards should improve such diversity but this should not be the only criteria 
in which boards define true diversity.   
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2.13 Conclusion 
In summary, many of the developments in corporate governance, although 
partially reactionary in nature, have helped to set out structural guidelines for 
corporations. Recommendations such as independent directors along other 
reforms related to audit and remuneration committees and the separation of 
CEO and chairman 50  are building blocks which can help to prevent poor 
decision making but they clearly are not a panacea. As the financial crisis has 
highlighted, good governance guidelines such as that set out in the Code 
doesn’t necessarily result in effective decision making and the existence of a 
robust board challenge. What is missing is an appreciation of the dynamics of 
individual boardrooms and in addressing the psychological aspects of how 
individuals interact within groups. The key to good reforms are therefore social 
rather than structural. As Sonnenfeld (2002) notes: “As important as 
implementation and rules and regulations are the human dynamics of boards as 
social systems where leadership character, individual values, decision-making 
processes, conflict management, and strategic thinking will truly differentiate a 
firm’s governance” (ibid, p.  112).  
The next chapter of this thesis focuses on examining the literature which 
explores the normative and informative influences on board decision making 
processes.  
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 See paragraphs C3, D1 and A.2.1 respectively of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2014).  
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Chapter 3: Groupthink; Herding, Group Polarisation, De-individuation, 
Epistemic Blind Spots and Economic Bubble Theories 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine the literature on the normative and informative 
influences on board decision processes. The starting point for this review 
related to the phenomena of groupthink and herding, both specifically identified 
by the Nyberg Commission (2011) as being a significant contributing factor in 
the poor decision process undertaken by the Irish banks in the lead up to the 
crisis. This chapter will not limit itself to just a discussion of just groupthink and 
herding literature but will also examine the literature related to group 
polarisation, epistemic blind spots and economic bubble theory. These 
phenomena have been identified in the review of the literature as being 
potentially relevant in enhancing the understanding of the decision processes of 
the Irish banks in the lead up to the crisis.  
 
3.2 Groupthink 
It was a school history project on the failed United States invasion of Cuba 
which was the catalyst for the concept of “groupthink”. Irving Janis was helping 
his daughter with her assignment when he began to wonder how John F. 
Kennedy and his advisors had agreed to the poorly thought out and ill-advised 
Cuban invasion. Janis questioned whether “some kind of psychological 
contagion, similar to social conformity phenomena observed in studies of small 
groups” (Janis, 1972, p. viii) had affected the decision making process. This 
question, and his subsequent search for the answer, was the catalyst for 
publication of his seminal book Groupthink in 1972. In this book, Janis studied a 
set of four policy decisions by four separate US presidents which resulted in 
fiascos; Roosevelt and his failure to foresee the attack on Pearl Harbour, 
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Truman and his invasion of North Korea, Kennedy and the aforementioned Bay 
of Pigs invasion and Johnson on the escalation of the Vietnam war. Janis 
looked to contrast the decisions made in these scenarios against two historical 
cases which produced good policy decisions; the development of the Marshall 
Plan to avert economic collapse in post war Europe and Kennedy’s handling of 
the Cuban Missile crisis. In the second edition of his book, published in 1982, 
Janis refined his theory and included the series of decisions by Nixon with 
respect to the Watergate scandal as a further example of groupthink51.  
Janis groupthink model legitimised the importance of previous academic 
research on social influences and group process and drew on work from 
pioneers in the field of conformity research, in particular Lewin (1947), Festinger 
(1954), Back (1951),and Schachter (1951).  
Janis’s groupthink model highlights the pressure for conformity in cohesive 
groups, the desire to reconcile ones opinions with that of a selected “in-group”, 
and the relationship between conformity and group attractiveness. Janis defined 
groupthink as a “quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people 
engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the 
members striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action” (Janis, 1972, p. 9) 
Janis’ interpretation and definition of the term groupthink was significant for two 
reasons. First, Janis made the link between the pressure for conformity in 
cohesive groups and the increased risk of a defective decision making process. 
Until Janis’s research, academics had thought that tightly knit groups came to 
quicker and more, not less, effective decisions (Aldag and Fuller, 1993). The 
idea was “impressive in its counterintuitive power: the realisation that, 
depending upon the content of group norms, harmonious, cooperative, team-
like entities may be a liability rather than an asset in producing high-quality 
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 Janis considered the Watergate cover up as his best example of groupthink.  
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decisions” (Hart, 1994, p. 253). Second, the analysis of political decision making 
had long been dominated by rational choice perspective and Janis was the first 
to try to interpret such decisions in a psychological sense52 (Hart, 1994).  
Janis’ groupthink is an excessive form of concurrence seeking amongst 
members of high prestige, tightly knit groups. It occurs when the group 
members come to value the group, and their membership of the group, higher 
than other factors. The result of this is that group members strive for a quick 
unanimity on the issues that the group has to confront. Agreement between 
members will generally occur very quickly through a strong tendency for 
concurrence seeking to maintain the atmosphere in the group. To preserve the 
clubby atmosphere and the unity in the group, members suppress personal 
doubts, silence dissenters and have a strong belief in the morality of the group 
and a poor view of those outside the group. The result is a distorted view of 
reality, excessive optimism and hastily thought out policies. These flawed 
policies then lead to inadequate and premature solutions, that in hindsight, 
surprise those outside the group by the hubris of the members, the absence of 
insight and lack of concern for the consequences of failure (Baron, 2005). 
Many sources and types of errors can produce defective decision making. 
There is widespread recognition in numerous studies that show conformity in 
group settings, see, for example Deutsch and Gerard (1955) and Asch (1952). It 
is however Janis’s argument that the cohesiveness of the group promotes this 
conformity because group members want to remain in the group given the 
status and prestige that such membership offers, that differentiates the theory of 
groupthink. According to Janis, it is the strong cohesion and the desire to 
commitment to the group itself, that the pressure for conformity increases, 
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 The essence of this debate continues today in the field of finance between those that argue 
that the markets are on the whole rational and efficient with those that argue that most decisions 
are not made rationally but are very often rooted in psychological responses which are not at all 
rational. See, for example, Skidelsky (2010) and Akerlof and Shiller (2009).  
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resulting often in premature consensus before a thorough decision making 
process is undertaken. Janis’ contribution lies in the counter-intuitive realisation 
that group cohesiveness might be a liability rather than a positive for high 
quality decision making. 
 
3.2.1 Group cohesiveness and group homogeneity in relation to 
Janis’ groupthink construct 
Group cohesiveness is the crucial “linchpin” in Janis’s depiction of the dynamics 
of groupthink (Hart, 1994, p. 251) and is the primary and necessary antecedent 
condition for groupthink to occur. It is therefore difficult to overstate the 
importance of group cohesiveness to the theory of groupthink and for Janis, 
groupthink cannot exist without cohesion: “Only when a group of policy makers 
is moderately or highly cohesive can we expect the groupthink syndrome to 
emerge as the members are working collectively on one or another of their 
important policy decisions (Janis, 1982, p. 176).”  
Janis himself does not provide a clear cut definition of cohesiveness although 
he does refer to cohesiveness in the context of members’ positive valuation of 
the group and their motivation to continue to belong to it. Janis’s cohesiveness 
is one of a comfortable and “clubby” solidarity as is illustrated by his statement:  
“When group cohesiveness is high, all the members express solidarity, mutual 
liking, and positive feelings about attending meetings and carrying out the 
routine tasks of the group” (Janis, 1982, p. 5).   
Festinger (1950) however defined group cohesiveness as “the resultant forces 
which are acting on the members to stay in a group” (ibid, p. 274). Longley and 
Pruitt (1980) on the other hand, summarise  Janis’ definition of cohesiveness to 
mean “the degree to which members find their group attractive (Ibid, p. 81)”.  
Although Janis does not provide a precise definition of cohesiveness, he does 
suggest several explanations as to how cohesiveness contributes towards 
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groupthink. One is that cohesiveness and the sense of security from that unity, 
encourages a strong sense of confidence perhaps even euphoria and an 
illusion of invulnerability that curtails examination of the positive or negative 
consequences of a specific decision. “The various devices to enhance 
confidence and self-esteem require an illusion of unanimity about important 
judgements. Without it, the sense of group unity would be lost, gnawing doubts 
would start to grow ... preserving the sense of unity can do more than keep 
anxiety, shame, and guilt to a minimum; it can induce pleasant feelings of 
elation” (Janis, 1982, p. 258). 
A second explanation is that members of cohesive groups are motivated to 
maintain the spirit and unity in the organisation that they so cherish, and that the 
preservation of this unity takes preference over a dissenting view: “The more 
amiability and spirit de corps among the members of a policy-making group, the 
greater is the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by 
groupthink” (Janis, 1982, p. 13).  
Finally, in drawing on the conclusions of Schachter (1951) and Festinger 
(1954), Janis notes that cohesive groups put pressure on dissenters to alter 
their views and conform to the group norm. “When groupthink dominates, 
suppression of deviant thoughts takes the form of each person’s deciding that 
his misgivings are not relevant, that the benefit of any doubt should be given to 
the group consensus” (Janis, 1982, p. 247).  
Janis recognised the distinction between task-oriented cohesion and social-
emotional cohesion. Janis’s model is therefore limited to those contexts in which 
social-emotional cohesion is dominant. This observation is consistent with 
research done by Bernthal and Insko (1993) who found that higher socio-
emotional cohesion were more likely to experience groupthink than groups high 
in task-orientated cohesion.  
Cohesiveness is a necessary condition in Janis’s model of groupthink but it 
does not follow that every cohesive group will fall victim to groupthink. A point 
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recognised by Janis: “It follows that the positive relationship between 
cohesiveness and groupthink cannot be regarded as iron law of executive 
behaviour that dooms the members of every cohesive group to become victims 
of groupthink every time they make a collective decision. If the group 
encouraged individual dissent and alternative strategies to problem solving, it is 
likely that groupthink will be avoided even in high cohesive groups”53 (Janis, 
1982, p. 245).   
Closely related to the concept of cohesiveness is homogeneity. Groups that are 
characterised by high levels of homogeneity are more likely to be cohesive as 
they are more likely to share common values and ideas. Group homogeneity 
was not, however, initially included as an antecedent by Janis in his original 
analysis of six antecedent (Janis, 1972) but was added in the 1982 version of 
the book which included a discussion of the Watergate cover-up with President 
Nixon – his best example of groupthink. “Lack of disparity in social background 
and ideology among the members of a cohesive group makes it easier for them 
to concur on whatever proposals are put forward by the leader to deal with the 
policy problems they are confronting” (Janis, 1982, p. 250).  
All of the literature reviewed for this thesis identified group homogeneity as an 
important antecedent for groupthink. Baron (1995), Whyte (1998) and Hart 
(1994) all included group homogeneity as an antecedent in their versions of 
groupthink. Further, Shafer and Crichlow (1996) and McCauley (1989) both 
specifically highlight group homogeneity as a key antecedent in their research 
findings. Unlike group cohesiveness which has engendered much discussion 
and disagreement as to its role in the groupthink process, the homogeneity of 
group members’ social backgrounds and ideologies, as identified by Janis, has 
been undisputed by researchers.  
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There is, as Janis notes, a natural tendency for human beings to gravitate 
towards those that are similar to themselves. This is well recognised in 
academic literature; Heffernan (2012) argues that the most important criteria in 
selecting a life partner is homogeneity and that we are attracted to those that 
are most similar to ourselves. In a business context, Moore (1962) notes that 
managers tend to promote those that are similar to themselves on the basis of a 
kinship based on which predominantly men reproduce themselves in their own 
image.  
 
3.2.2 The constructs of Janis’ groupthink model 
Janis identified four structural conditions (represented by Box B1 in Figure 1) 
that, in addition to cohesiveness, play an important role in groupthink. They are: 
1) group insulation from outside sources of information and opinion that could 
challenge group beliefs; 2) a lack of tradition of impartial leadership 3) lack of 
norms requiring methodical decision-making procedures for considering 
evidence and alternative options; and 4) homogeneity of members’ social 
backgrounds and ideologies. These conditions increase the likelihood of 
groupthink because they do not provide an organizational structure that would 
prevent members from developing the premature concurrence seeking 
associated with groupthink.  
Janis further identifies what he terms a “provocative situational context” related 
primarily to stress which also contributes towards groupthink (represented by 
Box B2 in Figure 1). These are 1) high stress from external threats, and 2) low 
self-esteem induced by recent failures, excessive difficulty on current decision 
making tasks and moral dilemmas relating to lack of feasible alternatives except 
ones that violate ethical norms.      
Not all of the antecedents noted above need to be present, but the more of 
those that are observed, the greater the chances of defective decision making 
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as a result of groupthink (Ibid, p. 245). After identifying the antecedents of 
groupthink, Janis then identifies eight observable symptoms of groupthink 
(represented by Box C in Figure 1) and the symptoms of defective decision 
making of which Janis has identified seven types (represented in Box D in 
Figure 1). The result of this being a low probability of a successful outcome 
(represented by Box E in Figure 1). In summary the groupthink process involves 
a causal link connecting the structural antecedent conditions with the 
concurrence seeking tendencies, indications of defective decision making and a 
decision outcome with a low probability of success.    
The model does not suggest that groupthink is inevitable, but rather that in the 
presence of the antecedents increased risk of defective decision making exists. 
This is reflected in the model itself as the end result of groupthink reflected in 
“Box E” in Figure 1 refers to a “low probability of a successful outcome”. 
Groupthink is thus a process not an outcome, and it does not necessarily follow 
that it will always result in poor outcomes but the chances are much higher that 
this will be the case. In other words, the link between groupthink and failure is 
probabilistic rather than deterministic (Yetiv, 2003).   
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Figure 3.1: Janis’ Groupthink Model 
 
Although Janis focused his research with respect to high level foreign policy 
fiascos, the groupthink concept has had a wide and interdisciplinary impact and 
is mentioned in literature in diverse fields including political science, 
communications, business organisations, social psychology, management, 
healthcare and academia. Groupthink has been mentioned as either the primary 
or a contributing cause of a huge range of defective decisions in a wide array of 
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decisions. This includes Ford’s decision to build the Edsel car (Huseman and 
Driver, 1979), the Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster (Esser and Lindoerfer, 
1989), the US decision to invade Iran (Yetiv, 2003), and the failures of 
WorldCom (Scharff, 2005), Enron (O’Connor, 2002) and SwissAir (Hermann 
and Rammal, 2010).  
Groupthink has also been explored in a religious context. Schnall and 
Greenberg (2012) discuss the vulnerability of the ancient court of Israel to 
groupthink antecedents and provide a wide range of reasons why they believe 
the courts avoided groupthink. Rost et al. (2010) noted that the structure of the 
Benedicte Abbeys made them vulnerable to groupthink. Klein et al. (2009) 
highlighted the risk of groupthink in academia. Mitchell and Eckstein (2009) 
reviewed the applicability of groupthink in relation to jury decisions and 
concluded that juries are at risk of groupthink. In the area of corporate 
governance, Maharaj (2008) urged greater attention to the behavioural 
characteristics of board members in order to reduce the likelihood of a 
groupthink mentality being created which would impede overall board 
effectiveness.  
Not surprisingly given the breadth of the examples noted above, groupthink 
theory has been described as the dominant theory used to explain decision 
fiascos and as a conceptual “tour de force” (Whyte, 1998, p. 186). Paulus 
(1998) describes the theory as an “influential and highly cited construct” (ibid, p. 
362). These views are shared by numerous other academic researchers (see 
for example Hart (1994), Esser and Lindoerfer (1989), McCauley (1998), Baron 
(2005), Yetiv (2003),  Wei Choo (2007) and O’Connor (2002)).    
 
3.2.3 Laboratory and Case Study application of groupthink  
Janis’s theory has created significant interest in academic circles and 
subsequent research into the groupthink theory can be divided into three broad 
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categories. First, laboratory studies which have looked to test and isolate some 
of the antecedents of groupthink identified by Janis. Second, and following 
Janis’s lead, research applying the groupthink concept in a retrospective case 
study analysis. Third, researchers that have suggested either modifications or 
revisions to Janis’s model, or in the extreme example of Aldag and Fuller 
(1993), a total rejection of the groupthink concept. These areas of groupthink 
research are discussed below.  
Laboratory research into groupthink has provided little support for Janis’s 
groupthink and in particular his core antecedent of group cohesiveness being a 
necessary antecedent for groupthink to occur (see for example Flowers (1977), 
Leana (1985), Fodor and Smith (1982) ,Callaway and Esser (1984) and 
Courtright (1978)). There are two possible explanations for this. First, this lack 
of support may be partly accounted for by the difficulty in testing the groupthink 
concept in laboratory settings. One of the limitations of laboratory tests relates 
to the complexity of the linear groupthink model with its seven antecedents, 
eight symptoms of groupthink and seven symptoms of defective decision 
making. Academics have found it impossible to do a comprehensive study with 
manipulation of all the variables. The reason being is that this would require a 
very large sample and the inevitable statistical problem of multicolinearity and 
high correlation between the independent variables. A point recognised by both 
Park (1990) and Flippen (1999). 
As a result, laboratory studies have tested a few of the antecedents in isolation 
(see for example Turner et al. (1992) that tested three of Janis’s antecedents or 
Moorhead and Montanari (1986) who tested just two). Partial tests can be 
misleading because the effects of two or three of the antecedent factors might 
be different from those of the full array considered simultaneously due to the 
way in which the antecedents might interact with each other (Park, 1990). This 
is consistent with Janis’s thinking, as he predicted interaction effects between 
the antecedents in his model. Indeed, Baron (1995) argues that the specific 
experiments relating to the link between group cohesiveness and groupthink is 
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more a test of a specific hypothesis within the broader framework of groupthink 
than it is a test of the theory of groupthink as a whole. 
Second, it is extremely difficult for laboratory tests to induce genuinely high 
levels of group cohesiveness such as that envisaged by Janis in mature groups 
working in “real life” situations. A comparison of “strangers” versus “mere 
acquaintances” as manipulated by Flowers (1977) is very different from the type 
of cohesion which exists in long standing and intense groups where the 
members have a deep emotional tie to the group and are making decisions in 
real life scenarios. This was recognised by Leana (1985) when she noted that 
her manipulation of cohesiveness may not have been powerful enough to 
produce the effects postulated by Janis (ibid, p. 15). All these experiments cited 
above were conducted using University students and generalising from this 
small sample of students to the entire population may not be valid. Moreover 
Posner-Weber (1987) pose the question as to whether students behave 
differently in a laboratory setting. 
In summary laboratory tests have reflected, at best, mixed support linking 
cohesiveness to a poor decision process. However, as discussed above, these 
result need to be seen in light of the limitations of replicating potential 
groupthink scenarios in a laboratory setting and may reveal more about the 
limitations of the tests themselves than the applicability of Janis’ groupthink 
theory.  
Researchers that have applied the groupthink concept to retrospective case 
studies of poor decision making scenarios have been more successful in 
evidencing groupthink (see for example Manz and Sims (1982), Hensley and 
Griffin (1986), Eaton (2001), O’Connor (2002), Yetiv (2003), Scharff (2005), 
Ahlstronm and Wang (2009) and McConnell (2012)). There are, however, 
epistemological hurdles relating to the application of retrospective case studies 
to the groupthink concept that need to be taken into consideration.     
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First such approach has, as a starting point, a series of poor decisions and then 
looks to apply a theory to those decisions, making an assumption of the cause 
and effect relationship between poor decision making and groupthink. In other 
words, a self-selected solution is applied to a self-selected problem without 
considering whether there are other potential causes of the poor decision 
making process. Indeed Paulus (1988) even argues that case studies can be 
used as evidence for almost any theory one wishes, whilst Yetiv (2003)  warns 
of what he sees as the risk of a “suspicious fit” when applying the theory to a 
retrospective case study.   
Second, there is the risk that that unconscious biases will result in selective 
interpretation of the events to match the theory of groupthink with the poor 
decision making processes. If one has a starting point a potential solution, it will 
require significant academic rigour and discipline to avoid looking for the 
evidence that connects the cause and effect, particularly if one applies a looser 
more generic version of the concept of groupthink. The debate as how to define 
groupthink is discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
 
 3.2.4 Research suggesting modifications to Janis’ theory 
The results of groupthink research in both the laboratory and through case 
studies has resulted in a number of suggestions and modifications to the 
original theory espoused by Janis. Such developments and suggestions are to 
be expected. Aldag and Fuller (1993), Baron (1995), McCauley (1998), Hart 
(1994) and Whyte (1998) all argue that the conceptual basis of the model needs 
to be broadened in light of the research results. Paulus (1988) recognised that 
Janis model “represents a brilliant construction” (ibid, p. 371), but argues that 
“theories are temporary guides to understanding reality on the way to 
discovering the truth” (ibid, p. 367) and that all theories require some 
modification subsequent to presentation. He cites Festinger (1987): “No theory 
is going to be inviolate. Let me put it clearly. The only kind of theory that can be 
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proposed and ever will be proposed that absolutely will remain inviolate for 
decades, certainly centuries, is a theory that is not testable. If a theory is at all 
testable, it will not remain unchanged. It has to change. All theories are wrong. 
One doesn’t ask about theories, can I show that they are wrong or can I show 
that they are right, but rather one asks, how much of the empirical realm can it 
handle and how must it be modified and changed as it matures.” (original paper 
unseen). 
In summary, what these academics are arguing is that the groupthink model 
must be adapted to take into account the years of research which have followed 
Janis’s initial findings in the early 1970’s. What follows below is a review of the 
research of Baron (2005), Whyte (1998, 1989, 1993), Hart (1994) and Turner 
and Pratkanis (1998) suggesting modifications to Janis’ groupthink theory54.  
Baron (2005) argues that Janis was correct about the symptoms of groupthink 
but incorrect when it came to identifying the antecedents of groupthink. “I 
contend that not only are these conditions [Janis’s antecedents to groupthink] 
not necessary to provoke the symptoms of groupthink, but they often will not 
even amplify such symptoms given the high likelihood that such symptoms will 
develop in the complete absence of intense cohesion, crisis, group insulation, 
etc.” (ibid, p. 13).  
Baron’s therefore suggests his ubiquity model of groupthink model representing 
a revision rather than a rejection of Janis’s model by re-defining the 
antecedents of groupthink. Baron identifies three as opposed to the seven 
antecedents to groupthink suggested by Janis. Baron’s first antecedent is that 
individuals must feel a sense of social identity with the collection of individuals 
they are among. If one is part of a group with a clear social identity, the theory 
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 This is by no means an exhaustive list of the literature in this area (see for example 
(McCauley, 1998; Raven, 1998; Schafer and Crichlow, 1996). However for the purposes of my 
thesis and in the interests of pragmatism a discussion was limited to the four views above which 
are representative of the types of modifications recommended to Janis’s groupthink.  
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being that this will evoke feelings of allegiances and social identity. Baron’s 
second antecedent condition is that group interaction must produce, or reveal, 
an emerging or dominant norm if the symptoms of groupthink are to occur. 
Lastly, Baron identified situational low self-efficacy as an antecedent to his 
ubiquity model of groupthink. Baron refers here to a situation where group 
members lack confidence in their ability to reach satisfactory resolution for the 
issues facing them in a decision process.  
A review of Baron’s antecedents reveal many similarities to that suggested by 
Janis, but not surprisingly the antecedents are less restrictive and allow for 
groupthink to develop in a much broader group setting than that envisaged by 
Janis. Excluded from his model are the requirements for intense cohesion, 
strong external threat in a crisis situation in which few feasible solutions are 
available, and the insularity of the group. Janis’s other antecedents such as 
homogeneity of the group, directive group membership and low self-esteem are 
indirectly included in Baron’s ubiquity model. Given the relaxation of the 
antecedent conditions proposed by Baron, it is not difficult to extrapolate from 
this that his theory that groupthink is much more common and pervasive than 
Janis had envisaged and therefore are not limited to high level, complex 
decision processes.  
Baron does reconcile his model to Janis’s when discussing the weak or strong 
version of his ubiquity model. The strong version of his theory holds that the 
three antecedent conditions Baron identified, were not only necessary for 
groupthink but also exhaustive. Baron however favours a weaker version of his 
model which implies that other antecedent factors, identified by Janis but 
rejected by Baron, as being causes of groupthink may still affect the groupthink 
process: “This moderate version of the ubiquity model leaves open the 
possibility that any of the antecedent conditions specified by Janis might still, 
under certain circumstances, heighten the likelihood or intensity of groupthink” 
(ibid, p. 37). In other words, Baron is less formulaic or prescriptive in identifying 
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specific antecedents of groupthink but rather that the impact of specific 
antecedent will be dependent on contextual circumstances.   
Whyte (1998, 1989, 1993), offers an alternative groupthink model to that 
proposed by Janis and Baron. Whyte, like Baron above, does not challenge the 
concept of groupthink and predicts the same outcomes, decision making 
defects and symptoms of groupthink as defined by Janis but relies on different 
explanations for the antecedent conditions. Whyte draws on the research of 
Longley and Pruitt (1980), Fodor and Smith (1982), Leana (1985) and, in 
particular, Tetlock et al. (1992) to argue that group cohesiveness and the 
antecedents associated with provocative situations (high stress and low self-
esteem) are dropped from the groupthink model. Whyte suggests replacing 
these antecedents with the concept of collective efficacy.  
Whyte (1998) defines collective efficacy as “a collective belief about the group’s 
ability to successfully perform some task” (ibid, p. 189). Whyte derives this term 
from the notion of self-efficacy and draws on the definition provided by Bandura 
(1986) who describes self-efficacy as “people’s judgement of their capabilities to 
organise and execute course of action required to attain designated types of 
performances. It is concerned not with the skill one has, but with the 
judgements of what one can do with whatever skills one possesses” (ibid, p. 
319).  
In Whyte’s view, perceived collective efficacy can become problematic when it 
becomes too high resulting in overconfidence and ultimately poor performance. 
Whyte (1989) makes a clear differentiation between overconfidence which he 
sees as “probably doing more good than harm” (ibid, p. 203) and what he sees 
as a very extreme form of collective overconfidence: “It is only when beliefs of 
collective capability become unrealistically exaggerated, unduly disparate from 
what is realistically possible, and assume the quality and hubris that high 
collective efficacy should be eradicated because it leads to groupthink” (ibid, 
p203).   
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Whyte noted that past successes of the group would heighten levels of 
collective efficacy which would then have an impact on other antecedent factors 
exacerbating the likelihood of groupthink occurring. As leaders make decisions 
that at least in the short term are vindicated by events that unfold, they can 
become intolerant to opposing views and more likely to show signs of impartial 
leadership. Further, success can make groups less concerned with the needs to 
maintain methodical procedures, another antecedent of groupthink. Whyte also 
suggests that the length of the track record of success might also determine 
how quickly efficacy perceptions decline in the face of negative feedback. In 
other words, the longer the group is successful, the less likely that the self-
efficacy will diminish when faced with a challenging situation. Historically 
successful groups are therefore more vulnerable to groupthink.  
Whyte argued that Janis had confused high collective efficacy and 
cohesiveness and that Janis’s approach is “infused with the notion of collective 
efficacy, although he does not use this term directly and attributes the formation 
of this attitude to cohesiveness as opposed to assigning it a role as the primary 
antecedent to groupthink” (ibid, p.203). Whyte refers to four case studies to 
illustrate this point, three of which relate to case studies cited by Janis himself.  
Whyte (1998) links his core antecedent of collective efficacy to the symptoms of 
groupthink identified by Janis. He notes that illusion of invulnerability and the 
belief in the inherent morality of the group relate to excessive optimism 
(collective self-efficacy) and increased likelihood of risk taking without 
considering the consequences of such action. Further Whyte argues that the 
other symptoms of groupthink, namely self-censorship, an illusion of unanimity, 
direct pressure on dissidents and reliance on self-appointed mind-guards are all 
related to high collective self-efficacy. 
Although Whyte recommends replacing high cohesiveness and provocative 
situational context with collective efficacy, he accepts Janis’s antecedents 
relating to the structural faults of the organisation, namely insulation of the 
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group, lack of tradition of an impartial leader, lack of norms requiring methodical 
procedures and homogeneity of group members. Whyte therefore accepts the 
symptoms of groupthink, the antecedents related to the structural faults of the 
organisation but his contribution in the groupthink debate lies in his argument 
for the replacement of group cohesiveness and stress related antecedents with 
the concept of collective efficacy.  
A comparison between Baron’s ubiquity theory of groupthink and Whyte’s 
collective efficacy theory highlights many similarities. Both theories are 
modification not repudiations of Janis’s original concept. Both accept the 
symptoms of groupthink identified by Janis and many of his antecedents as 
well. Both theories have as antecedents the lack of the tradition of an impartial 
leader, lack of norms requiring methodical procedures and homogeneity of 
group members55. Both theories rejected Janis’s claim that high cohesion based 
on a strong attraction of group members was a necessary antecedent for 
groupthink and both theories dismissed Janis’s antecedent related to decisions 
being made under high stress as an antecedent.  
The difference between the two alternative theories being that Baron suggests 
the situational low self-efficacy is an antecedent for groupthink whilst Whyte 
argues that collective efficacy of group members is a necessary antecedent for 
groupthink. At first glance, these researchers appear to have diametrically 
opposing views; Baron is arguing that lack of confidence and belief of individual 
group members are unlikely to challenge the group norm and to go with what 
they see as the majority view. Whyte, in contrast, argues that the collective 
overconfidence of the group will lead to a poor decision making process. Both 
researchers provide cogent and convincing arguments and reconcile their 
finding back to the research findings of Janis. Koerber and Neck (2003) test the 
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 Baron did not consider insulation of the group a core antecedent whilst Whyte accepted all of 
Janis’s antecedents which fell under the category of “structural faults of the organisation” which 
included insulation of the group.  
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application of Whyte’s model in the sports arena and conclude that using 
Whyte’s model that there was evidence of groupthink in the case studies.  
There is no external verification of Baron’s groupthink model in a  case study 
analysis but this does not in any way make the research any less meaningful56.  
The different research findings, described above, highlight the possibility that 
there is more than one path towards groupthink. Janis studies a series of 
political scenarios which involved cohesive groups in high stress and threat 
situations and concluded that the poor decision making was a function of 
premature concurrence seeking from members that valued the cohesiveness of 
the group above all else and named the process groupthink. Research from 
Baron and Whyte identify alternative paths to achieving the same outcome as 
that envisaged by Janis, and is consistent with Baron’s assertion, that 
groupthink is more common than the limited scenarios studies by Janis. Indeed 
the number of different scenarios in which groupthink has been noted to have 
occurred as reflected in Table 1 in this chapter does highlight the pervasiveness 
of groupthink.  
This multi-path approach has been adopted by Hart (1994) who identified two 
different types of groupthink; collective avoidance and collective over-optimism. 
Collective avoidance has similarities with both Baron and Janis’s groupthink in 
that it has as an assumption a lack of confidence of group members in the 
decision process and the fear of failure. Hart argues that if members of a group 
perceive that there is the chance of failure individuals will try to avoid being held 
accountable for that and will do one of three things. Either they will exit the 
group, express their dissent for the record or, hide within the group in an 
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 Baron (2005) research is cited in 120l articles and in the Nyberg Commission Whyte (1989) 
has 209 citations (source Google Scholar date 23/2/2015). Whyte’s research was published 6 
years prior to Baron’s paper. Clearly the number of citations of a research paper is not an 
indicator of the quality of the research undertaken but they do provide some limited indication as 
to the impact of the research undertaken. Both papers are it is submitted impactful.   
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attempt to spread responsibility to the collective group (the groupthink 
scenario).  
In contrast, groupthink associated with collective optimism assumes that group 
members perceive that the issues facing them are an opportunity for success 
and as a result are strong motivated to co-operate with each other in achieving 
the expected rewards for success. Members susceptible to this form of 
groupthink are characterised by high self-esteem and confidence. Hart notes 
that this type of groupthink affects “high confidence groups working on high 
prestige projects, expecting major policy successes and career advancement as 
a result of their efforts” (ibid, p. 192). Whyte cites the research of Hart and 
aligns his groupthink theory closely to the “collective optimism” version of 
groupthink identified by Hart.  
Hart adds that the distinction between these two types of groupthink can help to 
explain the symptoms of groupthink “illusions of invulnerability” which is difficult 
to envisage in the “pessimistic” variant but very possible in the “optimistic 
version”. Hart identifies both the Bay of Pigs and the Watergate cover up as 
examples of the “optimistic” version of groupthink, a view which Whyte (1998) 
agreed with when he presented his theory a few years later.   
Hart therefore identifies between “pessimistic” and “optimistic” variants of 
groupthink thus highlighting that there may be more than one path to 
groupthink, and that Janis’s groupthink is not exclusive and that there are other 
antecedents which can affect the symptoms of groupthink resulting in a low 
probability of a successful outcome.   
Hart (1994) identifies situations of intense intergroup competition and conflict 
between other groups as being an important factor in groupthink which had 
been largely ignored by Janis. He cites research from Blake and Mouton (1961) 
which shows that the presence of a threatening out-group increased intra-group 
solidarity and that the existence of such out-groups resulted in an increased 
tendency for group members to favour their own in group, consistently over-
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estimating in-group products and achievements versus the out-groups. Hart 
then links four of the groupthink symptoms; namely illusions of invulnerability, 
belief in the inherent morality of the group, collective rationalisation and 
stereotyping of out-groups as symptoms that are exacerbated in situations of 
intense competition between other groups. Although this theory is not 
developed further by Hart, the role of out-groups in the groupthink process is 
another facet of the groupthink debate. This discussion will be developed further 
in the discussion of herding later in this chapter.  
 
3.2.4. Is Groupthink a valid construct?  
Given the clear lack of consensus surrounding the groupthink model, is the 
theory itself robust or should it be discounted as a potential explanation, either 
partially or wholly for the poor decision process of the Irish banks in the lead up 
to the crisis?  
A review of the literature has revealed over one hundred articles and numerous 
textbooks covering the subject of groupthink. Articles have been identified 
through a research of the various academic databases at the University of 
Exeter, through article reference lists and in the identification of a collection of 
articles that appeared in a number of journals published in recognition of the 
theory’s twenty fifth anniversary in 199857. The literature review revealed a lack 
of consensus around some of the aspects of the theory itself but only Aldag and 
Fuller (1998) recommend abandoning the model completely.  
Aldag and Fuller argue that there has been little empirical support for the theory 
and that the theory has become legitimized because of its heuristic value and 
despite research which has highlighted weaknesses in the theory: “The quarter-
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 Indeed, only in 2014, Sunstein and Hastie, imminent academics from the Universities of 
Harvard and Chicago Booth Business School respectively, published a book titled Wiser: getting 
beyond groupthink to make groups smarter”. 
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century experience with groupthink represents an unfortunate episode in the 
history of group problem solving research. In view of the fact that there has 
been remarkably little empirical support for the groupthink phenomenon, that 
the phenomenon rests on arguable assumptions, that published critiques of 
groupthink have been ignored by groupthink researchers, and that groupthink is 
presented as fact in journal articles and textbooks, we see the continued 
advocacy of groupthink as a form of organizational Tonypandy, in which 
knowledgeable individuals fail to speak out against widely accepted but 
erroneous beliefs” (ibid, p. 163).   
Aldag and Fuller’s article was published in 1998 and the authors did not have 
access to the research which has been undertaken since their article was 
written – including the works of Baron (2005), Hart (1994) and Whyte (1998) 
referred to above. Since Aldag and Fuller criticised the groupthink concept for 
its lack of empirical evidence, there have been a number of further research 
articles which have concluded that the theory is indeed valid. Further, Aldag and 
Fuller criticise the theory on the basis on the “strong” version of the theory 
arguing that, as there is a lack of consensus about the applicability of some of 
Janis’s antecedents and group cohesiveness in particular, that the whole basis 
of the theory is questionable. Other researcher have taken a much broader view 
of Janis’s concept of extreme premature consensus and extreme pressure for 
consensus seeking in a group setting, have accepted that this can be ascribed 
to the term “groupthink” and have then added to the literature on the subject 
with their own specific recommendations or observations.  
Finally, Aldag and Fuller’s article and their rejection of the groupthink concept 
must be seen in context in which it was written. The article was written as part 
of a series of articles for the journal Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes in recognition of the twenty fifth anniversary since Janis 
presented his theory of groupthink. Other articles in the same series had 
praised the theory, for example Paulus (1998) described groupthink as a 
“brilliant construct” (ibid, p. 371). Aldag and Fuller presented a research 
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argument which balanced out these views; “we adopt the role of the devil’s 
advocate” (ibid, p. 163) which they saw very much in keeping with the spirit of 
what Janis would have wanted: “While it may seem ironic, or even unseemly, 
that we should take such a strong stand against groupthink in this volume, we 
see our position as entirely consistent with Janis’s call for the open airing of 
dissent. That is, in the face of an illusion of unanimity, where disconfirming 
information is regularly ignored or distorted and insiders struggle to present their 
preferred alternative in a favourable light, dissonant perspectives are essential” 
(ibid, p. 180). 
Despite Aldag and Fuller’s concerns noted above, there is, however, support for 
the concept of groupthink At the same time my thesis will recognise the 
literature which has been developed since the groupthink concept was 
formulated by Janis in 1972. A critical understanding of the literature with 
respect to herding, group polarisation, de-individuation, epistemic blind spots 
and economic bubble theory, builds on the findings of Janis, and enhances the 
overall understanding of the phenomena which can affect decision making 
processes in the context of corporate boards.  
 
3.2.6 How to define groupthink for the purposes of my research 
The literature review has identified many versions of groupthink and therefore 
great flexibility for the researcher in deciding how to define groupthink. Should 
the research focus exclusively on Janis’s (1972) version which has as a core 
antecedent high levels of group cohesiveness coupled with high stress and low 
self-esteem? In contrast, Baron’s (2005) version of groupthink stresses low self-
efficacy but de-emphasises Janis’s core antecedent of group cohesiveness and 
anticipates that groupthink will occur in a much wider range of group settings 
than those envisaged by Janis. Whyte (1998, 1989) also deemphasises 
cohesion and stress but identifies collective efficacy as a key antecedent whilst 
Hart recognises different types or paths to groupthink. Finally, researchers such 
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as Eaton (2001) take a very liberal view of the groupthink term, ascribing the 
theory with limited evidence. Which groupthink version should my thesis adopt? 
In answering this question, a researcher must first decide whether to accept 
either the “weak” or “strong” version of groupthink. The strong version relates to 
an integrated set of characteristics with deterministic linkages as set out by 
Janis whilst the weak version is used generically to explain poor decision 
making in a group setting that is vulnerable to conformity pressures.   
Esser and Lindoerfer (1989) in their analyses of the Challenge Space Shuttle 
disaster argue for a weaker version of groupthink and that it is a syndrome 
which can be identified when a majority but not necessarily all of the symptoms 
of groupthink are present. They contend that there might be cases where not all 
the groupthink symptoms are relevant. For example, not all situations involve an 
“enemy” out-group and therefore stereotyping the out-group may not always be 
relevant. In summary, the absence of a particular symptom should be seen in 
context and not necessarily lead to the conclusion that groupthink has not 
occurred.  
Hart (1994) is a strong critic of the weak form of groupthink and the use of the 
term in a more generic and colloquial manner as a broad reference to explain 
poor decision making in a group setting. Quick characterisation of a poor 
decision process as being the result of groupthink, without any academic rigour 
or thorough investigation can, he argues, create the illusion that groupthink is 
an all-purpose label that can be used to explain any number of unsatisfactory 
outcomes. He warns that if the weak version becomes widely accepted then the 
concept will “become a kind of analytical garbage can for commentators and 
analysts in need of a powerful metaphor when they seek to blame policymakers 
or managers for a variety of ills and evils of governance” (Ibid p. ix).  
Paulus (1988) backs up this view and notes that the misuse of the term 
groupthink can be dangerous and that inaccurate use of the term can 
compromise overall group effectiveness. Aldag and Fuller (1993) further 
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maintain that the weak interpretation of the model is sometimes used in 
response to the failure of empirical examinations to provide results wholly 
consistent with groupthink.   
Janis (1982) appears to support a stronger version of the theory: “it does not 
suffice merely to see if a few of the eight tell-tale symptoms of groupthink can 
be detected. Rather, it is necessary to see if practically all of the symptoms 
were manifested and also to see if the antecedent conditions and the expected 
immediate consequences – the symptoms of defective decision-making – are 
also present” (Ibid, p. 60). 
In contrast Turner and Pratkanis (1998) and Esser and Lindoefer (1989) argue 
that only a limited number of the antecedents need to be present. Baron (2005) 
and Whyte (1989) even question the validity of some of Janis’s antecedent as 
highlighted in chapter 2.  
Further another challenge relates to the relative depth of observations and the 
implications for the groupthink construct. For example, one might observe 
socio-emotional cohesiveness in two separate case studies but the level and 
depth of such cohesiveness might be significantly greater in one of the case 
studies. As an illustration, if one was reviewing two case studies, (case “A” and 
“B”) and observed more of the symptoms and antecedents of groupthink in case 
“A”, but in case “B” the depth of the observations were much more profound, 
how would you compare the two cases? This lack of certainty reflects the 
subjective nature of the groupthink construct itself and the reliance on the 
judgement of the researcher and, it is submitted, is an identified shortcoming in 
any research in this area. Further, it highlights the epistemological challenge of 
defining groupthink.  
In order to provide some context to the debate on the groupthink definition, a 
comparative study focusing on five case studies was undertaken. These case 
studies were chosen for review based on two criteria. First, three of the five 
case studies refer to corporate examples of groupthink with respect to Marks & 
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Spencer and BA (Eaton, 2001), Enron (O’Connor, 2002), and WorldCom 
(Scharff, 2005). As such they provide direct comparisons for the Anglo case 
study. Second, the remaining two case studies selected are more recent cases 
of groupthink and reflect the most recent thinking in this specific area of 
research. These studies relate to President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq 
(Yetiv, 2003) and the defeat of the French to Germany in the Second World War 
(Ahlstrom and Wang, 2009). These five case studies are not meant to be an 
exhaustive list for comparative purposes but rather to provide some context to 
explore the aforementioned research questions. A detailed comparative 
analysis of the five case studies is found in Appendix 4.  
The analysis of these case studies provides two broad observations relevant to 
the discussion on the groupthink definition. First, when analysing groupthink, 
research by O’Connor (2002), Yetiv (2003) and Ahlstrom (2010) have remained 
faithful to the original conceptualisation of Janis’s model. They have carefully 
analysed Janis’s antecedent and symptoms and rigorously looked for evidence 
of each antecedent and symptom before concluding the existence of 
groupthink. These academics observed supporting evidence for nearly all the 
antecedents and symptoms of groupthink (a full analysis of their findings is 
found in Appendix 5). In contrast, Scharff (2005) and Eaton (2001) self-selected 
the antecedents of groupthink. Eaton in particular has taken a very loose 
interpretation of Janis’s groupthink concept. Eaton does not, for example, 
consider nor discuss cohesion as a necessary antecedent condition for 
groupthink and redefines groupthink as “dogmatic decision-making strategy in 
conditions of general management stress, inducing tendencies to search for 
strong leaders, resulting in conformity and compliance” (Ibid p. 184). In this 
comment Eaton has totally redefined and reconceptualised Janis’s groupthink 
into a much more generic and wider form of concurrence seeking in group 
settings and has then labelled this as groupthink.  
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Further, two of the researchers (O’Connor and Yetiv) focused on providing 
evidence for both the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink whilst the other 
three research papers focused only on the symptoms of groupthink.  
My research will follow the lead of O’Connor and Yetiv, and focuses on both the 
antecedents and symptoms of groupthink and will focus on the “strong” form of 
Janis’s original groupthink construct. The perceived advantage of this approach 
is two-fold. First, it reduces the risk of self-selection of the antecedents and 
symptoms of groupthink related and mitigates the risk of a confirmation bias in 
the research. Second, by measuring groupthink against the strong form of 
groupthink my analysis will be testing the groupthink construct in the most 
rigorous and systematic way.  
The disadvantage of this approach is that by following Janis’ construct, the 
research does not directly reflect the developments and suggested 
modifications to the groupthink construct which have been suggested and 
discussed above. Baron (1995) for example argues that groupthink is ubiquitous 
and is far more widespread than anticipated by Janis. Baron identifies just three 
rather than Janis’ seven antecedents of groupthink. Further Whyte (1998) and 
Hart (1994) both suggest alternative antecedents to groupthink which focus on 
high levels of confidence, an attribute that it is submitted will be easier to 
observe in the Anglo case study which focuses on a period characterised by 
high levels of confidence associated with a property bubble. In other words, 
applying Janis’ groupthink is a more difficult task for the researcher with 
reference to the identified Irish case study. 
However, difficulty in evidencing a construct should not be primary reason for 
choosing a specific definition. Rather the decision on which version of 
groupthink to apply must be based on a strong epistemological foundation. It is 
submitted that, as highlighted in the literature review in chapter 2, that there are 
different but equally acceptable paths to groupthink. Janis’ construct represents 
one such path. An  “advantage” to Janis’ version of groupthink is that it has at is 
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core high levels of socio-emotional cohesiveness where the attraction and 
prestige to the group is high. This type of cohesiveness and attraction to the 
group is an attribute that can be associated with corporate boards and as such, 
it is submitted that Janis’ path to groupthink is particularly relevant. This is not to 
say that groupthink cannot be achieved through other routes, rather that Janis’ 
groupthink resonates in the context of corporate boards58.      
In summary, the research will follow Janis’ antecedents and symptoms of 
groupthink but will reflect where appropriate with the findings of subsequent 
research identified and discussed in this literature review59.  
The observation above identified a method of how groupthink can be measured. 
The second observation from the review of the five case studies relates to the 
identification of the sources of information that will be used to test the construct. 
Researchers in the aforementioned case studies relied on a number of sources 
for the analysis of their data including formal SEC investigations, press reports, 
and published articles. O’Connor (2002) additionally relied on a body of 
literature which defined general boardroom norms and then looked to apply 
these to the Enron case. In Ireland, and specifically with reference to Anglo, 
there are a number of comparable sources of information that are available for 
review. The three official inquiries into the Irish banking crisis (Honohan, 2010; 
Nyberg, 2011; Regling and Watson, 2010) provide an excellent insight into the 
Irish banking sector and Anglo in particular. A number of academic articles have 
been written on the Irish banking crisis and more generally on corporate 
governance in Ireland (Donovan and Murphy, 2013; Kelly, 2009; Kinsella and 
                                            
58
 It could be argued that I have self-selected a variant of groupthink increasing the likelihood of 
a suspicious fit. Whilst I recognise this criticism, as highlighted above Janis’ strong version of 
groupthink is actually more stringent than other “looser” variants of groupthink.   
59
 How this will “work” in practice will become evident in the chapter of the analysis of groupthink 
at Anglo in the lead up to the crisis. In particular refer to the discussion of research question 2g) 
as an illustration of this.  
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Leddin, 2010b; Mac Canna et al., 1998; O’Sullivan and Kinsella, 2011). 
Although none of these articles focus exclusively on Anglo, they do provide 
information which can, and will be used, when assessing this research question.  
Further, there have been a number of books which have been written on the 
banking crisis and three that focus exclusively on Anglo (Carswell, 2011; Kelly, 
2010; Lyons and Carey, 2011). These books include a number of interviews 
with decision makers at Anglo. Lyons and Carey’s (2011) book in particular is 
based on a series of interviews undertaken with Sean Fitzpatrick (who was both 
CEO and then Chairman of Anglo). Finally, the literature review that was 
undertaken earlier in this thesis with respect to both groupthink and corporate 
governance norms and regulations provides a number of applicable academic 
references.    
 
 3.2.7 Groupthink and unethical behaviour 
An additional stream of research relates to the linkage between groupthink and 
unethical behaviour. Indeed, O’Connor (2002) and Scharff (2005) observed 
groupthink behaviour at WorldCom and Enron respectively both organisations in 
which unethical (and illegal) behaviour occurred. What follows below is a 
discussion of why there is such a linkages and why boards which are vulnerable 
to groupthink tendencies are also vulnerable to acting unethically.   
Sims (1992) identifies organisations that have highly cohesive management 
boards that value loyalty as being more likely to have a culture that diffuses 
individual responsibilities for the consequences of unethical behaviour. In effect, 
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a process of de-individuation occurs that diffuses responsibility of an individual 
with respect to an ethical  indiscretions undertaken in a group setting60. 
Sims highlights the risks that highly cohesive groups, that value the 
preservation of the group itself above all else, (as identified by Janis in 
groupthink theory) can result in situations where ethical indiscretions will be 
ignored should they conflict with a preferred option: “The group is likely to 
perceive few ethical alternatives and to ignore potential problems with the 
preferred alternative. The group may reject any opinion that does not support 
the preferred alternative, and it is unlikely to reconsider an alternative previously 
dismissed by the group, even in light of new evidence. Decisions made through 
such a process are not always unethical, but there is a higher probability of the 
occurrence of unethical behaviour”. (ibid, p. 654) 
Ford and Price (1996) also link groupthink to corporate dishonesty and in 
particular the potential for individual self-deception to evolve into group self-
deception when they commented: “Arguably, groupthink represents a 
dangerous form of self-deception. To meet social needs an individual suspends 
his or her independent critical facilities and yields to the demands of the group 
...The more powerful and influential individuals sway the group, often deceiving 
themselves that the decision was correct because group unanimity was  
Hall (2007) highlights the risks that high levels of confidence and high self-
esteem can lead to dishonest behaviour. This can occur when over-confident 
people take on too much, or set goals too high for themselves, and are then 
faced with the possibility of failure impacting on their self-esteem. In such 
circumstances, subjects are at risk of engaging in unethical behaviour in an 
attempt to prevent failure. Hall highlights the management of Enron as an 
                                            
60
 The process of de-individuation and the linkage to groupthink is discussed in detail later in 
this chapter. 
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example of this, where there existed a “superstar” culture and executives 
believed that they could do no wrong.   
Langevoort (1995) argues that group dynamics can affect and bind individuals 
together and blind them to their ethical indiscretions and that the process of 
dishonesty are compounded at group level as a process of de-individuation 
occurs and the collective ego of the group takes over: “the organisation 
develops a collective ego that serves much the same function (and dysfunction) 
as the individual one. The collective egocentric bias is compounded by the 
diffusion of responsibility characteristic of large organisations, which 
encourages self-protective inference” (ibid, p. 874) . A number of the 
characteristic highlighted above as being synonymous with unethical behaviour 
are consistent with the symptoms of groupthink identified by Janis.  
The symptom of groupthink “illusions of invulnerability” can be related to Hall’s 
(2006) observation above regarding the “superstar” culture within the 
management of Enron.  
Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004) highlighted that the greater the perceived 
benefit of a specific course of action, the more likely we are to morally 
disengage and become wilfully blind. An environment in which a group is highly 
cohesive and maintenance of the group “esprit des corps” is highly valued by 
group members (a precondition for Janis’s groupthink) would provide a strong 
motivation for group members to ignore ethical considerations in decision 
processes. 
Indeed, Janis’s “best example” of groupthink was the Watergate cover up 
(Janis, 1982), whilst groupthink has been evidenced at both Enron (0’Connor 
2002) and WorldCom (Scharff, 2010), and Hall (2007) links the failure and the 
fraudulent actions of the directors’ of Australian insurance company HIH to 
groupthink. All of these companies have been characterised by unethical 
behaviour by management. It does not necessarily follow groups that are 
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susceptible to groupthink will commit ethical indiscretions, however, it is argued 
that such groups are more vulnerable to the risks of making unethical decisions.  
 
3.3 Herding 
Herding literature can be traced back to the writing of Keynes (1937) when he 
used the metaphor of voting in a beauty contest to describe the actions by 
rational actors in a market. At that time, beauty competitions were popular in 
newspapers, who would print one hundred photographs of women inviting 
contestants to write in with their views as to the faces they liked most. 
Contestants who picked the most popular face would then be entered into a 
raffle where they could win a prize. Keynes used this example as a metaphor to 
explain stock valuations and that pricing shares was not based on market 
fundamentals but rather on the views of what others thought the value of stock 
might be: “It is not a case of choosing those [faces] which, to the best of one’s 
judgement, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion 
genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we 
devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the 
average opinion to be”. (Keynes 1937 chapter 12) 
One of the most famous social experiments in the area of social conformity was 
undertaken by Asch (1952). Asch gathered a group of seven to nine college 
students in a classroom. These students were then asked to compare the 
length of lines shown on two large white cards. On one card was a single 
vertical black line and on another card were three vertical lines of various 
lengths. The subjects were then asked to match the single vertical line to the 
line of the same size of the other card. The experiment was designed so that it 
was obvious which lines matched. An illustration of this is reflected below with 
the line on the left matching with line “2” on the right:  
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The subjects, all University students, were asked to give their answers 
sequentially and the experiment was manipulated so that all participants, bar 
one, were confederates instructed to give incorrect answers before the answer 
of the true participant. Asch found that individuals matching the lines made 
mistakes less than one per cent of the time when asked to complete the 
experiment on their own, whilst in a group setting, the minority subjects swung 
to acceptances of the misleading majority judgements in 36.8% of the 
selections.  
Asch interpreted the results as showing the social pressure brought to bear by 
others on individual judgement as subjects “desperately tried to merge with the 
majority” concluding that the “social process is polluted ... we have found a 
tendency to conformity in our society so strong that reasonably intelligent 
people are willing to call white black is a matter of concern” (Asch (1952) p. 21 
cited by Sunstein (2000a)). Asch’s findings were widely cited as providing a 
scientific basis for claims that people do not have fully independent judgement 
and is still cited today61, despite the doubts which have been raised in the 
interpretation of his results as noted below. 
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) tested Asch’s conclusions with a controlled 
experiment identical to that undertaken by Asch, with one important difference: 
subjects were placed anonymously into groups of people they never saw (they 
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 Asch’s findings were published at a time of widespread concern over what was seen in the 
Western world as the threat of communist propaganda and brainwashing and continued 
bemusement relating to the German people obedience to the Nazi persecutions. 
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were separated by a partition and communicated only using a simple light 
system) and were told they would never see the other participants again62. 
Deutsch and Gerard found that subjects gave nearly as many wrong answers 
as when tested in Asch’s original experiment, and suggested that wrong 
answers had been given not because participants have been afraid to express a 
contrary view, but rather they were reacting to the information that when the 
vast majority of people share a view then that view must be correct. Deutsch 
and Gerard therefore interpreted Asch’s finding as being information based 
rather than due to normative social influences.  
Another widely cited experiment relevant to herd behaviour was performed by 
Milgram (1963). In his experiment, subjects on an individual basis were asked 
by an “expert” scientist to administer a series of electric shocks to an individual 
who, unbeknown to the subject was a confederate. The confederate was not 
actually being shocked, but was feigning great distress and pain to the subject 
and requesting for the shocks to be stopped. However, when the experimenter 
told the subjects that the shocks would cause no lasting damage and urged 
them to continue administering the shocks, many did so.  
These results were widely interpreted as demonstrating the enormous power of 
authority and the willingness to accede to authority. Another interpretation is 
that people learn that when experts tell them something is correct, it probably is, 
even if it does not seem to be the case (Shiller, 2005). In other words, the 
experiment can be interpreted at least partly as an information based 
interpretation of the results. This view is backed up by a variation to Milgram’s 
initial experiment in which he found that when the shocks were not being 
controlled by an “expert”, there was a much diminished tendency for the 
subjects to continue to take orders to continue giving electric shocks.  
                                            
62
 There was no “group” behind the partition only the experimenter manipulating the signals 
simulating the actions of a group member. 
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This informational based conformity is the basis for the “seminal” theory 
(Chamley, 2004) of informational cascades developed by Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer and Welch 63  (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) based on models of 
Bayesian learning64. The theory maintains that an information cascade occurs 
when information secured from predecessors’ actions is so conclusive that a 
rational follower will unconditionally follow the choices made by those before 
him and ignore his own private information. BHW define an informational 
cascade as an occurrence “when it is optimal for an individual, having observed 
the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behaviour of the preceding 
individual without regard to his own information” (Bikhchandani et al., 1992, p. 
992).  
Decisions in these circumstances are, therefore, not based on a coercive 
pressure to conform, but a rational act based on the information that has 
accumulated which overrides her private information even if this points to a 
different decision. Once this point is reached, her decision becomes 
uninformative for later choosers so her decisions does not reflect any further 
learning and the individual that follows is in the same position and will also join 
the cascade. The term “cascades” and “herding” are used interchangeably by 
researchers (see for example Shiller (2005) or Easely and Kleinberg (2010)) 
and for the purposes of this thesis will be used to describe a normative 
influence on decision processes which is a result of a belief by an actor that 
others have an informational advantage, suppress their own information and 
follow the herd.  
                                            
63
 Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch will be shortened to “BHW”.  
64
 The Bayes model is a model of decision making under uncertainty and works with 
probabilities given information you possess and information you have observed models the 
decision that a rational actor should make. 
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Informational cascades have been proven to occur in laboratory settings 
(Anderson and Holt, 1997, 1996) and Easley and Kleinberg (2010)) by using a 
simple urn with different colour marbles. In one version of this controlled 
experiment, the experimenter tells the subjects there is a 50% chance that the 
urn contains marbles in the ratio of two red for every one blue and a 50% 
chance that the ratio is reversed; two red for every one blue marble. Subjects 
are invited to draw a marble from the urn, observe its colour and place it back 
into the urn without showing it to the other subjects. The subject then has to 
guess whether the urn is majority blue or majority red. Individuals can therefore 
observe the actions not the signals of their predecessors – so that they do not 
see the colour of the marble drawn but are informed as to the choice; majority 
red or blue. Each individual therefore starts with some private information, 
obtains some information from predecessors, and then decides on a particular 
action.  
The first subject has an easy decision to make; if she draws a red marble then 
the rational decision is to guess majority red. This guess conveys perfect 
information about what (s)he has observed. If the second subject sees the 
same colour as the first logically she would guess the same colour as well. If 
however, the subject sees the opposite colour, she should be indifferent as to 
what guess to make (one red and one blue marble drawn). It is the scenario 
when the first two subjects have announced the same colour, blue, and the third 
subject draws red that an information cascade can develop. When the first two 
guesses are the same the third subject should rationally (and in accordance 
with bayesenian theory65)  guess blue regardless of the colour which she draws 
from the urn, and hence regardless of her own private information. The fourth 
subject is faced with a similar choice to the third, she knows that the third 
subject would guess blue regardless if her own information so this guess 
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 Easley and Kleinberg (2010) provide a full analysis of the working of the model and the 
decision process applying the model to this simple example. 
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conveys no information. So the fourth student is in effect in the same situation 
as the third subject and whatever colour she draws is outweighed by the first 
two draws of blue and, like the third subject, should guess blue. What can be 
inferred from this controlled experiment, is that over time and as the number of 
people guessing trends towards infinity the probability of a cascade begins to 
converge to one ((BKW (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) and (Easley and Kleinberg, 
2010)). Indeed Anderson and Holt (1995, 1996) found that in ninety four cases 
when an individual was confronted with a situation in which it was optimal to 
follow the guesses of her immediate predecessor in seventy nine of these the 
individual acted against their own signal and followed the cascade.  
From this simple model a number of inferences can be made. First, an 
information cascade can lead to a non-optimal outcome. For example, in a blue 
majority urn, there is a 1/3 chance of the first student drawing a red ball and a 
1/3 chance of the second student also drawing a red ball, and a 1/9th chance 
that both the first and second student draw a red ball. There is therefore a 1/9th 
chance that a red cascade is incorrectly created. Further, this error will not be 
corrected by subsequent guesses of the urn, as all subjects should guess red 
and disregard their own information if the first two guesses are red66.  
Second, informational cascades can be based on very little information - in the 
example above on just the observations of two subjects - and as a result this 
can make a cascade easy to start but if new information is made available it can 
also be rapidly reversed. Cascades can therefore be fragile (as is often 
demonstrated with fashion fads). The attached cartoon from The Economist67 
light heartedly illustrates the fragile nature of cascades: 
                                            
66
 This is what is known as a “reverse” cascade. 
67
 Found on http://www.flickr.com/photos/60433209@N00/2867609321/ on 26/1/13.  
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Third, informational cascade are, as demonstrated above, all pervasive and as 
such are an attractive means of explaining mass behaviour in areas such as 
consumer behaviour, politics, business strategy and crime enforcement and 
even academic publications (Bikhchandani et al., 1998). In the area of crime 
enforcement, there is evidence that the decisions to commit crimes is influenced 
by observing the behaviour of others and that when individuals see crimes 
going unpunished they interpret that the rewards from crime outweigh the costs. 
Shefrin and Triest (1991) showed that news stories about tax evasion led to 
greater number of people evading tax. In an academic environment if a journal’s 
referee is aware that a paper had been previously rejected, this would provide 
information to the referee about a signal from a previous referee and increase 
the chances that the referee also rejected the paper.   
The information cascade model presented by BKW is an extremely simple 
model of decision making in a controlled environment. It has many assumptions 
such as sequential decision making, and it may well be that subjects don’t see 
all the decisions made but only a few. Further, it assumes that all the signals 
convey equal information and does not account for differences in influence 
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amongst actors. Easley and Kleinberg (2010), whilst recognising these factors 
as potential limitations, argue that the basic principle of the model holds true: 
“When people can see what others do but not what they know, there is an initial 
period when people rely on their own private information; but as time goes on, 
the population can tip into a situation where people – still behaving rationally – 
begin ignoring their own information and following the crowd” (ibid, p. 442). 
Information cascades are more likely in areas where information is more readily 
communicated and disseminated. Shiller (2005) notes that certain type of 
information flows more freely than others, especially if the topics are imbedded 
in the psyche of a society or are important to the basic instinct of survival: 
“These topics resemble the kinds of things that our ancestors have talked about 
since time immemorial. But conversation seems to flow less well about abstract 
topics, such as the mathematics of finance, or statistics about asset returns, or 
optimal levels of saving for retirement. Transmission of such knowledge is of 
course effortful, infrequent, and imperfect” (Shiller, 2005 p. 161).    
The Irish obsession with property ownership and the property bubble which 
developed in Ireland in the build up to the financial crisis of 2007, would be a 
good example of information which would potentially be susceptible to a 
formation of a cascade given that it is very much imbedded in the Irish psyche. 
This is discussed in greater detail in the literature relating to epistemic blind 
spots discussed later in this chapter.    
A cascade will depend on the subjects subordinating their own private 
information in favour of the signals which they have received from others. There 
is no social learning or exchange of ideas taking place. If, however, subjects 
come from diverse backgrounds, they are more likely to have access to different 
sources of information and to have the confidence to act on their own private 
signals, and therefore less likely to allow the signals of others to dominate. In 
revealing their information to the group, diverse subjects would increase social 
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learning and could facilitate the breaking of cascades. Group diversity could, 
therefore, reduce the likelihood of information cascades occurring. 
Related to this argument is research by Easely and Kleinberg (2010), who 
found that the spread of an information cascade will stall when it tries to break 
into a tightly-knit community within the network. Easely and Kleinberg refer to 
this as  a “blocking cluster”, and argue that this blocking cluster is the only thing 
that will cause an information cascade from developing further.  
The model which they applied is based on the assumption that each node in a 
social network has a choice between two behaviours “A” and “B” and assumes 
that if two nodes are linked, then there is an incentive for the nodes to have 
their behaviours linked68. Using an algebraic equation the authors create a 
decision rule for each actor, ascribe a value of “2” and “3” for behaviour “A” and 
“B” respectively, and then model the impact of diffusion on a specified network. 
What their research highlights, is that the process becomes a chain reaction of 
the adoption of behaviour “A” until the network comes across a tightly knit 
network which blocks the spread of adoption. 
Although the model has very limited practical application, it does provide some 
evidence to illustrate that an information cascade will spread in a closely 
connected network. Further homophily can create a barrier by making it harder 
for information to be disseminated from outside a densely connected 
community. Therefore, a closely knit community is both more susceptible to the 
spread of an information cascade within the dense network, but is also less 
susceptible to the spread of cascade originating from outside the network to 
infiltrate the closed network itself69.  
                                            
68
 This may be relevant if perhaps they are sharing a common technology. 
69
 The implication has been in this paper that informational cascades are a negative, and result 
is a lack of social learning and can lead for example to asset bubbles. Information cascades 
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Information cascades can be applied not only to understanding mass 
behavioural movements such as why the Irish population became so hugely 
overexposed to property during the financial crisis, but also to understand how it 
might affect decisions making within small group settings, specifically within 
boardrooms. In particular, a scenario in which a board discusses a strategy and 
board members are asked to opine in sequence to express a view on a 
particular issue, can result in an information cascade. In this scenario, a 
cascade could occur if board members assume that early contributors to the 
debate have information which is comparable or even greater in quality than 
their own and will suppress his/her own information. 
 
3.3.1 Herding and Groupthink 
BHW  recognise that there are other explanations for conformity which are 
based on peer pressure rather than the rational decision making process of the 
informational cascades model. They suggest combining the impact of 
informational effects with psychological effects to ensure a better understanding 
of the decision process: “We believe that the integration of learning/cascades 
effects with other factors will lead us to better theories about the process by 
which society locks into technologies, or customs” (Bikhchandani et al., 1998). 
Indeed, it is the intention of this thesis to do just what BHW are suggesting, and 
to integrate the literature relating to both normative and informative influences 
on decision processes.  
Although they are coming at it from different perspectives, groupthink and 
herding have in common a suppression of individual thoughts in favour of 
others’ views. Herding arise as subjects suppress their own information and rely 
                                                                                                                                
could, however, have positive externalities if the information being disseminated is for example 
a type of innovation or health benefit.  
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on the informational signals they have received. Similarly with respect to 
groupthink, Janis notes that “when groupthink dominates, suppression of 
deviant thoughts take the form of each person’s deciding that his misgivings are 
not relevant, that the benefit of the doubt should be given to group consensus” 
(Janis, 1972, p. 201).      
Given this common thread of a suppression of individual thought, it is not 
surprising that groupthink and herding share common attributes. One common 
attribute is the existence of an influential directive leader. Janis (1972) identifies 
the existence of a directive leader as an antecedent of groupthink. The leader of 
an organisation should be impartial instead of stating preferences and 
expectations at the outset of any deliberation process as a means of helping to 
prevent groupthink. BHW warn of the risk that early disclosure by more 
prominent individuals (perceived as having better quality information) can 
exacerbate the likelihood of a cascade forming as subsequent subjects are 
more likely to suppress their own information should it be different to that which 
is already disclosed. For this reason, BHW suggest that it is social desirable 
that information in a group is communicated in reverse order of seniority, a 
recommendation shared by Janis and indeed practiced in the Ancient Israeli 
Courts (Schnall and Greenberg, 2012).  
Another linkage between the two processes is homogeneity. Herding and 
groupthink are both potentially heightened in homogenous groups with no/little 
diversity. Homogeneity was identified by Janis as being an antecedent of 
groupthink and the link between group homogeneity and groupthink has been 
widely accepted by other researchers; see for example Baron (2005), Whyte 
(1998), Hart (1994) and Schafer and Crichlow (1996). Further as highlighted 
above, homogeneity plays a role in group herding; see for example Easley and 
Kleinberg (2010). 
Information cascades are more likely to be broken if subjects rely on their own 
private information rather than suppress this in favour of signals received from 
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preceding others. Subjects who have information from diverse sources are 
more likely to have the confidence to rely on their own information than those 
from homogenous sources.  
Another common thread between herding and groupthink is that both processes 
are exacerbated thought high levels of competition. Hart (1994) and Turner and 
Pratkanis (1998) identified competition between groups as an important 
contributing factor contributing towards groupthink, as the threat from out-
groups increases both intra-group solidarity and the tendency for group 
members to favour their own group. Competition between groups also 
increases the likelihood of herding in an effort to maintain market share relative 
to competitors, as identified above. Therefore, the threat of competition affects 
both groupthink and herding tendencies70.  
There is also a complex interplay between the phenomena of groupthink and 
herding. Herding is often related to the motivation of an organisation to compete 
and maintain market position and is viewed as a process which occurs between 
different organisations. Herding can also be viewed from within an organisation 
where individual actors assume others have superior information and are 
suppress their own information and herd. This risk is particularly highlighted in 
boards of directors and in relation to NEDs with low functional and firm specific 
knowledge that are more likely to follow what they perceive as an informational 
advantage of the executive directors and herd. 
The likelihood of such NEDs herding is, it is submitted, exacerbated in groups 
which exhibit the symptoms of groupthink. NEDs that are looking to preserve 
the unity of the group, and are suffering from the symptoms of groupthink, are 
more susceptible to reduce their challenge. This lack of challenge will be 
                                            
70
 The impact of competition on both normative and informative influences on decision 
processes is discussed in detail later in this thesis.  
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exacerbated if such NEDs also believe that executive directors have an 
informational advantage. In other words, the normative and informative 
pressures combine together to reduce challenge and increase the likelihood of 
a poor decision processes being undertaken. Therefore, a director faced with 
both the social pressure and the informational pressure to conform is less likely 
to challenge and more likely to go along with the status quo. The risk of these 
influences combining together is heightened if such a firm is characterised by 
common attributes such as homogeneity, directive leadership and high levels of 
competition.   
Furthermore herding and groupthink can combine on another dimension. An 
organisation which has made a poor internal decision related to groupthink, and 
possibly “internal” herding, provides an opportunity for other firms to emulate 
this behaviour by herding. Groupthink creates a situation whereby a firm makes 
a poor decision, whilst herding amplifies the situation when other firms embark 
on the same strategy. Groupthink (and possibly herding) within an individual 
firm can create a situation which increases the risk of a firm making a poor 
decision, whilst herding can amplify the situation when other firms embark on 
the same strategy, increasing systemic risk. This identified interplay between 
groupthink and herding is developed further in the building of my model of poor 
decision processes in chapter 6.   
 
3.3.2 Conclusion 
The review of the literature has identified common trends between groupthink 
and herding and that both phenomena related to a suppression of individual 
thoughts in favour of the views of others. The motivation for this suppression of 
thoughts is different for these phenomena. In groupthink, the suppression 
related to the normative influences relating to the desire to preserve group unity, 
whilst for herding, the informative influences relate to a belief that others have 
superior information. However, both phenomena share common attributes, 
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namely; that they are exacerbated by the existence of a directive leader, 
homogeneity and high levels of competition.  
Finally this chapter has identified that herding and groupthink can interact with 
each other in different ways, both internally within a firm and between firms, 
increasing systemic risks of a poor decision process occurring.  
 
3.4. Group Polarisation 
The concept of group polarisation can be traced to James Stoner’s unpublished 
Master’s thesis (1961). Stoner asked business school students to respond to a 
serious of fictitious dilemmas using a choice dilemma questionnaire in which 
they had to decide between a cautious course of action with a small benefit, and 
a risky option with a large potential payoff. Stoner found that when people 
worked together in groups on this kind of problem, they opted for the more risky 
action than when they made decisions alone. Stoner termed this phenomena a 
“risky shift” and it sparked a flurry of research to test this assertion; so much so 
that Cartwright (1971) commented that “rarely in the field of social psychology 
has a single study stimulated as much research as the master’s thesis by 
Stoner” (ibid, p. 361).  
Subsequent research disproved Stoner’s “risky shift” phenomena. In Stoner’s 
research, students had an initial predisposition towards a risky position and this 
accounted for the shift towards a more risky outcome. However what 
researchers subsequently found, was that the direction of the shift depended on 
the original disposition. In other words, if individuals that care about loss interact 
with each other, they make more conservative decisions whilst those that had a 
great appetite for risk make riskier decisions when they interacted (Levine et al., 
2000). The risk shift that Stoner had observed was not a tendency towards a 
risky outcome but rather a tendency to polarize. The question that researcher 
then focused on was not why do group decisions cause risky shifts, but rather 
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why do group decisions cause more extreme choice shifts either to a more 
conservative or riskier position than individuals.  
It was Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) that clarified this process and coined the 
term “group polarization” as a means of explaining that groups tend to be more 
extreme in the direction in which they were already tending. The concept of 
group polarisation has become widely accepted and recognised in the literature 
and has been found to occur in a wide range of countries using a wide range of 
participants in both laboratory and natural settings (see for example Dion et al. 
(1970) and Lamm and Myers (1976)).  
Three theories have developed to try to explain why groups have a tendency to 
polarise; social comparison, persuasive argument and social identification 
theories. These are explained below: 
 
3.4.1 Social Comparison Theory 
Social comparison theory is based on the work of Leon Festinger (Festinger, 
1954) and asserts that actors espouse opinions which are less extreme than 
their true opinions because of a fear as being seen as an outlier. However, if 
group discussions reveal that others have similar or even more extreme 
positions, actors shift their positions towards their true values and may even be 
encouraged through competition to become more extreme. Advocates of the 
social comparison theory include Sanders and Baron (1977) and Goethals and 
Zanna (1979).  
Sanders and Baron (1977) sum up the theory as follows: “People often value 
opinions more extreme than those they personally espouse. People fail to adopt 
these (extreme) positions as their own due to fear of being labelled an extremist 
or deviant … However during a group discussion, in which members may 
compare their positions, relatively moderate members may realise that relatively 
extreme members hold opinions closer to their most admired positions. This 
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realization either “releases” the moderate members from their fear of appearing 
extreme, or motivates to “compete” with the extreme members to see who can 
come closest to espousing the most admired position. In either case, the 
moderates are motivated to adopt more extreme positions, while there is no 
corresponding pressure on extreme members to moderate their opinions 
(although of course, simple conformity pressure may lead to some small 
amount of moderation by extreme members). The net result is an overall 
polarization of opinions.” (ibid, p. 304) 
Friedkin (1999) explains the social comparison theory as a process of de-
inhibition followed by a status competition that brings about polarisation (ibid, p. 
859). The social comparison theory of group polarisation relies on knowledge of 
what other group members’ position is, and therefore requires that their 
positions are revealed or communicated. Research has found that mere 
exposure to other actors’ opinions without actual verbal communication was 
enough to produce group polarisation. For example Blascovich et al. (1975) 
found that people playing blackjack in groups made riskier bets than when 
playing on their own when actors could observe other players bets but could not 
discuss them.  
 
3.4.2 Persuasive Argument Theory 
The persuasive argument theory was put forward by Burnstein and Vinokur 
(1977) and has at its core the assumption that on any issue under deliberation, 
it is unlikely that there is a precisely equal balance of arguments for and against 
a specific issue but rather that there will be leaning in a specific direction. 
Before any group discussion takes place, individuals would not have access to 
all the arguments. However once the discussion gets under way, each actor 
becomes acquainted with more of the arguments supporting the dominant view 
and group members respond to the additional information and evidence 
supporting the initially favoured view by shifting their opinion further in that 
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direction. The group shift, or polarisation, is therefore dependent on actual or 
implicit arguments that result from group discussions. As Burnstein and Vinokur 
(1977) note: “When a preponderance of arguments in the pool favors a 
particular alternative, the average prior attitude reflects the direction and 
magnitude of this preponderance. Further thought or discussion leads to 
polarization toward the alternative that initially elicits more and/or better 
arguments” (Burnstein and Vinokur (1977 p.  316) cited by Friedkin (1999)).   
 
3.4.3 Social Identification Theory 
Social identification theory is based on Turner’s (1985) self-categorization 
theory and argues that polarisation is a result of group members attempting to 
conform to a shared in-group norm as what they see as prototypical for their in-
group. Turner describes the prototype as “the position that best defines what 
the group has in common compared with other relevant out-groups. A person 
becomes more prototypical as he or she differs less from in-group members 
and more from out-group members “(Turner, 1991, p. 77). 
Spears et al.’s (1990) findings in their laboratory experiment was supportive of 
the social identity theory. Groups of students were divided into groups with 
some groups emphasising the importance of group structures and in others the 
role of groups was de-emphasised. Results found that polarisation occurred 
across the board, but that it was significantly greater when group identity was 
emphasised. The conclusion being that polarisation is more likely and more 
extreme when group membership is made salient.  
Sunstein (2000, 2009) is also supportive of the social identity theory of group 
polarisation. He argues that if members of a group think that they have a shared 
identity, there will be heightening polarisation. Further, if individual members 
tend to perceive others as friendly, likeable and similar to themselves, the size 
and likelihood of the shift will increase.  
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Social identity theory therefore suggests that group polarisation is due to a 
member’s desire to be seen as loyal and a solid group member. Group 
polarisation can be seen as a form of conformity to a group norm as a means of 
showing status in the in-group and distance from out-groups. This theory 
therefore challenges the persuasive argument theory which assumes that 
actors will be persuaded of a particular argument regardless of who makes the 
arguments. Social identity theory argues that we are more receptive to 
arguments from our friends (in-group) as we are from our enemies (out-group). 
See for example Mackie and Cooper (1984) and Abrams et al. (1990).  
In summary, there has been much debate amongst academics as to the merits 
of the three theories discussed above. The theories themselves, however, do 
not need to be mutually exclusive and can combine together to achieve 
polarisation. For example, there will be a greater tendency to polarize when one 
hears a lot of persuasive arguments during for example a discussion of in-group 
members that supports a dominant view.  
The different theories will also be more or less appropriate depending on 
specific group settings. The persuasive argument theory is perhaps stronger 
when one knows very little about ones fellow actors’ positions going into the 
discussion so that the arguments are new and persuasive. If all the actors are 
aware of other actors’ positions in advance of the discussion then it is more 
difficult to see how they can be persuaded. Group members will have 
knowledge of their groups’ main attributes, characteristics and will shift towards 
them as their group membership becomes more important.  The social identity 
theory is perhaps the most relevant to cohesive, closely knit groups such as 
board of directors and in identifying vulnerabilities towards polarisation in group 
decision processes. 
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3.4.4 Social Influence Network Theory 
The three theories discussed above provide alternative (and arguably 
complementary) ways of explaining why polarisations occur. Social influence 
network theory was developed by Noah Friedkin together with Eugene Johnsen 
(Friedkin, 1999; Friedkin and Johnsen, 1999). Friedkin and Johnsen’s (1999) 
model attempts to bring network theory and its sociological influences to bear in 
the field of group polarisation a domain previous exclusive to the field of 
psychology.  
Friedkin (1999) recognises what he sees as a clear delineation between 
research in the fields of sociology and psychology and his theory attempt to 
bridge the gap between these two disciplines in the area of group dynamics. He 
wrote: “As an area of study within psychology … the field group dynamics has 
declined, and although the concepts of group membership and group effects 
have been retained, psychologist now rarely grapple with the network structure 
of groups, the social processes that unfold in these networks, and the 
contributions of these network structures and processes to individual and 
collective outcomes71. It is sociologists – concerned with the origins of influence 
networks and status structures, the effects of social exchange networks on 
actors’ bargaining behavior, and the effects of social networks on information 
flows, consensus formation, and collective action – who continue to grapple with 
these matters (ibid  p. 856).” 
Friedkin and Johnsen’s intention is not to dispute existing group polarisation 
literature but rather to complement it: “A network theory does not overturn 
extant work on group dynamics but instead envelops and enhances this extant 
work by attending to the structure in which interpersonal processes unfold in a 
group” (Friedkin, 1999, p. 858). 
                                            
71
 Friedkin’s paper was written in December 1999. However my experiences in the literature I 
have reviewed is that this observation still holds true today 
  
156 
 
Friedkin and Johnsen (1999) make a distinction between group polarisation and 
what they term a “choice shift” – a distinction not readily made by psychologists. 
A choice shift is said to occur when after a group’s interaction on an issue, the 
mean final opinion of group member differs from the members’ mean initial 
position. Group polarisation, on the other hand, is said to occur when the choice 
shift is in the same direction as the mean initial opinion. According to Friedkin 
and Johnsen group polarisation always involved a choice shift but that a choice 
shift can occurs in the opposite direction of the initial mean position. This would 
occur because of the higher influence network of a particular member of the 
deliberating group. 
It is the process of recognising the different influence network of various actors 
within a group and their resulting ability to alter the choice shift, that 
distinguishes the model developed by Friedkin and Johnsen (2011). They argue 
that the choice shift is a product of the group’s social structure in which certain 
members have more influence than others during the deliberation process and 
that the inequalities of influence within the network must be taken into account 
when modelling or predicting a choice shift. They wrote: “The crucial ingredients 
are the network of interpersonal influences and the process by which these 
interpersonal influences and the process by which these interpersonal 
influences modify person’s attitudes. Choice shifts are the by-products (the 
aggregate level consequences) of these individual attitude changes” (Friedkin 
and Johnsen, 2011, p. 231). 
Friedkin and Johnsen’s model includes actors’ pre group deliberation opinions 
and a relative measure of the interpersonal influence of each actor on another. 
The relative interpersonal influence of each actor is measured by subjective 
means by asking actors to divide tokens into piles and to allocate these 
according to the extent that they thought other group members influenced their 
decision. The subjective nature of the measure brings with it issues concerning 
members potentially underestimating the relative influence of other actors and 
the judgement of actors to assess the relative influence that actors may have 
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had on their decision process particularly when there is no single strong or 
obvious influence. Further, the model has very limited applicability when 
measuring group decision making outside of a controlled experiment 
environment given the practical problems of securing pre-deliberation opinions 
and asking actors to measure the relative influence of others actors on their 
decision process. 
Despite these clear limitations in the model described above, the core principle 
is sound; that inequalities of personal influence within a group network play an 
important role in the choice shift phenomena process. Indeed the relative 
influence of different actors was recognised by Sunstein (2000) in his analysis 
when he commented that “many examples of group polarisation require an 
appreciation of the role of leaders, whose views count for far more than those of 
other group members” (ibid, p. 87). Friedkin and Johnsen do not however limit 
themselves to focusing on the leader of a group but rather look at the influence 
network of the group more widely. An actor might not be a designated leader 
but at the same time could hold significant influence over other members in the 
decision process. In summary, Friedkin and Johnsen highlight the importance of 
the influence of an actor’s network on a choice shift.  
 
3.4.5 Group Polarisation and Homogeneity 
Sunstein’s (Sunstein, 2009, 2000b) research focuses on the consequences of 
group polarisation for group decision making across a wide range of areas 
including social, political and business settings. This is a subject which he 
believes has been widely ignored across the disciplines: “I have been unable to 
find sustained discussions on the literature [on group polarisation] in economics, 
sociology, philosophy, law or political science, and there appears to be no 
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treatment of the implications of group polarization for social behaviour or the 
theory of democracy”72 (Sunstein, 2000, p. 74).  
In particular Sunstein has highlighted the link between homophily73 and group 
polarisation as an area which has been largely ignored by academics, a view 
shared by Turner (1991). Sunstein noted that: “Existing work on homophily has 
not been bought into contact with the phenomena of group polarization. This is 
a serious gap” (ibid, p. 84). Indeed, he noted that the question of whether 
homogeneity increases polarisation has been “little pursued” (ibid, p. 49).  
Sunstein (2000) stresses the risk of group polarisation with respect to 
homogenous group settings and that in his view “social homogeneity can be 
quite damaging to good deliberations” (Sunstein, 2000, p. 76).  Sunstein argues 
that cohesive groups of like-minded people whose members are connected by 
close social ties often suppress dissent and can as a result reach inferior 
decisions compared to non-homogenous groups where dissent is encouraged.  
He concluded that “widespread error and social fragmentation are likely to result 
when like-minded people, insulated from each other, move in extreme directions 
simply because of limited argument pool and parochial influences” (ibid, p. 105).  
There is research supporting Sunstein’s link between polarisation and 
homogeneity. Goethals and Zanna’s (1979) concluded that homogeneity 
increased polarisation and that there was a greater level of polarisation in a 
study amongst actors when the actors established that they had a homogenous 
attitude related to risk prior to the group discussion. Further, Schkade et al. 
(2007) conducted an experiment as to the views amongst like-minded people 
                                            
72
 Indeed I have found no mention of group polarization or its consequences in any of the 
literature on corporate governance and the consequences for board room decisions.   
73
 Homophily refers to the tendency of individuals to associate with others that are similar to 
themselves (McPherson et al., 2001) and is an explanation for homogeneity. The terms are it is 
submitted inextricably linked and are used interchangeably in this thesis.  
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from three cities in the US whilst discussing three politically charged subjects, 
namely; global warming, affirmative action and civil unions for same sex 
marriages. They concluded that deliberation between actors increased 
consensus and significantly reduced diversity within the groups.  
Finally, Sagerman (2011) found that as group members preparing for an act of 
terror a process of natural selection took place whereby less radical members of 
the group left until only extreme members remained as a cohesive group with 
dangerous consequences. What this study shows is that polarisation can be 
exacerbated by members leaving the in-group because they are unhappy with 
the direction the group was taking. The end result is that actors are exposed to 
“softer and louder echoes of their own voices” (Sunstein, 2000, p. 119). In other 
words the group became more homogenous over time.   
Sunstein (2000, 2009) highlights the risks with respect to poor quality decision 
making and the increased likelihood of increased polarisation in group settings. 
The one mitigating factor about homogenous groups is that as a consequence 
of their homogeneity, members will have similar opinions so that the pre-
deliberation mean should be narrower and polarisation should be less extreme 
(but more frequent) than that which exists in diverse group settings. However as 
Sunstein notes the risk is that the group itself becomes more extreme in views 
through a process of self-selection so that although the extent of polarisation 
might be less severe in homogenous groups the pre-deliberation perspective of 
the group will have, as a starting point, a more extreme point of view.  
 
3.4.6 Group Polarisation and Geographical Isolation 
Sunstein (2009) argues that group polarisation is more likely in situations where 
actors are constrained in a geographical area and are physically separated with 
their own “free space” (ibid, p. 100). The term “free spaces” is referred to as a 
“degree of separation” related to a group’s physical separation (ibid, p100). 
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Sunstein cites research by Groch (2001) in support of this assertion. Groch 
researched various categories of physical disabled groups and concluded that 
their likelihood of polarisation depended on the extent to which the group was in 
physical close proximity and isolated from other groupings.  
 
3.4.7 Whyte’s (1993) Prospect Polarisation Theory 
Janis recognised the concept of group polarisation in his writings (Janis, 1972, 
p. 5 and p. 300) but made no attempt to incorporate it into his groupthink model 
of defective decision making process. Perhaps, one of the reasons why Janis 
did not try and link this into his model of groupthink, is that his groupthink theory 
is based on an ex post analysis of case studies relating to political disasters. In 
order to ascertain whether group polarisation has occurred requires knowledge 
of actors' pre-deliberation and this was not, of course, possible for Janis 
studying these case studies post event. Further, Turner’s (1985) social identity 
theory in relation to group polarisation was only developed in 1987, well after 
Janis’ groupthink. This theory has the most in common with Janis groupthink 
construct, but it was arguably “too late” for Janis.  
Whyte (1993), however, has developed a model of group polarisation which 
complements and reacts with groupthink. Whyte (1998, 1989) as highlighted 
previously, developed his own model for groupthink with a core antecedent of 
collective efficacy, replacing Janis’ requirement for group cohesiveness and 
antecedents related to provocative situations. Whyte, in addition to developing 
this model, also argued that groupthink was not sufficient in itself to explain poor 
decision making processes associated with fiascos but also developed a theory 
of what he termed “prospect polarisation” which would combine with groupthink 
to create an environment which would result in a poor decision outcome.  
Prospect polarisation combines the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and 
their prospect theory and work with respect to decision framing together with 
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existing literature on group polarisation. Prospect theory is based on the 
observation that as individuals we are loss averse, but also have an aversion to 
loss. Kahneman and Tversky explain this through experiments in which they 
offered subjects two problems. In the first scenario, subjects were asked for 
their preference between a certain £900 and a 90% chance of receiving £1000, 
and the great majority of subjects choose the certainty of the £900, indicating a 
natural conservatism and risk aversion. In the second scenario, the question to 
subjects is framed differently; asking whether they would choose between a 
sure loss of £900 and a 90% chance of losing £1000, and the vast majority of 
subjects chose the latter option, reflecting an aversion to loss. In other words, 
we move from being risk averse when our options are positive and become risk 
seeking when our options are bad. Tversky and Kahneman explained why we 
are both risk averse and at the same time have an aversion to risk by the fact 
that intrinsically losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman, 2011, p. 284) and 
that our decisions are made according to the specific reference point and how 
the question is framed and it is the framing of the question itself which 
determines our decision process.  
Whyte incorporates this theory into his model by arguing that if the notion of 
choice is framed in the domain of a loss (as illustrated in the second example) 
this framing elicits amongst members a preference for risk. This aversion for 
risk will then combine with the effects of polarisation and increase the extent to 
which the group has a preference for the riskier option as their opinions become 
more polarised.  
Whyte then links his theory of prospect polarisation into his own theory of 
groupthink centred on the concept of high group efficacy and confidence. Whyte 
observes that groups with high efficacy and high confidence will have high 
expectations of success. If, for example, they have an expectation of a profit for 
the year of $10 million, but there is a possibility that instead the group is more 
likely to make only $7 million, then given high expectations and confidence that 
this will be framed as a loss of $3 million rather than being viewed as an overall 
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profit to the group of $7 million. As a result of this framing, groups will have an 
aversion to loss, will take the riskier options available to them, and expose 
themselves to even greater losses in exchange for the chance to avoid the sure 
loss. Therefore groupthink combines with prospect polarisation to produce a 
scenario in which high risk and poorly thought our decisions are made resulting 
in poor outcomes.  
Whyte (1989) argues that the explanation advanced above “is equally 
applicable to business decision making, and it is consistent with the view the 
previously advanced that firms that are performing below target or reference 
levels are more likely to pursue risky options than those that are not” (ibid, p. 
53-54). Whyte then refers to previous research which concluded that poorly 
performing firms have a greater propensity to adopt riskier strategies in an 
attempt to make up for lost ground on competitors. Singh (1986) and 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), both cited by Whyte (1989), provide research 
will backs up this assertion.   
In summary, Whyte argues that groupthink can combine with group polarisation 
and that high levels of confidence can create an environment in which both 
groupthink and group polarisation occur, so that a poor and risky decision 
process is undertaken. This assertion is back up in the research findings of 
Gerard and Orive (1987) and Baron et al. (1996) who showed that confidence 
contributes to heightening opinion extremity. If an individual learns that others 
share his/her stance then the individual will feel greater confidence regarding 
the stance and will as a result be more willing to endorse more extreme views.  
 
3.4.8 Groupthink and Group Polarisation 
Whyte (1993), as discussed above, has linked what he terms “prospect 
polarisation” to his version of groupthink. Sunstein also recognises the close 
relationship and similarities between groupthink and group polarisation in 
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particular with respect to the conditions of homogeneity, cohesion, group 
solidarity and affection. Indeed, Sunstein argues that many of Janis’s case 
study examples can be seen as case studies in group polarisation, as groups 
move to more extreme points in line with their original tendencies (Sunstein, 
2009, p. 87).  
Sunstein “favours” group polarisation over groupthink as an explanation as to 
why groups make poor decisions. He argues that the groupthink model is too 
complicated and involved with its seven antecedents and eight symptoms that 
has made the theory unwieldy and difficult to test or prove whilst the concept of 
group polarisation has been proven and uncontroversial74. He notes that: ”group 
polarisation offers a simple and clear prediction: As a statistical regularity, 
deliberating groups will end up in a more extreme point in line with their pre-
deliberation tendencies. The idea of groupthink is far more complex and unruly, 
without any simple predictions” (ibid, p. 89). 
The complexity of the groupthink construct has been discussed in detail. . The 
conclusion drawn was that, despite Sunstein’s reservations, it was a valid 
construct and worthy of consideration. Sunstein’s argument does highlight the 
commonalities between groupthink and group polarisation, in particular with 
respect to the social identity theory of group polarisation.  
Friedkin and Johnsen (2011) compare their social influence network theory to 
Janis’s groupthink theory emphasising the similarities. They highlight Janis’s 
suggestion that one of the antecedents of groupthink is a directive leadership 
style and that this can, and will, contribute towards groupthink. This antecedent 
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 Refer to the section of this chapter  on Groupthink for an analysis of the criticism of the 
groupthink theory 
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is consistency with their views about how interpersonal influences within 
networks affect the decision process75.  
On the issue of group cohesion, a key antecedent for Janis’s groupthink theory, 
Friedkin and Johnsen argue that if groups are cohesive and homogenous then 
group members are likely to be more susceptible to change their opinion in line 
with more influential group members, hence increasing the likelihood of poor 
decision making in line with that envisaged by Janis.  
Friedkin and Johnsen (2011) further highlight the importance of cohesion in 
group polarisation when he noted: “If cohesion has the effect of increasing 
members’ susceptibilities to interpersonal influence, then group members with 
high susceptibilities may quickly abandon their initial positions in favour of the 
positions of members who, for whatever reason are both intransient and 
influential. In short if cohesion fosters a homogenous group membership and an 
efficient influence network, and if the groups social structure is stable across 
issue domains, then, as Janis suggests, a structural basis exists for low quality 
decisions” (ibid, p. 257). In other words, Friedkin and Johnsen highlight 
characteristics which are common to both groupthink and group polarisation 
which creates a vulnerability to a group undergoing a poor decision 
processes76.  
Sunstein (2000) highlighted that group polarisation is more likely when groups 
are isolated and Janis (1972) includes the insulation of the group from outside 
                                            
75
 A subtle distinction perhaps is that Janis limited his influence structure to the leader of the 
group whilst according to social influence network theory it may not necessarily be the 
designated leader that has the most influence within the network structure itself (although one 
might envisage that this is the case in the vast majority of times). 
76
 This approach of identifying common traits across identified phenomena to identify “red flags” 
with respect to decision processes is consistent with the approach which will be developed later 
in this thesis. 
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experts as one of his antecedents of groupthink. Finally Whyte (1998, 1999, and 
2003) argues that high levels of confidence, an antecedent of groupthink, can 
increase management expectations, and if expectations are not met, then this 
can result in the framing of a loss and a greater likelihood of higher risk taking. 
In other words, Whyte links groupthink and group polarisation through high 
levels of confidence.  
In summary, both groupthink and group polarisation have in common a strong 
sense of belonging and identification. Both phenomena are affected by high 
levels of homogeneity associated with cohesion, directive leadership, isolation 
from outside experts, and in terms of Whyte’s version of groupthink and 
polarisation by high levels of confidence. Given these strong links it is therefore 
possible that a group that suffers from groupthink would also be affected by 
group polarisation; so  not only is a decision making process defective but it 
also results in a more extreme decision. 
The study of group polarisation, however, provides some epistemological 
hurdles for the purpose of this thesis in that it is extremely difficult to apply in a 
retrospective case study. To “prove” that group polarisation had occurred in the 
Irish bank setting would require knowledge of the pre-deliberation views of 
individual board members and to then be able to compare those views with the 
outcome of the group itself. This is practically impossible especially given the 
time differences between the research undertaken and the decision making 
processes and the lack of access to pre-deliberation views.  
Not surprisingly therefore the literature review did not reveal any research into 
group polarisation based on a retrospective case study. O’Connor (2002) did 
considered polarisation as possible explanations in her analysis, but concluded 
that “groupthink, which is related but distinct from polarization and cascades, 
provides a more descriptive account of the Enron Boards’ role in Enron’s 
collapse” (ibid, p. 1257) . O’Connor (2002) provides no explanation as to why 
groupthink provides a more descriptive account, but it is submitted, that it is 
  
166 
 
easier for any researcher to measure groupthink than it is to measure group 
polarisation.  
The difficulty in measuring the concept of group polarisation directly to the 
proposed Irish case study does not in any way diminish the importance of the 
phenomena in understanding poor decision making processes in group board 
settings. The antecedents for group polarisation can be evidenced in a case 
study though it might not be possible to “prove” given the inability to determine 
pre-deliberation views. If the structural conditions which are necessary to group 
polarisation are observed, and the decisions undertaken are highlighted as 
being particularly extreme and risky then certain inferences and predictions can 
be made that there is a greater risk or likelihood that group polarisation did 
occur. Recommendations can then be made to highlight the risks associated 
with this phenomenon. This is discussed in greater detail in chapter 8.  
 
3.5 De-individuation 
This section of this chapter examines the concept of de-individuation and 
whether this is relevant to trying to understand the behaviour and poor decision 
characterised by boardrooms in Ireland in the lead up to the financial crisis. De-
individuation is a psychological state of decreased self-evaluation and 
disinhibition which looks to explain a variety of anti-social behaviours such as 
violence in crowds or mobs but may also be extended to include a possible 
explanation for reckless behaviour within the board room setting. In a de-
individuated state, individuals become so consumed by their collectively so that 
the group becomes the reference point, substituting individual goals and 
standards of behaviour for those perceived to be of the group.   
The origin of the concept of de-individuation can be traced back to the early 
crowd theorist, French social psychologist Gustave Le Bon. Le Bon (1960) had 
an altogether negative view of groups or crowds which in his opinion “displayed 
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a singularly inferior mentality” (ibid, p. 6). Le Bon argued that when individuals 
gathered in crowds they became anonymous, lose their personal responsibility 
and become dominated by a collective unconscious. This collective 
unconsciousness represents a primitive state of evolution in which atavistic 
emotions dominate, and as a result group behaviour lacks civilised attributes. 
Moreover, as individuals become part of a group or crowd, their behaviour 
becomes significant as a collective response and the salience and relevance of 
the group becomes more important resulting in greater levels of conformity to 
group norms: “In a crowd every sentiment and act is contagious to such a 
degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest. This is an 
aptitude very contrary to his nature, and of which a man is scarcely capable, 
except when he makes part of a crowd” (ibid, p. 18).       
Festinger et al. (1952) defined the term “de-individuation”, and in doing so, 
recognised the influences of Le Bon in their work77. Festinger et al. suggested 
that when group members were not seen as individuals, a state of de-
individuation may result, with a consequent lowering of restraints. Festinger et 
al. (1952) concluded that when individuals became immersed in the group and 
their own individual identifications reduced, subjects were more likely to engage 
in behaviour usually considered unacceptable.  
Arguably the most well-known example of de-individuation research was the 
Stanford Prison Experiment undertaken by a team of academics led by 
Zimbardo (Haney et al., 1972). In this experiment, eighteen Stanford University 
students were to be enrolled in what was meant to be a two week experiment 
simulating prison life. Nine students were randomly assigned as guards with the 
remaining nine assigned as prisoners. The “inmates” were arrested by local 
police who agreed to co-operate in the experiment and were subject to the 
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 Pepitone acknowledged that the idea had come “straight from the pages of Le Bon” (cited by 
Reicher (1984, p. 341).  
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normal procedures for arrested prisoners (handcuffs, finger printing, strip 
searching and the issuing of prisoner uniforms) before they were put into three 
men prisoner cells. The care of the prisoners was then handed over to student 
guards.  
Within a few days both sets of students became totally immersed in their 
respective roles. The guards started to inflict cruel punishments on the 
prisoners, and the prisoners started to address each other by prisoner number 
not name. As the guards became crueller and more vindictive, the prisoners 
became more demoralised. The experiment had to be abandoned after just six 
days as the prisoners started to show extreme signs of stress, hysteria and 
depression. 
Haney et al. (1972) explained the behaviour of the guards using the process of 
de-individuation and that individuals had become submerged into their clearly 
defined groups. They concluded that anonymity of the group members was the 
principal cause of the de-individuation process and that when individuals act in 
a large group, the group provides them with anonymity and diffuse their own 
personable responsibility for their actions. This leads to a loss of identity and 
reduced concern for social evaluation on a personal basis and is referred to as 
a psychological state of de-individuation (Brown, 2001).    
Subsequent research by Diener (1979) and Turner (1985) in particular, 
however, lessened the emphasis of anonymity as a primal factor in de-
individuation. These findings are summarised in the meta-analysis of the 
relationship between anonymity and de-individuation undertaken by Postmes 
and Spears (1998) in which they concluded that there was little evidence to 
support the relationship between de-individuation and anonymity as it pertained 
to socially unacceptable behaviour.  
Research undertaken by Johnson and Downing (1979) found that when they 
dressed up subjects in Klu Klux Clan type outfits this increased aggressive 
behaviour in subjects however when subjects were dressed up as nurses there 
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was a reduction in aggressive behaviour in the subjects. In other words, de-
individuation can also result in pro-social behaviour and is not as one sided and 
negative as the likes of Zimbardo or Le Bon had argued. The conclusion drawn 
from this research being that anonymity increased the responsiveness to what 
were the normative cues present in the environment. The environment in which 
the group operates is critical in determining the behaviour of de-individuated 
individuals, and being in a group will not itself lead people to act in a destructive 
fashion; rather they will behave depending on the norms which are salient to the 
group situation. 
Diener (1979), Turner and Killian (1987) and Brown (2001) all observed that 
there is a linkage between high levels of group unity and cohesion and the 
occurrence of de-individuation and that being in a cohesive group tends to 
cause people to make the group their main point of reference rather than their 
own individual perceptions, and that as such group cohesiveness is an 
underlying antecedent for de-individuation. 
This assumption is consistent with the findings of Reicher (1984) found that de-
individuation, and an individual’s immersion within the group, increased the 
salience of the group identity and increases adherence to group norms and that 
de-individuation leads to greater levels of group conformity. Furthermore should 
de-individuation take place in a boardroom setting, the norms salient to the 
group setting are more likely to be potentially destructive given the value system 
inherent in the banking culture. Evidence of the value system in banking can be 
seen in the literature (see for example Admati and Hellwig (2014), Stiglitz 
(2010), Carswell (2006)) and in the number of ethical indiscretions associated 
banking. Recent examples of such behaviour being the manipulation of the 
LIBOR setting, the fixing of foreign exchange rates and the miss-selling of 
interest rate swaps by banks to smaller and medium size enterprises.   
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3.5.1 De-individuation and Groupthink 
There are clear linkages between the processes of groupthink and de-
individuation and the behaviour of de-individuated persons and victims of 
groupthink (Hart, 1994). Both are group phenomena in which individuals forego 
their own independent thought process in favour of an emerging group norm or 
behaviour. Both phenomena are explanations for failures in group settings and 
both have at their core group cohesiveness and homogeneity.  
Hart (1994) hypothesised that in groups where the underlying cause of 
cohesion lies in the “prestige and rituals of the group, as well as the mutual 
liking of its members, de-individuation is more likely to occur and serve as a 
kind of intermediate state towards groupthink” (ibid, p. 124). Mutual liking of 
members is much more likely to occur in homogenous group settings (see for 
example Heffernan (2012) or McPherson et al. (2001)) and as such from this 
one can infer that de-individuation is more likely to occur in homogenous group 
settings.    
Further, both groupthink and de-individuation group processes are affected by 
the norms salient to the group itself. Turner and Pratkanis (1998) and Neck and 
Moorhead (1992) concluded that certain types of groups are more susceptible 
to groupthink by definition of their social identity. The social identity and value 
system of bankers has come under a lot of scrutiny since the onset of the crises 
with numerous commentators pointing towards a denigration of moral and 
ethical standards in the banking community as being  a significant contributing 
factor towards the crisis (see for example Stiglitz (2010), Admati and Helwig 
(2014) and Mason (2010) as illustrations of this.) There is therefore an 
argument that can be made that bankers, by definition of their social identity 
and focus on profitability, are much more susceptible to groupthink and de-
individuation than perhaps groups such as scientists and jurors. Scientists and 
jurors, in contrast to bankers, have social identities that by definition would 
encourage greater levels of vigilance and questioning of an existing status quo.  
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De-individuation and groupthink can be linked in a cause and effect relationship. 
De-individuation is a process whereby the individual subordinates his own 
feelings and standards in favour of those of the group setting. Groupthink is a 
process which can occur in a group setting where de-individuation has occurred 
and individuals prioritise the group over and above their own thought processes. 
This connection is recognised by Hart (1994) who links the two processes as 
follows: “There is sufficient evidence to make plausible the idea that given the 
similar antecedents and effects of both concepts, there might be a link in terms 
of processes: the concurrence-seeking tendency of groupthink can be seen as 
a manifestation of de-individuation. De-individuation posits the development of a 
group mind, groupthink occurs during its maintenance and preservation ... 
groupthink is enhanced by a state of de-individuation among group members. In 
other words, de-individuation is one of the group level mechanisms bringing 
about groupthink, conceived of as a premature and excessive concurrence 
seeking” (ibid, p. 72). Hart therefore links de-individuation to groupthink as a 
process or stage in groupthink.  
Despite these similarities, Janis makes no mention of the process of de-
individuation in his research other than indirectly, when he noted that other 
causal psychological factors may also have occurred in the case studies in 
which he observed groupthink (Janis, 1989). One of the reasons why Janis did 
not make the link between these two phenomena was perhaps that at the time 
of formulating the groupthink concept, there was little research into de-
individuation. Further the research that existed, emphasised anonymity as a key 
antecedent for de-individuation (Festinger et al., 1952; Zimbardo, 1969) which 
was a clear differentiating factor between de-individuation and groupthink. As 
noted above, anonymity has been de-emphasised in more recent research and 
replaced with a greater accent on cohesiveness and conformity which align 
groupthink and de-individuation more closely.  
In summary, de-individuation emphasises the attributes of cohesiveness and 
homogeneity and the importance of the salient norms of the group setting. 
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Certain groups are more vulnerable to destructive behaviour when affected by 
groupthink and de-individuation than other given salient norms. This is 
particularly relevant given that banking has been identified as an industry where 
salient norms have, at times, resulted in socially destructive behaviour.  
If however one relates this back to the research question of whether de-
individuation alone is a process that can be seen as a possible means to 
understand some of the decision making processes within the Irish banks, then 
the answer to this question is simply no. De-individuation is not a process by 
itself that can do this, rather it is inextricably linked to the groupthink 
phenomenon which is a possible explanation for the poor decision making 
processes by Irish boards.  
 
3.6 Epistemic Blind Spots 
Epistemic blind spots occur because humans process information selectively 
and favour information which confirms their beliefs; rather than consider how 
they might need to adjust their beliefs to fit the information. Wei Choo (2007) 
notes that such blind spots occur when a “stream of warning signals is not 
heeded because the information does not fit existing beliefs, or because there is 
no frame of reference for the warnings to be recognised” (ibid, p. 34). Moreover 
Wei Choo notes that some organisations follow a “justification” approach in their 
decision processes whereby the organisation holds its beliefs as being 
incontestable and during the decision process looks for evidence that supports 
its beliefs and decisions. A justifications organisation will stay firm to its beliefs 
and rarely abandon or change them. What Wei Choo describes above as an 
epistemic blind spot, represents in effect an extreme confirmation bias78.  
                                            
78
 A confirmation bias occurs when an actor looks to process information selectively and 
favours information that confirms a pre-existing belief (Kahneman, 2011; Nickerson, 1998).  
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Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2013) introduce the concept of bounded awareness 
to explain the tendency to exclude important and relevant information from the 
decision process by placing “arbitrary and dysfunctional bounds on our 
definition of a problem” (ibid, p. 7). These arbitrary boundaries are affected by 
what they term “motivated blindness” which exists when there is a vested 
interest regarding an outcome or situation. Subconsciously individuals create 
biases and boundaries that shape the decision making process in a way that 
achieves a result consistent with their initial vested interest. Despite an obvious 
bias in the decision process, investors still persuade themselves that the 
process was fairly undertaken.  
Heffernan (2012) refers to the term “wilful blindness” in her research and refers 
to the transcript of the trial of the CEO and Chairman of Enron as to the genesis 
of the concept. Heffernan quotes the presiding  Judge in the trial when 
instructing the jury: “You may find that a defendant had knowledge of a fact if 
you find that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise 
have been obvious to him. Knowledge can be inferred if the defendant 
deliberately blinded himself to the existence of a fact” (ibid, p. 2, original 
document unseen). 
Heffernan argues that we do not make a conscious decision to become “wilfully 
blind” but that it develops over a period of time as a result of a “skein of decision 
that slowly but surely restrict our view” (ibid, p. 27). This is consistent with the 
ideas formulated by Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2013) who note that ethical 
indiscretions often occur as a result of small, and what are seen at the time as 
being inconsequential changes over a long period of time. 
Heffernan observes the tendency for like-minded people to group together and 
provides numerous example to illustrate the natural tendency for homophily to 
develop. Heffernan links the propensity to develop blind spots to the tendency 
towards homophily. She argues that by seeking out those that are similar in 
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views and ideologies, individuals become more confident in the correctness of 
their views and blind to alternative views. As a result, we develop blind spots 
and fail to see arguments and ideas outside of the homogenous grouping we 
belong to. Heffernan thus provides another link between homogeneity and poor 
group decision processes.  
Regling and Watson (2010), in their scoping report for the Nyberg Commission 
(2011), recognise the importance of property ownership imbedded in the Irish 
culture and that this had become a blind spot in the run up to the financial crisis. 
They note that the crisis in part “reflected an uncritical enthusiasm for property 
acquisition that became something of a national blind spot” and that “some of 
the underlying misjudgements about debt and property were so embedded in 
collective psychology that this can be imagined, perhaps, to mitigate institutional 
failures to some degree” (ibid, p. 35).  
Regling and Watson do not develop the concept of an epistemic blind spot 
further in their report, and neither is the theory discussed by Nyberg in the final 
Commission79. Regling and Watson do observe that Ireland had never had a 
property crash before the crisis (ibid p. 5). Wei Choo (2007) asserted that such 
blind spots were likely when “there is no frame of reference for the warnings to 
be recognised” (ibid, p. 34). In effect what these academics are describing is 
how an availability80 and confirmation bias can combine together to affect a 
decision process. The fact that Ireland had never experienced a property crash 
(an availability bias) is information that investors in the Irish property market 
relied upon as evidence in relation to a confirmation bias that the Irish property 
market would continue to prosper. The significance of property investment to 
                                            
79
 Nyberg did however recognise the socio-economic and emotional attachment that the Irish 
had towards property as an asset class in his report.  
80
 An availability bias refers to a situation where an actor in making a decision places greater 
emphasis on information which is more readily available to them (see for example Kahneman et 
al.  (1982)).  
  
175 
 
the Irish psyche81 may have resulted in an extreme version of these biases 
occurring, and the creation of an epistemic blind spot in relation to property. A 
detailed discussion of whether there was an epistemic blind spot to property in 
Ireland is found in chapter 7.   
In summary, there are common themes that can link the literature on epistemic 
blind spots to groupthink. Janis (1972) observed that group members in the 
groupthink case studies he examined “showed interest in facts and opinions 
that supported their initial preferred policy and take up time in their meetings to 
discuss them, but they tend to ignore facts and opinions that do not support 
their initial preferred policy” (ibid, p. 10). What Janis is describing is a situation 
where group members are affected by a confirmation bias in their decision 
processes. Indeed, Janis included “collective rationalisation” as one of his 
symptoms of groupthink.   
An epistemic blind spot can therefore be intrinsic to the groupthink process 
itself. If a group suffers from an epistemic blind spot with respect to a specific 
asset or investment and suffers from groupthink symptoms, the group will not 
actively challenge the investment decision. In other words, groupthink prevents 
an organisation “seeing” the epistemic blind spot.  
Finally, the review of the literature on epistemic blind spots provides further 
evidence of a consistent theme in this literature review; the importance of 
homogeneity and cohesion, as the tendency to develop blind spots has been 
linked to homophily (Heffernan, 2012).  
 
 
 
                                            
81
 The Irish relationship with property is explored in detail later in this thesis.  
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3.7 Economic Bubble Theories 
This section of this chapter explores the body of literature which looks to explain 
why speculative bubbles occur. This area of research focuses on the role that 
the underlying culture of a society plays in influencing the environment in which 
board decisions are made. It recognises the importance of the wider zeitgeist of 
a society and argues that understanding the wider environment in which 
corporations operate, will provide some answers as to why financial crisis occur 
generally, and specifically why banks made such poor decisions in the lead up 
to the crisis. This literature review also provides a direct link to the observation 
made previously that both groupthink and de-individuation are influenced by the 
salient features of the group and that the behaviour of the group will be 
influenced by the environment in which it is operating.   
 
3.7.1 The importance of the underlying environment and societal 
values  
Market commentators have consistently emphasised the importance of 
understanding the cultural environment in which financial bubbles occur.  
Chancellor (2000), when analysing the Tulip bubble in Holland in the 1630s, 
observes that “conditions were propitious for the outburst for a speculative 
euphoria” (ibid, p. 14). He cites the Dutch republic loss of Calvinistic austerity as 
the nation “became a nation of consumer” (ibid, p. 15) as an important 
contributing factor towards why the Tulip bubble occurred.  
Galbraith (2009) when detailing the causes of the Great Depression of 1929, 
recognised the technical factors relating to leverage, and the poor regulatory 
and accommodative interest rate environment which existed leading up to the 
crash. Galbraith, however, concluded that the zeitgeist of the time was far more 
significant than underlying technical factors: “Far more important than rate of 
interest and the supply of capital is the mood. Speculation on a large scale 
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requires a pervasive sense of confidence and optimism and conviction that 
ordinary people were meant to be rich.” (ibid.  p. 187)  
Akerlof and Shiller (2010) argue that a society’s value system plays an 
important role in creating the environment in which speculative bubbles can 
develop. Like Galbraith, they focus on the Great Depression of 1929, and 
observe that in the United States in the 1920s “disrespect for the law was widely 
accepted and the failure of prohibition and that people both drank and gambled 
in flagrant violation of the law” (ibid, p. 39). In their view, it became common 
practice and acceptable to disregard and disrespect laws. They highlight 
literature such as The Great Gatsby, published in 1925, which celebrated 
economic predation, as an illustration of the mood and belief system at that 
time.   
Akerlof and Shiller (2010) use the metaphor of the demise of the card game 
contract bridge and the growth of poker as an indicator of a fundamental value 
shift in the build up to the crash of 2007. The authors observed the reduction in 
popularity in the United States of contact bridge, a game they observe which is 
played cooperatively and not for money, and the huge growth in popularity of 
poker in recent times, a game played individually, where bluffing (lying) is an 
important attribute to being successful. They conclude: “Of course we know 
there may be no link between what is taking place at the card table and what is 
taking place in the economy. But if card games played by millions of people shift 
the role of deception, wouldn’t we be naïve simply to assume that such shifts do 
not also occur in the world of commerce?” (ibid, p. 40) 
Shiller has focused much of his research on understanding the internet bubble 
which occurred around the start of the millennium and more recently the 
property market bubble in the US (see for example (Shiller; 2008, 2005, 1995)). 
For Shiller, a good part of what drives people’s thinking is purely social in 
nature, and central to Shiller’s thesis of understanding why speculative bubbles 
occur relates to the creation of an information cascade leading to herd 
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behaviour and the lack of independent thought. Shiller (2008) uses the 
metaphor of a virus to explain the social contagion of thought. He explains that 
every disease has a contagion rate, the rate at which the disease is spread from 
person to person, and a removal rate (the rate at which individuals are no 
longer contagious). If the contagion rate exceeds the removal rate by a 
necessary amount, an epidemic occurs. Shiller notes that the contagion rate will 
vary according to environmental factors, for example contagion rate for 
influenza are higher in winter. The contagion of thought patterns will soon 
gather momentum and a tipping point will be reached when the epidemic 
becomes endemic.  
 
3.7.2 Homogeneity and Information Cascades 
Shiller (2008) refers specifically to the findings of BHW (1992) and the literature 
on cascades and argues that an information cascade occurs when individuals 
rely on the information of others because they believe that they must have an 
informational advantage. In doing so they “disregard their own information, and 
act instead on general information as they perceive it, they squelch their own 
information. It is no longer available to the group and so does not figure in 
further collective judgements. Thus, over time, the quality of group information 
declines” (ibid, p. 47). Shiller (1995) further argues that information cascades 
are more likely to occur when groups are characterised by homogeneity. This 
link between homogeneity and the increased risk of informational cascades 
developing is consistent with the research finding highlighted in the chapter on 
herding (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010). 
Swarup (2014) explores the reasons behind the tulip bubble in Holland in the 
1630s and highlighted that at that time travel was limited. He observed that: 
“People gathered together locally to drink, and social conversation gave way to 
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economic posturing. It created a fertile environment for groupthink82 and for the 
words of an expert to carry a crowd that had little place else to go and more 
limited choices for speculation” (ibid, p. 177). In other words, Swarup (2014) 
argues that the environment, and in particular the isolation of the group, made it 
easier for an information cascade to develop.  
Swarup moreover observed that many of the participants in the bubble 
belonged to heterodox religious groups, most notably the Mennonites83 and that 
a consequence of this “market participants were more susceptible to the 
influences of their peers” (ibid, p. 177). Swarup, in this comment, is identifying 
homogeneity as a factor which contributed to the Tulip bubble itself.  
 
3.7.3 Confidence and Speculative Bubbles 
Minsky (Minsky, 1992; Minsky and Kaufman, 2008; Minsky and Minsky, 1982) 
observes that events leading up to a crisis always start with a “displacement”, 
an exogenous, outside shock to the macroeconomic system. This displacement 
might be a technological advance or a change in the interest rate environment 
but it leads to a period of sustained growth. The risks are that in an economy 
which has seen sustained growth without sufficient regulation, a mood of 
“explosive euphoria” (or overconfidence) can occur which leads to an asset 
price bubble. This excessive and unfounded optimism means that increasing 
number of participants take advantage of the perceived strength of the market 
                                            
82
 Swarup provides no evidence to back up the comment that groupthink may have 
characterised the behaviour of the actors in the Tulip bubble. However he observes both 
homogeneity and isolation of the group, both characteristics associated with Janis’s groupthink.  
83
 The Mennonites are a Christian group.  
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with little thought of the potential for any subsequent correction 84 . This 
somewhat irrational action is the beginning of the creation of an asset bubble.   
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) detailed empirical analysis of financial crises 
covering sixty six countries over eight centuries and provide extensive evidence 
to show that financial crises over times share many commonalities. The title of 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s book, This Time Is Different, refers to its underlying 
message and the concept of “new era” thinking which precedes a financial 
crisis. The authors refer to this phenomenon as the “this-time-is-different 
syndrome” and note that this syndrome is: “rooted in the firm held belief that 
financial crises are things that happen to other people in other countries at other 
times; crises do not happen to us, here and now. We are doing things better, we 
are smarter, we have learnt from past mistakes. The old rules of valuation no 
longer apply. The current boom, unlike the many booms that preceded 
catastrophic collapses in the past is built on sound fundamentals, structural 
reforms, technological innovation, and good policy. Or so the story goes” (ibid, 
p. 15).  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) maintain that this overconfidence is misguided and 
that overconfidence and associated new era thinking is, in their view, more 
likely in countries which have experienced rapid growth over a period of time: 
“The greatest policy insight is that premature self-congratulations may lead to 
complacency and demotion to a lower grade. Several debt crises involving 
default or near default occurred on the heels of countries’ rating upgrades, 
joining the OECD, and generally being portrayed as the poster children of the 
international community” (ibid, p. 290)85. 
                                            
84
 Minsky’s views are very similar to those expressed by Kindleberger (2000).  
85
 The relevance of this observation with respect to Ireland is discussed later in this chapter.   
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The concept of confidence, and in particular over-confidence, is a key theme in 
the research by Akerlof and Shiller  (2010). Like Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), 
the title of their book, Animal Spirits, is at the very heart of the message they 
wish to deliver. “Animal Spirits” is a direct quote from Keynes and refers to 
man’s “spontaneous urge to action” meaning that decisions are not as rational 
as some economic theory would dictate but rather are often made as a result of 
human emotions such as fairness, confidence, and money illusion. The authors 
argue that emotions play a key role in the decision making process and that 
economic decision cannot be explained by looking at pure “rational” (efficient 
market) economic theory alone.  
With respect to the emotion of over or under confidence, Akerlof and Shiller 
(2010) note that: “The very term confidence – implying behavior that goes 
beyond a rational approach to decision making – indicates why its plays a major 
role in macroeconomics. When people are confident they go out and buy; when 
they are unconfident they withdraw, and they sell. Economic history is full of 
such cycles of confidence followed by a withdrawal”. (ibid, p. 13)  
The authors argue that the Keynsian notion of a multiplier, developed by Hicks 
which focuses on the multiplier effect of consumption, ignores the impact of 
confidence: “We usually think about multipliers only with respect to conventional 
variables that can be easily measured. But the concept applies equally well to 
variables that are not conventional and that cannot be easily measured. Thus 
there is not only a consumption multiplier, an investment multiplier, and a 
government multiplier, which represents the change in income that occurs when 
there is, respectively, a $1 change in consumption, investment, or government 
consumption. There is also a confidence multiplier.” (ibid, p. 16) 
The role of confidence, highlighted as being important in the creation of 
speculative bubbles, has also been recognised as being an important 
contributing factor for the psychological phenomena of both groupthink and 
group polarisation. Janis, in developing his theory of groupthink, recognised 
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overestimation of the group as the key symptom of the groupthink phenomena. 
For example, in Janis’s analysis of the poor decisions made by then President 
Kennedy and his advisors, referred to the “unlimited confidence” that the team 
had when planning the invasion and that this centred on the promise of new and 
bold ideas and the “euphoria of the new day” (Janis (1972) cited by O’Connor 
(O’Connor, 2002)). Furthermore, Whyte (1998) argued that collective efficacy 
was a key antecedent for his version of groupthink, whilst Hart (2004) identified 
a version of groupthink related to excessive optimism.  
Overconfidence is also intimately connected to group polarisation as Sunstein 
(2000) observes: “Part of the reason for group polarisation appears to that as a 
class, extreme positions tend to be more confidently held” (ibid, p. 92). Indeed 
this confidence is further exacerbated if members of a group decide to leave 
because they are uncomfortable with the direction with which the group is 
heading so that the group becomes more confident and extreme in its opinions. 
Further, O’ Connor (2002) in her case study of Enron, makes the link between 
groupthink and overconfidence associated with new era thinking. She observed 
that the internet boom that preceded the collapse of Enron affected the Enron 
board’s decision making and that a financial bubble “may lull boards into a false 
sense of security” (ibid, p. 1240).  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter reflects a broadening of the literature review beyond groupthink 
and herding and group polarisation, epistemic blind sports, de-individuation, and 
the overall environment in which the banks operated. These have all been 
discussed and the key elements of each explanation highlighted.  
A review of the literature highlighted the interconnectivity of the related 
phenomena. First, there is interplay between herding and groupthink. Within a 
group setting, NEDs that believe that executive directors have an informational 
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advantage (pressure to herd) and also want to preserve the unanimity of the 
cohesive in-group (pressure for groupthink) are less likely to challenge an 
existing strategy which might be flawed. In other words, groupthink and herding 
tendencies can combine within a group to increase vulnerabilities of a poor 
decision processes occurring. Further, a leading entity that has pursued a 
flawed strategy could place informational pressure on competitors to herd. This 
is particularly the case when the ultimately flawed strategy is initially perceived 
as a success, as was the case with the leveraged property play in the lead up to 
the crisis. Groupthink and herding can therefore combine in a systemically 
important way. 
The literature review further identified the connection between group 
polarisation and groupthink and that groups can be affected by the symptoms of 
both groupthink and group polarisation. Therefore, not only is there a greater 
risk that a group makes a poor decision, but that there is also the risk of a 
polarisation in the decision processes itself. The consequence is that the flawed 
decision is exacerbated by polarisation.  
A review of the literature on de-individuation reflected that the process of de-
individuation itself, whereby the group member foregoes their own sense of 
independence in favour of an emerging group norm or behaviour, can be seen 
as a stage of groupthink. Groupthink and de-individuation are therefore 
inextricably linked. An epistemic blind spot is an extreme form of confirmation 
bias where actors pursue a strategy without recognises the risks or flaws 
associated with that strategy. This occurs because actors, for a variety of 
reasons and often related to a strong self-interest, persuade themselves 
through self-rationalisation, that the strategy is a good one. This process of self- 
rationalisation is a symptom of groupthink. In other words, if a group has a 
epistemic blind spot and suffers from the symptoms of groupthink then it does 
not “see” the blind spot. 
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In summary, groupthink is linked to herding, group polarisation, de-individuation 
and epistemic blind spots and appears to play a central role in the identification 
of vulnerabilities with respect to poor decision processes. This is reflected 
below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The link into groupthink is not surprising given the complexity and richness of 
the groupthink construct with its wide range of antecedents and symptoms. 
Groupthink is however very specific in that it intends to explain a premature 
concurrence seeking within a socio-emotional cohesive group. Group 
polarisation, de-individuation and epistemic blind spots are not dependent on, 
and can occur independently of groupthink, and can therefore offer stand-alone 
explanation for vulnerabilities in decision processes.  
What the literature review does highlight is that a combination of these 
phenomena may be more powerful than when identified in isolation. Cox and 
Munsinger (1985) recognise that a combination of factors, such as those 
highlighted above, can contribute towards a group bias and that when they 
combine together the sum of their parts is greater than the individual 
H   Herding 
Blind spots 
De-
individuation 
Polarisation 
Groupthink 
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components in what is referred to as a synergism or wholeness: “When several 
compatible psychological factors come together as a whole system, they jointly 
enhance total in-group bias, so that the effect is greater than we would expect 
on the basis of a simple additive model alone. This synergetic whole system 
has been observed frequently in the psychological literature. It is as if a 
coherent attitudinal system takes on a life of its own, and the wholeness 
enhances the influences of each individual factor ... this synergism creates 
compelling psychological forces towards in-group biases within the board” (ibid, 
p. 104). On the same theme, Brafman and Brafman (2008) refer to these 
psychological forces as “streams” that converge together to become even more 
powerful.   
Given the linkage between the phenomena it is not surprisingly that they share 
common characteristics. A summary of common features identified in the 
literature review are highlighted in the table below: 
Table 3.1: Common characteristics of identified phenomena 
Characteristic Identified in: 
Homogeneity (linked to 
cohesiveness)86 
Groupthink, herding, group polarisation and de-
individuation 
Influential or directive leader Groupthink, herding, group polarisation 
Isolation of the group Groupthink, de-individuation 
High levels of confidence Groupthink, group polarisation 
                                            
86
 As noted previously, groups which are homogenous and share common values and ideas are 
more likely to be cohesive.  
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Furthermore the threat of competition was seen as exacerbating the likelihood 
of groupthink and herding and of accentuates the in-out group bias related to 
groupthink and increases the pressure of firms to emulate the strategy of 
competitors. A review of the general literature related to bubbles highlighted the 
importance of confidence in creating a speculative environment associated with 
poor decision processes. This review highlighted the importance of the social 
identity of the group and the value system of the industry in which firms are 
operating and that macro and industry specific factors will affect the 
environment in which organisations make decisions.   
The identification of common themes or linkages identified above form the basis 
for the development of the theoretical model describing poor decision processes 
discussed in detail in chapter 6. The intention of the model is to identify potential 
“red flags” which might alert management and regulators of the vulnerabilities of 
a poor and potentially systemically significant decision processes. This 
contribution focuses primarily on the internal decision processes within boards 
and in improving the governance mechanisms of all corporations.  
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Qualitative v Quantitative Research 
Research can be categorised as being either qualitative, quantitative or of a 
mixed design. Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) and Bryman and Bell (2015) 
observe that qualitative methods of research involve the collection of data that 
is mainly in the form of words, whilst quantitative methods involves data which 
is either in the form of, or can be expressed as, numbers. Similarly, Stake 
(2005) observes that quantitative researchers represent happenings with scales 
and measures (numbers) whilst qualitative researchers are concerned what is 
happening with key episodes and represent this by means of their own 
interpretations and stories (narratives).   
Quantitative research makes the ontological assumption that reality is objective 
and external to the subject and that subjects can be studies through objective 
categories and verified by empirical methods (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). As 
such, in quantitative research there is a desire to limit the personal 
interpretation of the researcher from the period the research design is set, to the 
time the data is collected and analysed statistically.  
In contrast, qualitative research designs calls for the researcher to be in the 
field, making observations and exercising subjective judgements. Qualitative 
research emphasises the interpretation of the researcher and attempts to view 
events through the eyes of the subject which they are studying: “The social 
world must be interpreted from the perspective of the people being studied, 
rather than as though those subjects were incapable of their own reflections on 
the social world” (Bryman and Bell, 2015, p. 405).  Erickson (1986) argues that 
the most distinctive characteristic of qualitative inquiry is its emphasis on 
interpretation.   
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The approach which I have taken in my research is qualitative in nature. This 
decision was taken after considering how best to address the research 
questions which I have identified in my thesis. My research is focused on 
understanding the factors that affected the decision making process of the Irish 
banks in the lead up to the crisis, and seeks to gain a deeper understanding of 
what had happened through the subjective interpretation of the social actors 
that were involved. I am not seeking for definitive “yes” and “no” answers, or to 
prove or disprove a particular hypothesis, but rather to gather information and 
build theories. My research is intended to be “richly descriptive” (Merriam, 2002) 
providing the subjects with a voice and authenticity to the varying human 
experience (Silverman, 2010). The choice of qualitative methods was also 
attractive to me as it allowed me to engage and interact with the relevant actors 
and to increase my own understanding of the causes of the Irish crisis. 
There are many different languages within the context of qualitative research 
(Silverman, 2010). My research methodology has been described above as 
qualitative and I have adopted an interpretivist approach as my overall research 
framework. Interpretivism seeks to provide an understanding of social reality 
which comes from the subjective interpretation of the researcher. This contrast 
with positivism, normally associated with quantitative research, which 
incorporates the assumption that there are true answers, and that the objective 
of the researcher is to start with a hypothesis and then seek data that will prove 
or disprove this. The aim of positivist research is therefore to search for a 
correct answer and the elimination of other plausible explanations (Bryman and 
Bell, 2015; Easterby-Smith et al. 2013).  
Interpretivism is grounded in inducted reasoning, and does not provide hard and 
fast explanations from which causal relationship are identified and predictions 
made (McKerchar, 2010). Inductive reasoning seeks to supply strong evidence 
for, but not absolute proof, and this is consistent with the approach in my thesis. 
I am not testing theories or trying to identify the “correct” reason as to why the 
Irish banks made the decisions they did (i.e. positivism). Rather I am trying to 
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understand and interpret the views of the actors in the field and increase the 
comprehension of the decision making process of the Irish banks. I have posed 
“research questions” to be applied with reference to the identified case study, 
rather than hypothesis that will be proved or disproved.    
The style in which I have interpreted the data can be described as being based 
in the hermeneutic tradition. Hermeneutics is concerned with the nature of the 
understanding and interpretation of human behaviour and traditions (Greetham, 
2006). Hermeneutics provides insights into the ways in which the researcher 
interprets both written text and interviews. The underlying philosophy being that 
the researcher needs to understand the culture and the environment in the field 
in order to interpret the meaning of the data gathered (Easterby-Smith et al. 
2013). My research emphasises the importance of culture and the environment 
which is particularly relevant when trying to understand the Irish obsession with 
property as an asset class. In summary, my research is qualitative, based in the 
hermeneutic tradition and my approach is interpretive.     
 
4.2 Research Subjectivity  
One of the key characteristics of qualitative research is that there is an element 
of subjectivity in the researcher’s interpretation of the data. A discussion on 
subjectivity is particular relevant in the context of my own research and 
background. The geneses for this research are my own experiences working in 
an investment bank in the lead up to the financial crisis of 2008. Between 1994 
and 2008, I worked in the debt capital markets department of UBS Investment 
Bank, responsible for structuring and marketing the sale of debt and capital 
securities for financial institutions in Northern Europe including the Irish Banks. 
In that time, I executed over forty different bond transactions for five of the six 
domestically owned Irish banks. I had access to senior management of these 
organisations on numerous occasions, in particular when hosting investor 
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meetings where management presented and discussed their credit with 
investors.  
When the Irish banks failed so spectacularly, I reflected on my own experiences 
with the Irish bank management in the lead up to the crises. My casual 
observations included: 
1) The extreme confidence of Irish bank management in their own banks’ 
credit story and more generally in the strength and sustainability of the 
Irish property market. At no stage did any Irish bank executive ever 
express, either publicly or privately, any reservations that the Irish 
property market was over-priced. This confidence and belief appeared 
excessive compared to that which I evidenced in my dealing with other 
Northern European financial institutions.  
2) Very low levels of tolerance for contrary opinions on the sustainability of 
the Irish economy. As an illustration of this, at a meeting with the 
management of one of the largest Irish Banks in Munich in 2006, an 
investor referred to a critical research paper by Professor Morgan Kelly 
of University College Dublin (Kelly, 2007) in which he highlighted a 
bubble in the Irish property market and forecasted a 60% fall in Irish 
property prices. This research was dismissed by management of the Irish 
bank as being attention seeking, with Kelly portrayed to the investor as 
being out of touch with commercial reality and described as a “nutty 
professor”. On another occasion, I received a call from the management 
of an Irish bank threatening to take away a bond mandate as a result of a 
research paper which had been written by our independent equity 
analyst in which the analyst had challenged the strategy of the bank87.  
                                            
87
 These personal anecdotes are examples consistent with the symptoms of groupthink 
relating to “stereotyping out-group’s and “direct pressure on dissenters” identified by 
Janis in his groupthink model.  
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3) High levels of homogeneity and cohesiveness in the management of 
each bank. All of my dealings at board and executive level in Ireland 
where with Irish nationals, and, perhaps not surprisingly given the 
geographical size of Ireland and the concentration of the banking 
industry in Dublin, there were numerous examples of individuals who 
were well connected to each other. Further many managers and board 
members had been at the banks for their whole careers and bank 
management appeared to me to be extremely cohesive.   
4) High levels of competition between banks. In particular, the management 
of AIB and Bank of Ireland often discussed the success of Anglo Irish 
Bank and ways in which they could compete with, and regain, market 
share.  
5) Significant interest in property as an asset class in Ireland and an 
extreme confidence in property as an asset class. Property investment 
pervaded almost every conversation that I had in Ireland, whether this 
was in the taxi on the way to a meeting or over lunch with senior bank 
managers. Without exception, every person I spoke to was resolute in 
the belief that property prices would continue to rise.  
These are, of course, my own casual observations and have no academic 
substance. These personal anecdotes are, however, consistent with a number 
of the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink and herding. The conclusions 
of the Nyberg Commission and in particular the role that the Commission 
ascribed to both groupthink and herding in the Irish Financial crisis, provided 
further impetus to my thought process in developing a framework which 
identifies poor decision processes in a group setting.  
My own personal experiences meant that I began this research project with 
what can be described as a natural bias, highlighting an interesting 
epistemological debate. Silver (2012) uses Bayesian theory to argue that a 
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predisposition, such as the one I describe above, is central to making accurate 
predictions. Bayesian theory is concerned with conditional probability and looks 
to determine if an event or hypothesis is true given that an existing event has 
already happened. This depends on three variables; first the need to estimate 
the probability that the hypothesis or event is true, second the estimate of the 
probability that the event is false and thirdly (and most importantly), a prior 
probability. A prior probability refers to what the likelihood of the event occurring 
is, before exploring the event. In other words, prior beliefs should combine with 
the diagnosticity of the evidence.  
Kahneman (2011) refers to this prior belief as “the base rate” and provides a 
number of examples of how errors in forecasting are made by actors who ignore 
the base rate88. Kahneman argues that the importance of Bayesian reasoning 
can be summarised in two statements. First, the need to anchor your judgement 
of the probability of an outcome on a plausible base rate, and second, the need 
to question the diagnosticity of your evidence.  In effect this research has as its 
anchor my own casual observation coupled with the findings of Nyberg (2011). 
Kahneman, like Silver (2012) is supportive of the idea of anchoring decision 
processes with a credible base.  
                                            
88
 An example provided by Kahneman (2012) relates to an experiment when the actors were 
given a description of a fictitious student, “Tom W.”, and then asked to rank in order of likelihood 
which field “Tom W.” is studying. The description provided emphasises a stereotype which 
appears more suitable to someone from a computer science, engineering or library science 
background and as such actors in the experiment ranked those fields as most likely over fields 
such as the humanities, education and business studies. The point of this experiment was that 
the actors made their predictions whilst totally ignoring the base rate, and the fact that there 
were materially more students enrolled in the humanities, education and business studies as 
there were in the smaller esoteric fields they selected (and indeed “library science” was not 
even offered at the University). The point being that predictions are often made without 
reference back to the base rate, and it is this base rate which is intrinsic to any Bayesian 
calculation of probability.   
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Silver (2012) recognises that such an approach to prediction assumes 
subjectivity in the application of the prior probability in contrast to the frequentist 
approach as developed by Ronald Fisher as a method of making predictions 
which are not contaminated by researcher’s bias. The frequentist method 
defines an events probability of its occurrence in a large number of events. The 
underpinning philosophy behind frequentism is that the more data one collects, 
the less likely the error and probabilities are fundamentally related to 
frequencies of events. 
Silver however highlights what he sees as a fundamental weakness in the 
frequentist approach when he notes that it: “discourages the researcher from 
considering the underlying context or plausibility of his hypothesis, something 
that the Bayesian method demands in the form of a prior probability. Thus you 
will see apparently serious papers published on how toads can predict 
earthquakes89, or how big box-stores like Target beget racial hate groups90 
which apply frequentist test to produce statistically significant’ (but manifestly 
ridiculous) findings” (p. 252). Although Baysenian theory is normally associated 
with quantitative rather than qualitative research, it is submitted that the 
principle of the argument noted above, applies to my research, and that 
approaching research with a subjective bias can be a positive to research 
finding.    
Furthermore, Merriam (2002) notes that researchers, rather than trying to 
eliminate such biases or subjectivity, should identify, recognise and monitor 
them. Stake (1995) argues that subjectivity should not be seen as a failing that 
needs to be eliminated, but rather as an essential element of understanding. Yin 
(2013) argues that the researcher should strive for “high quality analysis” and 
that a researcher “should use your prior, expert knowledge and experience in 
                                            
89
 The citation for this article being Grant and Halliday (2010). 
90
 The link for this article is http://www.sciencenewsline.com/summary/2012041121000031.html 
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your case study” (ibid, p. 137). Pesckin (1988) goes further in arguing that a 
researcher’s subjectivity “can be seen as a virtuous, for it is the basis of 
researchers making a distinctive contribution, one that results from the unique 
configuration of their personal qualities joined to the data they have collected” 
(ibid, p. 18). In summary, my subjective position and knowledge of the field in 
which I am researching can be harnessed as a significant positive, but needs to 
be tempered with an appreciation of the risks of unconscious bias that are 
associated with my own unique circumstances.  
 
4.3 Case Study Approach 
Case studies are rich, empirical descriptions of particular instances of a 
phenomena that are typically based on a variety of sources (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2013). The case study approach is a popular and widely 
used research design particularly with respect to qualitative research (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2012; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The selection of cases 
should be based first and foremost on the opportunity to learn and researchers 
should chose cases where they expect learning to be the greatest (Pettigrew, 
1990; Stake, 1995). The choice of case study and the opportunity to learn is 
particularly important given qualitative case study research is normally limited to 
a single or limited number of cases. In my research I have identified the Irish 
case study and specifically Anglo Irish bank which, in my view, provide an 
excellent opportunity for learning91.  
Stake (1995) differentiates between two types of case study research; 
instrumental and intrinsic. In an instrumental case study, the case is looked at in 
depth because of its potential to help the researcher to understand an external 
interest and to provide insights into an issue. In contrast, an intrinsic case study 
                                            
91
 See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the history of the Irish bank case study and the 
background to Anglo Irish.  
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is researched to understand the unique features of the case with no emphasis 
on whether the case represents a particular trait or problem, rather the case is 
studied because of its own intrinsic interest. The case study research which I 
am undertaking is instrumental and has a broad focus relating to increasing the 
understanding of the decision making process in corporate boards.  
Laboratory experiments, typical in quantitative research, isolate the phenomena 
from their context, whilst case studies emphasise the real world context in which 
the phenomena occur (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Flyvjberg (2006) 
argues that case study research, where the researcher is intimately involved in 
the research subject, can increase the learning process when compared to 
research where the researcher is removed from the study matter: “Great 
distance to the object of study and lack of feedback easily lead to a stultified 
learning process, which in research can lead to ritual blind alleys, where the 
effect and usefulness of research becomes unclear and untested. As a research 
method, the case study can be an effective remedy against this tendency” (ibid, 
p. 223). Finally on this point, Flybjerg (2006) cites research from Beveridge 
(1950) in which he concludes that there are more discoveries stemming from 
the intense and rich observations from a case study that there are from 
statistics applied to large groups92. 
Eisenhardt (1989) notes that case study research can be used for three main 
aims; to provide descriptions, to test theory or to generate theory. My research 
falls into the category of testing theory given that I develop a model which looks 
to identify vulnerabilities to a poor decision process and then to apply the case 
study to the model. The approach that I have adopted is consistent with that 
suggested by Silverman (2013) who argues that a researcher’s case study 
                                            
92
 It is not, however, an intention to debate the relative merits of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods, and I fully accept that both approaches have their merits. My view, 
expressed above, is that a qualitative case study approach is best suited to addressing my 
specific identified research questions.  
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selection should not be based on statistical grounds but rather derived from a 
particular theory that the researcher wants to examine.  
Case study research is better placed with respect to research questions related 
to “how” and “why” and are not suitable to address research questions such as 
“how often” and “how many” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). My research is 
very much focused on the research questions related to “how the Irish banks 
made their decisions” and “why they made the decisions in relation to property 
investment”. This provides me with further comfort as to the applicability of the 
case study method in my research.  
A criticisms levelled at case study research is that one cannot generalise from 
the findings and it can be argued that this is “considered to be devastating to 
the case study” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 224). Flyvbjerg however disputes this and 
contends that case study research is ideal for generalising using the principle of 
“falsification” developed by Popper (1959). Flyvbjerg refers to Popper’s example 
relating to the assumption that “all swans are white”, and there is just one 
observation of a “black swan”, this sighting would falsify the initial proposition. 
Flyvbjerg concludes that: “The case study is well suited for identifying ‘black 
swans’ because of its in-depth approach: What appears to be ‘white’ often turns 
out on closer examination to be ‘black’” (ibid, p. 228). In other words, even a 
single case study research can provide generalisability if the observations from 
the case study contrast with a pre-existing belief.  
Yin (2013) further highlights that the validity of extrapolation from a case study 
depends not on the representatives of such a case in a statistical sense (as 
would be the case in research of a positivist nature) but rather on the 
plausibility, depth of analysis and cogency of the reasoning used to describe the 
results from them.  
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My research focuses on a single case study93. The decision to focus in a single 
case study, rather than a multiple case study, was made given my desire to 
provide as rich and deep a description of my chosen subject. A single case 
study review was the only realistic means of achieving this given the time 
constraints of my research. Single case studies can richly describe the 
existence of a single phenomenon (Siggelkow, 2007) but multiple cases can 
create more robust theory because the propositions are more rigorously 
grounded given the variety of evidence gathered. Further multiple case study 
analysis allows for broader exploration of identified research questions and 
theoretical elaboration (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). I recognise the 
limitation of my research with respect to issues of generalisability of a single 
case study analysis.  
 
4.4 Interviews  
The use of interviews in case study research is a widely accepted and effective 
means of gaining a rich understanding, and in portraying the multiple views of 
the case (Stake, 2005). There are three types of interviews that can be 
undertaken; structured, semi-structured and unstructured. Easterby et al. (2012) 
highlight that structured interviews contain a set of predetermined questions and 
as a result, allow for very little interaction with the interviewee. Structured 
interviews are typically more suited to quantitative research where the aim is to 
maximise the consistency of measurement of key concepts. Unstructured 
interviews are on the other extreme of the spectrum, and are more akin to a 
general conversation. Unstructured interviews are more suited to an exploratory 
type of research and where, for example, the case study is used to generate 
                                            
93
 I refer to my study as a single case study as it looks at the Irish banks and Anglo in particular. 
I consider this to be a single case study rather than a multiple case study (even though I do 
consider all six of the Irish banks in my analysis) because of unique context in which the Irish 
banks operate and that as a result my work should be seen as a collective and single case 
study review.  
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theory. The semi-structured interview represents the “middle ground”, and will 
allow me to impose some structure on the interview but at the same time 
provide me with the flexibility for inter-reaction with the interviewee and to allow 
the interviewees “a degree of freedom to explain their thoughts” (Horton et al., 
2004, p. 340). For this reason I chose a semi-structured interview approach.   
Although interviews are an extremely prominent method of gathering data in the 
qualitative researcher’s armoury (Bryman and Bell, 2015), four of the five 
comparative case studies which I analysed in chapter 3 did not use interviews 
as part of their research gathering process. It is submitted that the reason that 
these researchers did not undertake interviews does not relate to a 
methodological objection to the interview process itself, but rather through a 
lack of access to the decision makers (highlighted by LeBlanc and Schwartz 
(2007)).  
Of the five groupthink case studies I reviewed, only Yetiv (2003) relied partly on 
information sourced from interviews. Yetiv warned that “while interviews can be 
useful, especially for a data-demanding theory like groupthink, they can also 
pose risks” (ibid, p. 422). Yetiv highlights that these risks relate to decision 
makers not recollecting events accurately or providing self-serving and bias 
accounts of the events. To mitigate this risk, Yetiv backed up information 
secured from interview against one or more source by means of data 
triangulation. Statements that were deemed to be self-serving were explored in 
follow up interviews or ignored.  
The risk of a self-serving bias is exacerbated given that the research subject 
concerns understanding a poor decision process and there is an increased 
motivation for actors to justify their actions and to abdicate responsibilities for 
failures. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggested that researchers gather 
interview data from actors “who view the focal phenomena from diverse 
perspectives. These informants can include organizational actors from different 
hierarchical levels, functional areas, groups, and geographies, as well as actors 
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from other relevant organizations and other observers such as market analysts” 
(ibid, p. 28). Park (1990) noted that it would be better to interview outsiders 
rather than group members given group members’ inherent biases and lack of 
objectivity when assessing the group decision process. To mitigate the risk of 
self-serving bias, and taking into account the comments above, a wide set of 
actors were interviewed so that a broad and more balanced perspective was 
obtained. 
The list of actors interviewed, (summarised in chapter 7) is consistent with the 
mix of interviewees recommended by Eisenhardt and Graebner above. 
Moreover, the identification of biases in the account of events when compared 
with data from other sources may provide useful information for the research 
itself. Janis (1972), for example, identified collective rationalisation as a 
symptom of groupthink and the communication of such biases by interviewees 
may be suggestive of such biases. 
In any interview process there is the risk that the interviewees do not recollect 
events accurately. This is particularly relevant as this research was conducted 
in 2014, six years since the start of the Irish banking crisis. It is submitted that 
the time period which has lapsed between the events leading up to the crisis 
and the interviews itself are not so distant so that interviewees will be unable to 
recall most events. Interviewees’ memories of specific events were, on 
occasion, prompted by my recall of specific factual events94. It is, however, 
recognised that despite these prompts, there may still be errors in the recall of 
events and that this is a natural limitation of the interview process.  
A practical issue related to any interview process is the lack of access to the 
relevant actors (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007). The reluctance of actors to agree 
to be interviewed is exacerbated in Ireland given existing and potential litigation 
related to the banks and the announcement of a further banking inquiry into in 
                                            
94
 A timeline of events was drawn up which assisted interviewee recall when necessary. 
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Ireland95. This point is highlighted in the following e-mail exchange with an actor 
who had been an executive director at one of the Irish banks finance before the 
crisis: 
“Hi Gary  
As I believe the saga of the financial meltdown is not yet finished and 
may be the subject of some formal investigations here in Ireland, I would 
prefer not to participate in your study”  
Due to a number of litigation claims, particularly around Anglo Irish bank, certain 
actors were reluctant to be interviewed – even if it is for academic research 
purposes96. This point is well illustrated again in an e-mail exchange with a 
former (well connected) employer at Anglo: 
“Overall, it will be very hard to talk to my contacts as they are all facing 
court cases over the coming months. Even if they weren't I am not sure 
                                            
95A Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis has been set up by the Irish Government and 
evidence is currently been taken by the Commission (March, 2015). A number of bankers are 
due to give evidence before the Inquiry but these are scheduled for April/May of 2015. See 
https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/hearings/. .  
96
 Anglo Irish Banks auditors are being sued by Anglo Irish bank for their part in the bank’s 
demise. There is also the possibility that the directors of Anglo might be sued in relation to the 
window-dressing of Fitzpatrick’s loans to directors (see for example 
http://www.aclsolicitors.ie/news-events/current-news/anglo-irish-bank-scandal-the-possibility-of-
legal-actions-seeking-compensation/). Furthermore executive from IL&P and Anglo have been 
charged with conspiracy to defraud with respect to a loan between IL&P and Anglo intended to 
boost Anglo’s reported deposit numbers ( see 
http://www.litigationreview.info/articles/share/1310874/). Further there are a number of litigation 
claims or potential claims with respect to INBS. These include a potential claim against INBS 
auditors KPMG, and existing litigation claims against the directors of INBS with respect to their 
stewardship of INBS in the lead up to the crisis.  
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how they would feel about commenting on the crisis. They have been 
through the mill both personally and publicly.”   
Finally, a further logistical problem was contacting the ex-directors of the Irish 
banks to request interviews. In the lead up to the crisis the directors of the Irish 
banks suffered significant personal damage to their reputations and as a result 
many are no longer working in industry and are difficult to contact. Those 
currently working in industry were contacted by letter at their place of work. 
However, not a single director of Anglo agreed to be interviewed. The closest I 
have to an interview with an Anglo director is the interview I conducted with 
Actor P, a close friend of Tom Browne (a director of Anglo in the lead up to the 
crisis)97. However, my research can draw on The Fitzpatrick Tapes (Lyons and 
Carey, 2011),a series of interviews which were conducted by Lyons and Carey 
with Fitzpatrick and proved very useful in this research. Other indirect access to 
directors of Anglo was obtained through other media sources and books and 
newspapers and is reflected in the analysis of my findings in chapter 7.  
In summary, there are a number of challenges in the interview process. There 
are natural limitations to any interview process relating to the accurate recall of 
events and self-serving biases by interviewees. It is submitted that these 
identified limitations are in essence no different to that undertaken by many 
other researcher projects which are interview based. Furthermore, the practical 
challenges with respect to access to relevant actors are also not unique to this 
research project - although the difficulties of access in Ireland are exacerbated 
given the specific circumstances in described above. These are not, however, 
                                            
97
 The only evidence I have that Actor P is a “close friend” of Tom Browne, a former Anglo 
director, was that I was told this not only by O’Connor himself but also by both Actor Q and 
another former business associate of mine (individuals I had known and trusted when working 
in Ireland). I tried to contact Browne for a direct interview and, although for legal reasons he was 
uncomfortable doing this, I also understood from Actor P that he was aware and comfortable 
with me talking to Actor P.   
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insurmountable epistemological obstacles and does not mean that an interview 
process is not useful to the research process. The interview process was, it is 
submitted, additive to the information which had already been gathered and was 
conducted with a full appreciation of the potential limitations noted above. 
 In total I interviewed twenty individuals and conducted twenty one interviews 
each lasting between 30 minutes and 1.5 hours 98 . These semi-structured 
interviews began with me asking the interviewee if they could describe what 
they did at their organisation in the lead up to the crisis. This was then followed 
up with a broad question often asking if they could describe the culture at their 
own organisation or at Anglo. I would then try and pick up on relevant themes 
that came out of their answers and try to develop those further with probing 
questions. I made a conscious effort not to ask any “leading questions” but 
rather to try very hard to listen, be patient and “steer” the interviewee. Of 
course, the more interviews one does the more accomplished one becomes as 
an interviewer and later interviews were arguably richer in content that some of 
the earlier interviews conducted. No two interviews were the same or followed 
the same format but rather developed in line with their answers99.   
The interviewees reflect a wide range of actors including those that worked 
inside Anglo, competitors of Anglo, service providers to Anglo as well as 
external participants. As highlighted previously, the one limitation in the mix of 
                                            
98
 I conducted two separate interviews with Actor B.  
99
 My supervisors kindly provided me with advice in the interview process and I shared the first 
few interviews with them and took their feedback. I learnt that a good interview is one in which 
the interviewee did the talking.  
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interviewees is that I did not gain access to a main board director at Anglo100. A 
full list of the interviewees can be found in chapter 7.   
All the interviews were conducted in person with the exception of the interviews 
with Nyberg, Actor P and Carswell which were conducted telephonically. All the 
interviews were recorded with the express permission of the interviewees. The 
only exception being Actor H, who gave permission for me to take notes only.  
The process of selecting interviewees was also to some extent arbitrary due to 
the fact that my starting point was past contacts that I knew from when I worked 
with the Irish banks. Past contacts included Actor N (who was a competitor at a 
rival bank), Actor A and Actor B from Anglo, Actor F and Actor K from BKIR, 
Actor M and Actor J from AIB, Actor G from Ulster Bank and Actor Q from Davy. 
Some of these interviewees provided leads and introductions which led to 
further interviews. For example, three separate interviewees had mentioned that 
Actor E would be a good person to interview and provided me with an e-mail 
and introduction to him. Some interviews were the result of unsolicited e-mails 
and responses (for example Peter Nyberg, Actor O and Actor I).  
In summary, there is an accepted arbitrariness to the list of interviewees and a 
(frustrating) absence of Anglo directors. However, the interview process was 
just one part of the evidence gathering process and additional evidence was 
gathered from an extremely wide and diverse range of sources. It is submitted 
that the interview process complemented the information gathered from other 
sources and indeed provided an additional richness to the analysis undertaken 
in this chapter.  
 
4.5 Data Analysis; validity, reliability and generalisability 
                                            
100
 This lack of access was not a result of a lack of effort on my behalf. I attempted to contact all 
of Anglo’s past directors from the start of the millennium, all without success.  
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Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) highlights that a researcher needs to answer three 
questions with respect to research validity, reliability and generalisability: Does 
the study clearly gain access to the experiences of those in the research 
setting? Is there transparency about how the researcher made sense of the raw 
data? Do the concepts and constructs derived from the study have any 
relevance to other settings? These three questions are discussed below. 
 
4.5.1 Research validity 
Yin (2013) observes that a major strength of case study collection is the 
opportunity to use many difference sources of information and this allows the 
researcher “to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal and behavioural 
issues” (ibid, p. 97). He notes that through a process of data triangulation, 
findings are much more likely to be accurate if they are based on several 
sources of information all triangulated on the same set of research questions. 
This is very much in line with the approach which I have taken and reflected in 
chapter 7101. For the purposes of my research I was able to draw on a wide 
variety of data sources covering both direct and indirect interviews, annual 
reports and accounts, public inquiry documents, newspaper and television 
articles, academic articles and books written on the subject. The depth and 
variety of the observations are reflected in chapter 7.  
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) highlight what they see as three important factors 
which will affect the quality of the data gathered in interview. These relate to; 1) 
building trust with interviewee, 2) using the appropriate language in interview 
and 3) making sure that the research has relevance to the respondents. On the 
issue of trust, Easterby-Smith et al. warn that failure to develop trust may result 
                                            
101
 For an example of this please refer to Table 7.6 where I summarise all the observations I 
have made, categorising them by different data sources. Further in the appendix I provide some 
context to the number of variety of data sources by providing a comparative analysis with 
reference to other relevant studies.   
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in the interviewee responding to telling the researcher what they want to know 
or to hold back from telling their true version of events. I was very fortunate to 
have built up trust with a number of the actors that I interviewed over a 
sustained period of time during my years as an investment banker. Even with 
the actors that I did not know before interview, we could make a connection 
based on common business acquaintances and friends and this helped to build 
up a level of trust. Second, given my knowledge and experience in banking I 
was able to communicate effectively with the interviewees and to understand 
the more technical banking terms that came up in interview. This further helped 
to develop a bond of trust and my knowledge of the field allowed me to probe 
more incisively in interview. Third, all the interviewees were engaged in the 
interview process and in making a contribution to research which would improve 
the decision making in bank boards, especially in light of the severity of the 
crisis which they had experienced.  
 
4.5.2 Data reliability 
There were a number of challenges I faced when analysing the data. First, 
related to the risk of data asphyxiation (Pettigrew, 1990) given the large volume 
of information at my disposal. I tried to deal with this by being as organised as I 
could in the categorisation of the data into pre-agreed themes or codes. The 
approach which I adopted in the analysis of the data was broadly consistent 
with framework analysis (Rapley, 2011). This process involved first familiarising 
myself with the data, generating themes and sub-themes from the data, coding 
the data, developing descriptive accounts and explanatory accounts before then 
writing up the information. The development of codes for which to categorise 
information was driven by the theoretical model which I developed. As an 
illustration of this, Janis’ groupthink has seven antecedents and eight symptoms 
which provided me with categories in which to categorise information.  
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Eisenhardt (1989) highlighted that the researcher should ensure that the theory 
is not too rich or complex and that the hallmark of good theory is parsimony but 
accepted that “given the staggering volume of rich data there is a temptation to 
build theory which is very rich in detail but lacks the simplicity of overall 
perspective” (ibid, p. 547). Langley (1999) further noted that the aim for a 
researcher in data collection is to “move from a shapeless data spaghetti 
towards some kind of theoretical understanding that does not betray the 
richness, dynamism and complexity of the data but that is understandable and 
potentially useful to others” (ibid, p. 695) 
I found the challenge, identified by both Eisenhardt and Langley above, 
particularly difficult. I was faced with a balance between not wanting to 
overwhelm the reader with the depth of information, but at the same time trying 
to show the richness of my analysis. Further, I felt that by illustrating to the 
reader that the data supporting a specific research question was 
comprehensive, and from a number of different sources, this would partly 
mitigate any criticism of a “suspicious fit”. I accept that at times that I may have 
erred on the side of overwhelming the reader, and that my finding reflected in 
chapter 7 may be “heavy going” at times for the reader.  
Another issue which I faced, in common with all other researchers, is the 
acceptances that humans are poor processors of information and are 
susceptible to a number of inherent biases in the processing of information (see 
for example (Kahneman et al., 1982; Tversky et al., 1981; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986). To reduce the tendency to process information selectively 
and to only look for evidence which confirmed by existing view (confirmation 
bias), I took heed of the advice of both Yin (2013) and Eisenhardt (1989). These 
academics encourage the researcher to consider literature which conflicts with 
the theory you are developing. As Eisenhardt (1984) noted, a review of 
conflicting literature “represents an opportunity” and that the “juxtaposition of 
conflicting results forces researchers into a more creative, frame breaking mode 
of thinking that they might otherwise have been able to achieve” (ibid, p. 544). I 
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found that this advice was particularly useful when reviewing the five existing 
models which linked board attributed to financial performance (refer to chapter 
2). In particular the model of Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) provided a 
challenge and identified a limitation in my model as discussed in chapter 6. 
Other conflicting research which I found useful in shaping my thoughts includes 
Sunstein (2009), Stein (2014), Hart (1994), Aldag and Fuller (1993) and Kerr 
and Robinson (2011).  
 
4.5.3 Generalisability 
Langley (1999) observes that it is the “thick description” that will allow the 
reader to judge the transferability of ideas to other situations and that good 
research “will often produce a sense of déjà vu among experienced readers” 
(ibid, p.695). It is hoped that the narrative of the Anglo case study, described in 
chapter 7, will provide the reader with such a sense of déjà vu in relation to 
other similar cases. Finally Colville et al. (2013) argue that although it is difficult 
to generalise from single case studies they cite note that single case studies 
“are not only necessary ingredients for developing more general theories of 
behaviour but they also provide rich resources bridging empirical evidence and 
theory building” (ibid, p. 1206). I do, however, recognise the limitations of over-
generalising from my single case study and that an identified area of further 
research, is to apply my model of VPDP in a different context102.  
 
 
 
                                            
102
 Please refer to chapter 8, and in particular the discussion on the limitations of my research 
and identified areas for further research.  
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4.6 Research ethics  
Saunders et al. (2011) defines business ethics as “the appropriateness of your 
behaviour in relation to the rights of those who become the subject of your work, 
or are affected by it” (ibid, p. 129). This definition of research ethics, which puts 
those affected by the research right at the right of any ethical considerations, is 
consistent with the view expressed by Bryman and Bell (2015), Easterby-Smith 
(2012) and Silverman (2012). Silverman further highlights that as qualitative 
research inevitably involves contact with human subjects in the field, ethical 
considerations are of particular concern. 
Bryman and Bell (2015), Easterby-Smith (2012) and Silverman (2012) 
highlighted a number of issues that I needed to take into account to protect the 
interests of research subjects, in particular the interviewees. 
1) To make sure interviewees were fully informed about the research and 
that they gave their consent to be interviewed. For each of the twenty 
interviewees I engaged with, I explained that I was studying towards a 
PHD, that my chosen field was the Irish banks case study with particular 
emphasis on Anglo, and that the intention of my research was to 
increase the understanding of the decision making process if the Irish 
banks in the lead up to the crisis. All the interviewees gave their consent.  
 
2) For all twenty interviewees I offered them fully anonymity. Five of the 
interviewees requested that they be anonymised for the purposes of my 
research whilst the remaining fifteen actors all gave their permission for 
their names to be used. Despite this permission, a decision was made to 
anonymise all the actors other than Peter Nyberg and Simon Carswell. 
This decision was taken, in consideration of the comments from my 
external examiners, to protect the actors given the sensitive nature of the 
inquiry and the potential for harm to the interviewees. It was deemed 
unnecessary to protect the identity of Nyberg and Carswell whose views 
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are already in the public domain (Nyberg though his Commission, and 
Carswell in respect of his two books and numerous press articles). 
Further, I made this judgement given that neither interviewee made 
comments to me in interviewee that was inconsistent with what they have 
said in public or which would be considered harmful to them.   
3) Easterby-Smith (2012) highlights that participants privacy must be 
respected at all times. This was particularly relevant in the interview 
which I conducted with Actor B. Actor B expressed concerns over privacy 
and we agreed to conduct the interview in the privacy of his home. For all 
the other interviews, interviewees were given the option of where they 
would like the interview to take place. Only two of the interviews were 
conducted in public places, both venues chosen by the interviewee. 
4) All interviewees were offered a copy of the interview transcription, thus 
ensuring that any deception and issue of data has been minimised 
(Easterby-Smith, 2012). Only one interviewee requested a copy of the 
notes and made no corrections or alterations.  
 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter reviewed and justified my choice of research methodology and 
methods. It includes a discussion on the use of case study design for my 
research, the rationale for choosing the single case study approach and the use 
of semi-structured interviews as part of the data gathering process. I have 
justified the validity and reliability of my data, explained how I processes the 
data and discussed research ethics and the implications of this for my own 
research. Finally I have recognised the limitations of my research. These relate 
to the subjectivity in the interpretation of my research findings, the inherent 
biases which exist in the collection of data, the limitations with respect to 
generalisability of my finding from a single case study, and the difficulty in 
getting access to participants to interview. Despite the acceptance of the 
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limitations above, I am confident that my research findings, reflected in my 
thesis, have a contribution to make to the literature in my field.  
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Chapter 5: Background to the Irish case study 
 
This chapter provides the background to the identified Irish bank case study. 
What follows below is, 1) an analysis of the economic backdrop to the Irish 
financial crisis, 2) a study of the environment in which the Irish banks were 
operating and, 3) a granular review of all six of the Irish domestic banks.   
 
5.1 Background to the Irish Crisis 
When Ireland joined the European Union in 1973 it did so as its poorest 
member and as the “economic laggard” of Europe (Kirby and Kirby, 2010, p. 
31). From the late 1980’s, Ireland was however to undertake a period of 
unprecedented growth which was to become known as the era of the “Celtic 
Tiger”103. Indeed, in the 1990’s the Irish economy grew at an average rate of 
7.5% which was more than three times the average of Europe rivalling the 
growth of China (Kirby, 2010, p. 2).  
This growth is linked to the election of Fianna Fáil, in February 1987, which 
signalled a new direction for the economy and the ideological underpinnings 
instituting a policy of expansionary fiscal contraction (McCann, 2011). The 
government tackled over-indebtedness and negotiated a series of centralised 
social partnership agreements with trade union which traded in wage 
moderation in return for income tax concessions. 
                                            
103
 The term “Celtic Tiger” was first used by Kevin Gardner an economist at Morgan Stanley in a 
research report. The use of the word “tiger” being a direct comparison with the Asian tiger 
economies such as Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia which had witnessed high 
levels of growth in the 1980s and an increase in standards of living from a base level way below 
that of OECD average, as they caught up with the economies of the “First World”. 
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Ireland benefited from steady improvements in its educational standards104, 
improved infrastructure connected to favourable EU subsidies and grants, 
liberal labour markets and the strong growth in the UK - its largest trading 
partner. Favourable employment demographics were additional important 
contributing factors towards growth. In 1989, only 31% of Ireland’s population 
was in work, the lowest in the OECD. Ireland’s baby boom, which started in the 
1970’s and peaked in the 1980’s, meant however that by the end of the late 
1990s Ireland had a higher fraction of the working age population than either 
the US or the UK (Mulholland and Bradley, 2009).  
Lane (2011) points to the increase of the “weightless economy” during this 
important phase of growth in which high value but low weight sectors such as 
the computer and pharmaceutical industries were increasingly important. This 
meant that Ireland’s peripheral geographical status became less of a barrier to 
export-oriented production. Investment came particularly from the United States 
due to Ireland’s historical links, attractive corporate tax rate of 12.5% and its 
proximity to Europe. 
The improvement in Ireland was such that by the end of the 20th Century, 
Ireland’s GDP was at European average. Ireland had effectively caught up with 
the rest of Europe. The two decades of sustainable and competitive growth 
which had preceded this growth phase however created expectations of a 
continuing rise in living standards and asset values and an environment in 
which lenders, borrowers and regulators became accustomed to economic 
growth in the region of 7%. This created an expectation of success in Ireland, 
and “new era thinking”. 
                                            
104
 Honohan and Walsh (2002) note that education standards in Ireland rapidly increased as a 
result of the introduction of free secondary education in Ireland in 1967. 
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Instead of growth stabilising around European averages, the start of the 21st 
century saw Ireland move into the next phase of growth; shifting from that 
based on solid fundamentals and export demand to one based on domestic, 
debt fuelled and bank funded demand focused on the construction industry and 
related property investment. The expectations for such high growth levels 
masked the risks associated with this second phase of growth. 
Donovan and Murphy (2013) argue that it was the slight weakening of the Irish 
property market in 2001 which was the catalyst for the start of the housing and 
construction boom in Ireland. In 2001, Irish property was beginning to show 
signs of slowing, related to weakness primarily in the US following the collapse 
in share prices of high growth internet companies (the “dot.com” bust), the 
weakness in Irish agricultural imports related to the foot and mouth outbreak, 
and the events of September 2011.  Faced with the possibility of a slowdown in 
growth, Irish policy makers took a range of steps to reignite the property market 
and ensure that Ireland continued to enjoy the high levels of growth for which it 
had become accustomed.  
The rejuvenation of the Irish economy took the form of tax incentives to 
encourage building and the investment in property. The Irish political party 
Fianna Fáil were the dominant coalition partner when such tax incentives were 
introduced and in the lead up to the crisis itself. Commentators have pointed to 
a very close relationship between Fianna Fáil and those in the building and 
construction industry as a potential reason to explain why such favourable tax 
incentives were introduced to encourage construction (Donovan and Murphy, 
2013; O’Toole, 2009; Ross, 2010,).  
From January 2002, interest accrued on borrowed money employed in the 
purchase, improvement or repair of rented residential property was allowed as a 
tax deduction against all rental income when calculating rental income. Ireland 
was, at that time, one of only four OECD countries that allowed income tax 
deductibility for mortgages, whilst not taxing imputed rental income or capital 
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gains for owner occupied homes (Honohan, 2010). Finland, Portugal and Spain 
also allowed a tax deduction for mortgage interest payments, but did not tax 
imputed rent or capital gains on principal owned dwellings. However, unlike 
Ireland, all three aforementioned countries had municipal taxes on property 
taxes ranging from 0.1% to 1% (Rae and van den Noord, 2006). Research has 
shown that there is a strong positive association between the volatility of house 
prices generosity of the tax system towards housing (van den Noord 2004).  
Tax deductibility for mortgage income was not the only property related tax 
deduction. Section 23 of the Irish Corporation Tax Act was first introduced in 
1981 for the purpose of stimulating the then flagging construction industry. It 
allowed investors to write off all but the site costs of an apartment against their 
total rental income for the first year including rental income from other 
properties whilst any unused tax relief was carried forward indefinitely. Further 
tax reliefs were made for multi-story car parks, holiday homes, hotels and 
student accommodation. Builders took advantage of these tax reliefs and used 
them, not to meet specific demand, but rather ostensibly to receive the tax 
subsidies. During the period that tax relief was available for hotels, the number 
of hotel rooms increased 150% whilst tourists in Ireland only increased 70%. As 
O’Toole (2009) observed: “Developers were building hotels, not to meet 
demand, but simply to get subsidies from the government” (ibid, p. 118).  
The extent to which Irish growth focused, in this second phase, on the 
construction industry can be seen in a number of economic statistics. By 2006 
residential construction, which had been 4-6% of GDP in the 1990s, reached 
13% and at this level was more than twice the GDP average and higher than 
any OECD country including Spain. The proportion of Ireland’s economy 
derived from the construction industry Ireland’s “became excessive” (Regling 
and Watson, 2010, p. 22).  
The construction boom resulted in a significant increase in the number of new 
houses built. In 2005, house completions in Ireland were 80,000 compared to a 
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population of 4 million. In contrast in 2005 in the UK, housing completions were 
209,000 relative to a population of 60 million (Nyberg, 2011). By 2006, at the 
height of the construction boom, the number of new houses being built per 1000 
people in Ireland was 22 compared with 3.5 in the UK and 3 in Germany. Many 
of the houses were built speculatively and to take advantage of tax 
incentives105. Ryan (2011) cites the example of Leitrim, the smallest county in 
Ireland with a population of just 29,000. Leitrim built 3,000 houses in the boom 
whilst the estimate was that fewer than 600 were needed given population 
trends.  
The increase in the number of houses built in Ireland relative to its peers is well 
illustrated by the following graph highlighted by the following graph (Kinsella 
and Leddin, 2010, p. 93).  
Figure 5.1: Number of New Homes Built per 1,000 people, 2000-2007 
 
                                            
105
 O’Doherty writing in the Irish Independent in 2006, at the height of the housing boom, vividly 
describes new housing estates built speculatively, and on the back of tax incentives, sitting 
desolate and unoccupied.  
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Despite the increase in supply of houses relative to real demand as noted 
above, house prices continued to rise. Ireland experienced a threefold increase 
in the average price of property from 1994 to 2006 (Honohan, 2010). Irish 
house price inflation was the highest amongst OECD countries between the 
mid-1990s and 2006, with the United Kingdom and Spain second and third 
respectively (Malzubris, 2008). Krugman (2009), when comparing the US and 
Irish property boom in the lead up to the crisis, remarked that Ireland was 
Florida without the snakes.  
At the peak of the Irish property bubble, the average first time buyer mortgage 
had risen to eight times average earnings, and the average second-hand house 
cost seventeen times average earnings. The positive wealth effect from rising 
property prices led to a strong growth in private consumption. Furthermore, tax 
revenues from property related sources were very high in this growth period, 
and funded an increase in government expenditure.  
The IMF (“World Economic Outlook Housing and the Business Cycle,” 2008) 
provides further evidence of the extent to which property prices in Ireland had 
become divorced from fundamentals. The research included a comparison of 
house price valuations across 17 different markets. Prices were modelled as a 
function of seven fundamental factors, namely affordability, disposable income, 
long term interest rates, credit growth, stock market performance and 
demographic factors such as the size of the population by working age. The 
portion of the actual house price increase that could not be explained by these 
factors was termed the house price “gap” or overvaluation. The study covered 
the 10 year period from 1997 to 2007 with Ireland topping the house price gap 
with a 33% house price gap. 
The construction boom significantly impacted Irish government revenues from 
tax receipts. The structure of Ireland’s tax revenues changed dramatically from 
the early 1990s to 2006-2007.  Previously Ireland had been reliant on relatively 
stable taxes such as personal income tax and VAT, but in the construction 
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boom tax revenues became much more reliant on cyclical taxes such as 
corporation tax, stamp duty and capital gains taxes. These cyclical taxes 
accounted for 30 per cent of tax revenue in 2006 compared with just 8% in the 
late 1980’s (Regling and Watson, 2010, p. 26). 
In summary, Ireland had become increasingly reliant on a narrowed and cyclical 
tax base dependent on a buoyant property market and when the property 
market collapsed it quickly created a very large public deficit which Ireland is 
now struggling to come to terms with. 
 
5.2 Euro membership and its impact on Irish banking growth 
When the Euro came into force in January 2002, Euro interest rates were set at 
a level inappropriate to the Irish economy. Euro monetary policy was set with 
countries like Germany and France in mind; countries with mature economies, 
low growth rates and very moderate price and house inflation. This represented 
a complete contrast to the economic cycle in Ireland.  
Estimates suggest that the ECB policy rate was on average almost one 
percentage point lower than a standard Taylor rule106 would suggest for Ireland 
over the period 2001 to 2006 (OECD, 2009).  Kinsella estimates that had it the 
opportunity, the Irish Central Bank would have raised interest rates around 
2003, and that real interest rates were close to -4% in the early 2000s and that 
“this free money and the expansion of credit goes a long way to explaining the 
boom in the domestic economy” (Kinsella and Leddin, 2010, p. 14). Further, 
most mortgages in Ireland are floating or variable rate so that low Euro interest 
rates made mortgages more affordable further boosting the demand for housing 
                                            
106
 The Taylor Rule is a monetary policy rule which looks to provide central banks with an 
indication as to how much they should adjust nominal interest rates in response to changes in 
the rate of inflation, and output and other economic indicators.  
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(Rae and van den Noord, 2006). Artificially low interest rates would have also 
contributed towards Irish consumer indebtedness.  
Another consequence of EMU membership was the elimination of exchange 
risk which gave the Irish bank’s “virtually unfettered access to funding from 
European and other capital markets” (Nyberg, 2011, p. 3). Dellepiane and 
Hardiman (2010) sum it up when they commented: “Among the perverse and 
unintended consequences of the Euro was the fact that an institutional design 
intended to bring about economic stability by ending currency volatility, ended 
up creating incentives for much greater instability in the form of very uneven 
growth, asset price inflation, and unsustainable credit expansion. Ireland, like 
other European peripheral economies, fell victim to the politics of market-led 
indiscipline” (ibid, p. 488).  
The Irish property boom was effectively funded by the Irish domestic banks. The 
three years ending in 2006 saw compound growth in the Irish banks loan assets 
at 28% and the Irish banks went from lending 60% of GNP in 1997 to 200% in 
2008 (Kelly, 2009). Irish banks increasing dependency on wholesale funding 
was also very evident. The Irish banks which had been more or less completely 
deposit funded in 1997, drew on interbank deposits for over 40% of their funds 
in 2007 (OECD, 2009). Net indebtedness of the Irish banks to the rest of the 
world was just 10% of GDP at the end of 2003 but by 2006 this had risen to 
60% of GDP (Honohan 2009). Irish bank wholesale funding was focused on 
short term markets. This overdependence on short term funding was not of 
course unique to the Irish banks and was prevalent in banks worldwide (in 
particular in the US and the UK). The primary attraction of borrowing in the short 
term wholesale markets was of course lower costs  
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5.3 The bursting of the Irish property bubble 
The global reduction in bank liquidity was a catalyst for the collapse of the Irish 
housing bubble but it was not its cause. Nyberg (2011) observed that “the 
problems causing the crisis as well as the scale of it were the result of domestic 
Irish decisions and actions” (ibid, p. ii). Honohan (2010) refers to the 
characteristics of the Irish crisis as being both “domestic and classic”. He 
observed that the Irish banks had no meaningful exposure to the US sub-prime 
market, nor had they been involved in aggressive international acquisitions but 
instead “had been fatally weakened by a deep involvement in a world-beating 
property bubble which took off on the eve of Euro area membership and 
swelled” (ibid, p. 19). Regling and Watson (2010) refers to the causes of the 
Irish crisis as “home-made” relating to a “plain vanilla” property bubble in Ireland 
(ibid, p. 5-6). Finally, Kelly (2009) agrees that the collapse in Ireland was 
precipitated by the world crisis but concludes that “the Irish property boom 
would have collapsed anyway” (ibid, p. 59).  
When the Irish housing cycle started to turn in 2007 in line with a weakening of 
the global economic outlook, the Irish banks found themselves overexposed to 
an asset class that was hugely overvalued, and at the same time their access to 
funding limited given developments in international markets. The Irish 
government’s flexibility and ability to act was also limited by its overreliance on 
revenue from the very asset class which was struggling - property. The 
consequence of this was the collapse of the Irish economy and the IMF bailout 
which subsequently followed.  
The change in Irish fortunes appeared sudden and dramatic. In 2006 the Irish 
stock exchange, buoyed in particular by the bank stocks, had risen 28% 
outperforming the Eurostoxx 50, the FTSE and the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average. In 2007, Ireland’s GDP per capita had ranked behind only Norway, the 
US and Luxembourg (Ross, 2010). In contrast by 2008, Ireland’s economy 
contracted by 11% in real terms and 16% in nominal terms, and house prices 
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fell by 36%. Figures from the Irish Central Office Statistics in July 2011 reflected 
that house prices had fallen for 42 consecutive months down 42% off their 2007 
peak. Ireland has experienced the deepest and fastest contraction by any 
Western Economy post Second World War (Kelly, 2009). So dire was Ireland 
economic contraction that in 2010 Ireland requested, and was granted, a €85bn 
bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)107. The open letter written by 
the Irish Finance Minister and head of the Irish Central Bank in 2010 requesting 
the IMF bailout noted that Ireland “faced an economic crisis without parallel in 
recent times” and that “at the root of the problem is a domestic banking system, 
which at its peak was 5 times the size of the economy, and is now under severe 
pressure108.”  
In summary, the tangible causes of the crisis were artificially low interest rates 
in Ireland which made borrowing artificially low and encouraged housing related 
lending, whilst at the same time the Irish banks had access to a deep pool of 
cheap and short term commercial funding which they then on-lent to both 
individuals and property developers. Favourable tax incentives added more fuel 
to the property fire, resulting in the creation of a significant property bubble in 
Ireland. The consequence of the bubble was a loss in competitiveness and a 
tax system and government too reliant on the dependence of the continuation of 
the boom itself. The significant reduction in bank liquidity relating to the 
                                            
107
 The €85bn is broken up as follows: €22.5bn from the IMF Extended Fund Facility, €45bn 
from the European Financial Stability Facility including bi-lateral loans from UK, Sweden and 
Denmark and €17.5bn from Ireland’s own resources from the Irish Treasury cash buffer 
investments of their National Pension Reserve Fund 
108
 The open letter was written by Brian Lenihan (then Irish finance Minister) and Patrick 
Honohan (Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland) to Mr Dominic Strauss-Kahn dated 
December 3. 2010 and can be found on this link 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2010/irl/120310.pdf 
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international credit crisis was the catalyst for the collapse of the Irish economy 
and the resulting request for an IMF bailout in 2010.  
 
5.4 The environment in which the Irish banks were operating 
Research into the causes of speculative crises has highlighted the importance 
of the macro environment in shaping attitudes and ideologies and in fostering 
an environment of overconfidence and new era thinking109. Specifically relating 
to Ireland, McWilliams (2007) observes the change in Irish attitudes and values 
from Hibernian Catholic Ireland to the transformation into “Europe’s hedonists” 
and the “most decadent Irish generation ever” (ibid, p. 4). Hibernian Catholic 
Ireland represented to McWilliams the concept of a conservative, insular and 
understated Ireland. McWilliams provides many facts and anecdotes backing up 
his claims of Irish decadence, consumption and the change in core moral 
values in Ireland. As an illustration he observes changes in Irish consumption 
trends and that by 2007, Ireland spent more on gambling than on newspapers, 
more on chips than the British and more on chocolate than the Belgians 
(McWilliams, 2007, p. 9).  
McWilliams traces this change in Irish attitudes back to 1979 after Ireland joined 
the European Monetary System and the Pope visited Ireland. He argued that 
rather than the Pope’s visit being the highpoint of Hibernian Ireland, it served 
instead to underline that the church had started to become less important, and 
had been replaced with more outward looking and consumer orientated 
attitudes. McWilliams observes that the baby boom in Ireland peaking in June 
1980, exactly nine months after the Pope’s visit, and that it is was this 
generation, with its new set of values, that fuelled the Irish consumer boom. 
Whether one can actually trace a tipping point in Irish values back to a specific 
                                            
109
 Refer to chapter 3 for a review on economic bubble theory.  
  
222 
 
historical point is debatable. However McWilliams makes a strong argument for 
the change in Irish values and attitudes as Ireland embraced European Union 
and the neo liberalism values and (ultimately debt driven) consumerism which 
reflected a move away from Ireland’s traditional roots  
McWilliams was not the only commentator to notice the change in Irish attitudes 
to spending. Murphy and Devlin (2009) paint a picture of an Irish society 
obsessed with consumerism. Murphy and Devlin (2009) observed that in 
Ireland: “Sales of high tech gadgets, fancy furniture, and exotic holidays 
skyrocketed. Prestigious designer names from Tiffany to Dolce & Gabbana, 
from Versace to Jimmy Choo, set up camp to cash in. Smart gyms, spas and 
golf clubs had a membership glut. Hair and Beauty salons were extending their 
hours and opening new braches as fast as they could raise signs over the 
doors. Whether opting for teeth whitening or cosmetic surgery, buying state of 
the art Gaggia coffee machines or installing electronic security gates, people 
were routinely living beyond their means. Money, and what it could buy, was 
worshipped. By the crest of the boom, personal credit reached one and half 
times that of disposable income110” (ibid, p. 41).  
Further, Ireland had seen a huge period of growth that preceded the onset of 
the financial crisis. In the 1990s the Irish economy grew at an average rate of 
7.5% which was more than three times the average of Europe and rivalled the 
growth of China (Kirby, 2010). Ireland, and the miracle of the Celtic Tiger, 
rapidly converged towards Western European standards of living, and it was 
often referred to as a model for other emerging and open economies to 
emulate. Ireland was no longer the “economic laggard” of Western Europe 
(Kirby, 2010 p. 31). In 2005, The Economist magazine produced a global quality 
of life index ranking in which Ireland was classified as the country with the 
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 Murphy and Devlin observe that in 2006, Ireland had the highest personal credit card debt of 
any European country (ibid, p. 41). 
  
223 
 
highest quality of life in the world and in 2007 Ireland’s GDP per capita ranked 
behind only Norway, the US and Luxembourg.  
This strong level of growth resulted in greater levels of overconfidence and 
perception that Ireland had entered a new paradigm of growth. Nyberg (2011) 
recognised that Ireland was more vulnerable to overconfidence associated with 
“new era” thinking given its track record of growth over recent years. Nyberg 
(2011) noted that “traditional values and practices were seen as less relevant in 
the new financial order” (ibid, para 5.4.3) and that long period of strong and 
benign growth in Ireland “played a substantial role in convincing observers that 
developments were stable (ibid, para 5.4.5).” The high levels of growth that 
Ireland achieved in the two decades leading up to the start of the 21st century 
created an expectation of further growth and masked some of the warning 
signals associated with the divergent growth, path Ireland took leading as it did 
to an economic crisis. This observation is consistent with the risks, identified by 
Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) that countries which had been previously 
successful and portrayed as “poster children” of the international community are 
more vulnerable to new era thinking (ibid, p. 290).  
This point is further developed by Brawn (2009) who argued that the term 
“Celtic Tiger” came to represent Irish expectations and were imbedded in the 
Irish psyche and new era thinking: “Unfortunately the term ‘Celtic Tiger’ took on 
a whole new meaning among the general population: it morphed into an idea 
and became part of the zeitgeist. It had seeped deep into the Irish psyche, 
especially among the younger ‘Generation Y’, those born since 1980 and who 
were too young to remember the bad old times. In 21st-century Ireland there are 
Celtic Tiger people (Celtic Cubs111), clothes (Abercrombie and Fitch) television 
programmes (e.g. Xpose112), homes, cars, and so on. Incredibly it appears to 
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 Celtic Cubs is a term relating to children that were born during the Celtic Tiger period.  
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 Xpose is a popular Irish celebrity gossip programme.   
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have become fixed in the outlook of many people as a way of life” (ibid, p. 40-
41).  
McWilliams (2007), Murphy and Devlin (2009) and Brawn (2009) all focus on 
changes in underlying values within Irish society as a whole. Other 
commentators focus specifically on the culture within the Irish banks when 
looking to understand the crisis. Clifford and Coleman (2012) argue that the 
banking crisis should not have come as a surprise in Ireland, and was 
systematic of the lack of respect for laws and also a poor political leadership 
and the overly close relationships between politician and business. They cite a 
number of examples to back up their assertions. Many of these are purely 
political in nature; for example a passport for sale scandal, a businessman who 
had made personal donations to politicians in return for favours, an illegal lottery 
to fund the hospital system and a case of “jobs for friends”. In all of these 
examples according to the authors little or no action was taken against the 
perpetrators. 
Carswell (2006) provides thirteen different examples of banking related 
aspersions beginning in 1976. These include the removal of the Chairman of 
Irish Permanent for payments made to him for improvements to his personal 
dwelling, overcharging of customers by National Irish Bank, a foreign exchange 
fraud at AIB and the decision by AIB to write off debts owing from two former 
Prime Minister. Carswell argues that these examples reflect the moral state of 
the Irish banking sector. Books covering similar themes of banking and political 
scandals in Ireland covering the period of the past years include Banana 
Republic (Sweeney, 2009) and Bust (McDonald, 2011).  
The Deposit Interest Retention Tax (DIRT) scandal in Ireland is an excellent 
illustration of the environment in which the Irish banks were operating. This tax 
was first introduced in 1986, obliging banks to withhold tax at source from the 
interest paid to borrowers and pay this directly to the Revenue (simply an 
interest withholding tax). Irish non-residents however could fill out a form 
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declaring that they did not live in Ireland, which allowed them to receive their 
interest gross before the DIRT deduction.  
The consequence of this legislation was that a number of people claimed non-
resident status. O’Toole (2009) notes that by the end of 1998, 17% of all Irish 
held deposits were in theory held by non-residents, a number totally out of kilter 
with the number of true non Irish residents. The Irish banks were widely seen as 
turning a blind eye to customers who were filling in the forms and in some cases 
were actually helping customers to complete forms (Clifford and Coleman, 
2010). The scale of the practice was such, that according to Carswell (2006) 
“some banks even advertised for non-resident deposits in the window of their 
branches” (ibid, p. 35).    
Bank of Ireland initially adopted a policy of complying with DIRT, but in the first 
year of the tax had €120 million of deposits withdrawn from its branches, and 
quickly “got the message and joined the other banks in facilitating their 
customers’ crimes” (O’Toole, 2010 p. 50). This race to the bottom and 
emulation of competitors in Ireland was an important part of the lowering of 
credit standards by the banks competing to secure property lending business 
during the property boom and a theme that will be discussed in chapter 7. This 
further highlights an example of bank herding identified by Nyberg (2011) as 
being a factor in the credit crisis as well as the role that competition played in 
affecting bank board behaviour. These are both themes identified in this 
chapter.  
Eventually the DIRT scam was bought to a head,113 resulting in a government 
report by the Dails Committee of Public Accounts. The report concluded that the 
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 It was an internal auditor at AIB, Tony Spollen who was the whistle blower. His internal audit 
report to his superiors at AIB was leaked to the press in 1991. This report prompted the 
Comptroller & Auditor General to investigate the scale of the tax owned from these false non-
resident accounts ultimately leading to the above mentioned enquiry.  
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problem of DIRT evasion was an industry wide phenomenon and that the 
evasion of DIRT was practiced in a wider culture of more generalised tax 
evasion.  
Importantly although the banks were fined, 114  no one bank executive was 
deemed responsible nor held to account for the scam. Ross (2010) makes a 
comparison between the fines levied by the FSA in the UK – another regulator 
body famed for its light touch regulation - to those levied by the Irish regulator to 
illustrate the lack of action taken in Ireland. Between 2002 and 2007 he 
calculated that the UK FSA fined banks and building societies £14 million and 
then £27 million between January 2008 and June 2009.  In Ireland the banks 
received no fines at all between 2002 and 2007 and the only fines meted out by 
the Irish regulator between January 2008 and June 2009 were €10, 000 and 
€5,000 to the Irish Times and the Phoenix magazine respectively.  
The Ansbacher banking scandal, which broke in 1997, was another banking 
scandal which perhaps helped to set the tone for future bank behaviour. This 
was a relatively simple circular fraud. Investors gave the Irish bank, Guinness 
and Mahon, money which was deposited in Ansbacher Bank in the Cayman 
Islands but unrecorded for Irish tax reasons. This same money was then lent 
back to the participants as a loan allowing them to record the interest which 
they were receiving as a tax deduction. As with the DIRT enquiry, there was no 
prosecution which followed the unveiling of this scam, leading O’Toole (2010) to 
conclude that “Irish banking did nothing to create a collective ethic, a set of 
common standards that would ensure that nothing like the DIRT and Ansbacher 
scandals could ever happen again” (ibid, p. 69).  
The lack of accountability for these failures amongst the Irish banks may have 
affected the attitudes of bank boards. It is possible that the banks suffered from 
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 In total IR225 million was recovered from 25 different institutions including IR133 million in 
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what Wilson and Kelling (1982) call a “broken window syndrome”. This 
syndrome has its roots in criminology but has application for understanding the 
causes of financial crises generally, and specifically in Ireland. Wilson and 
Kelling were concerned about why crime and vandalism were higher in some 
areas of the US than others. They concluded that vandalism can occur once the 
sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility are lowered by actions that 
seem to signal that no-one cares, and that street crime flourishes in areas in 
which disorderly behaviour goes unpunished: “Social psychologists and police 
officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left 
unrepaired all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice 
neighbourhoods as in run down ones. Window breaking does not necessarily 
occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined 
window breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers, rather, one 
unrepaired broken window is a signal that no-one cares, and so breaking more 
windows costs nothing (ibid, p. 3).”  
To illustrate the point that vandalism can occur in “nice neighbourhoods” the 
authors cite an experiment undertaken by Zimbardo (1969) where he left a 
vehicle in a salubrious area. The car was untouched for a week. He then went 
back and smashed part of the car with a sledgehammer and within a few hours, 
the car had been turned upside down and totally destroyed.  
Carswell (2006), Sweeney (2009), McDonald (2011), Ross (2010) and O’Toole 
(2009) highlight the claims that financial corruption and tax evasion are 
“imbedded” in the Irish culture and in 2005 The New York Times in 2005 
described Ireland as the “Wild West” of International Finance. O’Toole (2010) 
noted that: “For more than thirty years before the Irish banking system 
collapsed, it had been colluding on a massive scale with fraud, tax evasion and 
routine breaches of exchange control” (ibid, p. 46).   
Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004) refer in their research to an “ethical fade” where 
over time the ethical aspects of decision making fade into the background. One 
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of the factors that Tenbrunsel and Messick cite as a factor which contributes 
towards an ethical fade is “ethical numbing”. This occurs when an unethical act 
is repeated a number of times so that participants come to accept unethical 
behaviour as being mainstream and acceptable. Examples such as the DIRT 
enquiry, the Ansbacher back to back frauds and the numerous other smaller, 
(and perhaps in isolation trivial) misdemeanours set the tone for the 
environment in which the Irish banks plied their trade.  
None of the three official reports into the Irish financial crisis, however, discuss 
the history of ethical indiscretions, lack of accountability and a perceived 
change in value system in Ireland in the run up to the crisis. Perhaps the reason 
for this is the subjective and intangible nature of the discussion and the risk of 
any comments being interpreted as being moralistic, judgemental and of a 
socio-political context. These are, however, important factors in identifying the 
environment in which corporations operate and are indeed intended to be 
captured in the model which was developed in chapter 6 as important 
“contextual factors”.  
 
5.5 Background to the Irish Banks 
The discussion above focuses on the macro economic backdrop and the 
environment in which the which the Irish banks operated in the lead up to the 
crisis. What follows below is a more granular review of the Irish banking sector 
itself.  
There were four domestic banks and two domestic building societies in Ireland 
in the lead up to the crisis115. Allied Irish Banks (AIB) and Bank of Ireland 
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 Throughout this thesis I have used the term “bank” to include both banks and building 
societies. Although these are technically different due to the structure of their ownership, I have 
done this in the interests of pragmatism.   
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(BKIR) were Ireland’s largest banks and were considered full service banks. 
Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo) concentrated almost entirely on business banking and 
in providing finance to commercial property assets whilst Irish Life and 
Permanent (ILP) concentrated on providing residential mortgage financing and 
insurance products through its insurance arm. In addition to the four banks, 
there were two domestic building societies, Irish Nationwide Building Society 
(INBS) and Educational Building Society (EBS). In addition to the six Irish banks 
noted above, three British banks competed in the Irish domestic banking 
market; HBOS, Northern Rock and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)116. Northern 
Rock competed almost exclusively for retail deposits. As a result Northern Rock 
did not suffer any material impairment in Ireland but rather from a reduction in 
the retail deposits from Irish customers. HBOS and RBS, in contrast, competed 
primarily in the Irish domestic mortgage and commercial property market and 
suffered material losses in Ireland. HBOS suffered impairments on its Irish 
mortgage portfolio of £10.9 billion which was the equivalent to 36% of its loan 
book as at end of 2008. The percentage of impairments as a proportion to loans 
at HBOS was higher than that of AIB, BKIR and RBS but less than that of Anglo 
(Standards, 2013). RBS recorded a cumulative impairment charge of £6.45 
billion on its Irish loan book, more than that recorded in both its UK retail 
banking and UK corporate banking over the same period (FSA, 2011).   
In addition to the six domestic Irish banks and three UK banks there were thirty 
two international banks based in Ireland. The rational for these international 
banks basing themselves in Ireland dates back to a decision in 1987 by the Irish 
government to set up the International Financial Centre (IFSC) in a designated 
area of the Dublin Docklands by the river Liffey. The idea was to attract foreign 
bank investment in Ireland with the incentive being a low tax rate of 10%, but 
which was increased to 12.5% in 2005. Under Irish tax law, a corporation can 
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 RBS acted through a combination of Ulster Bank in Northern Ireland and First Active in 
Southern Ireland. 
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pay its entire tax bill in Ireland if its central control and management are located 
in the state even if its core businesses are undertaken elsewhere. This 
encouraged banks to create the façade that their businesses were being 
managed out of the IFSC whilst in reality the businesses were being run 
elsewhere in Europe (O’Toole, 2009).   
The international banks played little or no role in the domestic Irish market and 
held only 7% of Irish household deposits and only provided 5% of the total 
credit outstanding in the Irish market (Honohan, 2010). Given this, my thesis will 
focus on the six Irish domestic banks and HBOS and RBS when focusing on the 
decision process of the banks’ board and their over-investment in property in 
the lead up to the crisis.  
The three official Irish reports into the crisis (Honohan, 2010; Nyberg, 2011; 
Regling and Watson, 2010) focus exclusively on the six domestic banks and 
their decision processes. This is, however understandable given that the inquiry 
focused on the Irish crisis, and the Irish government guaranteed the debts of the 
Irish banks whilst HBOS and RBS received support from the UK government.  
 
5.6 A review of the strategies of the Irish Banks 
5.6.1 Bank of Ireland and AIB 
The 1960s was a period of consolidation in the Irish banking sector with the 
emergence of two core banks, AIB and BKIR117. This consolidation was borne 
from a desire to remain competitive and to reduce the threat from an overseas 
banking entering the Irish banking domain. AIB and BKIR had, however, very 
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 AIB was formed in 1966 a result of a merger between the Provincial Bank of Ireland, Royal 
Bank of Ireland and the Munster and Leinster Bank. Bank of Ireland took over Hibernian Bank in 
1958 and National Bank in 1965 
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different cultures. BKIR was predominantly a Protestant Bank118. It had a court 
rather than a board of Directors with the bank’s charter being awarded in 1783. 
AIB, in contrast, had strong Catholics roots and was seen as a more abrasive 
and aggressive competitor119.  These two banks, despite the difference in their 
cultures, dominated the domestic Irish retail market. O’Sullivan and Kennedy 
(2010) noted that in 2006, AIB and BKIR controlled 80% of all Irish current 
accounts and 40% of all loans and deposits.  
Nyberg (2011) highlighted that one of the core strategies of both AIB and BKIR 
was to maintain independence and that strong growth and share price 
performance protected them from a potential take-over. Further, despite their 
dominance in the Irish retail market, Nyberg also notes that both these banks 
viewed Anglo as a threat and that Anglo was “highly regarded and greatly 
admired by many market commentators and advisors both domestically and 
abroad” (ibid, p. 24). The threat which Anglo presented to AIB and BKIR is 
explored in detail later in chapter 7.  
 
 5.6.2 INBS, EBS and IL&P 
INBS business model was “unique” (Nyberg, 2011) in that they provided 100% 
finance to developers to acquire sites that were zoned but had not as yet 
acquired planning permission. When planning permission was acquired, the 
loan was typically repaid to INBS and the property was financed by a competitor 
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 Indeed it was only in 1991 that Patrick Molloy became the first Catholic CEO of Bank of 
Ireland.  
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 Ross (2010) explained the differences between the cultures of the two banks when he 
observed that when chasing a client Bank of Ireland would politely knock on the door and wait 
for an answer while AIB would head straight for the back door with a crowbar (ibid, p. 27). 
Certainly my own impression of the two banks was that AIB was significantly more aggressive 
than BKIR when dealing with banking counterparties.   
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bank. INBS would often enter into profit share arrangements with the developer 
and receive a percentage of the profits when the project was completed. The 
business model was more like that of a venture capitalist financier than a 
traditional bank. It was hugely exposed to a decline in the Irish property markets 
and in particular commercial property and it was also over-reliant on the 
wholesale market for its funding.  
INBS key strategy was a demutualisation and sale which would have resulted in 
a significant windfall for its members. INBS most significant growth spurt was 
accordingly in the years leading up to the expected demutualisation. The credit 
crisis of 2007/2008 however made such a demutualisation impossible and INBS 
was rescued alongside the other Irish banks.  
In contrast, EBS was committed to mutuality and its business model was that of 
a traditional building society taking deposits from members and lending these 
out as mortgages. EBS core strategy did however change in 2006 when the 
made the strategic decision to enter into the market for financing commercial 
properties.  
ILP was a converted building society which kept close to its historical roots 
focusing on the Irish mortgage market and combining this with its insurance 
business. Residential mortgages accounted for 84% of ILPs total loan portfolio 
in December 2008 (Nyberg, 2011).   
 
5.6.3 Anglo Irish Bank 
Anglo classified itself as being “a relationship based business bank with a 
centralised business model operating in three core areas – Business Banking, 
Treasury and Wealth Management” (Anglo AFS; 2006). In essence, however, 
Anglo was a single focused commercial property growth model characterised by 
a centralised decision making process with a very limited branch network. 
Anglo’s lent on a secured basis on commercial property primarily in Ireland but 
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also in the UK and in the Boston area of the United States. Business and 
personal banking accounted for just 5% of their business. Anglo was described 
by O’Toole (2009) as the “quintessential developers’ bank” (ibid, p. 199).   
Leverage was an intricate part of Anglo’s business, and often they would 
finance not only the investment syndicate, but the individual members of the 
syndicate themselves. For a particular development, Anglo would put a limit on 
the amount it would lend to the property syndicate, and would require the 
syndicate members to provide the rest of the capital for the development 
upfront. In theory therefore Anglo would prudently limit its exposure to the 
development to a defined percentage of the loan to value. However, Anglo also 
financed the individual members of the syndicate through its private bank. The 
security which Anglo’s private bank would take being existing property (which 
given the buoyant property market would have almost certainly increased in 
value since it had been initially encumbered) or equity which might include 
Anglo shares. Thus, in practice, Anglo was highly leveraged and exposed to the 
success of specific property developments and was very sensitive to falls in the 
Irish property market.  
Anglo was also very sensitive to maintaining relationships with its key 
commercial property clients. Anglo’s loan book was extremely concentrated on 
a few large lending relationships and its exposure to its top twenty customers as 
at May 2008 accounted to half of its total loan book of €41.7 billion (Nyberg, 
2011). As a result of the desire to maintain its core relationship and in light of 
the strong competition, Anglo felt pressurised to approve loans for fear of losing 
customers. This point is highlighted by Kelly (2010), a property developer who 
was a customer of Anglo’s: “The [credit committee] meeting was for getting 
deals approved, and they rarely came back with a no. If a deal looked tricky, the 
bank would put up the price of money, but lent it anyway” (ibid, p. 39). The 
extent to which competition influenced the decision process of Anglo and 
competitor banks will be explored in detail in chapter 7.  
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Anglo saw significant growth in both its profitability and market capitalisation in 
the lead up to the crisis. In July 2007, its share price peaked at €17.53 and its 
market capitalisation €17.53 billion. This represented an 80% increase in share 
value and 103% increase in market capitalisation over a two year period, 
significantly outperforming all the other Irish banks (O’Sullivan and Kennedy, 
2010).  In 2007, management consultants Mercer Oliver Wyman named Anglo 
Irish Bank as the best rated bank of the 170 banks over US$10 billion that they 
had surveyed globally, whilst Investor Relations Magazine in 2008 named Anglo 
as “Best Overall Investor Relations” (Murphy and Devlin, 2009). 
In 2007, Anglo became only the fourth ever Irish company120 to disclose profits 
in excess of €1 billion when it reported its twenty second consecutive year of 
uninterrupted growth, with profits up 44% to €1.221 billion. Beltratti and Stulz 
(2009) concluded that banks that had performed best before the crisis and were 
rewarded with the largest stock increases before the crisis were the banks that 
suffered the most during the crisis. Anglo is an excellent example of this 
research.  
In December 2008, two and a half years after its market capitalisation had 
peaked at €17.53 billion, Anglo was nationalised by the Irish government, its 
shares worthless. In March 2011, as a fully nationalised entity, Anglo recorded 
an annual financial loss of €17.7 billion breaking its own record corporate loss in 
Ireland losses incurred in 2010 at €12.7 bn. The total cost of the government 
bailout of Anglo is estimated to exceed €34 billion the largest of the Irish 
banks121. The IMF (2010), in their report setting out the details of their bailout, 
specifically mentioned Anglo noting that “Although the bank [Anglo] was 
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 Two of the other three being Bank of Ireland and AIB.   
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 The precise cost to the Irish government of Anglo is difficult to quantify as it was first split 
into two entities, a “good” and a “bad” bank in September 2010 and then merged with Irish 
Nationwide in July 2011.  
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nationalized almost two years ago, it has sucked in ever-increasing public 
funds, and has served as a nagging reminder of the severe banking supervision 
deficiencies in Ireland and the poor state of the Irish banks” (ibid, p. 13).  
Lyons and Carey (2011) noted that: “The collapse of Anglo Irish Bank is the 
central drama in a series of events that has culminated in the Irish state 
requiring a bailout from the International Monetary Fund and the European 
Union – an extraordinarily dramatic downfall.” Kelly (2009) described Anglo as a 
“genuinely rogue bank” (ibid, p. 82) whilst Lewis (2011) cites a comment from a 
hedge fund manager that “Anglo Irish was probably the world’s worst bank” 
(ibid, p. 84).    
Three significant governance indiscretions have been identified with respect to 
Anglo in the lead up to the financial crisis. These relate to the warehousing of 
the chairman Sean Fitzpatrick’s loans over year end at a competitor institution, 
the back to back arrangement with ILP to booster year end deposits, and the 
“Golden Circle” transaction where Anglo provided financial assistance for the 
purchase of its shares from a distressed holder. These are discussed briefly 
below.  
During the period 2001-2007 loans from Anglo to Fitzpatrick were transferred to 
INBS so that the full extent of his borrowings would not be disclosed in the 
Anglo AFS. After year end, on the 3rd or 4th of November, these loans were then 
transferred back to Anglo. By 2007 Fitzpatrick had loans of €127 million 
outstanding from Anglo whilst only disclosing €7 million in the annual financial 
statements (Lyons and Carey, 2011, p. 220) 122 . The exposure of this 
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 Fitzpatrick justified his decision to conceal the loans in the series of interviews that made up 
the book The Fitzpatrick Tapes (Lyons and Carey, 2011). Fitzpatrick rationalised the decision to 
warehouse the loans on the basis that he had invested in a number of tax driven partnerships 
which meant for legal reasons relating to partnership law that he would need to disclose the full 
amount of the loan in the accounts and not just his partnership share. He felt that this would 
have created a false impression of the magnitude of his loans. This argument is, it is submitted, 
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governance failure in late 2008 led to the resignation of Fitzpatrick, CEO 
Drumm and NED Bradshaw123.   
The back to back arrangement with ILP was another indiscretion which involved 
the manipulation of Anglo’s balance sheet. Anglo was perceived internationally 
as the most vulnerable of the Irish banks to a reduction in wholesale funding. 
Anglo’s mono-line business strategy described above, lower debt credit rating124 
and its reliance on wholesale funding, made for obvious comparisons with 
Northern Rock. Northern Rock had received UK government emergency 
funding in September 2007 and had been bought under UK government 
ownership in February 2008 as a result of short term liquidity failures. 
In Anglo’s September 2007 year end accounts it had disclosed as a balance 
sheet item customer deposits of €53 billion. and in the run up to the September 
2008 year Anglo would have potentially had to report customer deposits of 
around €46 billion – reflecting a reduction of 13% on 2007. Customer deposits 
were an important indicator of the health of Anglo’s funding profile as customer 
deposits were perceived by the investor community as being reliable and less 
liable to flight risk. Interbank deposits in contrast were perceived to be as being 
extremely vulnerable to the drying up of wholesale markets associated with 
ongoing concerns relating to the banking crisis.  
                                                                                                                                
flawed. Fitzpatrick warehoused not only partnership loans but other loans not linked to 
partnerships. Moreover any loan exposures related to his partnership liability could have been 
easily explained by means of a note to the Anglo annual report and accounts. 
123
 Bradshaw’s loans had inadvertently also been warehoused by Fitzpatrick as one of the 
partnerships related to an exposure to a partnership which Bradshaw was a partner.   
124
 Anglo had a single “A” credit rating from the rating agencies whilst both AIB and BKIR had a 
“split” AA/A rating. The lower rating meant that it was both more expensive to secure wholesale 
funds and also more difficult given the perceived higher risk.  
  
237 
 
Anglo’s management believed that any disclosure of a reduction in corporate 
deposits would be a signal to the market that Anglo was struggling to secure 
stable funding. Indeed, Cooper (2009) highlighted that in the run up to the 
announcement of Anglo’s 2008 year end results that Anglo had been struggling 
to raise anything more than overnight money. O’Toole (2009) further highlights 
the stress that Anglo was under when he noted that in the last week of Anglo’s 
year end, €5.4 billion in corporate and retail deposits was withdrawn from Anglo. 
On the 29th September the day before the year end Anglo’s shares had dropped 
46% in the market (ibid, p. 206)125.  
ILP was a bank-assurer with a separate life assurance company Irish Life and 
as such was uniquely positioned to aid Anglo. Any deposit made from ILP’s 
insurance arm Irish Life would technically be classified as a customer deposit 
rather than as an inter-bank. Anglo approached, and executed, with ILP a back 
to back transaction whereby Anglo deposited €7.45bn with ILP (disclosed as an 
inter-bank loan) and ILP, through its insurance arm Irish Life, deposited the 
money back with Anglo who then disclosed the deposit as a “customer deposit” 
in its September 2008 year end accounts. This allowed Anglo to falsely boost its 
customer deposit numbers and to create the perception amongst users of 
financial statements that Anglo was not as reliant on inter-bank deposits than in 
reality it was126.  
                                            
125
 This drop in Anglo’s share price was not of course in isolation. September 2008 was the 
most volatile month in the crisis. Indeed in September 2008, Lehman Brothers had gone into 
liquidation, Merrill Lynch had been saved from a similar fate and had been bought by Bank of 
America, Fortis Bank had been part nationalised whilst German bank Depfa Bank was amongst 
others struggling for funding.    
126
 In effect the € 7. 45 billion received from ILP allowed Anglo to reflect customer deposits in its 
2008 accounts as just over €53 billion therefore showing no deterioration in the number from 
that disclosed in 2007. The effect of this false disclosure on the Anglo share price performance 
is, however, impossible to quantify. The Irish Government, on the date of Anglo’s year end 30 
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The “Golden Circle” transaction related to the arrangement by the board of 
directors to fund the purchase of Anglo’s shares by ten large customers of 
Anglo from the distressed investor Sean Quinn 127 . From late 2005 until 
September 2007, Quinn built up a position in Anglo shares which at its peak 
was 28.5% in Anglo, 28% synthetically though derivate contracts and 0.5% 
through a direct holding (Lyons and Carey, 2011, p. 117).  
Anglo had lent Sean Quinn either directly or indirectly €2.8 billion of which €574 
million related directly to loans with respect to his share purchases (Lyons and 
Carey, 2011, p. 134 and 142). Quinn bought the rights to his shares between 
the prices of €13.25 and €17 (Cooper, 2009, p. 190) and as Anglo’s share price 
fell, Quinn came under significant pressure. Speculation built up as to the extent 
of Quinn’s exposure to Anglo. The board of Anglo became concerned that if the 
full extent of his exposure to Anglo became known, it would put further 
downward pressure on the Anglo share price.  
Anglo put together a list of ten close banking relationships, which was to 
become known as the “Maple 10” or the “Golden Circle” who would each take 
1% of Quinn’s share positions with the remaining to be taken up by Quinn 
himself or sold down in the marketplace. All ten clients were given financial 
assistance by Anglo to purchase the shares. Three quarters of the sums being 
lent to buy their shares were secured against the shares itself, whilst the bank 
                                                                                                                                
September 2008, took the decision to guarantee all the dated liabilities of the six Irish domestic 
banks. This provided a huge (albeit short term) boost in confidence in the Irish banking sector. 
The guarantee covered €440 billion of liabilities approximately twice the countries GNP. As part 
of the guarantee the Government employed Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) to review the 
accounts of Anglo. It was as a result of this enquiry undertaken started in November 2008 that 
the details of the guarantee became known. 
127
 In 2008, Quinn was Ireland’s richest man with Forbes magazine placing him in their top 200 
in the world list (Lyons and Carey, 2011, p. 99). Quinn invested heavily in Irish bank shares and 
in particular in Anglo. 
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had recourse to the borrower’s other assets for just 25% of the purchase price. 
In effect, 75% of the loans were secured against shares which were to become 
worthless leading to huge losses to the state via its ownership of Anglo. Two of 
Anglo’s executive directors, McAteer and Whelan have been found guilty of 
breaching Companies Act regulations with respect to providing financial 
assistance for the purchase of Anglo shares.   
As highlighted in chapter 4, case study selection should be influenced by the 
case which gives the researcher the greatest opportunity to learn (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Stake, 1995b). These three governance failures described above, 
coupled with the central role that Anglo played in the Irish crisis highlight Anglo 
as an interesting case study for further analysis.  
 
5. 7 Conclusion 
The level of severity of the Irish crisis and the central role that the banks played 
make this an excellent case study to test my theoretical model of poor decision 
outcomes. In particular, Anglo has been identified as a bank which was central 
to understanding the Irish crisis itself, and in assessing whether the model can 
assist in understanding systemic risks associated with a poor decision outcome 
at a leading bank leading to emulation of that strategy by competitors.  
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Chapter 6: A multi-theoretical approach to the development of my model 
of VPDP  
 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I will develop a model which provided an alternative lens to 
identify vulnerabilities within a board to a poor decision process. My model of 
VPDP will then be compared and contrasted to the five recognised models 
which link board attributes to financial performance discussed in chapter 2. 
Finally from the model itself, five research questions will be identified which will 
then be applied with reference to the identified Irish bank case study.  
The proposed model will lean heavily on both behavioural and institutional 
theory128 and is in keeping with the call to bring multi-dimensional and different 
approaches to research into the field of corporate governance (Daily et al., 
2003; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Payne et al., 2009; Roberts et al., 2005).  
The model will also be consistent with Huse’s (2005) recommended conceptual 
framework for behavioural research in the field of corporate governance. Huse’s 
(2005) conceptual framework for exploring behavioural aspects of boards is 
characterised by three factors. First, a greater understanding of the intermediate 
processes such as board cohesiveness and cognitive conflict which sit between 
board attributes and firm performance. Second, Huse recommends applying 
theories from group and cognitive psychology to understand boards and 
decision making groups. Third, Huse urges researchers to adopt a pluralistic 
approach to board theories and that various approaches are needed to meet 
                                            
128
 Institutional theorists argue that the institutional environment can strongly influence the 
behaviour of individual firms that operate within such environment. The discussions regarding 
the macro environment and the impact which this has on the decision process highlighted 
above all fall within the broad tenets of institutional theory.  
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the various research questions in this field. All three of these factors identified 
above by Huse are included in my proposed model.  
The model draws from the extensive literature review undertaken earlier in my 
thesis. First, from the literature detailing the normative and informative 
influences on group decision processes, and the inherent biases in our decision 
processes through the identified phenomena of groupthink, herding, group 
polarisation, de-individuation and epistemic blind-spots. The review of the 
literature in this area identified that these phenomena were closely related, and 
can combine together to create a more powerful force than when looked at in 
isolation (Cox and Munsinger, 1985). 
Second, the model draws on the literature review which discusses the 
importance of context, the interplay between broader macro and micro factors, 
and how this might affect decision processes. This review concluded that 
context is critical in understanding processes and that it should be explicitly 
embedded in models of human behaviour (see for example Johns (2006), 
Ocasio (1999), Westphal and Zajac (2001) and Pye and Pettigrew (2005)). 
Further, recognition is made of Powell and DiMaggio’s (1983) research, which 
argues that institutional pressures within a specific domain increase the 
homogeneity of corporations transacting within that field. Once a set of 
organisations emerge through a combination of coercive, mimetic and 
normative pressure, corporate leaders make their organisations increasingly 
similar to those around them.   
The model further recognises the literature which highlights the environment in 
which speculative bubbles occur (see for example Shiller ( 2008; 2005), Swarup 
(2014) Galbraith (2009, 1994) and Kindleberger (2000)). This is of particular 
relevance as the economic backdrop to the collapse in the Irish banks, 
described earlier, represents a classic example of a speculative property bubble 
which burst resulting in the IMF bailout of Ireland in 2010. A review of this 
literature highlighted the importance of behavioural factors in explaining 
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irrational behaviour associated with bubbles, and identified high levels of 
confidence and a belief that “this time is different” as important factors common 
to financial bubbles.  
Third, the model recognises the role that directors’ low skill levels affect board 
decision processes generally, and also increases the vulnerability of normative 
and informative pressures on decision making (Zahra and Pearce (1989), 
Walker Report (2009)).  
The model will capture three layers of decision processes and the vulnerabilities 
with respect to a poor decision process at each of these levels. First, with 
respect to an initial decision recommendation (normally made by a CEO). 
Second in respect to the ratification of such a decision by the board of directors. 
Third, with respect to implications for a systemically poor decision process 
relating to herding by competitors.    
In summary, the proposed model is in keeping with the call for a multi-
theoretical approach. It draws on a wide and extensive review of literature 
covering behavioural and contextual factors and functional skill levels and 
covers three levels of decision processes.    
 
6.2 Building blocks for the model of poor decision processes 
The model has as a starting point an initial poor decision or strategy suggestion 
in the context of a corporate boardroom. A poor decision process has been  
defined previously as a decision which could have been avoided, and which 
results in a lower value to the firm in the present or future. Such a poor 
recommendation may simply be poorly thought out, inadequately researched 
and made by an actor with low levels of knowledge and experience. Such a 
recommendation may, however, be affected by inherent inbuilt biases in the 
decision processes itself. Literature related to behavioural economics argues 
that our decision processes are not always rational but rather are affected by a 
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number of identified biases (see for example Akerlof and Shiller, 2010; Ariely, 
2009; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman et al., 
1982).  
Examples of such biases relate to bounded rationality with respect to 
overconfidence, availability and confirmation. With respect to overconfidence, 
research findings have found that actors are overconfident and overestimate the 
precision of their forecasts (Daniel et al., 1998). Moreover, if investors 
experience gains in their holdings of an asset, this gives them some comfort 
that they have a cushion against a potential loss and they become even less 
risk averse and purchase more of the same asset (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). 
Overconfidence can, therefore, negatively impact decision processes. 
An availability bias relates to when actors make decisions and place greater 
emphasis on information which they have available to them (see for Kahneman 
et al., 1982; Wänke et al., 1995). For example, the fact that Ireland had never 
experienced a national property crash, might affect decision processes whether 
to invest in property. Again, the existence of such a bias could lead to a poor 
decision process.  
A confirmation bias exists when actors favour information which confirms their 
existing beliefs, whilst ignoring other information which contradicts this 
(Nickerson, 1998). Confirmation biases exist when humans process information 
selectively and favour data which confirms an existing belief, rather than 
considering how they might adjust their beliefs given the information (Wei Choo, 
2007). The greater the vested interest, the greater the likelihood that actors will 
be vulnerable to such a bias. Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2013) refer to the 
process in which actors deceive themselves into thinking that a decision is fair, 
even though the reality is that such a decision is skewed in favour of their 
vested interests, as motivated blindness. An extreme version of a confirmation 
bias has been referred to as an epistemic blind spot (Wei Choo, 2007).  
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Heffernan (2012) highlights that actors looking to convince themselves about a 
specific course of action are likely to surround themselves with other actors who 
have similar views to them, who will reinforce these beliefs rather than 
challenge them. Further, as such homophily develops, so does confidence in 
the correctness of their views, and the greater the blindness towards 
alternatives. In other words, epistemic blind spots are associated with 
homogeneity and will exacerbate confidence.  
To illustrate this, assume a scenario where an actor with a vested interest and a 
strong confirmation belief that property is a good investment, relies on the 
availability of information which shows that property has performed well in the 
recent past and that there is no history of a property crash. In this scenario, a 
confirmation bias has combined with an availability bias. Further, this 
confirmation bias will be exacerbated if the actor is confident in his decision 
processes, a confidence which might be a function of past recent successes. A 
confirmation bias here combines with an overconfidence bias. In this way, these 
biases can combine together to affect an initial decision process.   
The model recognises that our decision process has a number of inherent 
biases and potential flaws. Further when faced with a vested interest in a 
specific outcome, actors look to justify or rationalise a choice. Such 
rationalisation often involves a form of self-deception and a tendency towards 
homophily, actively seeking others who have similar views. Such homogeneity 
then exacerbates confidence in the (often flawed) decision process. In 
summary, the starting point for the model is a poor decision or strategy 
recommendation. This decision may simply be no more than a “poor choice” 
made from a position of low levels of knowledge, but could also have been 
affected by inherent biases in the decision process itself.  
This is reflected below: 
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Figure 6.1: First building block of my model of VPDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Normative influences and how they affect decision processes 
The first building blocks of the model are concerned with the vulnerabilities of a 
poor decision by an individual actor. My model is concerned with understanding 
how decisions are made in the context of a corporate boardroom. Material 
decisions or recommendations by a CEO (or another member of the board), 
need to be agreed by the collective board of directors. The primary role of the 
independent NED is to monitor management and to provide a robust challenge 
when necessary.  
The effectiveness of NEDs to challenge management is, however, affected by a 
number of factors. The first of these relate to normative pressures on decision 
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decision processes, namely groupthink, de-individuation and group polarisation. 
Groupthink was defined by Janis (1972) as “a mode of thinking that people 
engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group when the 
members strive for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action” (ibid, p. 9). Group polarisation refers to the 
phenomenon where a group tends to be more extreme in the direction in which 
it was already trending (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969). De-individuation is a 
psychological state of decreased self-evaluation and disinhibition, where de-
individuated individuals become so consumed by their collectivity that the group 
becomes the reference point, substituting individual goals for those perceived to 
be of the group (Festinger et al., 1952).  
As highlighted in the literature review, these three phenomena are inextricably 
linked. Groups that suffer from polarisation are also most likely to be suffering 
from groupthink. Moreover, a de-individuated individual will subordinate his/her 
feelings in favour of those of the group, and as such a de-individuated individual 
is, therefore, more susceptible to groupthink. These phenomena share common 
characteristics of cohesiveness, homogeneity, directive leadership, and are 
exacerbated in situations of high confidence. Groupthink, group polarisation and 
de-individuation can combine together to create an environment in which the 
risks of a poor decision outcome are heightened. Cox and Munsinger (1985) 
highlight, when phenomena combine together, a form of synergism occurs so 
that the combination of the effect is more powerful as a force than if phenomena 
are looked at in isolation. Further, Rousseau and Fried (Rousseau and Fried, 
2001) observed that a set of factors when considered together can sometimes 
yield a more interpretable and theoretically interesting pattern than any of the 
factors would show in isolation. 
This additional building block to the development of the model is reflected 
below: 
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Figure 6.2: Second building block of my model of VPDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure above reflects that group decision processes are affected by 
normative influences on decision making which can reduce the likelihood that 
an initial poor decision will be challenged, and increases the risk that such a 
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normative influences, reflect the interconnectivity of the identified normative 
influences, and that de-individuation and group polarisation are closely 
connected to groupthink.  
 
6.4 Informational pressures to conform 
A further building block of the model relates to the informative pressures to 
conform leading to herding. This pressure is not coercive, but rather the result 
of a rational act based on the accumulation of information which is perceived to 
be superior to that of an actor’s own information. As such, the actor will follow 
the choices made by others and ignore her own information. This informational 
based conformity has strong support in the literature, see for example 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Anderson and Holt (1996) and Easley and Kleinberg 
(2010). A distinction can be made between normative pressures which are 
rooted in psychology, and informative pressures which are rooted in traditional 
financial theories based on the rational assessment of information. 
A review of the literature related to informative influences on decision processes 
revealed that herding is more likely to occur in homogenous groups (Easley and 
Kleinberg, 2010). The propensity to herd is greater if the signals or information 
which actors rely on, come from others which are considered influential. In other 
words we are more likely to herd when the informational signals are from other 
actors whose signals are valued (Friedkin and Johnsen, 1999).  
High levels of competition can lead to herding as market participants look to 
maintain market share (Donovan and Murphy, 2013; Nyberg, 2011). Shiller 
(1995) further highlights that herding is more likely to occur where information 
about an asset class is more readily communicated and disseminated, 
especially if the topics are imbedded in the psyche of a society or are important 
to the basic instinct of survival. Shiller (2008) specifically highlights property as 
an example of such an asset class which is more susceptible to herd behaviour.  
  
249 
 
The literature review further identified a linkage between normative and 
informative pressures on a decision process. Both normative and informative 
pressures have in common a suppression of individual thoughts in favour of 
others’ views. Not surprisingly there are common threads, namely: directive 
leadership, homogeneity, isolation of the group and are both exacerbated in 
environments associated with high levels of competition. Further, there is a 
complex interplay between normative and informative influences which can 
exist internally within a firm, and also between firms. Within a firm, normative 
and informative pressures can combine together, and a NED who believes that 
an executive director has better information, is more likely to herd. Herding can 
increase cohesion and confidence within a group. Both of these are 
characteristics associated with normative pressures to conform. Herding can, 
therefore, increase the likelihood and vulnerability of a group to groupthink, 
group polarisation and de-individuation. The relationship between informative 
and normative pressures described above illustrates that the sum of the whole 
can be more powerful than the individual components (Cox and Munsinger 
(1985) and Rousseau and Fried (2001)).  This additional building block to the 
model is reflected below:  
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Figure 6.3: Third building block of my model of VPDP 
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informative pressures can impact normative influences and can combine to 
reduce the likelihood of a robust challenge.  
 
6.5 The importance of context to the model itself 
As noted previously, a model of decision processes needs to consider the 
contextual factors which impact on both normative and informative influences in 
decision processes. The industry type is an example of such a contextual factor. 
Turner and Pratkanis (1998) argue that certain types of groups are more 
susceptible to groupthink than others and that jurors and scientists, by definition 
of their group social identity, are more likely to appraise critically a situation 
before making a specific decision. They note that a scientist is more likely “to 
bend over backwards to prove himself wrong rather than right on matters of 
scientific investigations” (ibid, p. 230). Related to this, Neck and Moorhead 
(1992) found that although many of the antecedents were present, groupthink 
was avoided by the jury in the case against DeLorean. The responsibility and 
expectation associated with the role meant that jurors were able to resist 
groupthink.  
Finally, further evidence of this point is found in the research of Johnson and 
Downing (1979) into the process of de-individuation. These researchers found 
that when subjects were dressed up in Klu Klux Clan type outfits this lead to an 
increase in aggressive behaviour whilst those subjects who were dressed up as 
nurses, there was a significant reduction in violence. None of this research was 
related specifically to banking but the high number of ethical indiscretions which 
have been associated with the industry would indicate that banking was a 
higher risk industry in this respect. Bankers, if they were to “dress up”, are more 
likely to do so in Klu Klux clan outfits than nurses!  
The industry type, therefore, impacts the salient norms of an industry, and 
certain industries are more vulnerable to groupthink (Neck and Moorhead, 
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1992; Turner and Pratkanis, 1998) and to related ethical indiscretions (see 
(Ford and Price, 1996; Hall, 2007; Langevoort, 1995; Sims, 1992)129. This risk is 
reflected in the model above by the inclusion of “industry type” in the contextual 
factors.  
The threat of competition is another contextual factor that will impact the 
decision process. The impact on inter-group competition on groupthink is 
highlighted by Turner et al. (1987) and Hart (1994). Hart (1994) highlights that 
intense competition between different groups, and the existence of a 
threatening out-group, can increase intra-group solidarity, increasing 
cohesiveness and the likelihood of groupthink. Hart argues that the four 
symptoms of groupthink identified by Janis, namely illusions of invulnerability, 
belief in the inherent morality of the group, collective rationalisation and 
stereotyping of out-groups, will be impacted by competition from external 
groups. Janis (1972) identified high stress from external sources as an 
antecedent in his groupthink model, and the threat of competition is an example 
of such stress130.  
                                            
129
 For a fuller discussion of this please, refer to chapter 3 on groupthink, and in particular the 
sector titled “groupthink and unethical behaviour”.  
130
 Banking is an industry which has been associated with high levels of competition and high 
confidence. Both of these observables are characteristics associated with normative and 
informative influences on decision processes. This further highlights the vulnerability of banking 
as an industry to a lack of adequate boardroom challenge. 
Furthermore, high levels of competition, particularly amongst a small number of dominant 
players, was a feature of the environment in which Arthur Andersen went into liquidation, and 
was a key feature of the backdrop in which the credit rating agencies made poor decisions with 
respect to the rating of structured products in the lead up to the financial crisis (Alcubilla and del 
Pozo, 2012). A review of the decision processes related to the accountancy firms and the credit 
rating agencies is, however, outside the remit of this thesis.  
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The life cycle of the company, both with respect to the company itself and the 
longevity of its directors, is another contextual factor which will impact on the 
cohesiveness of the group. A company which has experienced high levels of 
growth and success, is likely to be characterised by high levels of confidence. 
Further, a board which is more mature, and where the directors have worked 
together for a long period of time, is more likely to be characterised by high 
levels of cohesiveness.  
The overall confidence at a macro level will feed into the confidence at a micro 
bank board level. High levels of confidence associated with a “this time it is 
different” attitude has been identified as being a key factor common to 
speculative bubbles (Chancellor, 2000; Galbraith, 2009, 1994; Kindleberger and 
Aliber, 2011; Mackay, 2004; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Shiller, 2008). The 
institutional pressure for homogeneity, identified by Powell and DiMaggio (1983) 
will affect the homogeneity at a firm level. Again, this illustrates how contextual 
factors affect the decision making process. Finally, the socio-political, legal and 
regulatory environment and zeitgeist in which firms operate, as discussed in 
chapter 3, will affect the environment in which individual firms will make 
decisions.   
In summary, a number of specific contextual factors will impact on the 
observable attributes associated with both normative and informative influences 
on decision processes. These contextual factors can, it is submitted, exacerbate 
the likelihood of normative and informative pressures on decision processes, 
reducing the likelihood of a challenge and increasing the risk that a poor 
decision strategy goes unchallenged. These contextual factors are added to the 
model below: 
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Figure 6.4: Fourth building block of my model of VPDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The diagram reflects the potential amplifying effects that context can have on 
decision processes. The impact of context is seen in different “parts” of the 
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making. Further high confidence levels are associated with normative influences 
on decision making so that, not only can high confidence in an economy affect 
an initial decision, but it can also increase the vulnerability to groupthink and 
group polarisation and the effectiveness of the challenge of the decision itself.  
High levels of competition have been associated with both normative and 
informative influences on decision processes both of which can reduce 
challenge. Finally, the institutional pressure towards homogeneity within a 
society can also manifest itself within an organisation, increasing the 
vulnerability to both normative and informative influences on a decision process. 
Homogeneity has been identified in the literature review as being a 
characteristic associated with both normative and informative pressures on 
decision processes. In summary, contextual factors will amplify or exacerbate 
the factors identified as potential vulnerabilities to a challenge of an initial poor 
decision process.  
 
6.6 The impact of the functional and firm specific skill level of Directors 
Low functional and firm specific skill levels with respect to the board of directors 
will impact the likelihood of a poor decision process at two levels. First, the 
starting point of the model itself was an initially poor decision recommendation, 
or strategy suggestion, being made. There is an increased risk of a poor 
decision being made initially if the skill level of the initial decision maker 
(normally the CEO) is low.  
Second, if the skill level of the directors, and in particular the NEDs, are low, 
they are more likely to herd and accede to the superior knowledge of the CEO 
and other executive directors. This lack of dissent can then lead to higher levels 
of confidence amongst executives who interpret the lack of a challenge as a 
sign of confidence. Low firm and functional skill levels amongst NEDs will, 
therefore, lead to both higher levels of cohesiveness and increased levels of 
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confidence. The consequence of this will be to increase the risks of normative 
pressures on decision making with a greater likelihood of fewer boardroom 
challenges. In other words, lack of directors’ skill leads to greater likelihood of 
informative pressures on directors to herd, which in turn can increase 
confidence and cohesion and the increased risk of normative pressures on the 
decision process. The net effect of this is the increased likelihood of a lack of 
robust challenge.  
This highlights once again the interconnectivity of all the attributes of the model 
and that they “feed” off each other. This final building block in relation to the 
model is reflected below:  
Figure 6.5: Fifth building block of my model of VPDP 
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As the diagram illustrates, low functional and skill levels can affect the initial 
decision process itself. Further low skill levels can increase the risk of herding 
and increase cohesiveness within a group, thus affecting both normative and 
informative pressures and reducing the likelihood of an effective board 
challenge. In summary a complete illustration of the model is presented below: 
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Figure 6.6: My completed model of VPDP  (firm specific)  
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6.7 Systemic risk of a poor decision process 
The model above has described an internal process within an organisation and 
identifies the vulnerabilities of a poor decision process being undertaken 
internally within a firm. This reflects two levels of decision making; first with 
respect to the initial policy recommendation, and second with respect to the 
challenge of such a strategy by the collective board. A further nuance of the 
model is the impact that a poor decision process at an individual firm can have 
on other firms in the same industry. This is best illustrated though a theoretical 
scenario: 
As a starting point, a poor decision is suggested by the CEO of a specific firm. 
The decision is one which is made as a result of a decision process which is 
affected by any one of a number of inherent biases in the decision process. A 
possible scenario is that the CEO recommends that the firm lend more 
aggressively in the property market. This decision may be affected by an 
availability bias (such as there has never been a property crash) or a 
confirmation bias (the CEO has a personal vested interest in the property 
market and is looking to confirm his vested beliefs) or the CEO might be 
affected by a historical belief in the security associated with property as an 
asset class, something which is deep seated in the culture of the environment in 
which he is operating (an epistemic blind spot). The board in which the CEO is 
sitting is characterised by all the antecedents of groupthink; high cohesion, high 
levels of homogeneity, an influential CEO and a board which is not overly 
concerned with compliance to detailed rules and regulations.  
The environment in which the bank is operating is highly competitive, increasing 
the feeling of cohesion within the board under threat from competition. The 
overall business environment is characterised by high growth, an expectation of 
further growth, and a belief that “this time it’s different”. The board of the 
company is longstanding, and the company has a track record of success 
increasing confidence within the board itself. These assumed contextual factors 
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amplify the observable attributes associated with normative and informative 
influences on group decision processes.  
The NEDs of such a company are, inter alia, the internal gatekeepers in the 
boardroom. In line with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) they 
represent the “solution” to the conflict of interest between management and the 
shareholders. In this theoretical example, the NEDs are characterised by high 
levels of cohesiveness and homogeneity with management and are themselves 
susceptible to groupthink. Further, such NEDs have low functional and firm 
specific knowledge of the firm and are even less likely to challenge 
management, but rather to accede to the perception of superior knowledge and 
information of the firm’s executives. In other words, the NEDs herd, suppressing 
their own information in favour of that of the CEO. The propensity to herd will be 
exacerbated in situations where there are high levels of homogeneity between 
executive and NEDs.  
In summary, what has been described above is a theoretical scenario of a 
company in which the recommendation of a poor decision is not challenged 
through a combination of both groupthink and herding. All this occurs within a 
specific organisation and results in the execution of a poor decision process by 
that individual firm. 
Developing our theoretical example further, and assuming that the broad 
environment in which the banks operate is characterised by high levels of 
competition, homogeneity and high confidence levels. The likelihood of other 
firms herding and following the decision and informational signal by the leading 
firm is, therefore, intensified. A poor decision process from an individual firm 
can influence the behaviour of others, creating systemic risk.  
This interplay is reflected below:  
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Figure 6.7: My completed model of VPDP (systemic risk) 
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6.8 Comparison of my model of VPDP to the five existing models 
highlighted in chapter 2. 
In chapter 2, I identified and analysed five models which looked to link board 
attributes to financial performances (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; McNulty et al., 2013; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). What follows below is an analysis of how my own model can be 
differentiated from these established models.  
 
 
6.8.1 What can I add to the Zahra and Pearce (1989) model? 
The Zahra and Pearce model described in chapter 2, represents an integrated 
model linking four board attributes both directly and indirectly to board financial 
performance. The model explicitly recognises the importance that context plays 
in influencing the identified attributes and board roles and how this links to firm 
performance. In that sense their model is aligned with the conclusions I have 
drawn from my literature review which also stresses the importance of taking 
into consideration how contextual issues affect the environment in which board 
decisions are made. Other similarities relate to the recognition of the leadership 
style of the CEO and the structure of the board.   
My model of VPDP can be differentiated from Zahra and Pearce’s in that it 
recognises the role that human psychology plays in decision processes and 
ultimately in financial performance. One of the core assumptions for the model 
of VPDP is the role that human behaviour plays in affecting board processes 
and, it is submitted, this is an important differentiating factor between my model 
of VPDP and that of Zahra and Pearce (1989).  
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6.8.2 What can I add to the Forbes and Milliken (1999) model? 
The Forbes and Milliken model recognise the importance that psychological 
factors play in affecting governance effectiveness which is consistent with the 
approach I adopted in the development of my own model. My model of VPDP 
focuses primarily on understanding the factors which affect a robust boardroom 
challenge. Forbes and Milliken identify the importance of cognitive conflict in 
ensuring that such a challenge exists.  
Forbes and Milliken focus specifically on cohesiveness and the role that it can 
play in affecting firm performance. High levels of task orientated cohesion can 
lead to high levels of firm performance whilst high levels of socio-emotional 
cohesiveness can lead to groupthink and reduce performance. The suggested 
antidote to high levels of socio-emotional cohesiveness associated with 
groupthink is to promote cognitive conflict through diversification, and by 
increasing the number of outsiders to the board.  
Cohesiveness has been identified in my literature review as a key factor 
associated with poor decision processes. Forbes and Milliken focus on the 
impact on cohesiveness with respect to groupthink, whilst the conclusions from 
my literature review are that high levels of cohesiveness and related 
homogeneity will increase the vulnerability, not only to groupthink, but also to 
group polarisation and de-individuation. Further, I intend to consider the impact 
that internal herding can have in affecting firm performance. This is only 
indirectly recognised by Forbes and Milliken in that the use of knowledge and 
skills of the directors is reflected as having a direct input on cognitive conflict, 
increasing the likelihood of board challenge. 
Moreover, I highlight explicitly that group homogeneity is an important factor 
contributing towards the risk of a poor decision process and is associated with 
both normative and informative pressures on decision processes. Forbes and 
Milliken only indirectly recognise the importance of group homogeneity when 
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they note that diversity in the boardroom can increase cognitive conflict and 
boardroom challenge resulting in a better decision process.  
Forbes and Milliken identify increasing the number of outsiders in the board as 
a means of enhancing cognitive conflict and boardroom challenge. The 
conclusions from the literature review are, however, that an increase in the 
number of NEDs will not necessarily enhance cognitive conflict. Rather, the 
effectiveness of NEDs challenge will be impacted by three important factors: 
namely, normative and informative pressures and the skill level of directors. 
These three factors do, as described previously, combine together to affect the 
impact of NEDs to increase the cognitive conflict associated with a robust 
boardroom challenge.  
The significant difference between my model of VPDP and the model presented 
by Forbes and Milliken (1999) is, however, that Forbes and Milliken do not take 
context into account whilst my model of VPDP assumes that context is critical to 
shaping decision processes. My model therefore captures elements of the 
models of both Zahra and Pearce and Forbes and Milliken; It includes the 
contextual considerations emphasised in the Zahra and Pearce model and the 
psychological factors stressed by the Forbes and Milliken model. However, it 
can also be differentiated from these two models in that it highlights how factors 
such as groupthink, group polarisation, herding, de-individuation and blind spots 
can combine together to increase the risk of poor decision processes in a way 
that is not, it is submitted, envisaged by either Zahra and Pearce (1989) or 
Forbes and Milliken (1999).  
  
6.8.3 What can I add to the Hillman and Dalziel (2003) model? 
The Hillman and Dalziel model discussed in chapter 2 was criticised in that it 
assumes that actors will act rationally and that psychology does not play a part 
in decision processes, and in that sense is the antithesis of the model which I 
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have developed which assumes that decision making is affected by both 
normative and informative influences and is often not rational. I argue that the 
effectiveness of NEDs to monitor management will be affected by a number of 
powerful psychological factors identified in my literature review, and equity 
incentivisation will not always be sufficient to counter such forces. This would 
particularly be the case in a scenario where an entity is characterised by the 
normative, informative and contextual influences on decision processes 
highlighted in my model. This   
Further, Hillman and Dalziel’s model does not take some of the contextual 
factors particularly associated with speculative bubbles which would affect the 
monitoring function. The case study of Anglo Irish, analysed in chapter 7, 
describes a bank which undertook a myopic and leverage bet on commercial 
property with catastrophic results. Both the executive and NEDs of Anglo had 
high levels of equity ownership (Nyberg, 2011, p. 27), a cohesive board with 
no/little challenge from the NEDs131.  
Hillman and Dalziel’s concept of greater equity incentivisation leading to greater 
levels of monitoring has received no support in the legislature. The Cadbury 
Report (1992) recommended that NEDs should not take part in share options as 
this could compromise their independence, although it allowed such NEDs to be 
paid in shares. This recommendation is reflected in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2014) which notes that remuneration for NEDs should not 
include share options or other performance-related elements, and that such 
type of payment could be relevant to ascertaining NED independence (para 
D.1.3). There are, to my knowledge, no calls for reforms resulting from the crisis 
itself which are suggesting greater NEDs incentivised through equity 
compensation.  
                                            
131
 This statement is discussed and evidenced in great detail in chapter 7. 
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Hillman and Dalziel‘s model of alignment of agency and resource dependency 
theories through equity incentives, assumes that actors are fully rational and 
fails to take into account the fact that decisions can be made in environments 
which are characterised by strong normative and informative pressures for 
conformity, as we saw in the lead up to the financial crisis.  Moreover, the model 
does not recognise the role that context plays in affecting decisions. In 
summary, it is submitted that my model of VPDP is in direct contrast with the 
basis of rationality of human behaviour which the Hillman and Dalziel model is 
based.  
 
6.8.4 What can I add to the Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) model? 
The Sundaramurthy and Lewis four part model described in chapter two 
provides an interesting “challenge” to my proposed model. The two parts of their 
model which overemphasises collaboration over control in both a high and low 
performing cycle is very much in keeping with the conclusions I have drawn 
from the literature review. In these scenarios, Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
emphasise the importance of high levels of cohesiveness and confidence and 
argue that groupthink is core to creating a decision process which leads to 
failure.  
There are, however, three notable areas that my model can be differentiated 
from Sundaramurthy and Lewis’s “collaboration over control” model. First, the 
literature review identified that groupthink can, and will, combine with other 
identified normative influences, and informative influences, and is also affected 
by the skill levels of the directors themselves. In this sense, my model reflects a 
more complex interplay of forces than that suggested by Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis. Second, the conclusion I drew from the literature review was the 
importance of recognising the significance of context, and how this can and will 
affect process. Sundaramurthy and Lewis consider context in the sense that 
they look at firms in both high and low performance cycles but arguably do not 
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consider context as broadly as I do132. Third, the model which I will present only 
suggests vulnerabilities which might lead to a poor decision process, whilst 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis appear less cautious and more definitive that the 
emphasis of collaboration over control will ultimately lead to failure. However, 
despite these difference, Sundaramurthy and Lewis’s model of collaboration 
over control is closely aligned to what I intend to present, albeit through a 
different lens. 
It is, however, the second of Sundaramurthy and Lewis’s models that provides 
the greatest challenge to my model of VPDP. Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
present a model which assumes an overemphasis of control over collaboration, 
and has at its core a lack of trust. This lack of trust leads to a polarisation of 
board members and low confidence levels, all associated with an over-
emphasis of the control function associated with agency theory. This represents 
the antithesis of the conclusions drawn from the literature review with respect to 
the causes of a poor decision process, which has at its core high confidence 
levels and high levels of cohesion associated with the identified phenomena of 
groupthink, herding, group polarisation, de-individuation and inherent biases in 
decision. These phenomena have been associated, and indeed influenced, by 
the literature associated with speculative booms such as that experienced in 
Ireland before the financial crisis. 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis therefore present an alternative explanation for a 
poor decision process which my literature review has not explored highlighting 
that the model which I intend to present is not a complete explanation for all 
scenarios in which poor decision processes might occur.  
                                            
132
 My model of VPDP highlights a broad range of contextual factors which will have a bearing 
on decision processes which includes: the industry type, level of competition, confidence in the 
overall economy, the industry type and the life cycle of the company.  
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It is, however, submitted that the scenario that Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
present of high levels of monitoring and distrust being associated with a high 
performance cycle is unlikely. A firm which is performing well with high levels of 
confidence is unlikely to experience increased levels of monitoring and mistrust 
but rather is more likely to be characterised by complacency, high levels of 
cohesion with vulnerabilities to overconfidence, and availability biases which will 
lead to less, rather than more, rigorous monitoring.  
Distrust is more likely to occur in an organisation which is in a poor performance 
cycle, where confidence is low and the reaction to poor performance is an 
increase in monitoring.  In this scenario, Sundaramurthy and Lewis have 
described a very plausible explanation for a poor decision process not 
contemplated in my model.  
My model of poor decision processes is one which will has as its core features 
such as cohesiveness, homogeneity, and cohesiveness combining together to 
create a combination which can greatly increase the risk of a poor decision 
process. Sundaramurthy and Lewis’ model of high levels of monitoring and 
distrust in a low performing cycle is based on the concept of distrust, which can 
be associated with high levels of diversity, low confidence levels and low levels 
of cohesiveness leading to a poor decision process.  
Although this scenario is plausible, the literature review highlighted that there is 
a natural pull towards homogeneity and cohesiveness in boards. This relates to 
the prestige associated with belonging to bank boards (Dallas, 1996) and the 
homophilic tendency of self-selection in boards which would increase the risks 
of homogeneity and cohesion. In other words, it is submitted that, as highlighted 
in the literature review, the greater risks in boards relates to scenarios where 
collaboration overrides control, rather than when control dominates over 
collaboration. Indeed, the reason why agency theory rather than resource 
dependency theory has dominated corporate governance reforms is because 
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legislators are more concerned with the need to enforce the control function of 
boards.   
Having said this, the Sundaramurthy and Lewis model which emphasises 
control over collaboration, and the characteristics of low confidence and distrust 
does highlight that my model of VPDP will not be a complete explanation of why 
corporations make poor decisions. My model of VPDP may present a plausible 
lens to view poor decision processes in a scenario where collaboration 
overrides control. This, it is argued, given the nature of the make-up of 
corporate boards, is a greater risk, and a more likely scenario. It is, however, 
accepted that my model will not be all encompassing and will not explain all the 
circumstances leading to a poor decision process. In other words, there is 
another path to a poor decision processes which will not be explained by my 
model.  
This does not, it is submitted, mean that the model which I present has no 
contribution to make. It highlights in particular how phenomena can combine 
together to produce poor decision processes. This can have important systemic 
implications, as the combination of groupthink and herding will result in the poor 
decision process of a leading firm being multiplied across the industry. There is 
no systemic risk associated with the Sundaramurthy and Lewis model related to 
reinforcing cycles of control. In other words, such a scenario of a company 
which is characterised by distrust is unlikely to affect the decision processes of 
other unrelated organisations. Another specific contribution I can make is in the 
identification of observable characteristics of a poor decision process which can 
act as red flags for both management and regulators in identifying risks and 
recommending reforms to counter risks.  
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6.8.5 What can I add to the McNulty et al. (2013) model? 
McNulty et al.’s (2013) research provides support for the approach which I have 
adopted in this thesis. The authors conclude that “an analytical approach that 
studies the inner behaviour of boards (i.e., the intervening processes) is widely 
regarded as an important direction towards progress in corporate governance 
and board research” (ibid, p. 73). Further they conclude that “corporate 
governance regulators are justified in their attempts to go beyond structure and 
identify behavioural issues that are integral to improving board governance” 
(ibid, p. 74). This is consistent with the approach which I have adopted. My 
proposed model of VPDP, however, can be differentiated from that of McNulty 
et al (2013) in that it recognises the implicit interplay between normative and 
informative influences on decision processes and how this can affect board 
performance. In other words, my model of VPDP explains how normative and 
informative influences can and do combine together to influence decision 
processes in a manner which differentiates it from the McNulty et al. model, and 
indeed all other models which I have reviewed.   
 
6.8.6 Summary of my model of VPDP  
My model of VPDP above highlights the attributes which increase the likelihood 
or vulnerability of an individual firm pursuing a poor decision process and the 
increased risk of emulation by competitors. However, the link between the 
identification of the attributes associated with poor decision processes and 
organisations that are characterised by poor decision processes, is probabilistic 
rather than deterministic. In other words, the research above does not prove 
that if a poor decision process is observed that it was a result of the 
characteristics identified in the model. Other explanations not identified in the 
model or the literature review may provide a more complete explanation for the 
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same decision process133. Indeed my model of VPDP does not capture a poor 
decision process in a situation where there is distrust and low levels of 
confidence, as discussed previously and highlighted by Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis (2003). 
Further, it is possible that one may observe all the characteristics noted above 
in an organisation that is predisposed to a poor decision process, but that 
organisation avoids, or appears to avoid, a poor decision process. There are, it 
is submitted, three possible reasons why this might occur. First, relates to the 
timing of the observation. If I had undertaken my research of, for example, RBS, 
HBOS or Anglo Irish Bank in 2006, I may have observed all the characteristics 
identified above, but also organisations that were perceived to be very 
successful. It was only in 2007/2008 that their earlier poor decision processes 
unravelled.  
Second, it is feasible that a board might make a decision which fails to consider 
the alternatives, where there is a lack of boardroom challenge, and where the 
board is characterised by attributes associated with groupthink, group 
polarisation and high confidence levels, but that the decision path that the board 
takes turns out to be a successful one. In other words, the characteristics 
associated with a poor decision process, which I have identified above, increase 
the risk of a poor decision process being taken because they increase the risk 
of a one dimensional decision process being taken where alternatives are not 
considered and there is a lack of challenge. However, it is possible that such a 
decision process leads to a positive outcome. The chances of this happening 
                                            
133
 For example, Stein (2014) draws on psychoanalytical theory to argue that the closeness of 
organisational identities in twin organisations may lead to increased rivalry, narcissism a greater 
tendency for greater-risk taking and vulnerability. Stein focuses on the case studies of HBOS 
and RBS and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but notes that his findings may be applicable for 
understanding the decision processes of AIB and BKIR in the lead up to the crisis (ibid, p.12).  
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are, it is submitted, higher if the skill levels of the directors, and in particular of a 
strong directional leader are very high.  
Having said this, any organisation which is one dimensional and does not 
actively consider alternatives is, however, susceptible to a poor decision 
process at some stage in the future. In other words, a decision process might 
be correct now, but in the future there is a risk that at some stage a poor 
decision is made and that this is not corrected or challenged. 
The third argument relates to the role that the external gatekeepers play in 
affecting the decision processes. This is particularly relevant in the case of 
highly regulated industries such as banking where the regulator has a 
meaningful role in modifying or adjusting the entities decision process. It is 
possible that two banks from different jurisdictions will both have very similar 
attributes identified in the model as being associated with a poor decision 
process but only one of the banks will go down a poor decision path. A bank 
might be “saved” from a poor decision process by a vigilant and forceful 
regulator who identifies the bank’s high risk strategy and forces the bank to 
modify its strategy134.  
The Irish banking sector was characterised by light touch regulation, a 
deferential regulator (Honohan, 2010) adopting what Nyberg (2011) described 
as a naïve interpretation of the efficient market hypothesis. The Irish banks 
were not “saved” or forced to modify their decision processes by the regulator. 
In contrast for example, the Bank of Spain required the Spanish banks to 
maintain high and counter cyclical loan loss provisioning in the lead up to the 
crisis which acted as a buffer when the cycle changed and helped to reduce the 
impact of the losses on the Spanish banking (Nyberg, 2011, p. 44).  
                                            
134
 The impact that the gatekeepers could have on a corporation’s internal decision process 
would be a “contextual factor” that affects internal decision processes and, it could be argued, is 
therefore, captured in my model of VMPD.    
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The model which I have presented is, however, generic and is not specific to 
the banking sector and as such has relevance to other sectors that are not 
regulated. Furthermore, even for those sectors which are regulated, the model 
could be used by regulators to help identify entities which are more susceptible 
to poor decision processes and to be more vigilant in their supervision.   
Finally, the model does not measure, nor attempt to measure, the extent to 
which an entity might suffer from some of the characteristics identified as being 
associated with a poor decision process. In other words, two entities might be 
characterised by cohesiveness and homogeneity, but to very different extremes. 
It is submitted that, all things being equal, the entity which is more cohesive and 
more homogenous is more vulnerable to a poor decision process. What is 
important is not only the identification of the observables, but also the depth of 
the observation itself.  
The model of VPDP reflects the interconnectivity of a number of related 
phenomena but the way in which these interact with each other is extremely 
complex with many different variables. It is, therefore, very difficult to predict 
with any certainty the sensitivities of the model to any specific changes in the 
variables. These observations are discussed in greater detail later in the 
chapter dedicated to potential reforms.  
In summary, the model is probabilistic rather than deterministic, and it does not 
follow that entities that have the characteristics associated with a model of poor 
decision process will all make poor decisions for the reasons described above. 
The model has a number of limitations as highlighted above but does, it is 
submitted, provide a useful starting point to identify potential vulnerabilities in 
decision processes and from them to recommend reforms. Indeed, from this 
model two streams of research follow. First, the need to test this theoretical 
model with reference to a relevant case study. Second, the identification of 
potential reforms which might mitigate the likelihood and severity of poor 
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decision processes going unchallenged in the future. These are discussed  later 
in my thesis.  
 
6.9 Applying the model to generate the research questions 
 
Below is a table which identifies relevant research questions derived from a 
review of my model of VPDP which can be applied to the Irish case study: 
 
Research question Relevance to the model 
 
 
The Anglo board was affected by an epistemic 
blind spot towards property as an asset class 
and also displayed other inherent biases in 
their decision processes. 
 
The starting point for the model is an initial 
poor decision process. Over-investment in an 
inflated property bubble has been identified as 
being the primary cause of the Irish financial 
crisis (Donovan and Murphy, 2013; Kinsella 
and Leddin, 2010; Nyberg, 2011) 
 
The Anglo Board was affected by the 
antecedents and symptoms of groupthink in 
the lead up to the financial crisis.  
 
This proposition will not only address the core 
normative influence identified in my model, but 
will also confront one of the key identified 
contributions that this thesis can make; namely 
to provide academic rigour to Nyberg’s (2011) 
assertion that the Irish banks suffered from 
groupthink in the lead up to the crisis.   
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The Anglo board’s decision process in the 
lead up to the crisis was affected by group 
polarisation. 
  
This proposition will address the identified 
normative influence of group polarisation.  
 
The directors, and in particular the NEDs of 
Anglo, had limited banking knowledge and 
experience.  
 
This proposition addresses the importance of 
director knowledge and experience plays in 
the model itself.  
 
I recognise that these four research questions do not represent a complete 
review of my model. First, there is no research question which addresses the 
internal informative pressures to herd amongst Anglo board members. The 
primary reason for this admission is that the lack of access to Anglo board 
directors meant that there was no way of directly testing this research question. 
However, the analyses of the identified proposition can potentially observe high 
levels of homogeneity, strong directional leader and low levels of direct skill 
levels. If these observables are evidenced then this can highlight the 
vulnerability of the Anglo board to normative pressures. However, a more direct 
observation is not possible without access to the main board directors.  
Second, there are no identified research questions which specifically address 
the contextual issues highlighted by my model of VPDP. The industry type was 
identified as creating a social identity within which firms operate and banking 
was identified as an industry which has a history of failures associated with poor 
judgements and ethical indiscretions. Anglo was of course operating in the 
context of a banking environment and as such there is no reason to identify and 
discuss a specific research question in relation to this. Chapter 3 detailed the 
socio-political environment in which the Irish banks were operating and in 
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particular the history of poor governance of the Irish banks which had largely 
gone unpunished. 
Further, high levels of confidence in the overall Irish economy have been 
identified by a number of commentators, specifically in relation to the success of 
the Irish Tiger and the associated new era thinking (see for example Donovan 
and Murphy (2013), Honohan (2010), Kelly (2009) Kirby and Kirby (2010) and 
Nyberg (2011). High levels of confidence in the Irish economy are not surprising 
given that this has been identified in the literature review as being a key feature 
associated with speculative bubbles, such as the property bubble which Anglo 
was operating (see for example (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010; Kindleberger and 
Aliber, 2011; Shiller, 2008). As such it was deemed unnecessary to devote a 
specific proposition to this contextual issue. High levels of competition, identified 
as another contextual factor in my model, will be discussed and addressed in 
respect of the research question with respect to whether the Irish banks herded 
and emulated the strategy of Anglo. This is discussed below.  
The four research questions developed above related to the application of the 
model to a firm specific case study, in this case Anglo. The model however also 
has application on a wider systemic basis as is highlighted by the model itself in 
figure 6.7. 
The second level to the model reflects the risks that an informational signal from 
a leading actor can lead to herding by competitors who assume that the leading 
bank has an informational advantage. Further, the lower the level of experience 
and skill amongst the directors in competing banks, the more likely these banks 
will herd and follow what is perceived to be the leading bank. This gives rise to 
one additional research question and to a minor alteration of an existing 
established proposition.  
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Research question Relevance to the model 
The Irish banks herded in the lead up to the 
crisis and in particular emulated the strategy of 
Anglo.  
This proposition addresses the third level to 
the model and the vulnerabilities of a poor 
decision process within an individual firm 
resulting in a wider systemic risk.  
The directors of the Irish banks had limited 
banking knowledge and experience.  
This represents a very slight modification of 
the research question developed with respect 
to Anglo by widening the hypothesis to look 
wider at the skill level of the directors of the 
Irish banks in general. This widening of the 
identified research question allows me to 
explore whether there was low skill levels in all 
of the Irish banks which may be connected to 
their propensity to herd and follow Anglo.  
In summary therefore I have identified five research questions which will be 
tested with respect to the Irish bank case study. These are summarised below: 
Research question One: The Anglo board was affected by an epistemic blind 
spot towards property as an asset class and also displayed other inherent 
biases in their decision processes. 
Research question Two: The Anglo Board was affected by the antecedents and 
symptoms of groupthink in the lead up to the financial crisis. 
Research question Three: The Anglo board’s decision process in the lead up to 
the crisis was affected by group polarisation. 
Research question Four: The directors of the Irish banks had limited banking 
knowledge and experience.  
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Research question Five: The Irish banks herded in the lead up to the crisis and 
in particular emulated the strategy of Anglo. 
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Chapter 7: Application of the research questions to the Irish case study 
7.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to apply the five research questions identified in 
chapter 6 to the Irish case study.  
In reviewing these five research questions, data was gathered from a wide 
range of reports, books, newspaper articles and annual report and accounts, 
the extent of which is reflected in the bibliography. Semi-structured interviews 
were, as discussed, also conducted. A list of the anonymised actors who were 
interviewed are noted and categorised below:  
Table 7:1 List of actors interviewed 
 
Anglo Employees 
 
 
Note all Anglo employees have been designated 
with the letter (A) after their name to help the reader 
identify the context of their comments.   
Actor A Senior executive at Anglo, direct access to Anglo board 
Actor B Senior executive at Anglo, head of investor relations, 
direct access to board members on a regular basis. 
Actor C Mid-ranking executive at Anglo but had direct contact 
with board members at Anglo.  
Actor D Senior executive at Anglo, direct report into board 
member. 
Actor E Senior member at Anglo, direct report into Anglo CEO.  
 
Anglo competitors 
 
 
All Anglo competitors are designated with a (C) after 
their name.  
 
Actor F – BKIR Senior executive at BKIR, direct report into BKIR board 
member. 
Actor G – Ulster Bank NED at Ulster Bank.  
Actor H – ILP NED at ILP in the lead up to the crisis. 
Actor I – EBS NED at EBS in the lead up to the crisis. 
  
280 
 
Actor J – AIB Senior executive at AIB, direct report into board 
member. 
Actor K – BKIR Senior executive at BKIR, direct report into board 
member. 
Actor L – AIB Senior executive at AIB, direct report into board 
member.  
Actor M – AIB Senior executive at AIB, direct report into AIB executive 
committee member (one level below board).  
Anglo Service Providers 
 
Anglo service providers have an (S) after their name 
Actor N – Merrill Lynch (ML) Managing Director at ML, head of Irish debt capital 
markets. Part of the ML team that advised both the Irish 
government and prior to that Anglo Irish Bank.  
Actor O – Davy Stockbrokers Equity analyst at Davy Stockbrokers, Ireland’s largest 
broker. 
Actor P – Davy Stockbrokers Bond salesman Davy. Closely connected to Tom 
Browne, a former director of Anglo.   
Actor Q – Davy Stockbrokers Chief Executive at Davy Stockbrokers. 
Actor R Fund manager at Banquo Capital (fund manager). 
Others 
 
Peter Nyberg Author of the Nyberg Commission. 
Simon Carswell Journalist and author of two books on the Irish banks.  
For ease of reference, the five research questions are repeated below: 
Research question One: The Anglo board was affected by an epistemic blind 
spot towards property as an asset class and also displayed other inherent 
biases in their decision processes. 
Research question Two: The Anglo Board was affected by the antecedents and 
symptoms of groupthink in the lead up to the financial crisis. 
Research question Three: The Anglo board’s decision process in the lead up to 
the crisis was affected by group polarisation. 
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Research question Four: The directors of the Irish banks had limited banking 
knowledge and experience.  
Research question Five: The Irish banks herded in the lead up to the crisis and 
in particular emulated the strategy of Anglo. 
What follows below is a systematic review of the five identified research 
questions.  
 
7.2 Research question 1: The Anglo board was affected by an epistemic 
blind spot towards property as an asset class and also displayed other 
inherent biases in their decision processes. 
Inherent biases in our decision processes relate to inbuilt preferences which 
consistently violate the rules of rational choice (Kahneman, 2011) and form the 
basis of the field of research referred to as “behavioural economics”. There are 
a number of inherent and psychological biases which can be identified as being 
influential in the decision process of the Irish banks to invest in property. These 
related to biases related to representativeness, availability and confirmation. 
The representative bias reflects that people tend to over-extrapolate the past 
when making forecasts about the future. As a result, actors place too great an 
emphasis on past performance when making predictions about the expected 
direction of future events (Barberis, 2013).  
The availability bias reflects that decisions are made with reference to ease with 
which relevant instances come to mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). An 
illustration of this bias would be if there had never been a property crash and 
property prices had only increased in value, then the availability of this 
information would affect decision processes.  
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A confirmation bias occurs when actors seek information which will confirm their 
previously held conviction and avoid confrontation with facts that might 
contradict their existing opinion or position (Szyszka, 2010). If actors believed 
that the property market was a good investment and only likely to increase in 
value, they would only seek information which confirmed that belief and would 
dismiss, or look to ignore, contrary information. Further, the greater such actors 
are financially committed to a specific course of action, the greater the risk of 
this bias occurring (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2013; Heffernan, 2012). In other 
words, actors who have a personal financial commitment to the property market 
and benefit from its increase, are more susceptible to be influenced by a 
confirmation bias and to seek information which will confirm that their decision 
to invest in property is sensible. Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2013) refer to this 
as a form of  “motivated blindness” which can exist when there is a vested 
interest regarding an outcome or situation so that actors process information 
selectively.  
Epistemic blinds spots have been identified as occurring when we process 
information selectively and favour information which confirms our beliefs, rather 
than consider how our beliefs might need to be adjusted to take into account the 
facts of a specific situation (Wei Choo, 2007). In effect, an epistemic blind spot 
is an extreme form of confirmation bias 
 
Evidence 
Regling and Watson (2010) and Nyberg (2011) recognise and identify examples 
of the biases identified above. Regling and Watson, when explaining the strong 
preference for property as an asset class in Ireland, highlighted that Ireland 
“had never experienced a property crash” (ibid, p. 5). Nyberg added that: “Great 
comfort seems to have been taken from the specific Irish experience from 
earlier years; previous slowdowns had not resulted in property crashes and 
price declines, if any, were relatively modest” (ibid, p. 21). Finally, Actor L (C) 
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noted that: ”People became more and more accustomed to the idea that 
property prices could only go in one direction.“ These observations reflect that 
both by availability and representativeness biases may have affected decision 
processes related to property investment.  
The high levels of growth which Ireland experienced from the late 1980’s to the 
start of the millennium created an expectation of growth and further success 
going forward (Honohan, 2010; Kelly, 2009). This level of expectation may have 
contributed towards a confirmation bias amongst actors who looked for 
information which would confirm their beliefs, created from such expectations, 
that the Irish property market was to continue to increase in value. Further, the 
existence of a motivated self interest in the property market would have 
increased the likelihood of actors being influenced by such a bias.  
Such motivated blindness may have occurred at Anglo, an organisation in which 
the directors were identified as having significant holdings in the bank’s equity in 
the lead up to the crisis (Nyberg, 2011). As will be highlighted in research 
question 2a), the directors of Anglo had significant shareholdings in Anglo, and 
there was a material financial incentive to believe in the sustainability of the 
property market135. As noted above, Bazerman and Tenbrunsel  (2013) observe 
that the greater the financial interest, the greater the propensity for an actor to  
be susceptible to confirmation biases and to persuade herself that the course of 
action she has taken is the correct one. Therefore, the directors of Anglo may 
be particularly vulnerable to look for information which would confirm their view 
that the property market would continue to increase in value.  
                                            
135
 In addition to exposures to Anglo shares (and indirectly to the property market) Lyons and 
Carey (2011) highlight a number of investment in both commercial and residential property that 
Anglo’s Fitzpatrick had made in the lead up to the crisis.  
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Actor F (C) observed that the Irish “got caught up with the thoughts that things 
could continue to grow”. Actor A (A) observed that at Anglo “there was a sense 
building that we could not get things wrong, we were always getting things 
right”. Actor B (A) highlighted that: “Anglo had nineteen years of growth and that 
this created an expectation of future growth”. Actor E (A) noted that “it was all 
about self-interest and conflict and they [Anglo management] did not want to 
hear an outsider tell them it was risky”.  All these comments could be 
interpreted as reflecting inherent biases in decision processes relating to 
representativeness, availability and confirmation.  
A number of commentators and interviewees referred to the possibility of a blind 
spot in Ireland with respect to property as an asset class. Nyberg (2011) 
referred to the existence of a “national speculative mania in Ireland during the 
Period136, centred on the sale and acquisition of property” (ibid, p. 94). Regling 
and Watson (2010) observed in Ireland an “uncritical enthusiasm for property 
acquisition that became something of a national blind-spot” (ibid, p 34-35).  
Social commentators have explained the Irish relationship with property from a 
historical perspective related back to the history of the Irish as landless tenants 
during English occupation. Murphy and Devlin (2009) note that: “The history of 
the Irish people gives them an unusual attachment to home ownership. Pre-
independence, the bulk of land was owned by outsiders who were often 
absentee landlords. Tenants had sparse legal protection and were rarely sure of 
the roof over their heads. Race memory – indeed, family memory – meant that, 
given the opportunity, an Irishman or woman would always seek the security of 
owning the land on which they lived” (ibid, p. 32).  
                                            
136
 Nyberg defines “The Period” as the dates between 1 January 2003 and 15 January 2009. 
The 1 January 2003 is identified in the Commission as the period when Ireland entered its 
second and dangerous phase of growth focused on the construction industry whilst, 15 January 
2009 is the date that the Irish banks were taken under government ownership.  
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Kelly (2010) stresses the historical and emotional relationship that the Irish have 
with property as an asset class: “Property was the rock on which Irish society 
was built and economic life seemed to revolve around it. This is, at least in part, 
a consequence of our previous existence as landless tenant farmers. To own 
land was to live and survive, so the importance of ownership has been drilled 
into our minds” (ibid, p. 208). Other commentators who have highlighted the 
importance of property in Irish society include Lee (1989) and Brawn (2009)137.  
Twelve interviewees made mention of the Irish attachment towards property. All 
of them emphasised the historical links and emotional ties that the Irish have 
towards property. A selection of these comments is noted below: 
• Actor E (A): “The Irish have an absolute obsession with property. Land 
ownership and property ownership, it is a sign of social status in 
Ireland.” 
• Actor Q (S):  “Our attachment to property is rooted in history. Ireland is a 
peasant society, you never sell land.” 
• Actor G (C); “Property is in our molecules, it is deeply, deeply, deeply 
rooted in our culture to own property because there was a time when we 
were kicked off our land and we were not allowed to own property.” 
• Actor D (A): “There is an Irish attitude towards property, the best time to 
buy is now, and the best time to sell is never.” People will not sell, when 
they buy they won’t sell, perhaps they are saying they are not making 
any more of it.” 
• Actor F (C): “That fascination with property is in many respects an 
inferiority thing, it’s about the need to own things, it’s due to the fact that 
a lot of the Irish come from an agricultural background and during the 
                                            
137
 This observation ties in with my own anecdotal experience when working in Ireland. Property 
ownership and speculation was a constant topic of conversation both in business and social 
situations.  
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19th Century Irish people did not own the land because it was owned by 
the landlords and therefore when you got your hands on land you held 
onto it. That sometimes drives mad behaviour.” 
• Actor J (C): “People in Ireland like to have possession. I have heard 
many times the saying in Ireland ‘they are not making any more land’”.  
• Actor K (C): “My father in law is cash poor, really cash poor but land 
rich. He has 90 acres near the Irish Sea and he will never sell that land. 
No way. It’s a useless piece of land like literally from that side of my 
office to the other that he cannot do anything with and instead of selling 
it to me has given me an easement which is ridiculous because I would 
give him €20 000 for it which is ridiculous because he can never do 
anything with it.” 
In summary, a review of this research question has identified in Ireland the 
historical and emotional attachment to property. There is evidence to suggest 
that the decision processes of the boards of the Irish banks, and Anglo’s in 
particular, may have been affected by inherent biases relating to 
representativeness, availability and confirmation.    
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7.2 Research question Two: The board of Anglo was affected by the 
antecedents and symptoms of groupthink.  
Janis (1972) defined groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in 
when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ 
strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action” (ibid, p. 9). Chapter 3provides a detailed analysis 
of the concept of groupthink. The conclusion drawn from this chapter was that 
groupthink was a valid construct and one which has been widely accepted in 
the literature as a contributing factor to poor decision processes across a 
number of different decision making scenarios.  
One of the challenges identified and discussed in the groupthink discussion in 
chapter 3related to the challenges of defining groupthink. Five case studies of 
groupthink were reviewed in this respect. The conclusion drawn was that my 
research, consistent with the approach of Yetiv (2003) and O’Connor (2002), 
would follow Janis’s original groupthink construct and focus on both the 
antecedents and symptoms of groupthink. The perceived advantage of this 
approach was deemed to be two-fold. First, it reduces the risk of self-selection 
of the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink that “fit” the case study. 
Second, by measuring groupthink against the strong form of groupthink my 
analysis will test the groupthink construct in the most rigorous and systematic 
way138.  
                                            
138
 However, as highlighted in the literature review, researchers such as Whyte (1998), Hart 
(1994) and Baron (2005) present modifications of Janis’s interpretation of groupthink. In 
particular they identified an alternative path to groupthink which emphasised a form of collective 
optimism and high self-efficacy as an alternative antecedent to the high stress/low self-esteem 
identified by Janis. The intention is to follow Janis interpretation of groupthink but will take into 
consideration the alternative routes to groupthink identified above.  
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Moreover Nyberg (2011), when concluding that the Irish banks suffered from 
groupthink, appeared to reach his conclusion from a more intuitive analysis of 
the information rather than a more rigorous process of identifying antecedents 
and symptoms of Janis’s groupthink. He told me in interview:  
“I did not go into the details of the elephant [of groupthink]. I just seemed 
to recognise that it had the essentials ... I never really had the time to go 
deeper into looking into the exact hypothesis that would fit in. It was not 
strictly speaking a scientific effort, like the one you are trying to do, it was 
more trying to structure information and draw conclusions”.  
Nyberg’s approach is completely understandable in the context of his 
commission, and his absence of rigour in the measurement of groupthink does 
not detract from his commission. Further, although the Nyberg Report does not 
go through the systematic process of identifying each of the antecedents and 
symptoms of groupthink, it does provide a number of observations resulting 
from the data gathered and interviews undertaken which will be used in this 
chapter in respect to the discussion of the identified research questions. Indeed, 
the Nyberg Commission accessed approximately 200,000 documents from 
authorities, financial institutions and other sources and conducted 140 
interviews with 120 individuals (Nyberg, 2011, p. 10). 
Hart (1994) does, however, warn that the concept of groupthink can, and has 
been abused, and that the term is often used “loosely and indiscriminately as a 
symbolically powerful pejorative label to stick on any controversial episode of 
organizational action or public policy-making” (ibid, p. ix). In light of this and 
Nyberg’s comments about how he measured groupthink, there is an opportunity 
for me to provide a more rigorous test of the groupthink construct as it may 
apply to the Irish banks and to Anglo Irish in particular.   
As noted above, Yetiv (2003) highlighted the risks to researchers of being 
vulnerable to confirmation biases and of seeking for evidence which confirms a 
predetermined theory. Janis was aware of the risk of assuming that a poor 
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decision process will automatically lead to groupthink and that researchers 
could overestimate the predictability of past events in analysing case studies 
leading them to conclude that the poor decision process must have been 
groupthink (Janis, 1972 p. 194). Janis recommended that researchers go 
through a comprehensive and rigorous process of structuring any groupthink 
inquiry. To achieve this, Janis suggested examining four questions when 
assessing whether groupthink could have been a contributing factor in a poor 
decision process: 1) Researchers should ask who made the policy decision, 
was it the leader alone or did group members participate to a significant degree. 
If the members did participate, were they a cohesive group? 2) To what extent 
was the policy a result of a defective decision making procedure? 3) Can the 
symptoms of groupthink be discerned in the group’s deliberations? 4) Were the 
antecedents that foster groupthink syndrome present? 
In the case of Anglo, I can answer Janis’s first two questions in the affirmative. 
First, Anglo had a board of directors, held regular board meetings and noted, in 
its accounts: “That the Board is responsible for the leadership, direction and 
control of the Bank (Anglo, AFS, 2006, p.35).” The extent to which Fitzpatrick, 
as leader, influenced boardroom decisions and the level of cohesiveness of the 
Anglo board are discussed in detail in relation to research question 2. Second, 
the policy or decision to finance commercial property to the extent that Anglo 
did, was clearly flawed given the need for the Irish government to bailout Anglo 
at a cost estimated to be in excess of €50 billion to the Irish state. Questions 
three and four above relate to the symptoms and antecedents of groupthink that 
Janis raised and are reviewed in the analysis of the research questions. 
Furthermore, Janis recommended that researchers analysing retrospective 
case studies in relation to groupthink consider both the symptoms and 
antecedents of groupthink in their analysis. This, it is submitted, provides further 
support for the decision noted above to focus on analysing both the symptoms 
and the antecedents of groupthink.  
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What follows below is a number of propositions related to both the antecedents 
and symptoms of groupthink as set out by Janis (1972). Each sub-hypothesis 
includes a discussion on how it might be defined and any evidence which might 
support or contradict the proposition from the source materials and interviews 
conducted.  
A summary of the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink and the related 
propositions are: 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Research question 2a) 
The board of Anglo Irish in the lead up to the crisis constituted a cohesive 
group. 
Group cohesiveness is the core underpinning to Janis’s theory and indeed 
groupthink cannot exist unless the antecedent of cohesiveness exists. The 
concept of cohesiveness has been described as “one of the most interesting, 
and most elusive constructs in the study of small group behaviour” (Mullen et 
al., 1994, pp. 189–190).There are a number of different types, definitions and 
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means of measuring cohesiveness. Janis’ concept of cohesiveness was very 
much focused on the interpersonal nature of cohesiveness rather than on any 
type of task oriented cohesion. Janis focused on a cohesiveness characterised 
by “amiability” and “spirit des corps” and noted that: “Concurrence seeking 
tendencies probably are stronger when cohesiveness is based primarily on the 
rewards of being in a pleasant ‘clubby’ atmosphere or of gaining prestige from 
being a member of an elite than when it is based primarily on the opportunity to 
function completely on work tasks with effective co-workers” (Janis, 1972, p. 
201)139. The focus on establishing whether the board of Anglo was cohesive 
will, therefore, focus on identifying this socio-emotional cohesiveness based on 
an attraction to the group itself.  
 
Evidence 
The starting point for evidencing cohesion within the Anglo board is the natural 
tendency towards cohesiveness which exists in corporate boards. Chapter 2 
which focused on the governance literature referred to a 1995 Korn/Ferry study 
(cited by Dallas, 1997) of U.S. boards where directors were asked “what is the 
most important factor in deciding to join a board?” The majority of answers 
received were not the soundness of the balance sheet, or the opportunities for 
directors to make a contribution, but rather the identity of other board members. 
                                            
139
 Janis’s observation about socio-economic versus task oriented cohesion are back up by a 
meta-analysis undertaken by Mullen et al. (1994) that concluded that cohesion associated with 
an interpersonal attraction impaired decision making whilst task focused cohesion enhanced 
group decision processes.  
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In other words, it was the attraction and prestige of other board members that 
was the most important factor in deciding to join a board140.    
Cox and Munsinger (1985) provide further support for the results of the 
aforementioned survey: “The reward [of board membership] is non-monetary, 
prestige, influence, and pleasure associating with other successful people, to 
work with others that they admire and want to work with and get better 
acquainted. These preferences are a manifestation of the inherent drive for 
affiliation and companionship which motivates people to seek identity with a 
group” (ibid, p. 94).   
It therefore follows that the starting point in assessing socio-emotional 
cohesiveness in the context of a board room is that there is a natural tendency 
for this type of cohesiveness to exist in any boardroom. Indeed, O’Connor 
(2002) relied on what she saw as being boardroom norms with respect to the 
natural pull towards cohesiveness when providing evidence that the Enron 
board was most likely cohesive141.   
Nyberg (2011) highlighted the cohesive nature of the Irish bank boards in his 
report:  “All bank boards appear to have operated on a collegiate and 
consensual basis … In some cases there were explicit references to both the 
good atmosphere of the board and the wish to avoid fractious or consistently 
contrarian behaviour” (ibid, p. 49). Nyberg does not mention Anglo specifically 
in his report but he did tell me in interview that “the strength of Anglo for so long 
was that they did have a very catching and cohesive internal culture” (bold 
added). Thus Nyberg specifically identifies the cohesive culture at Anglo.  
                                            
140
 Although this is a US study, there is no reason why the results would be different in 
comparable jurisdictions such as Ireland and the UK.  
141
 O’Connor cited the research of Cox and Munsinger (1985) in support of this assertion.  
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Fitzpatrick highlighted specifically the collegiate atmosphere within the Anglo 
board in an interview cited by Lyons and Carey (2011) when he observed:  
”Anglo was forged from a unique culture, rooted in humble beginnings and 
fostered by a collegiate spirit, hard work, self-belief and a fair dollop of ‘us 
against the world’” (ibid, p. 72 italics added).  Actor A (A) described the culture 
of cohesiveness when he told me:  
“It was not like we were the Moonies but there was a collegiate feeling 
among the staff and there was a pride in where we were and what we 
were doing.”  
Actor E (A) in describing the Anglo credit committees as “a cross 
between a Nuremberg rally and a pep talk at an American football 
game”. These descriptions above reflect a sense of cohesiveness at 
Anglo.  
O’Connor (2002) identified strong financial incentives through the Enron 
director’s share ownership and share options as a factor that contributed 
towards the high level of cohesiveness in the Enron board. Similarly, the board 
of Anglo were bound together by their shared exposure to the Anglo share 
price. As already highlighted, the board of Anglo had significant financial 
interests in the success of Anglo. All the directors and NEDS had interests in 
ordinary shares of Anglo whilst five of the directors had both ordinary shares 
and options. The largest personal interest as at the 30 September 2006 year 
end was Sean Fitzpatrick who had 4,473,869 shares at a market value at year 
end of €57,936,603. The directors with the smallest exposure to Anglo’s shares 
were Anne Heraty (25,000 shares at €323,750) and Fintan Drury (53,796 
shares at €696,658). All other directors had exposure to Anglo exceeding €1,5 
million.  This shared interest in the performance of Anglo may have contributed 
towards a greater level of cohesiveness amongst the board.   
A comparison of stock ownership and options at the other three listed Irish 
banks, BKIR, AIB and ILP, provides context as to the relative exposure of Anglo 
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directors to their company is provided in the table below. All exposures were 
calculated as at their 2006 year ends and data was taken from their respective 
annual reports and accounts. 
Table 7.2 Analysis of the Irish bank directors share exposures (2006)  
 Anglo BKIR AIB ILP 
Highest director 
exposure to shares 
and share options 
€57, 9 million 
Fitzpatrick 
Chairman 
€7,1 million 
Goggins 
CEO 
€5, 1 million 
Sheehey 
CEO 
€3,0 million 
Went 
CEO 
Smallest director 
exposure to shares 
€323 750 
(Heraty) 
€16 940 
 
8 out of 14 
directors 
(57%) at 
BKIR had 
exposures 
less than 
Heraty 
€10 800 
 
9 out of 15 
directors 
(60%) at AIB 
had 
exposures 
less than 
Heraty  
No exposure 
 
5 of the 9 
directors 
(55%) at ILP 
had exposures 
less than 
Heraty.  
Source: Annual Financial Statements for Anglo, BKIR, AIB and ILP for year 
ending 2006.  
The table above highlights a significant difference between the exposures of 
Fitzpatrick compared to the CEOs of the other three listed banks. Fitzpatrick is 
eight times more exposed to Anglo than the second highest in the table, Goggin 
at BKIR.  Further, the table highlights that all of the directors at Anglo, including 
NEDs, had material exposures to the share price of their organisation whilst this 
was not the case at BKIR, AIB and ILP142.  
                                            
142
 My thesis recognises that the existence of observables in itself does not necessarily tell the 
whole story and that one also needs to understand the depth or intensity of the observables. 
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Further, high levels of stock ownership at Anglo was not exclusive to their 
board, but pervaded the entire organisation. Actor B (A) noted that:  
“Virtually every member of the staff owned stock in the bank. They [the 
staff] all had a direct interest and involvement in the future direction of 
the bank. People would have had a very active interest in the share 
price, where the share price was. If a particular piece of research came 
out, a strong piece of research, a “buy” recommendation on Anglo that 
would give people a gee up. When I describe the culture at Anglo it was 
very much a hands on and ownership culture so people were very much 
encourage to buy into that, it was their company and they were part of 
the future success of the business and by their hard efforts that success 
was going to continue. And what we did every year, and it probably was 
in contravention of every rule in the book, was that the first people that 
got the results were the staff and on the night before the results were 
announced to the market, after the close of business in this part of the 
world in Dublin we told the staff what the figures were. The Finance 
Director, CEO or whoever stood up and addressed them and said this is 
what your efforts have generated this year this is where we are 
compared to last year compared to the last half year end. So there was a 
real spirit of ‘this is your company and this is what your efforts have built 
and this is going to contribute towards your own sense of well-being; 
financial well-being as well’.”  
Actor D (A), mirrored this sentiment when he observed that the culture was 
“very much that you own this bank, we own this bank, this is our bank.”  The 
sense of “this is your company” linked to share ownership described by the 
interviewee above highlights cohesiveness at Anglo.  
                                                                                                                                
Higher levels of stock ownership at Anglo might be one indicator that the board of Anglo was 
more cohesive than that of its rival banks. However a comparative analysis of relative levels of 
board cohesiveness between the Irish banks is beyond the remit of this thesis.  
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Actor A (A) identified the strong sense of loyalty that employees felt to Anglo 
and that, in his view, selling stock would have been a signal of disloyalty to the 
company:  
“I can tell you for a fact that I did not sell my shares, and I had shares 
that I was not locked into that I never sold, and I absolutely believed the 
story right up very close to the end and even at that point when I knew 
things were in trouble but through some frankly misguided sense of duty I 
felt it would be inappropriate for me to sell them and if I was seen to be 
selling them, even though I was allowed to sell them would that had hurt 
the broader effort. That’s naivety and cost me a lot of money.”  
Again in this comment the interviewee Actor A (A) highlights the connectedness 
between high levels of loyalty, share ownership and cohesiveness at Anglo.  
Staff were encouraged to buy stock and indeed offered loans to do so. Actor C 
(A) in his interview noted that he was offered a €50,000 loan to buy stock to buy 
equity in the bank. Carswell (2011) further noted that executive director Willie 
McAteer had taken out a €8.25 million loan to purchase shares in Anglo. Actor 
G (C) highlighted that Anglo board members were “ferociously pressurised into 
buying the Anglo shares”. Actor G (C) presented this pressure as a means of 
locking them into the Anglo business model:  
“The way it locked them in was to get them to borrow so that they were 
no longer independent and you get them to borrow shares in the 
company, so that the borrowing makes them incapable of extricating 
themselves from the company. So the description I heard was of a darker 
side than just a simple side of everyone getting into the bubble 
mentality”.  
When asked who was driving this darker side, she noted that it was from CEO 
and Chairman level (Drumm and Fitzpatrick). There is however to my 
knowledge no way for me to verify this claim, and indeed this is the only time I 
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heard such a claim. However there was a consistent message communicated to 
me in the interviews that this was an organisation with a high level of share 
ownership and a strong pervading culture of “this is our bank” which contributed 
towards cohesiveness within Anglo.    
Another factor which would affect cohesiveness is the existence of friendship 
between group members. The principle that working groups which are made up 
of friends are more likely to be cohesive and collegiate was recognised by Janis 
(1972): “People with strong affiliative needs prefer their work colleagues to be 
good friends, even if those friends are not very competent. Such people give 
priority to preserving a friendly relationship, at the expense of achieving success 
in the group’s work tasks” (ibid, p. 242). 
The analysis of the Anglo NEDs as at the end of the financial year 2006 at the 
height of the property bubble, highlights a number of strong friendship and 
connections amongst the NEDs. NEDs are particularly important in the context 
of a group setting given their role in monitoring and challenging management as 
highlighted in the chapter dedicated to corporate governance (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). An analysis of the NEDS is provided below:  
Table 7.3: Analysis of the connections between the Anglo NEDs (2006) 
NED Connection 
 
Sean Fitzpatrick – Chairman (previous 
CEO)  
 
Fitzpatrick connected to all the NEDs as 
highlighted below. 
 
Fintan Drury 
 
 
Drury connected to Fitzpatrick; social and 
shared directorships. 
 
A close friend of Fitzpatrick (Lyons and Carey, 
2011 p. 62).  
 
Fitzpatrick sat on the board of Drury 
Communications, a corporation set up by 
Drury. 
 
 
Ned Sullivan 
 
Sullivan connected to Fitzpatrick; social and 
shared directorships.  
 
A close friend of Fitzpatrick (Lyons and Carey, 
2011 p. 125).  
 
Sullivan was chairman of the board of 
Greencore. Fitzpatrick sat on the board of 
Greencore 
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Lars Bradshaw 
 
Bradshaw connected to Fitzpatrick; social and 
shared directorships. 
 
Close friend and business associate of the 
chairman, Fitzpatrick (Ross, 2009 p. 54). 
Murphy and Devlin (2009) describe Bradshaw 
and Fitzpatrick as “bosom buddies” (ibid, p. 
86). Lyons and Carey (2011) detail the 
significant business investments that 
Bradshaw and Fitzpatrick undertook in 
partnership.   
 
Bradshaw was the chairman of DDDA, a board 
which Fitzpatrick sat on. 
  
 
Patrick Wright 
 
Wright connected to Fitzpatrick; past shared 
directorship. 
 
Fitzpatrick and Wright had sat on the board of 
Aer Lingus together. 
 
Anne Heraty 
 
Heraty connected (indirectly) to Fitzpatrick. 
 
Heraty sat on a common board (Further 
Education and Training Awards Council) with 
Fitzpatrick’s sister Joyce O’Connor. 
 
 
Gary McGann 
 
McGann connected to 
Wright (social) 
Fitzpatrick (shared directorships) 
 
McGann was a “close pal” of fellow director 
Patrick Wright (Ross, 2009 p. 55). Fitzpatrick 
was Chairman on the board of Smurfit where 
Fitzpatrick was a director. 
 
Michael Jacob 
 
Jacob connected to Fitzpatrick through a long 
standing friendship 
 
Michael Jacob who was described by both 
Lyons and Carey (2011) and Carswell (2011) 
as one of Fitzpatrick’s closest friends. 
 
Furthermore, as is highlighted below in the discussion of research question 2c), 
Fitzpatrick was also strongly linked to the executive board of Anglo. This 
connection existed, because Fitzpatrick had previously been the CEO and had 
worked closely with the existing executive directors and second, through his 
influence in appointing David Drumm as his successor as CEO. The strong 
social and business connections between the NEDs of Anglo point towards the 
likelihood of a board that was cohesive and one in which a collegiate 
atmosphere existed.  
The analysis above was consistent with what was said in interview.  
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Actor E (A) noted that: “A lot of the board were golfing buddies and 
friends of his [Fitzpatrick].” Actor A (A) observed that “there was a 
definite sense that all of the non-executives were picked by Sean 
[Fitzpatrick]. Sean was a very gregarious, charming, street smart CEO 
and he was no fool and I think he certainly did try and put people around 
him that were loyal”.  
Actor D (A) told me that Fitzpatrick “did have his people alongside him 
who, in my opinion, would not have necessarily been the best or the 
smartest but they were his people… He had his fixers, he had his men, 
he had his people. Michael Jacob was one of them. I mean people who 
had a respect for Sean and possibly let that respect override logical 
thought from time to time. Look we believe you, we trust you.”  
Another factor which could affect cohesiveness identified previously is the 
longevity of its directors.  A board which is more mature and where the directors 
have worked together for a long period of time is more likely to be characterised 
by high levels of cohesiveness. A review of the longevity of the Anglo Board as 
at the end of the 2006 financial year reveals: 
Table 7.4: Analysis of the Anglo board tenor (2006) 
Director Name Duration (in years) 
NEDs 
Sean Fitzpatrick  20  
Michael Jacob 18 
Lars Bradshaw  2  
Ned Sullivan 5 
Anne Heraty Less than 1 year 
Gary McGann 2 
Patrick Wright 6 
Fintan Drury 4  
Executive Directors 
David Drumm 2  
William McAteer 14 
Pat Whelan 
 
Less than 1 year 
Tom Browne 2 
Declan Quilligan Less than 1 year 
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This analysis highlights that Fitzpatrick, McAteer and Jacob had been directors 
for significant periods of time. Executive directors Drumm, Whelan and Quilligan 
were all newly appointed to the board in 2006, but all had been working at 
Anglo for long periods before their board appointments. Drumm had been at 
Anglo for 13 years, Whelan 17 years and Quilligan 16 years (source Anglo 2006 
AFS). During that time period, these three relatively new board members would 
have worked their way up the firm and most likely worked closely with existing 
long standing board members. This point was highlighted by Actor B (A) who 
commented:  
“The people that were there from the very beginning or the very early 
stages of Anglo who had grown up with the organisation in every sense 
of the word, they had grown professionally in terms of their working life 
they really felt a sense of ownership of the company.”  
In contrast, the NEDs of Anglo, with the exception of Jacob, were relatively new 
appointments although as highlighted previously they are closely connected in 
particular to Sean Fitzpatrick. Therefore, although the NEDs may not have 
worked together for long periods of time at Anglo, there is longevity through 
other personal and business connections which precede Anglo and may be 
seen as potential evidence of cohesiveness. A closer analysis therefore reflects 
that the executive board of Anglo was characterised by longevity. 
Another potential indicator of the likelihood of cohesiveness is the existence of 
homogeneity amongst board members. There is a natural tendency for human 
beings to gravitate towards, and be close to, those who are similar to 
themselves. Therefore, it follows that if a board is characterised by high levels 
of homogeneity, it is more likely that such a board will be cohesive. The natural 
pull towards homogeneity in a group setting is well recognised in academic 
literature. Heffernan (2012)  argues that the most important criteria in selecting 
a life partner is homogeneity; we are attracted to those who are most similar to 
ourselves. In a business context, Moore (1975) notes that managers tend to 
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promote those who are similar to themselves on the basis of a kinship in which 
predominantly men reproduce themselves in their own image.  
Janis recognised the importance of homogeneity to his groupthink model and 
includes “homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies” as a 
stand-alone antecedent to groupthink. Janis argued that homogenous group 
members will lack a diversity of thoughts and ideas, and given their similar 
backgrounds are more likely to view problems from the same perspective and 
as such less likely to challenge a poor decision process. Group homogeneity is 
important for two reasons; first because it is associated with cohesiveness and 
second because it is associated with a lack of diversity of cognitive thought 
processes.  
The approach adopted in this chapter is to take each of the symptoms and 
antecedents of groupthink systematically and in the order presented by Janis. 
Group homogeneity is discussed below with reference to research question 2e). 
Any evidence of homogeneity observed however will provide further indication 
that the board of Anglo was cohesive in the lead up to the crisis.   
In summary, there is a natural gravitation in a corporate boardroom setting 
towards homogeneity given the prestige and status associated with board 
membership. With regard to the Anglo board, there is evidence to suggest that 
the board was cohesive in the lead up to the crisis. The Anglo board was 
characterised by the existence of friendships and business connections, shared 
interest in the share price performance of Anglo, longevity of membership or 
connections and homogeneity (see research question 2e) below). All of these 
are associated with the type of socio emotional cohesiveness associated with 
groupthink.   
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Research question 2b) 
The board of Anglo Irish was insulated from outside experts. 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 
 
 
2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Outside experts could challenge or correct a board’s opinion by introducing new 
information that might generate an examination of the initial decision process. 
Outsiders therefore provide a diversity of thought process associated with a 
better decision process (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Milliken and Martins, 1996; 
Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). Further, outsiders to the group are less likely to 
value membership of the group so highly and will be less vulnerable to the 
premature concurrence seeking pressure associated with groupthink.  
The principle of the independent NED is very much in keeping with the thinking 
highlighted above. Independent NED directors will provide alternative views and 
opinions that can bring a fresh dimension and challenge the executive board. 
The effectiveness of the independent NED to challenge the executive directors 
and provide diversity of thought can be reduced due to a number of factors as 
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highlighted in the model of poor decision processes. These pressures relate to 
vulnerabilities to normative social influences, of which groupthink is the most 
pervasive, and also the informative pressures associated with herding. 
Normative pressures are deemed to be higher when NEDs have low levels of 
functional or firm specific skill levels which increase the likelihood that they will 
not challenge an existing decision process. In summary, the effectiveness of 
NEDs as outside experts to challenge management can be greatly reduced, as 
was the case in many banks in the lead up to the financial crisis.   
NEDs are, however, just one example of outside experts that boards might be 
exposed to. Other examples include the regulator, the firm’s auditors, the 
Central bank, bank analysts, the rating agencies and investment bankers. The 
board of Anglo would have been exposed either directly or indirectly to a wide 
number of outside experts143. It is submitted that given this there is no evidence 
to support research question 2b).  
This poses the question as to whether a) outside experts did warn the board of 
Anglo about the risks of property investment and the board, vulnerable to 
normative and informative pressures and caught up in new era thinking, ignored 
such a warning or b) whether such outsider experts did not identify or warn the 
board of the risks associated with their aggressive growth strategy.  
It is submitted that the answer to this question does not lie in an “either/or” 
solution. Rather there will be examples of outside experts who warned 
management at Anglo but were ignored, and also examples of experts that did 
not warn Anglo of the risks associated with their strategy because they 
                                            
143
 From my own experience as an investment banker I had exposure to the board of Anglo and 
indeed facilitated on numerous occasions meetings between board members at Anglo and 
credit analysts at potential investors. Further, Anglo had credit ratings from both Moody’s 
Investor Services and Fitch Ratings. These agencies will not, as a matter of course, provide 
solicited ratings without meeting with executive directors. Further, it is difficult to envisage that 
the Regulator and the auditors did not have access to the board of Anglo.   
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themselves did not recognise the risks. Indeed, the groupthink model identifies 
examples of management ignoring the warnings of outsiders (stereotyping of 
out-groups and direct pressure on dissenters). These relate to symptoms of a 
board that does not take heed of warnings but rather, as a consequence of 
groupthink, ploughs ahead with a pre-existing strategy. These symptoms will be 
discussed when analysing the symptoms of groupthink later in this chapter.  
Discussed below is the second of these possibilities, namely that outside 
experts did not warn Anglo because they themselves did not recognise the 
risks. O’Connor (2002) in her analysis of Enron described what she termed 
“collective groupthink” as a reason why Enron’s gatekeepers failed to detect the 
problems at Enron. O’Connor noted further that “a circular form of social 
learning took place whereby each of these groups discounted the negative 
information it possessed because the other groups failed to show 
apprehension” (ibid, p. 1265).   
Janis (1972) touched on the concept of collective groupthink in case study of 
Pearl Harbour when he observed that three interlocking groups, the Navy, the 
Army and the War Council, responsible for the defence of Pearl Harbour 
“reciprocally indulge in groupthink” (ibid, p. 95) and that these groups mutually 
reinforced each other’s lack of vigilance. However, Janis did not develop the 
concept of collective groupthink further (it is mentioned in one paragraph on just 
one page of his book). O’Connor (2003) also does not investigate this concept 
in any detail, and dedicates only one paragraph of her eighty seven page report 
to the concept of collective groupthink.   
Nyberg (2011) highlights the possibility of groupthink existing between 
organisations: “The Commission is of the view that there also was pressure for 
‘group think’ within the institutions, and possibly, between them as well” (ibid, p. 
86, italics added). The Commission further noted the failure of the gatekeepers 
to challenge the Irish bank’s expansion strategies and that: “Bank leadership 
and staff also appear to have taken comfort from the fact that neither the FR 
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[financial regulator] nor the Central Bank, apparently saw any problem worthy of 
a policy change with either the very rapid growth of balance sheets or the 
related concentration of exposures to property” (ibid, p. 50).  
There is, to my knowledge, no other research other than that highlighted above, 
which attempts to explain the collective failure of a wide range of actors to 
prevent a poor decision process being enacted as being ascribed to a form of 
“collective groupthink”. Rather explanations focus on the psychology of new era 
thinking, and information cascades (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010; Galbraith, 1994; 
Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011; Robert J Shiller, 2008). An information cascade 
occurs as a result of herding where actors squelch their own information 
believing that others must be better informed so that over time the quality of 
information declines (Shiller, 2008). What then occurs is a social contagion of 
thought processes, described by Shiller as being similar to that which happens 
when a biological virus spreads. Indeed, O’Connor’s (2002) comment noted 
above relating to a “circular form of social learning” appears to be a reference to 
an information cascade rather than a process of collective groupthink.    
It is submitted that perhaps one of the reasons why the concept of collective 
groupthink has not been explored is that researchers have seen groupthink as 
an internal process, something which happens within cohesive in-groups rather 
than something which happens collectively in a wider environment. Indeed, 
Janis’s version of groupthink is predicated on the existence of a socio-emotional 
cohesiveness based on mutual attraction and the prestige of the in-group. This 
type of cohesiveness is difficult to envisage in the larger business environment.  
Evidence from the interview process was that the Irish bank boards did not 
socialise and that there was, if anything, distrust and suspicion between the 
Irish banks. The absence of a cross board socio-emotional cohesiveness was 
highlighted by Actor Q (S):  
”The banks knew each other but they did not cross over. They generally 
played their cards close to their chest. They were a bit like us and the 
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other brokers, we knew them but we would not socialise with them, it is 
competitive. The CEOs would meet each other but they would not 
socialise with each other.”  
Actor N (S) commented that Anglo:   
“regarded them with ‘we are going to give you a poke in the eye’ and 
when I am talking about them I am talking about AIB and BKIR. Each of 
those institutions would have had a very strong culture, and were 
different and did not like each other and considered Anglo a 
whippersnapper.”  
Actor H (C) and Actor I (C), both NEDs at Irish banks confirmed that the only 
contact they had with the management of the other Irish banks was in 
capacities unrelated to their banking roles.  
In summary, given the geographical closeness of the banks and bankers to 
each other, it is submitted that the directors of the Irish banks most likely knew 
each other but there was no sense from any of the interviews and indeed the 
literature144 that the bankers formed a close and cohesive bond across bank 
boards. Socio-emotional cohesiveness is a pre-requisite for Janis’s groupthink 
and it in the absence of this antecedent it is difficult to progress the concept of 
the existence of an intra-group groupthink in the Irish bank boards.   
It is however possible that a number of institutions could have suffered from 
groupthink at the same time and that a number of the Irish banks, and their 
gatekeepers all suffered from the symptoms and antecedents of groupthink. 
Indeed, if Anglo Irish is shown to have many of the antecedents and symptoms 
                                            
144Some of the literature (Cooper, 2009; O’Toole, 2009; Ross, 2010) however highlighted a 
close relationship between the banks and the regulator and between some bankers (in 
particular Fingleton and Fitzpatrick from INBS and Anglo respectively) and politicians but not 
between the banks themselves. 
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of groupthink and flourished in the Irish banking context, it is likely that other 
Irish institutions would be similar. This is the argument put forward by Powell 
and DiMaggio (1983), who argue that once a set of organisations emerge in a 
field (such as an established banking environment in Ireland) corporate leaders 
make their organisations increasingly similar to others around them. That is, the 
institutional pressures within a specific domain increase the homogeneity of 
corporations transacting within that domain. All six of the Irish banks had 
headquarters in Dublin increasing the susceptibility towards homogeneity and 
cohesiveness.  
As highlighted in the theoretical model of poor decision making, it is the 
combination of both normative and informative influences on decision 
processes that combine together to create the risks of collective environment in 
which speculative bubbles can develop. Further, when these phenomena 
combine together they become even more powerful than when considered in 
isolation (Brafman and Brafman, 2008; Cox and Munsinger, 1985).   
This thesis has focused on the central question of groupthink in Anglo and 
herding by other market participants. However, it is very possible that 
groupthink existed at all or some of the Irish banks and gatekeepers, and that 
this groupthink exacerbated the collective poor decision process and a form of 
collective social learning (O’Connor, 2002) took place. Indeed, as highlighted 
above, this was the very conclusion that Nyberg (2011) came to.   
The interview process focused primarily on those who had been associated with 
Anglo, and the interviews undertaken with participants from the Irish banking 
institutions focused on their interactions with Anglo and the competitive 
landscape and whether there was pressure to emulate Anglo. In other words, 
the interview process did not specifically explore whether all six domestic Irish 
banks were characterised by the symptoms and antecedents of groupthink 
more broadly in the Irish banking sector. The interview process did, however, 
highlight some antecedents and symptoms associated with groupthink in 
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relation to the domestic Irish banks. For example, Barbara Patton (C) 
highlighted pressures towards uniformity, stereotyping of out-groups and 
pressure towards uniformity at EBS. Actor J (C) similarly evidenced 
stereotyping of out-groups and pressure towards uniformity at AIB. Actor F (C) 
identified illusions of invulnerability at BKIR whilst Actor H (C) noted 
homogeneity in the selection process of directors at ILP. Indeed, an analysis of 
the educational backgrounds of the board directors as of year-end 2006 of the 
four listed banks (AIB, Anglo, ILP and BKIR) reflected very high levels of 
homogeneity. Of the 57 directors across the 4 banks, 22 or (38.5%) attended 
UCD and 7 (12%) Trinity College (so that over half attended just two 
Universities) and 28% of these were qualified Irish accountants.  
However, practically for the purpose of this thesis, it is not possible to undergo 
the same rigorous analysis of groupthink in each of the six Irish banks and the 
gatekeepers. There is to my knowledge only two groupthink studies which have 
looked at multiple cases of groupthink. Janis (1972) analysed seven different 
political case studies whilst Eaton (2001) looked at two companies BA and 
Marks and Spencer. As discussed previously, Eaton did not undertake a 
comprehensive review of the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink. Further, 
Janis’s seminal book, of which there are three editions, focused exclusively on 
introducing the concept of groupthink whilst this thesis attempts to include 
groupthink in the context of a model of poor decisions processes. In other 
words, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake a comprehensive and 
detailed analysis of the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink for all six Irish 
banks and the gatekeepers.  
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Research question 2c) 
Anglo Irish Bank was characterised by the lack of tradition of an impartial leader 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 
 
 
2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Janis (1972) noted that impartial leaders were those who strongly stated their 
own views and actively discouraged dissent. In the case of Enron, O’Connor 
(2002) focused on the CEO Ken Lay as the leader when concluding that 
Enron’s leader was impartial: “Congressional hearings indicated that the Enron 
Board lacked impartial leadership. As with most boards, the CEO, Ken Lay, 
appointed many of the Enron directors, and served as chairperson of the Enron 
board” (ibid, p. 1267). 
 
Evidence 
In the case of Anglo, the leader was widely recognised to be Sean Fitzpatrick 
(Carswell, 2011; Lyons and Carey, 2011; Ross, 2010). Fitzpatrick was CEO of 
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Anglo between 1986 until 2005 when he moved from CEO to Chairman. His 
successor, David Drumm was widely seen as a surprise appointment (Carswell, 
2011; O’Toole, 2009; Ross, 2010). Fitzpatrick was not on the nominations 
committee but Lyons and Carey (2011) argue that Fitzpatrick was hugely 
influential in the appointment of Drumm. This is a viewpoint shared by Drumm 
himself. Drumm commented in a newspaper interview in the Irish Times: “Sean 
[Fitzpatrick] left nothing to chance, and particularly not the appointment of his 
successor as CEO. I would not have allowed my name to go forward for the 
position if Sean had not pushed me into it; Sean usually got what he wanted. I 
most certainly would not have been appointed CEO if Sean didn’t want that. He 
had total control of the board (Simon Carswell 2011)”.  
Drumm further highlighted the role that he believed Fitzpatrick played once 
Drumm had been appointed as CEO in a separate interview with The Daily 
Business Post: “Sean was a very, very powerful person. He was a controlling 
person not just of the executives, but of the non-executives. He ran the board, 
in a highly premeditated, controlled manner. There were meetings before board 
meetings to make sure he got what he wanted and so on. Sean was like that 
before I became CEO, he was 18 years as CEO and he wasn't planning on 
changing. So as chairman, he was an executive chairman for all intents and 
purposes and a highly controlling one, there is no doubt in that. Anyone that 
knows him knows that is true” (O’Dowd, 2011).  
Lyons and Carey (2011) noted that in one of the interviews they conducted with 
Fitzpatrick he admitted that he “controlled the board” (ibid, p. 74). Other 
commentators who stressed the control which Fitzpatrick had over the board 
include Carswell (2011), Murphy and Devlin (2009), Cooper (2009) and Ross 
(2010). Carswell (2011) cited an (unnamed) former director of the bank: “He 
[Fitzpatrick] wanted semi-yes men around him. He didn’t mind having an 
argument but he always wanted to win. If he didn’t win an argument, he would 
think very badly of you. Sean Fitzpatrick felt that it was Sean Fitzpatrick plc and 
not Anglo Irish plc – he felt it was his bank, that he should call the shots to the 
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board and the management … He didn’t want a board at all” (ibid, p. 38). Lyons 
and Carey (2011) referred to a quote from an (unnamed) employee at Anglo: 
“You didn’t question Sean. No-one can tell him what to do or not to do” (ibid, p. 
86). 
A number of the quotes in both Carswell (2011) and Lyons and Carey (2011) 
accounts are from unnamed sources. Carswell (2011), however, does include 
quotes from two named former directors of Anglo; Adam Stanzel who had been 
an Anglo NED from 2001-2005 and Tony O’Brien who had been the chairman 
of Anglo before Fitzpatrick replaced him. Stanzel, on the issue of Drumm’s 
appointment as CEO noted: “I always had the feeling that Sean Fitzpatrick 
would have liked to have [Drumm] in that position. Sean said he was neutral in 
the appointment but my impression was that he wanted him as chief executive” 
(ibid, p. 65).  
Tony O’Brien observed the leadership style of Fitzpatrick when he stated: 
“[Fitzpatrick] was very good at putting his case and if it was not accepted, there 
would be a lot of aggro145” (ibid, p. 38). Carswell further argues that Fitzpatrick 
was hugely influential in the selection of the Anglo board: “As the senior 
member of the appointment committee, Fitzpatrick selected the people he 
wanted to sit on the board … the interview process was also led by Fitzpatrick” 
(ibid, p. 41)  
These provide further evidence to back up the assertion made earlier that 
Fitzpatrick in effect controlled the board and was the effective leader of Anglo. 
Further evidence of Fitzpatrick’s influence in the boardroom is reflected in the 
aforementioned analysis of the NEDs in Anglo in which Fitzpatrick is shown to 
be closely linked to all other Anglo NEDs. 
                                            
145
 The term “aggro” above being slang for aggression.  
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The evidence above which points towards Fitzpatrick as an influential and 
directive leaders was substantiated in the interview process. Actor B (A) noted 
that:  
“There probably was a feeling amongst a number of us that Sean was 
trying to control or manage the board, that he did not want too many 
people disagreeing or taking a very different or opposite view to what his 
own was.”  
Actor A (A) commented that Fitzpatrick tried to: “put people around him 
that were loyal and would do what he asked them to do” and that he had 
been told that “the game was to have David [Drumm] as a puppet for 
Sean.” Actor D (A) commented: “The bank [Anglo] was driven by Sean 
Fitzpatrick, there is no question of that”. Finally Actor Q (S) commented 
that: “The culture of Anglo was very much driven by Sean Fitzpatrick. 
David Drumm was definitely Sean’s pick and no-one else.” 
Actor P’s (S) version of events around the appointment of David Drumm as 
CEO in 2005 is consistent with that highlighted above; that Drumm was 
appointed at Fitzpatrick’s behest. O’Connor told me:  
“When David Drumm got the job, and I firmly believe that Drumm got the 
job through Sean’s manipulation, he got the job for the very simple 
reason that Sean thought he was malleable. He was very malleable and 
once or twice he did try to kick out but by in large Seanie [Sean 
Fitzpatrick]  was the puppet master and he was doing as he was told.  
How can I prove it, I can’t prove anything, I am giving you opinions. I 
would know David Drumm, I would know Pat Whelan [a former director of 
Anglo], I would know Tom [Tom Browne, one of the contenders for the 
CEO job when Drumm was appointed] very well I would know Tiernan 
[Tiernan O’Mahoney, a former executive director of the bank] the general 
feeling and I would have heard evidence about the interview process. 
Tom clocked at one stage during the process, at an early stage when he 
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was one of the favourites, he said to me ‘I think the whole thing is a set 
up and that he [Fitzpatrick] doesn’t want me’. Tom would not have been 
malleable. Tom identified during his interviews that the biggest single 
threat to the bank going forward was Sean Fitzpatrick and over 
interference by a chairman. That was in the presentation he did, it was 
very much seen as a negative.”   
Actor B (A) and Actor D (A) in interview both suggested an explanation which 
would explain the rational for Fitzpatrick’s directive leadership style. Both 
interviewees pointed to the failed 1999 merger between Anglo and First Active. 
First Active was a converted building society that had been an attractive partner 
for Anglo given its access to retail funds through its branch network and its 
excess capital. Anglo had been in advanced merger negotiations with First 
Active but negotiations broke down over the make-up of the merged board 
(Carswell, 2011; Lyons and Carey, 2011)146. Fitzpatrick had wanted to be the 
CEO of the combined bank and O’Brien, the then Anglo chairman, wanted to be 
the chairman of the combined bank, a position which the management of First 
Active found unpalatable. O’Brien and Fitzpatrick both refused to back down 
and the deal fell through.  
Both Actor B (A) and Actor D (A) argued that the conflict between Fitzpatrick 
and his then Chairman O’Brien shaped his view of how he wanted the future 
boards at Anglo to operate. Actor B noted that:  
“The [First Active/Anglo] deal never got consummated because of egos. 
So that probably marked Sean’s card or set Sean’s thought process 
down a very particular path that he needed to be very wary of who and 
what was on the board with him and what the respected positions of 
those board members would be. I would say that probably a life lesson 
for him in so far that Tony O’Brien was a tough hard-nosed business 
                                            
146
 First Active was subsequently taken over by RBS.  
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man, probably  to be fair to him but he wasn’t going to be rolled over he 
wasn’t going to be anybody’s lap dog and he dug his heals in and Sean 
realised there was no way he was going to manoeuvre and that taught 
Sean a big lesson.”  
Actor D (A) commented that the failed First Active deal:  
“bit Sean in the bum [the failed take-over of First Active] , it really did 
when he was taking over First Active. Subsequent to that, in my opinion, 
the board NED that came in would have been known to Sean“.  
Carswell (2011) in support of these comments quotes an unnamed Anglo 
insider as saying “there was no way that Seanie was going to let O’Brien serve 
another term as chairman after the First Active deal collapsed” (ibid, p. 40). 
In summary, evidence suggests that Fitzpatrick had significant influence over 
the Anglo board, that he liked to exert his influence on the decision process and 
that this desire for control may have been  shaped from a past experience when 
Fitzpatrick may have believed that he lacked the necessary control over the 
board during a critical process.  
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Research question 2d)  
The Anglo board was characterised by a lack of norms requiring methodical 
procedures. 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 
 
 
2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
Janis (1972) notes that if an organisation has sufficient rules and standards that 
this would help to prevent members of a cohesive group “indulging in uncritical 
conformity” (ibid, p. 249). In other words, the lack of such norms will result in 
cohesive groups being more vulnerable to premature concurrence seeking 
associated with groupthink.  
Evidence 
Anglo was a listed Irish company and subject to the formal rules related to Irish 
Company Law, the Irish Listing requirements and the “comply or explain” model 
of the UK Corporate Governance Code 147 . A review of the Anglo Annual 
                                            
147
 The UK Corporate Governance Code was known as the “Combined Code” up until 2008 and 
in 2010 this was changed to the UK Corporate Governance Code. For practical purposes it has 
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Accounts from 2002 to 2007 reveals that in every year Anglo received an 
unqualified audit report and also reported that it had been in compliance with 
the Corporate Governance Code.   
There are, however, a number of examples of corporate governance failures 
that have been identified at Anglo. The first of these relates to when Fitzpatrick 
moved from CEO to Chairman of Anglo in 2005. The UK Corporate Governance 
Code provision 2.2 notes that a chief executive should not go on to become a 
chairman. The rational for this being that a previous CEO would have undue 
influence on the board itself in his/her new role as Chairman. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code does, however allow such a move to take place as long as 
the board has consulted major shareholders in advance - setting out its rational 
for the move.  
The board of Anglo did consult with the Irish Association of Investment 
Managers before Fitzpatrick’s appointment as Chairman in 2005. They agreed 
to the appointment, but requested that Anglo appoint a senior independent 
director to the board. No such senior independent director was appointed.  
Another such indiscretion relates to the warehousing of Fitzpatrick’s director 
loans at INBS. As described previously, this related to the warehousing of 
Fitzpatrick’s loans over reporting periods with INBS so that such loans were not 
disclosed in the Anglo report and accounts. Immediately after financial year 
end, these loans were then transferred back from INBS to Anglo. Fitzpatrick 
noted that the annual warehousing of the loans with INBS “had escaped 
attention within the bank because there had been no specific process to monitor 
it” (Lyons and Carey, 2011, p. 220). Further, Anglo did not keep a registry of 
directors’ loans at the bank (Lyon and Carey, 2011). 
                                                                                                                                
been referred to throughout this thesis as the UK Corporate Governance Code although 
technically it could be referred to as the Combined Code up until 2008.  
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Carswell (2011) highlights that Anglo consistently overrode its own credit 
procedures particularly during the period 2005-2007 as the pace of lending 
increased. Lenders orchestrated what he referred to as “corridor credits” (ibid, 
p. 52) whereby loans were informally approved outside the credit committee to 
get deals done before they were formally rubber stamped later. Loans which 
had been rejected in the London credit committee were subsequently 
resubmitted to the Irish committee and then approved. Carswell quotes an 
(unnamed) director at Anglo: “We kidded ourselves that the system really 
worked – we just didn’t have the time” (ibid p. 52).  
Carswell (2011) further quotes from an unnamed former banker of Anglo that 
worked out of their US office (which accounted for about 13% of Anglo’s loans). 
The former director noted that the Anglo credit committee meetings “were not 
like those at other banks and it was more like a committee of peers and that 
loans were then rubber stamped back in Dublin” ( ibid, p. 100).   
A further illustration of the lack of methodical procedures in place was that 
Anglo had a well-publicised lending rule of limiting lending no more than one per 
cent of its total loan book to a specific customer148. A review of the Anglo loan 
book carried out by Price Waterhouse Coopers after Anglo was nationalised 
revealed that Anglo had breached that rule in the case of its top eight customers 
(Carswell, 2011; Lyons and Carey, 2011; Nyberg, 2011).  
Nyberg (2011) highlights inadequacies in Anglo’s lending policies noting that 
exceptions to lending policies were very common and that loans that were not 
supported by strong or sufficient cash flows or collateral were supplemented by 
personal guarantees. However such personal guarantees were already 
encumbered or supported by equity in other property which had already been 
                                            
148
 I heard this mentioned by senior Anglo representatives a number of times at investor 
meetings as an internal rule which was used to illustrate to investors  that Anglo was not over-
exposed to any single counterparty.  
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pledged to Anglo (ibid, p. 32). Further, Nyberg noted that the credit reporting 
procedures were inadequate and the quality of information presented to the 
Risk and Compliance Committee and the Board of Anglo “was not of the highest 
standard” (ibid, p. 30). Not only were credit policies inadequate, Nyberg 
observed that these policies were relaxed in the years leading up to the crisis 
and that cases of further exception to even relaxed credit policy was a frequent 
occurrence (ibid, p. 31).   
Further evidence of the lack of norms at Anglo can however be seen in 2007 
when the responsibilities of the Chief Risk Officer at Anglo were assumed by 
that of the Finance Director. As Nyberg (2011) notes: “At this time, Anglo’s 
property-related exposure in Ireland, the UK and the US had grown very 
significantly, and the need to monitor and manage the attendant complexities 
and risks had grown proportionately. This decision would suggest that risk 
management was not appropriately prioritised within the bank” (ibid, p. 27).   
Furthermore Nyberg highlighted to me in interview a general observation about 
Irish attitudes towards rules when he said:  
“There are some features which I am not sure about but seemed 
reasonable at the time that seemed typically Irish, for example not really 
liking rules and so forth. I agree that it is not necessarily only Irish, but I 
am comparing with Finland, where it is very important that rules are 
followed and if one wants to change stuff one changes the rules and that 
was not true in Ireland at all. However, as regards other countries I can’t 
say, it is just an impression I have. 
I got this impression from, I did not only get it only from the interviews 
and the data, and it was also something I observed from the daily life, 
from reading the papers, reading the debates from the papers, and of 
course I did read about the previous inquiries (e.g. Dirt) but it did seem to 
me. I like Ireland a lot and the Irish but it seems a lot more tribal as a 
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nation, and if you are a tribe you just care about the rules of the tribe not 
the rules of the nation. This is just me speaking.“ 
These comments from Nyberg provide a contextual explanation for the 
background in which Anglo was operating but are, as he highlights above, 
casual observation. The Irish banking environment has been historically 
characterised by a number of banking scandals in the years before the onset of 
the crisis itself such as the DIRT inquiry, the Ansbacher affair, the government 
bailout of ICI, and the Farrell “affair149”, all of which are detailed by Carswell 
(2006). These banking “scandals” provide some support for Nyberg’s assertion 
although there was no supporting evidence for this in any of the interviews.  
Fitzpatrick has been described above as an influential and directive leader and 
his attitude towards the adherence of norms would have influenced the general 
culture in that respect at Anglo. In an interview with The Irish Independent he 
was asked if he was a details person, to which he replied “I wouldn’t be well 
organised and would be fearful of those who are”. (“5 min with Sean 
Fitzpatrick,” n.d.).  
Moreover, Fitzpatrick appeared to be resistant to governance reforms. In 2005, 
Fitzpatrick gave a speech at the Irish Times Property Awards in which he was 
reported to have attacked the increase in governance and regulation. He noted 
that the pronounced moves towards greater control and regulation could 
squeeze the life out of an economy that has thrived on institution, imagination 
and a spirit of adventure” (“Media should spare us the polemics and give us 
balanced business news,” 2005). This was not an isolated example. Actor G (C) 
highlighted in her interview that she had shared a platform with Fitzpatrick in 
2007 at a business event and that Fitzpatrick had been anti corporate 
governance:  
                                            
149
 The Farrell scandal related to the forced resignation of the former CEO of Irish Permanent 
for misuse of company expenses.  
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“He said the “F” word as part of his diatribe on corporate governance.”  
Fitzpatrick’s influential views on governance may have affected the culture at 
Anglo and the attitude towards adherence to norms.    
The interview process identified a number of examples which reflected the lack 
of adherence to strict and rigorous procedures and norms and that, on 
occasion, the “can do” culture at Anglo overrode the need for adherence to 
rules and procedures. Anglo had been Actor A’s (A) and Actor C’s (A) first 
employer and it was only in hindsight, and having worked elsewhere, that they 
recognised the lack of conformity to norms at Anglo. Actor C (A) told me:  
“My experience now in this organisation [his current employer] is there 
are a lot more checks and balances that would not have been in Anglo. If 
there was a good idea, pull together a paper, there wasn’t a committee 
that you needed to go to, there was a credit committee but these ideas 
got ‘approved’ and you did not need to go through a lot of layers of 
bureaucracy or checks and balances at the same time.“  
Actor A (A) added that:  
“There were a lot of us that grew up in the organisation and we did not 
know anything was going on was wrong but having worked now and 
seen what governance looks like in a proper bank there is just a world of 
a difference, the challenge, the second line oversight which people pull 
their hair out over that happens for a reason and that wasn’t there, we 
had challenges but we did not have anything like the challenges we 
should have.”  
Comments by both interviewees should be taken in context. Both of them 
currently work in banking in the post financial crisis banking environment which 
is much more compliance and procedure driven. However, their general 
comments about the lack of controls at Anglo do provide good supporting 
evidence with respect to the lack of such norms.  
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Actor E (A) further highlighted that even when there were suitable controls and 
procedures in place, that in reality these were often ignored:  
“So they had all the structures and the committees but actually what was 
happening was that Drumm would speak to Quilligan [an executive 
director and head of lending in the UK] and Quilligan would speak to 
Campbell [head of lending in the US] and the deal would be approved 
then 10 days or two weeks later the deal would come to credit 
committee. You know. It was how it was evolving and I found it 
disturbing.” 
In summary, the examples highlighted above from a wide variety of sources and 
situations provide significant evidence for research question 2d) above, and that 
there appeared to be a lack of enforceable norms and procedures at Anglo 
compared to expected basic industry norms in the conduct of its business in the 
years leading up to the financial crisis.  
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Research question 2e) 
The Anglo board was characterised by the homogeneity of members’ social 
background and ideologies. 
 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and 
ideologies 
 
 
2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Janis (1972) reasoned that diversity in group members’ backgrounds and 
ideologies would reduce the chances of a member giving into the pressure for 
consensus. A lack of diversity in social backgrounds would, therefore, increase 
the likelihood for group members to concur with the proposal put forward.  
Cohen (1977) identified three possible sources of homogeneity; the pressure 
towards conformity (S. Asch, 1955; Sherif et al., 1961), the selective elimination 
of the most disparate group members (Schachter 1952) and homophilic 
selection. Cohen (1977) defined homophilic selection as “the tendency to over-
choose as clique mates others who are similar to one’s self” (ibid, p. 227). 
Cohen concluded from his study that homophilic selection accounted for much 
of the groups’ homogeneity. In other words, according to Cohen, homogeneity 
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manifests itself primarily through a self-selection process. This finding is of 
particular relevance for groups such as board of directors who are self-
selecting, so that there is a natural pull towards such homophilic selection and 
hence homogeneity. Specifically with respect to Anglo, the evidence suggests 
that the board, and the NEDs in particular, where closely connected through 
friendships and business connections.  
McPherson et al. (2001) distinguished between two different types of 
homophily; baseline and inbred. Baseline homophily is created through 
demographic reasons whilst inbred homophily is induced though social 
preferences. The two types of homophily can and do combine together and 
ethnic/racial homophily (baseline) leads to the highest levels of inbreeding 
homophily. “Inbreeding homophily often complements baseline, such that 
smaller categories of individuals who would otherwise have networks dominated 
by the majority group actually have associates that are much more similar to 
them than we would predict” (ibid, p. 429). McPherson et al. goes on to argue 
that the most basic source of homophily is space and that we are more likely to 
have contact with those who are closer to us in geographical location than those 
who are distant.  
This is of particular relevance in Ireland, which is characterised by high levels of 
baseline homophily given the geographic isolation and the domination of Irish 
nationals in the boards of the Irish banks and more generally the Irish property 
market. This is highlighted by Kelly (2010): “I cannot remember a single 
instance during the twenty years in the business when I encountered a foreign 
investor in the Irish property market. We built it ourselves, and the collapse was 
because of us” (ibid, p. 202).  
Further, Marsden (1987) highlighted that personal networks were highly 
homophilous on education. Again this has specific relevance for boards of 
directors which tend to be dominated by those with secondary educations, with 
a strong emphasis on business. Ireland is characterised by a few large 
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Universities, University College Dublin (UCD) and Trinity College, so that many 
of the board members have shared the same education (Clancy et al., 2010).  
Yetiv (2003) measured homogeneity by emphasising friendship and shared 
experiences within the Bush inner circle. He noted that Bush had been friends 
with and played tennis doubles with a member of his inner group, and that the 
members of the group had all had the shared experiences of being 
parliamentarians together. O’Connor (2002) noted that the board members of 
Enron had similar social educational and career backgrounds and were 
members of the power elite in the US.  
Evidence 
Ireland is a relatively small geographically isolated island with a population of 
around six million. Therefore, it would not be unexpected to find high levels of 
homogeneity and director overlaps in the boards of Irish companies. Mac 
Canna et al. (1998) reviewed the networks of interlocking directors of the top 
250 Irish companies with a view to comparing these findings with a previous 
comparative study of ten countries undertaken by Stokman and Wasseur in 
1976. Data gathered by Mac Canna et al. of the network of Irish companies in 
1994 was compared to data gathered by Stokman and Wasseur in 1976. The 
comparison revealed that overall the Irish boards were found to have looser 
connected network structures which were sparser and less dense than those of 
the countries tested by Stokman and Wasseur. These results, at first glance, 
contradict the expectation that the Irish board network would be denser and 
more interconnected.  
Mac Canna et al. (1988) however recognised that these results were 
significantly affected by the sample of companies selected and that a 
disproportionate number of the companies selected were Irish subsidiaries of 
foreign multinationals with no independent boards. Further, an additional 
sizeable tranche of the 250 companies selected consisted of family and private 
companies and are less likely to have high levels of board linkages. Mac Cann 
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et al. concluded that intense linkage did exist in “relatively large indigenous 
significant plcs. This fact, along with scarcity and peripherality of women in the 
Irish network, leads to the conclusion that, within the relative limitations and 
constraints of Irish business, the ‘old boys’ club flourishes where it can” (ibid, p. 
375). 
O’Higgins (2002) interviewed twenty six NEDs and chairmen of Irish listed 
companies. This included board members of eight of the ten largest quoted 
companies which included AIB, BKIR and Anglo. O’Higgins noted that a number 
of interviewees asserted that NEDs should be “acceptable” within the 
boardroom culture and included quotes from interviewees: ‘You pick people with 
a similar value system, philosophy, attitude towards economic behaviour and 
compatibility’; ‘congenial, clubbable’; ‘the old school’; ‘the old boys’ network, in a 
way” (ibid, p. 24).  
O’Higgins (2002) concluded that there were high levels of homogeneity and a 
lack of diversity amongst the NEDs interviewed: “The homogeneity among the 
study participants is striking, in terms of their occupational backgrounds and 
their way of thinking. This again strengthens the notion that a lack of diversity 
exists in Irish boardrooms. This situation is reinforced by the fact that the Irish 
subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, arguably the most dynamic sector in the 
country, tend not to be interlinked into the mainstream of indigenous companies’ 
networks though non-executive directors interlocks” (ibid, p. 28).   
Clancy et al. (2010) undertook a study of the directors of twenty six private and 
fourteen state owned bodies between 2005-2007 identified by the researchers 
as being important to the Irish economy. The list included four of the Irish 
banks; AIB, BKIR, Anglo and IL&P. The report concluded that there was a 
significant lack of diversity among members of the director network which they 
studied, and highlighted the gender imbalance with only one in nine directors 
being a woman. They concluded that: “Severe gender imbalance and 
similarities in world views and experiences may lead to persistent ‘groupthink’; 
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that is decision-making that ignores alternative evidence as a result of a group’s 
desire to reach consensus. One major contributing factor to this is where the 
group members all come from similar backgrounds” (ibid, p. iv).  
Clancy et al. recognise that the lack of diversity of directors could be due to the 
relatively small population in Ireland. The study focused on a director network of 
thirty nine directors who were identified as holding two or more directorships 
within the forty identified companies. This included directors from AIB, Anglo, 
BKIR and IL&P. The report highlights that these directors were typically based 
on the south side of Dublin and that all but six of the thirty nine directors whom 
they studied, lived in either Dublin or its neighbouring counties. They note that 
many have attended private schools and detail three such schools in particular; 
Gonzaga, Blackrock and Belvedere150. Further they note that many would have 
trained as either accountants or barristers and that University College Dublin 
“appears to be the third level institution of choice” (ibid, p. 24). Finally Clancy et 
al. highlight that many of the directors were over fifty and that the youngest 
director of the thirty nine whom they analysed was forty six.   
In summary, Clancy et al. argue that the directors of the companies which they 
analysed were characterised by high levels of homogeneity and a lack of 
diversity which contributed towards the crisis in Ireland. The report recommends 
a number of governance reforms which might look to reduce homogeneity, 
increase diversity and to reduce what they see as economic inequality in 
Ireland. Reforms recommended include limiting the number of directorships that 
can be held simultaneously, introducing a quota system for woman directors 
                                            
150
 The report did not provide a breakdown of the schools and Universities attended, 
professional qualifications or ages of the identified Director network.   
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and a debate on the introduction of a cap on the remuneration packages of 
senior management in both public and government enterprises151.   
Focusing specifically on Anglo, its board has already been highlighted above as 
one characterised by long standing friendships, and shared experiences. 
Friendships are more likely to develop amongst those who share similar 
ideologies and backgrounds. Homogeneity and socio-emotional cohesiveness 
are often very closely linked. We are more likely to be cohesive with those who 
we are similar to (Heffernan, 2012; McPherson et al., 2001).   
The culture at Anglo appeared to be one which encouraged homogeneity. This 
is reflected in an interview Fitzpatrick gave in 2001: “The whole thing here [at 
Anglo] was about belief – we wanted like-minded people to whom we could give 
a platform from which they could develop. If they were not capable or 
committed, we got rid of them” (Kenny, 2001, p. 81 italics added). Fitzpatrick 
further noted that: “unlike some others, we never employed people to tell us we 
shouldn’t lend” (Carswell, 2011 p. 16). 
A review of the Anglo Board as at year end 2006 identifies the nationality, 
education, age and sex of the Anglo directors: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
151
 Chapter 8 of this thesis is devoted to discussing potential reforms in corporate governance.  
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Table 7.5: Analysis of the Anglo board education, age and nationality 
(2006) 
Name Nationality Education Age (in 2006) 
    
Sean Fitzpatrick Irish University College Dublin 
Chartered Accountant 
 
58 
Lars Bradshaw Irish MBA (International Institute 
of Management 
Development) 
Prior education unknown 
46 
Michael Jacob Irish Fellow of the Chartered 
Institute of Management 
Accountants 
Education unknown 
61 
Pat Whelan Irish Member of the Institute of 
Bankers 
Education unknown 
44 
Tom Browne Irish Member of the Institute of 
Bankers 
Education unknown 
44 
Gary McGann Irish University College Dublin 
Fellow of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants 
56 
David Drumm Irish Chartered Accountant 
No formal education, joined 
Deloitte Touch accounting 
firm straight from school 
40 
Fintan Drury Irish University College Dublin 48 
Decal Quilligan Irish Trinity College  43 
Willie McAteer Irish Chartered Accountant 
Education unknown 
56 
Patrick Wright Irish Fellow of the Irish 
Management Institute 
Education unknown 
65 
Anne Heraty Irish University College Dublin 46 
Ned Sullivan Irish University College Dublin 58 
Source: Anglo AFS 2006. Where the accounts have not provided details of 
education attempts have been made to find this through internet search 
engines.  
The table above does highlights some homogenous tendencies in the Anglo 
directors: 
1) All of the directors were Irish nationals. 
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2) Five of the thirteen directors were educated at the same University, 
University College Dublin.  
3) Three of the directors were chartered accountants and two were 
members of the same affiliation, the Institute of Bankers.  
4) Six of the thirteen directors were over 55 years old whilst the other seven 
directors were in the age bracket 40-49 
5) All but one member of the board, Anne Heraty, were male.  
These homogeneous traits identified above are not unsurprising given the 
linkages between board members already identified and that actors are more 
likely to socialise and connect with those who are similar to themselves.  
Furthermore evidence from the interview process strengthened the argument 
highlighting homogeneity in the Anglo board. Actor B (A), Actor D (A), Actor E 
(A) and Actor A (A) all identified high levels of functional homogeneity among 
the Anglo executive directors as a factor contributing towards the poor decisions 
made by Anglo. Executive directors Whelan, Drumm, Quilligan, Wright, Browne 
and Campbell152 all came from the lending side of Anglo’s business and had 
similar experiences relating to lending in the commercial property sector. 
McAteer was the only exception to this153.  
Actor D commented:  
                                            
152
 Tony Campbell was not an appointed executive director of Anglo but in charge of Anglo’s US 
lending operations. However it was explained to me by White (A) that he was to all intents and 
purposes a board member and attended all the board meetings, but the only reason he was not 
nominated as a board member was due to the regulatory structure of Anglo in the US which 
was set up as a branch rather than a fully owned subsidiary, and for that reason it precluded 
official representation at the board.  
153
 McAteer had an accounting background, having worked previously at PWC. However his 
effectiveness as an executive director is discussed in detail in research question 4. 
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“They [the executive board] were all commercial lenders. Put them in a 
field and ask them how much it would cost to develop the field, brilliant. 
Ask them what was going on in the financial world, what was in the 
financial times that day, about commercial mortgage securitisation, how 
treasury are managing their risk, not a clue”.  
Actor E (A) noted that Drumm had surrounded himself with fellow lenders and 
that he “had a cabana around him, he had put these people Campbell, Quilligan 
and Whelan and their idea of banking was just lending money”. These 
comments highlight the homogeneity of the functional backgrounds of the Anglo 
executives but are also relevant to the discussion relating to a lack of functional 
skill level of the directors and are discussed again later in this chapter.  
Actor I (C) highlighted her perception of the homogeneity of the Anglo 
executives when she commented:  
“I was on the board of a charity, and we were looking for support from 
Anglo and I met some of them. It was the management team. I was really 
struck by how they all seem to be cut-outs of the CEO. They all looked 
like Drumm, they talked like Drumm, they dressed like Drumm, it was 
remarkable.” 
Actor H1 (C) observed that Fitzpatrick was attracted to appointing self-made 
business people as NEDs to the Anglo board and that this was very much in 
keeping with how he saw himself, as someone who had taken over a small 
bank and had transformed it into the fourth largest company in Ireland. 
Specifically Actor H noted that three of the Anglo NEDs; Heraty, Drury and 
McGann were all “self-made” and had developed large and successful 
businesses from scratch. He noted that Fitzpatrick would have been very 
resistant in his view to appoint what he termed a “West of England” board 
member. What he meant by that is someone who had a strong English/British 
heritage coming from a privileged background but wanted to appoint directors 
who were similar in make-up to how Fitzpatrick saw himself. This observation, 
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relating to the homophilic desire to surround oneself with individuals who are 
similar to yourself is well recognised in the literature (McPherson et al., 2001) 
and is another potential indicator reflecting homogeneity within the Anglo board.  
In summary there is a tendency towards homophily in boards in general and this 
pull is exacerbated given the specific Irish contextual circumstances highlighted 
above. Further, a review of the Anglo board revealed a board where all the 
members were Irish, with strong educational similarities, strong friendships 
particularly amongst the NEDs, and almost no functional diversity amongst the 
executive board.  
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Research question 2f)  
The board of Anglo was characterised by high levels of stress from an external 
threat. 
 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
 
High stress from external factors 
 
 
2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Janis’s rational for this antecedent being that the threat from an external source 
threatens the existence of the cohesive in-group and can create an “us versus 
them” mentality. The group then becomes even more cohesive and the 
importance of the maintenance of the group above all else exacerbated.  Janis 
(1972) identified a situation where the group was being threatened by losses 
from an external source and believed that there was no hope of finding a better 
solution to the problem than the one favoured by the leader (ibid, p. 250).   
Janis (1972) did however recognise that stress from an external or internal 
source was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for groupthink. Indeed, 
Janis cites examples when stress led to a decrease in cohesiveness and an 
increase in the group’s problem solving abilities. In this antecedent, Janis 
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focuses on the specific circumstances when the levels of stress leads group 
members to become more dependent on the group itself for social support. 
Stress in this situation will then lead to greater levels of socio-emotional 
cohesion and a greater desire to maintain the positive feeling in the group 
above all else. Groupthink therefore becomes a form of “defensive mode” 
(O’Connor, 2002, p. 1268) for coping with the stressful situation  
 
Evidence 
The board of Anglo was put under considerable stress with the onset of the 
crisis in 2007 and in particular the deterioration in wholesale funding associated 
with the sub-prime crisis. This liquidity freeze was the catalyst for the dramatic 
deleverage in the financial system and the bursting of the Irish property boom. 
The Anglo board was faced with the constant pressure of securing sufficient 
wholesale funds to fund its operations. Further, this situation was exacerbated 
by the large synthetic share position that a speculative and distressed investor, 
Quinn, had taken in Anglo’s shares which he became unable to honour.  
Two notable ethical indiscretions occurred during this time. The first of these 
related to the back to back funding arrangement with IL&P which artificially 
boosted Anglo’s year end funding disclosures so that it looked to outside 
investors that Anglo was in a more comfortable funding position than it really 
was. The second ethical indiscretion was the arrangement to assist ten of 
Anglo’s customers to purchase Quinn’s shares in Anglo. The board of Anglo 
contravened the rules set out in the Companies Act by providing financial 
assistance to these shareholders to allow them to purchase these shares154. 
                                            
154
 Two of Anglo’s directors , Pat Whelan and Willie McAteer have been found guilty in the Irish 
courts of providing financial assistance for the purchase of such shares and in effect artificially 
increasing the price of Anglo’s shares.  
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Both of these decision processes were made under severe external pressure 
where the future of Anglo was under threat.  
The focus of this research, however, is on the period in the lead up to the crisis 
before the beginning of the financial crisis. During the period from early 2000s 
to mid-2007, confidence was high, property prices continued to rise, and 
liquidity was readily available. It was during this time frame that the Irish banks 
collectively over-invested in property as an asset class.  
The research questions which are to be explored set out in this thesis focuses 
on this specific period and whether the decision process of the Anglo board to 
invest in property was affected by groupthink, and that the other Irish banks 
emulated Anglo’s lead. The ethical indiscretion related to decisions made by the 
Anglo board once the financial crisis had begun, as described above, may well 
be examples of decision process affected by groupthink but are not the focus of 
this research155.  
In the period before the start of the crisis there was an identifiable external 
threat to Anglo in the form of the competitive pressures from both domestic and 
UK based banks looking to make inroads into Anglo’s market share, and to 
emulate its perceived growth in share price performance. One of the research 
questions discussed later in this chapter is that competition from Anglo affected 
the behaviour and performance of the other domestic Irish banks.  
                                            
155
 The Anglo board in the period after the financial crisis had started was, in effect, the same 
board that governed Anglo during the crisis with all of the same characteristics. Therefore, it 
follows that a board which had groupthink tendencies before the start of the crisis is most likely 
going to suffer from the same tendencies after the crisis had begun, particularly faced with the 
additional stress associated with the specific external threat which the financial crisis posed to 
the very existence of Anglo and the board itself.  However, this research is focused on the 
period before the onset of the crisis and in particular the systemic risk that groupthink can 
potentially have across an industry in times of speculative bubbles.  
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The threat of competition also affected Anglo. Anglo’s business model was very 
much built on the strength of its client relationships, and Anglo looked to 
differentiate itself from its competitors not on the basis of price, but by being 
able to make quick and favourable decisions on loans156.  
This point is illustrated by Kelly (2010), who was a property developer and a 
client of Anglo’s. Kelly describes the competitive pressure on Anglo to maintain 
clients by agreeing to lend in the fear that if Anglo refused other banks would: 
“There was a lot of competition from banks to lend money to the big developers 
on the big deals, and I think Anglo’s biggest fear was that they would lose 
clients and deals to the other banks who charged less. Anglo had always 
charged more for their money, but they won and kept clients by lending this 
money more easily than their competitors. As developers, we talked about the 
‘Anglo premium’ all the time, and some chose to go elsewhere for lower interest 
rates and fees, but not many and certainly not us. We valued Anglo’s flexibility 
and didn’t mind paying for it. The Anglo premium was easily outweighed by the 
benefit of being able to do more deals” (ibid, p.36). Anglo was initially more 
expensive but whilst the developers were making money in a rising market 
Anglo provided freer access to credit and this was one of the cornerstones on 
which Anglo built their business model. 
Anglo’s concern with maintaining its core relationship meant that they were very 
reluctant not to lend to their relationship clients for fear that they would go 
elsewhere. Lending decisions were nearly always favourable to the lender.  As 
Kelly (2010) noted “Once numbers on the deal stacked up, Anglo was there – 
and sometimes Anglo was there even if the numbers didn’t stack up” (ibid, p. 
37).  
                                            
156
 At a debt investor meeting which I attended, Fitzpatrick boasted that decisions on loan 
approvals were made with a 24 hour turnaround. 
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Anglo’s desire to maintain its competitive position in light of the increased 
competition inevitably led to a reduction in the margins that Anglo could charge. 
This is highlighted by Nyberg (2011) when he noted that “as competition 
increased in Anglo’s core lending markets, margins declined and greater risks 
were taken to retain customers. This is evidenced by material changes made to 
Credit Policy in 2005, 2006 and 2007 which relaxed key elements of lending 
criteria” (ibid, p.31).  
There is evidence to support a culture at Anglo of an “us versus them” mentality 
at Anglo. Fitzpatrick noted in an interview in 2005 that the difference between 
Anglo and its competitors was “a collegiate spirit, hard work, self-belief and a 
fair dollop of ‘us against the world’” (italics added) (Brian, n.d.). Actor Q (S) 
noted that Anglo “had the kind of attitude we are the runt of the litter and we are 
going to take on AIB and BKIR and eat their lunch, that was their culture”. Actor 
P (S) noted that: “There was a huge culture of insularity. As in we are Anglo and 
everyone hates us.” Actor N (S) further described Anglo as “the sharp elbowed, 
ugly kid” comparing the culture to that of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns in 
that they were challenging the establishment.  
In summary, the external threat of competition has been identified as a potential 
example of stress which could have been a contributing factor towards 
groupthink. Furthermore, interviewees have highlighted their perception of an 
“us versus them” attitude at Anglo related in Anglo’s case to the competitive 
pressures, which would have exacerbated cohesiveness. As Janis highlights 
above, a determinant of groupthink is when such a threat increases the in-group 
bias and cohesion of the group.  
 
 
 
 
  
337 
 
Research question 2g)  
The board of Anglo suffered from low self-esteem induced by recent failures, 
excessive difficulties in current decision processes and the existence of moral 
dilemmas. 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
 
 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Antecedent 2g) above referred to an external threat to the group. This 
antecedent relates to internal sources of stress identified by Janis as being 
evident in the case studies he examined. Janis (1982) saw the interplay 
between internal and external stress as a potential “either-or” scenario: “Even 
when the members are not particularly concerned about risks of material losses 
for themselves or their organizations, so that the level of external stress is low, 
they may nevertheless be subject to internal sources of stress” (ibid, p. 255, 
italics added). Janis concluded that high levels of internal stress can make the 
group members more dependent on the group to maintain morale and to deal 
collectively with stress levels in the same way that external stress can.  
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Evidence 
There is no evidence from the literature that the board of Anglo were suffering 
from high levels of internal stress related to low esteem in the build-up to the 
financial crisis. In the decision processes related to the back to back funding 
arrangement with ILP and the financial assistance provided to boost the Anglo 
share price, then it is possible that Anglo directors were suffering from low self-
esteem and recent failures related to the constant pressure that the bank was 
under. However, as discussed previously these potential examples of decision 
processes affected by groupthink are outside the remit of this thesis. In the 
period before the crisis broke there is evidence, which will be presented when 
discussing the symptoms of groupthink, that the board was highly confident and 
characterised by high levels of self-efficacy157. 
Hart (1994) and Whyte (1998) both present an alternative route to groupthink 
which does not rely on low self-esteem and stress but rather focuses on a form 
of collective optimism as an antecedent for groupthink. In this version of 
groupthink, group members see opportunities for success and as a result are 
strongly motivated to work together as a close team to reap the expected 
rewards for success. Members susceptible to this form of groupthink are 
characterised by high self-esteem and confidence.  
Indeed, Hart (1994) highlights that this alternative, but optimistic form of 
groupthink, is much easier to reconcile to the symptom of groupthink identified 
by Janis relating to “illusions of invulnerability”. It is difficult to envisage a group 
                                            
157
 The observation with respect to high confidence levels of Anglo board will be explored with 
respect to the symptoms of groupthink, specifically the research question related to the illusions 
of invulnerability.  
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that is characterised by low self-esteem induced by recent failures also as 
having as a symptom of groupthink the illusions of invulnerability.  
In summary Janis has presented antecedents related to both internal and 
external levels of stress, which have been discussed above with respect to 
proposition 2f) and 2g) . There is some evidence pointing to high levels of 
external stress relating to the competitive environment in which Anglo was 
operating. There is no initial evidence of high levels of internal stress relating to 
low self-esteem. Janis did highlight that stress could be from either internal or 
external sources and that it is the reaction of the group to the stress that is 
important. Janis argues that a group can react to stress (whether it is external or 
internal) by becoming closer and more bonded and therefore more susceptible 
to groupthink. Further, other academics have presented an alternative version 
to Janis’s antecedent related to low levels of self-esteem which is related to 
high levels of optimism which are explored later in this paragraph. Given this, 
the absence of evidence relating to this research question does not, it is 
submitted, detract from the possibilities that the Anglo board suffered from 
groupthink.  
 
Antecedents and Symptoms of groupthink 
Research questions 2a)-g) examined Janis’ seven antecedents of groupthink. 
High levels of socio-emotional cohesiveness are a necessary antecedent for 
Janis’ groupthink construct. It is submitted that there was strong evidence from 
a broad range of sources which would support this necessary antecedent. 
Further, there is a strong linkage between socio-emotional cohesiveness and 
homogeneity and the analysis highlighted high levels of homogeneity which 
further re-enforces this necessary pre-requisite. Further support was found in 
the analysis for the antecedents related to directive leadership, lack of norms 
and high stress through the threat of competition. There was no support for the 
antecedent related to the insulation of the group from outside experts. However, 
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access to outside experts can be a countenance to groupthink only if such 
outside experts provide a contrary opinion which acts as a challenge to a 
board’s decision process. However, as highlighted above, this may not be the 
case if there is a process of circular learning occurring relating to an information 
cascade. Finally, the lack of evidence related to the existence of low self-
esteem related to a recent failure is discussed above in relation to different 
interpretations of groupthink and, it is submitted, is not critical to the 
development of the construct itself. Indeed Janis (1972 p. 245) did highlight that 
not all the antecedents of groupthink need to be present.  
The observation of antecedents related to groupthink only tell a partial story. As 
Janis (1972) noted: “The first step in developing a theory about the 
consequences of groupthink is to anchor the concept of groupthink in 
observables by describing the symptoms to which it refers” (ibid, p. 174). 
Proposition 2h) - 2o) analyse all eight of Janis’ identified symptoms of 
groupthink. After these research questions are reviewed, it will allow me to 
make a much more rigorous assessment on the groupthink construct given the 
examination of both the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink. What follows 
below is an analysis of the symptoms of groupthink.  
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Research question 2h)  
The board of Anglo was characterised by illusions of invulnerability. 
 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
 
Illusions of invulnerability158 
 
 
2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Janis noted that illusions of invulnerability can be manifested in expressing 
overoptimistic views about the group’s power and by ignoring warnings that call 
attention to the dangers of continuing a set course of action (Janis, 1972, p. 
220). Janis highlighted the thought that “nothing can stop us” and the concept of 
group members believing that they belong to a “super group” as being indicative 
of this symptom (ibid, p. 36). Janis further stresses the role of the leader in 
creating an environment in which this sense of confidence pervades the group. 
                                            
158
 I have interpreted Janis’s symptom of the “illusion” of invulnerability to refer to the symptom 
of extreme confidence. This interpretation is consistent with how all other academics have 
understood this terminology.  
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Janis argued that the confidence and euphoria associated with belonging to an 
invincible group would create an even greater sense of socio-emotional 
cohesiveness amongst group members.  
Scharff (2005) referred to the strong stock price performance of WorldCom and 
the awards and favourable press which the organisation had received as 
indicative of the existence of the illusion of invulnerability within the WorldCom 
board. O’Connor (2002) also highlighted past successes at Enron as a 
contributing factor towards creating the illusion of invulnerability.  
Evidence 
When Anglo was first listed on the Irish stock exchange in 1987 it was valued at 
a market capitalisation of £1.6 million, whilst at its peak twenty years later, its 
market capitalisation was €17.53 billion, making it Ireland’s fourth largest 
company. Anglo experienced an 80% increase in its share value during the 
height of the property boom in Ireland covering the two years 2005-2007. Anglo 
significantly outperformed both AIB and BKIR in terms of profitability and share 
price performance, particularly in the years leading up to the crisis (Nyberg, 
2011).  
Anglo had also received a number of awards including being rated as best bank 
globally by Mercer Oliver and Wyman in 2007. In 2003, a Sunday newspaper in 
Ireland ran a poll of analysts asking who was the best CEO in Ireland, 
Fitzpatrick accounted for 71% of the vote (Lyons and Carey, 2011).  
There are a number of comments in the literature which highlight the extreme 
confidence at Anglo. Carswell (2011) quotes an unnamed former employee of 
Anglo who commented that: “It was thought that Anglo had found a new way of 
doing banking … it was like an Apple computers [sic] or Microsoft in software” 
(p. 56). Ross (2010) further quotes from an unnamed executive at Anglo: “As 
the business grew, so did Sean’s [Fitzpatrick] ego. He began to think he could 
walk on water” (ibid, p. 52). Carswell (2011) quotes an unnamed senior Anglo 
  
343 
 
executive as saying: “There was an arrogance in Anglo – we thought we were 
masters of the universe” (ibid, p. 122).  
Fitzpatrick has made a number of quotes that highlight the belief and 
confidence as to the Anglo business model. A selection of his comments being: 
• “I was determined this was not going to be another bank. We were going 
to be a different bank, with a different culture and a different way of doing 
business.” (Kenny, 2001, p. 81) 
• “They [the employees of Anglo] are able to spend their money, send their 
kids to the best schools, live in nice houses, buy big cars. They are held 
up as role models because it is possible for younger people to achieve 
that.” (Carswell, 2011, p. 67) 
• “We had ideas and we had balls ... as we worked the scene and 
maximised the moment, the world watched with astonishment. That is no 
exaggeration.” (O’Toole, 2009, p. 169)     
A further illustration in support of this proposition can be seen once the crisis 
had started. In September 2008, just three months before Anglo was to be 
nationalised, Fitzpatrick, Bradshaw, Drumm and Whelan all bought additional 
shares in Anglo (Carswell, 2011; Lyons and Carey, 2011).  September 2008 
was the height of the global financial crisis (this was the month when Lehman 
Brothers went into liquidation and AIG needed to be rescued by the US 
government and Lloyds rescued HBOS in the UK). The decision by the directors 
of Anglo to invest in Anglo shares at this point in time could be seen as a signal 
of the illusions of invulnerability of the Anglo directors.  
There was a strong sense from the interviewees that backed up the assertion 
relating to Anglo’s illusions of invulnerability. This was evidenced from both 
interview comments from those who worked within Anglo and also those who 
interacted with Anglo as service providers or competitors.  
A summary of relevant interview comments being: 
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Comment from Anglo Insiders 
Actor A (A): “There was a sense that we couldn’t get things wrong”. In theory 
they [the Anglo board] believed in the end they were infallible.” 
Actor D (A): “As Anglo grew, the confidence and the swagger grew, so that if 
we walked into AIB if we were part of syndication we would not be 
hiding behind a bushel anymore. We were actually saying: ‘look 
lads we are a senior partner in this, ‘F’ off AIB, you might have 
been able to tell us what to do 10 years ago’.” 
Actor B (A): ”It was the way the phone was answered, there was this belief we 
what we were trying to do was unique, it was just better than our 
competitors … we believed that our model was better, our 
approach was better, the way we did business, the way we 
underwrote credit, the way we interacted with customers, the way 
we knew our customers inside out, by virtue of the fact that we 
had sight of customer cash flows, the value of their securities, 
their personal guarantees. These guys had known and grown up 
with us. We didn’t just inherent these customers overnight, we 
had grown up over twenty years. There was a real belief that our 
strategy was completely different to the others.” 
Comments from Anglo outsiders 
Actor O (S): “They thought they were doing the right thing, they were winning 
market share, people were trying to replicate them, they were 
gods, they were told they were great in the newspapers every 
time and every day every week, all the awards, best CEO, best 
investor relations, best CFO, company of the year.” 
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Actor Q (S): “It was an extremely confident culture [Anglo]; they were masters 
of the universe.” 
Simon Carswell: “He [Fitzpatrick] was a very forceful individual he had no doubt 
about himself or his model. He had been around for so long and 
been in charge for so long that it gave him this sense that the 
bank was invincible and that compounded their problems when 
the crisis hit.” 
Actor G (C) “So there was a kind of a bit of a flash harry, a seat of the pants, 
all the rest of you are fuddy duddys, we are quick we are on our 
feet, we are sharp.” 
Actor H (C) “Anglo thought they were ‘masters of the Universe’ and were 
‘cocky;”. Actor H also highlighted that Fitzpatrick was “flashy” 
commenting on his haircut (long hair) and dress sense (his style 
of suit and diamond cufflinks) and that this was an outward 
reflection of his confidence. 
Actor F (C ) “There was an arrogant invincibility about a lot of people in Anglo. 
It came with the enormous success, with the growth of the 
balance sheet, it looked like they could do no wrong.” 
Actor N (S) “They had a real self-belief in what they were doing, they were 
evangelical I would say in the belief of their business model.” 
Richard Curran: “There was a feeling of invincibility and a feeling that we [Anglo] 
can do no wrong. We have found a new way of doing this and it 
works” 
(Lynch, Adrian, 2010). 
Finally, Actor G (C) noted a story about a social interaction which she had with 
Fitzpatrick in which a story about an ethical indiscretion relating to Lord Browne 
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(who had been the CEO of BP) was discussed. Actor G noted that Fitzpatrick 
was strongly of the view that in time Browne would be able to resume his 
business career and that the indiscretion would be soon forgotten. Actor G 
interpreted this stance as being reflective of Fitzpatrick’s own views on himself, 
and noted that she:  
“found it a very interesting revelation on his part because he thought that 
even if he [Fitzpatrick] got caught [contravening governance procedures], 
he could resuscitate himself afterwards, and as it turned out, it did not 
happen to him.”  
If Actor G is correct in her interpretation then this view can be seen as a further 
demonstration of Fitzpatrick’s belief in his sense of invulnerability and that he 
could recover from any set back.     
In summary, there is significant evidence which would point towards high levels 
of confidence and illusions of invulnerability amongst the directors of Anglo. 
Anglo had an extremely strong track record of growth and exceptional share 
price performance in the years preceding the onset of the crisis. The company 
and its leader had been recognised externally for their successes. Fitzpatrick 
had made a number of comments that reflected his strong belief in the group 
and what they had achieved. The decision by the directors to invest in Anglo 
shares just three months before Anglo was nationalised reflects a board that 
must have had a very strong belief in the group itself. Finally, the interview 
process identified further strong support for this proposition from a number of 
actors as highlighted above.  
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Research question 2i)  
There was a strong belief in the inherent morality of the Anglo board. 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 
 
 
2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Janis groups together the symptoms of groupthink related to a) the illusions of 
invulnerability and b) the belief in the inherent morality of the group, under the 
same heading “overestimation of the group”. Janis (1972) identified group 
member’s inherent belief in the morality of the group, and the principle that the 
group was “good and wise”, as a means of allowing the group to minimise 
decision conflicts between ethical values and expediency (ibid, p. 256). If there 
was a core belief in the inherent morality of the group this would allow the group 
to get comfortable with the ethical stance of any policy under discussion.  
The concept that actors tend to overestimate their own abilities and the impact 
which they have had on positive outcomes is well recognised in the literature 
(Kahneman, 2011; Thaler, 2012). Such over-optimism and belief can lead to a 
“can do” mentality and in groups can increase the socio-emotional 
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cohesiveness of a group. This strong in-group cohesiveness increases 
members desires to maintain the good atmosphere in the group above 
everything else leading as it can to groupthink  
This specific symptom which focuses on the inherent morality of the group is 
perhaps more relevant in the context of the political group settings which Janis 
analysed. All of Janis’s case studies involved decision process which had broad 
ideological and moral ramifications. For example, the support given to attempt 
the overthrow of the Castro administration, or the North Korea conflict, are 
decisions where ideologies and morality would have been right at the heart of 
the decision process. These types of decision process are different to a pure 
business decision such as the choice as to whether to invest in property as an 
asset class. In a business scenario it is submitted that such a belief in the 
morality of the board will be less pervasive.  
Both Scharff (2005) and Eaton (Eaton, 2001) do not specifically deal with the 
symptom related to the inherent morality of the group in their research, but 
rather group this together with the symptom related to the illusions of 
invulnerability and discuss in broad terms any evidence which highlights an 
overestimation of the group itself. O’Connor (2002), in contrast, reviewed and 
evidenced a belief in the inherent morality of the Enron board by referencing a 
comment by the then CEO Skilling noting that “We’re the good guys” and 
“We’re on the side of the angels” (ibid, p. 1274-5) and that board members of 
Enron were strong proponents of deregulation and the belief in the self-
regulating abilities of the market. Deregulation underpins a philosophy that 
business can effectively self-regulate and such self-regulation implies an 
inherent belief in the morality, or self-righteousness, of the leaders of such 
boards. Further O’Connor (2002) notes that the American culture of the time 
portrayed Enron management as “modern day heroes” (ibid, p. 1276) and that 
such leaders were given iconic status as part of the elite corporate royalty (ibid, 
p. 1277).    
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Evidence 
Fitzpatrick was, in common with the Enron board, a strong advocate of 
deregulation. Fitzpatrick noted: “Having developed this marvellous 
entrepreneurial culture, which is delivering so many benefits in terms of 
employment and wealth to the country, we must ask ourselves if there is now a 
danger that our regulatory environment has gone too far. Are we starting to 
shackle, instead of encouraging, the entrepreneurs who in turn generate more 
wealth, not just for themselves but for the country as a whole” (Cooper, 2009, p. 
208). This statement by Fitzpatrick and in particular the comment that the 
entrepreneurial culture, of which he was clearly a part, had “delivered so many 
benefits in terms of wealth and employment to the country” does point towards 
an inherent belief in the morality and usefulness of his industry.  
Another example which might highlight Fitzpatrick’s belief in the inherent 
morality of Anglo’s business can be seen in the comments he made in a radio 
interview following the Irish government decision to guarantee all the liabilities 
of the Irish banks (including Anglo Irish) in September 2008. When asked by the 
interviewers whether Fitzpatrick was sorry and wanted to apologies for the need 
for the Irish government to support Anglo, he replied; “It would be easy for me to 
say sorry. The cause of our problems was global so I can’t say with any degree 
of sincerity and decency but I do say thank you” (Cooper, 2009, p. 210). 
Fitzpatrick’s interpretation of the events as being of a global nature and not as a 
result of poor decisions made by Anglo itself could be seen as another example 
of his belief in his and Anglo’s morality. 
Fitzpatrick’s reaction when it was disclosed that he had been warehousing his 
loans with INBS so that they would not be disclosed in the Anglo accounts, 
provides further evidence which suggests that Fitzpatrick believed in the 
inherent morality of his actions. He noted that the arrangement “appeared to be 
the best and simplest way of dealing with the [accounting] problem so as to not 
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give an exaggerated figure of my indebtedness” (Lyons and Carey, 2011, p. 
81). Further, in his resignation statement when the extent of his loans was 
discovered, Fitzpatrick noted that: “The transfer of the loans between banks did 
not in any way breach banking or legal regulations 159 ”. Once again this 
comment may be seen as reflecting Fitzpatrick’s belief that his actions were 
justified implying a sense of morality on his behalf. 
Finally, the interview process with those that had worked at Anglo highlighted a 
belief within Anglo that they had a unique and different business model and that 
they were better than their competitors. Actor B (A) noted that:  
“We believed our model was better, our approach was better … I am not 
beating my own trumpet but we were told by people that we were way 
ahead of our competitors, way ahead of our competitors [comment 
repeated by interviewee], we punched way above our weight.”  
Actor A (A) observed that “we were always getting things right”. Actor D (A) 
noted that “we became the place to go to for staff at the other banks, people 
wanted to work at Anglo”. These statements appear to indicate a sense of 
confidence, invincibility and arguably a sense of inherent morality as well which 
pervaded the culture at Anglo.  
In summary there is evidence that Fitzpatrick, as leader of the Anglo board, 
believed in the inherent morality of the board and his own actions. Further the 
awards that Anglo and Fitzpatrick had received in the lead up to the crisis might 
have added to the perception within the Anglo board that they were part of 
corporate elite in Ireland, working for the good of the people and the country 
with a sense of morality. This strong sense of confidence associated with a 
                                            
159
 Refer to http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/3850245/Anglo-
Irish-chairman-Sean-FitzPatrick-resigns-over-inappropriate-loan.html for Fitzpatrick’s statement. 
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sense of inherent morality was mirrored by the comments with Anglo 
interviewees as noted above.  
 
Research question 2j)  
The board of Anglo suffered from collective rationalisation in explaining away 
potential warning signals that would suggest the need for a change in strategy.   
 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
 
Collective rationalisation 
 
 
2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
O’Connor (2002) explains this symptom as groups demonstrating a mind-set of 
“hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil” and that groups interpret negative data 
in a way that supports the maintenance of the status quo (ibid, p. 1278). Group 
members go through a process of cognitive dissonance and self- persuasion to 
persuade them that the policies which they have adopted are sound. The group 
interpret negative data in a way that supports the maintenance of previously 
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agreed policies and actually increases the level of commitment to the agreed 
strategy.  
Langevoort (2000) highlights that there is a natural pull in boardrooms towards 
a process of self-rationalisation, particularly in the case of an NED. He argues 
that NEDs place trust and their reputational capital in the executive board and 
the CEO when deciding to accept a board role. If NEDs are then faced with a 
situation when this trust might be misplaced, they undergo a process of 
cognitive dissonance and persuade themselves that they were correct to place 
their trust in the executive board in the first place. Langevoort explains that this 
desire for self-rationalisation is greater when a director  is placed in a position of 
having to question the judgement or integrity of a friend on the board.   
Evidence 
Anglo’s business strategy was very much based on the bank’s close 
relationship with leading property developers. As the market for lending got 
more competitive, Anglo felt pressurised to continue to lend to their customers 
believing if they did not provide the funds, their competitors would go elsewhere 
(Kelly, 2010; Nyberg, 2011). Thus, the board of Anglo could have used the 
threat of losing their relationship clients as a form of self-rationalisation for why 
they continued on their aggressive lending strategy. This appears to be implied 
from this statement by Anglo’s CEO Drumm: “One thing that goes around and 
around in my mind is that we made a decision in 2004 to reduce our land and 
development exposures, particularly in Ireland, because at that time we saw 
intense competition coming in from other banks, we saw land prices going up at 
a ridiculous rate and we made a conscious decision to pull back from it. We 
failed to execute on our own plans, and we never pulled back. That was 
because of the strength of the relationship, we just had very strong, long 
standing relationships with our borrowers and we couldn’t stand back from 
them”  (Carswell, 2011, p. 71). This statement could be interpreted as implying 
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that it was the strength of Anglo’s longstanding relationships with existing 
customers that justified or self-rationalised their decision to continue to lend.  
Another potential interpretation of a process of self-rationalisation is a comment 
made by Fitzpatrick when defending his actions in the lead up to the crisis: “I 
had a duty. To whom? Investors. What was it? It was to make money. How do 
we make more money? We made it doing what we did. We were admired for 
doing that and doing it well” (Lyons and Carey, 2011, p. 264). In this statement 
Fitzpatrick appears to be rationalising the decisions to take the risks that Anglo 
did on the basis that it was in the best interests of shareholders to pursue such 
strategies. Further the comment that Anglo was “admired for doing that and for 
doing that well” refers back to both the symptoms of the illusion of invulnerability 
and the belief in the inherent morality of the group highlighted previously.  
Actor N (S) indicated that at investor roadshows he attended representatives of 
Anglo used to:  
“point out that Irish people did not have credit card debt, they were not 
short term borrowers on an unsecured basis to go out and buy consumer 
goods, they were more thrifty prudent, they bought property and, 
therefore, overall they were not more indebted on the rest of the world 
they spend it on different things, they spent it on property”.  
Again this could possibly be interpreted as a form of self-rationalisation based 
on the importance that was placed in Irish society with regard to property 
ownership. 
In summary, as Langevoort (2000) observes there is a natural pull towards self-
rationalisation in the boardroom context which is exacerbated in situations when 
boardroom friendships exists (as was the case at Anglo). Further, there is some 
initial evidence that the directors of Anglo rationalised their decision to invest 
heavily in property on the basis that not doing so would mean that they would 
jeopardise the relationships they had with their client base. The decision to 
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invest appears also to have been justified on the basis that it was “the duty” of 
the board to take such risks and make money for shareholders. Finally, as 
highlighted above, high levels of debt financing were justified on the basis that 
debt was being used to finance property and that property was an extremely 
valuable and important asset class.  
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Research question 2k)  
The Anglo board negatively stereotyped both outsiders that threatened Anglo as 
well as insiders that did not conform to group consensus.  
 
Antecedents of Groupthink 
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink 
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
 
Stereotyping of out-groups 
 
 
2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Janis (1972) argued that members of a concurrence seeking group vulnerable 
to groupthink tendencies, tended to view any out-group who they were up 
against as “weak and stupid” and that such “wishful beliefs” dominate their 
thinking until an unequivocal defeat proves otherwise (ibid, p. 37). Raymond 
(1978) cited by Scharff (2005) noted that organisations suffering from 
groupthink viewed out-groups as “generally incompetent, and incapable of 
countering effectively any action by the group, no matter how risky the decision 
or how high the odds are against the plan of action succeeding” (ibid, p. 46). 
O’Connor (2002) highlighted that Enron board members conveyed an attitude of 
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“we are smarter than you” when dealing with equity analysts and got offended 
by certain questions.  
This stereotyping can also occur internally within the group itself with respect to 
group members who do not go along with consensus. Within a cohesive group, 
a value system of “you are either with us or against us” can develop and those 
internally who oppose the in-group can become outcasts and excluded from the 
group itself. O’Connor (2002) noted that within Enron employees who did not 
conform where quickly dismissed, quoting an Enron employee as saying: “You 
either got with the system or you were out of the door” (ibid, p. 1285).  
Finally, competition between in group and out group members has been shown 
to be an important factor which can contribute towards such negative 
stereotyping and intergroup discrimination. Competition has been shown to 
exacerbate the distinctiveness of one’s membership in a group so that in-group 
bias becomes more pronounced (Cox and Munsinger, 1985; Sherif et al., 1961).  
 
Evidence   
Competition has been highlighted above as exacerbating in-out group biases 
and intergroup discrimination. The Irish banking environment was characterised 
by extreme levels of inter-bank competition  (Honohan, 2010; Nyberg, 2011; 
Regling and Watson, 2010). This competition might have exacerbated the in-out 
group biases with respect to Anglo.   
Indeed, Carswell (2011) highlights that the Irish stockbroker Davy had a number 
of private clients for which it had arranged property investments, and turned 
down a number of property investments which were subsequently taken up by 
Anglo. A row developed between Davy and Anglo, with Davy personnel 
questioning the sustainability of the Anglo business model. Carswell quotes an 
unnamed senior executive of Anglo when commenting about this disagreement: 
“There was a sense that we felt these people [Davy] didn’t know what they were 
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talking about because we believed our own press” (ibid, p. 122). The comment 
that “these people did not know what they were talking about” implies a 
stereotyping of outgroups. 
Comments by Fitzpatrick also highlight potential external and internal out-group 
stereotyping. Fitzpatrick noted that if employees “were not capable or 
committed, we got rid of them” (Kenny, 2001, p. 81). Moreover in relation to 
external out-group stereotyping Fitzpatrick noted; “Sometimes I am asked why I 
don’t talk about my competitors. My response is ‘What do I want to talk about 
them for’” (ibid, p. 84).  
Another potential illustration of the isolation of contrarian views related to the 
stereotyping of out-groups relates to comments made by a former NED of 
Anglo, Anton Stanzel. Stanzel was a NED at Anglo from April 2001 to January 
2005 and was the only non-Irish national on the Anglo board160. Carswell (2011) 
noted that Stanzel regularly warned the bank to diversify out of property lending. 
Carswell quotes Stanzel: “They listened but the focus was just on property 
because it was so successful. It is difficult to tell people that an area of lending 
is very, very dangerous when you have such success” (ibid, p. 69). Stanzel’s 
contrarian views may have resulted in him becoming isolated and stereotyped 
as a board member and may have been a factor in him leaving the board in 
2005.  
Actor C (A) reflected in interview a story which illustrates an example of 
negative stereotyping of an insider that did not conform to consensus:  
“When we set up the US MTN programme [this is a legal programme 
which allows borrowers to issue debt into the US market] I did not 
appreciate the pressure that Niall  was under. He was in charge of 
                                            
160
 Stanzel’s board appointment relates to the purchase of a small private banking operation in 
Switzerland/Austria by Anglo in April of 2001.   
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setting the sectorial view of our lending and the guys did not like what it 
looked like and they kept on having him go back to change it but Niall 
was trying to do a rational for it. I remember flippantly joking about 
moving something from one side of development to the other, to being 
Greenfields to being something else, and I keep coming back to Matt 
Moran [Anglo CFO] and I had a lot of interaction with him, but Matt and 
Pat Whelan [board member] were, ‘no we can’t show that’ we had better 
show it this way. So basically it was a fictitious mix, we never issued off it 
thank god, but the story wasn’t right. Niall was given a hard time. Niall, 
we were saying, ‘just get the figures’, we want to do a deal we need to 
get on with things why are you prevaricating. He was considered like he 
wasn’t top draw because he wasn’t ‘on the programme’, at Anglo we get 
on with it, we do it and where he was more of an analytical person and 
trying to reconcile things which is the right thing he should have been 
doing but it wasn’t given the right answer on it.”  
The comments by Actor C above, reflecting that his co-worker Niall was “not 
considered top draw” and “he wasn’t’ on the programme” because he would not 
produce the results that Anglo management wanted, provides an example of 
negative stereotyping.  
Carswell in interview provided another example relevant to research question 
with respect to the finance director Willie McAteer: “There was one voice that 
spoke out more than others and that was Willie McAteer at credit committee 
level. They would make fun of Willie because he was older and more 
conservative”. When Carswell notes that senior Anglo employees would make 
fun of McAteer, and the reference with respect to his age, provide examples of 
negative stereotyping.  
Another example of negative stereotyping of an Anglo employee is the case 
related to ex-Anglo employee Actor E (A). During the course of my interviews 
four interviewees, Actor N (S), Actor B (A), Carswell and O’Connor (S), 
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highlighted his case as an example of an Anglo employee who was 
marginalised and forced out of Anglo because he challenged management.  
Actor E (A) described in interview how he believed he was forced out of Anglo:   
“I exited in late May 2006, but it was the end of a very nasty process 
where I was marginalised and I can trace that process back to late 
October 2005. Drumm had been in his position for about 10 months as 
he had taken over in January 2005. 
I arranged to see David Drumm and at that meeting I said to him David 
believe me I have run a bank albeit a smaller one than this but I 
understand both sides of the balance sheet. And I said do you 
understand there is nobody, and I mean nobody on the board at Anglo 
who has any clue of what I do, there is nobody that understands market 
risk, there is nobody who understands gap risk, liquidity risk, operational 
risk in treasury. I said ‘are you not concerned about that?’ Now I would 
have thought that an intelligent guy with not a huge amount experience 
but intelligent would have said ‘Jeez [actor E], you are 10 years older 
than me I should be listening to you’. But instead what he did he 
physically came across the table from me and he almost hit me. I thought 
he was actually going to strike me and his first six words to me were 
‘FUCK YOU, FUCK YOU, FUCK YOU’.  
He said you are just talking your own book, you just want to be on the 
board of Anglo. And I said to him it doesn’t matter if I am on the board or 
not, I was on the executive board, and in fact I preferred not be on the 
main board, it was a matter of supreme indifference to me.  But that was 
his response, and after that I was in the naughty corner with the dunce’s 
hat on. It was very subtle but it was obvious and I then always knew I 
was in the departure lounge after that. 
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I was circulated with the notes of credit committee and I used to really 
read it through to look what was happening but I noticed in the last 6 
months that stopped and I was not getting the notes. And I would ask for 
it, and get it but then it would stop again and that might have been part of 
the process of softening me up for departure. To keep me a little in the 
dark as to what was happening on the credit side.”  
In this exchange, Actor E highlights how he was seen as “being in the naughty 
corner with a dunce’s hat on” and that he was denied access to notes of 
minutes provides another example of negative stereotyping and isolation of a 
contrarian.  Further, it also provides an example of the way in which Anglo 
management treated dissent, which is discussed fully in relation to research 
question 3n) below. 
This exchange reflects Actor E’s subjective view in relation to his departure from 
Anglo. However, there is further evidence which is supportive of his claims. 
Actor B (A) highlighted that Actor E was seen as an outsider that had a different 
perspective on the bank that was not welcomed:  
“I think Actor E was perhaps regarded with some suspicion by some of 
our senior executives at Anglo, particularly guys those that had been 
there for a long period of time. Brian was more an investment banker, 
treasurer type a different animal altogether than a lender than had grown 
up through the ranks in Anglo.”  
Actor N (S) noted that Actor E:  
“did not last very long because I think he did not get into the culture you 
had to get in and fit the Anglo way, whatever that was, and from the 
outside I am not saying that I knew but you had to be on message.”  
Actor P (S) noted that;  
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“Actor E (A) was very badly dealt with by Anglo. Tom [Browne, an 
executive director at Anglo] would have expressed regrets to me. Drumm 
and Moran, were involved in that. I think there was an article where 
Moran spoke about them in public. It was nasty and Tom thought he was 
very badly shafted at the time as did Tony Campbell [shadow board 
member], but none of them did anything about it at the time.” 
Actor P (S) above is referring to comments in an article which appeared in The 
Irish Independent following Actor E’s departure. The article ascribes quotes to 
an Anglo spokesman but not specifically to either Drumm or Moran as actor P 
(S) alludes to above. Indeed, Actor E (A) in interview told me that he believed 
that Drumm had been responsible for the quotes detailed below. However, 
there is no way of verifying who made the comments. The newspaper 
comments are nevertheless relevant to the research question and are quoted 
below:  
“[An Anglo] spokesman described the parting of the ways as ‘something of a 
cultural thing’. He said that [Actor E] had joined Anglo from ‘a big bank 
environment and was more used to the slightly slower attitude to business in 
such organisations  that which he found in Anglo”. The article went on to quote 
another unnamed source, this time from someone “close to the bank”: “ ‘For 
guys in the senior positions, this means a lot of pressure,’ one source close to 
the bank commented yesterday. ‘It's a tough environment,’ he added, ‘a great 
environment to work in but that means you have to keep up with the pace.’ " 
(“Treasury chief [Actor E] leaves Anglo Irish,” n.d.).   
The comments in the article in relation to his departure “being a cultural thing” 
and “needing to keep up with the pace” are examples of how Actor E appears to 
have been stereotyped and because he came from a “big bank environment” 
did not conform to group consensus.  
Professor Morgan Kelly of UCD provides a final example of negative 
stereotyping of an outsider to Anglo. As discussed previously Kelly had been a 
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contrarian in the lead up to the crisis, warning about the overvaluation of 
property and the likelihood of a property crash (see for example (Kelly, 2007)). 
Actor A (A) highlighted that:  
“everyone in the bank thought that Morgan Kelly was a mad hatter and 
was reckless for the country and there was a lot of anger towards him”.   
The reaction of Matt Moran, the CFO of Anglo towards Kelly is discussed in 
detail in research question 3 (n) below.  
In summary, there does appear to be evidence of members of the Anglo board 
negatively stereotyping both outsiders to the group and also those that did not 
conform internally.  
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Research question 2l)  
The members of Anglo did not actively challenge the leadership or strategy but 
instead self-censored themselves. 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
 
Self-censorship 
 
 
2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Janis (1972) reasoned that a member of a cohesive in-group that is under threat 
“feels himself to be under an injunction to avoid making penetrating criticisms 
that might bring on a clash with fellow members and destroy the unity of the 
group” (ibid, p. 258). By doing so members ensure that the collective strength 
and cohesion within the group is maintained. O’Connor (2002) refers to this as a 
tendency to “put up or shut up” or “go along to get along” (ibid, p. 1288) where 
members remain silent even if they disagree, or may withdraw their objections 
when they see that the group favour a specific decision.  
In relation to Ireland specifically, Nyberg (2011) observed generally within the 
Irish bank boards that there was “the wish to avoid fractious or consistently 
contrarian behaviour” (ibid, p. 49). Mike Soden was the CEO of Bank of Ireland 
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between 2001 and 2004 161 . In 2010, Soden wrote a book about the Irish 
financial crisis titled Open Dissent – An Uncompromising View of the Financial 
Crisis. Soden concludes that the lack of open dissent, what he terms “silent 
dissent” in Irish boardrooms, was central to the crisis: “One of the main causes 
of the banking crisis was the culture of silent dissent in our corporations and 
Governments. Most people who have served on a board in any corporation or 
organisation in Ireland will be familiar with this disease (Soden, 2010, p. 57).”  
Soden identifies the role that cohesiveness plays in the suppression of dissent: 
“When friends are part of an elite group it is often deemed disloyal if one 
professes an opinion that is contrary to accepted orthodoxies” (ibid,, p. 59). 
Finally, Soden recognises that this culture of silent dissent is not isolated to the 
Irish boardroom and is prevalent throughout Irish society: “whether it is in the 
church, the government or clubs, it is ever present in our business and social 
lives” (ibid, p. 61).  
Evidence 
Actor B (A) highlighted that in his opinion it was difficult at Anglo to offer a 
contrarian opinion:   
“Now it wasn’t an easy organisation to stand up and offer your opinion 
and depending on who you offered your opinion to. There were some 
very strong willed people in executive roles, and I am primarily thinking 
Sean [Fitzpatrick] and Tiernan [O’Mahoney] did not take too kindly to 
people having strong opinions and maybe strong opinions that were 
contrary to perhaps what their opinions were.” 
 Actor B (A) above is suggesting that self-censorship related to a desire not to 
clash with strong dominant board personalities.  
                                            
161
 Soden was forced to resign from Bank of Ireland when details of his private life were 
exposed in the press but was subsequently appointed a Director of the Irish Central Bank in 
2010.  
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Actor E (A) noted:  
“The NEDS all had shares and they were all getting 150 grand a year for 
doing nothing. For coming in and having a rubber stamp board meeting 
and getting nice fancy trips abroad. I don’t think there was any challenge. 
And at times certain loans were made that should not have been made 
and bankers who were questioning them and it was not going down too 
well. They would have been considered overly conservative if they 
challenged. There was a culture we have to get this though … It was a 
culture that if you challenged you might be laughed at. They did not want 
to hear an outsider tell them it was risky, that things could be done 
differently.”  
Actor E is, therefore, suggesting that another reason for the lack of challenge 
was that directors would not have been seen to be part of the in-group by being 
“overly conservative” and that it could result in negative stereotyping. 
Actor P (S) suggested in interview that the NEDs did not challenge given their 
financial interests not to do so when he said:   
“By in large, it goes back to the culture, the NEDs they certainly were not 
in the questioning mode, they were not picked with the view to be in the 
questioning mode, they were mostly picked on an old boy basis. The 
other NEDs, and I have come across a few of them, they were getting 
€50 or €100 grand a year and were being invited to rugby matches and 
to this that and whatever and this bank is fantastic. There definitely was 
no-one on the board that was asking any hard questions, even though 
there were a good few bright people but there was a lot of head nodding. 
How do you know? I know that from having conversations from Tom 
Browne ... There was a small clique within the board; McGann 
Fitzpatrick, Drury, Ned Sullivan, Lar Bradshaw those five or six that ran it. 
And they were Seanies men and they were getting a piece of the action 
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from deals that Seanie was involved in and they were borrowing money 
from Anglo and it was all perpetuating a bit.” 
Finally Actor A (A) showed his frustration as an employee of Anglo for the lack 
of boardroom challenge:  
“Towards the end we were screaming for them to stop lending and they 
were lending. Why? They just thought whinging treasury guys, we are 
just making money here, they are just jealous, they are telling us they 
can’t get the money, they can get the money and even when it became 
wholly inappropriate from a liquidity perspective to lend, they could not 
get off the crack pipe they thought it was a blip it was going to go away. 
There were many warning signals; there was Bear Stearns, Northern 
Rock, Lehman’s and even with the SIV funds in the States, we in 
treasury were calling out ‘there is a problem here, we have got to stop, 
we have got to batten down the hatches’ … I can tell you for a fact that 
they did not want to listen, and because we did not have an executive 
director up there saying stop.” 
Actor A is suggesting in this comment that the lack of challenge is related to a 
type of “addiction” in the culture of lending and that financial incentives allowed 
the director to deceive themselves that the lending model was sustainable. This 
process of self-deception related to high levels of self-interest is consistent with 
the literature, see for example Ariely (2013) and Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 
(2013).   
In conclusion there appears to be some evidence that there was a lack of 
challenge amongst the Anglo board. A number of potential reasons have been 
suggested as being the cause of this. First Soden’s identifies what he sees as a 
specific Irish culture of “silent dissent” that pervaded Irish society. Actor B (A) 
and Actor E (A) highlight that given the strong directional leadership at Anglo it 
was difficult to voice a contrarian opinion and as a result many remained silent. 
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Finally, Actor P (S) and Actor A (A) suggest that suppression of challenge was 
related to financial self-interest.  
 
Research question 2m) 
The Anglo board was characterised by the illusion of unanimity. 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
 
Illusions of unanimity162 
 
 
2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
Janis (1972) argues that a perception of unanimity can help to maintain self 
confidence in the group and maintain high self-esteem particularly with respect 
to important judgements. “Without it, the sense of group unity would be lost, 
                                            
162
 I have interpreted Janis’ symptom relating to an “illusion” of unanimity to mean a belief in the 
unanimity of the group. This is consistent with how other academics have understood this 
terminology.  
 
  
368 
 
gnawing doubts would start to grow, confidence in the group’s problem solving 
capacity would shrink, and soon the full emotional impact of all the internal and 
external sources of stress generated by making a difficult decision would be 
aroused” (ibid, p. 258). Every group decision process requires some form of 
consensus but what Janis is referring to here is both a premature and extreme 
form of consensus. The consequence of this would be the lack of an effective 
boardroom challenge.  
This illusion of unanimity can occur when members of a group remain silent 
even when they disagree, the process of silent dissent as described previously 
by Soden (2010). The pressure to remain silent and not to “rock the boat” 
(O’Connor, 2002, p. 1287) is likely to be higher in a group with a strong directive 
leader who does not tolerate dissent.   
O’Connor (2002) evidences an illusion of unanimity at Enron by noting that 
board votes were generally unanimous and that there was no evidence that the 
directors challenged management over strategy. Scharff (2005) makes the link 
between silence and concurrence and that the lack of objections raised at 
WorldCom employees with respect to proposed accounting disclosures was 
interpreted as an illusion of unanimity. 
It is submitted that this symptom and the symptom related to self-censorship 
discussed above are inextricably linked. If actors are undergoing a process of 
self-censorship then this will lead to an illusion of unanimity and a perception 
that everyone concurs. Indeed, researchers such as Scharff (2005) and Eton 
(2001) have looked at both of these symptoms collectively under a general 
theme related to high levels of consent in a board and a lack of boardroom 
challenge.  
Evidence 
The review undertaken in research question 2l) above highlighted a culture of 
silent dissent in Ireland and emphasised Fitzpatrick’s strong and directive 
  
369 
 
leadership style. Further Nyberg (2011) observed that the Irish bank boards’ 
looked to avoid contrarian opinion” (ibid, p. 59). Nyberg (2011) further noted 
specifically with respect to Anglo that “there is little evidence that [Anglo] board 
members at the time were active in challenging the bank’s approach or its pace 
of lending growth” (ibid, p. 51). This lack of challenge could be seen as a desire 
for unanimity amongst the members of the Anglo board.  
Actor D’s (A) observations about Anglo and in particular the need for staff to be 
“on message” provides an insight relevant to this proposition and can be seen 
as illustrative of the illusions of unanimity:  
“Everyone had to be on message, no matter what happened, and again 
this is common with people that dominate organisations. Even for internal 
budgetary management meetings, we all prepped, we all sat around the 
table and listened to what each other was going to say. Don’t say that, 
say this, shape it this way, you are not coming across the right way, you 
are not coming across well. Now there is not an organisation that does 
not press itself and shape its message for external consumption, but 
internally there was a control mechanism, when people were talking to 
their peers, explaining what they did, what the budgets were for next 
year, everything was framed with little room for going off on tangents.  
When I look back on it, if somebody like Sean who drives it forward, has 
a clear message he wants to gets across he wants to make sure 
everything else is in line and he has the ability to inculcate that value and 
that it will all get done.  
I think for all its bluster about being open and honest when it came to 
criticising each other’s areas we were very reluctant to do it. And the 
lenders were generally beyond reproach.” 
Actor D’s (A) observation above, and in particular the need to carefully script 
what was said internally at Anglo, highlights the pressure towards unanimity at 
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Anglo. Actor N (S) also highlighted that at Anglo “you had to be on message”. In 
summary there is evidence from the literature, the Nyberg Report and from the 
interview process which supports the proposition that there was an illusion of 
unanimity at Anglo.  
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Research question 2n) 
At Anglo direct pressure was put on those who were considered dissenters. 
 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
 
Direct pressure on dissenters 
 
 
2 n) 
Self-appointed mindguards 2 o) 
 
In regard to this symptom, Janis (1972) referred to the social pressures that 
group members place on individuals who question the group’s judgement and 
position. Janis argues that placing pressure on dissenters is a form of 
psychological defence mechanism which deflects attention away from anxiety 
and any doubt associated with the group’s decision process. Janis highlighted 
the pressure put on dissenters by the inner circle of the Johnson Administration 
as a prime example of this symptom. O’Connor (2002) highlights the pressure 
put on Enron employees and their auditors by members of the Enron board to 
agree to their plans particularly as it related to the third-party partnership 
arrangements. Scharff (2005) highlighted the culture at WorldCom where 
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employees felt that they risked losing their jobs by disagreeing with executives 
or policies that were being implemented (ibid, p. 114).   
 
Evidence 
There are a number of examples from both the literature and the interview 
process which highlight the pressure which was put on dissenters. In research 
question 2c) relating to the lack of an impartial leader at Anglo, it was 
highlighted that Fitzpatrick did not tolerate dissent and disagreements and saw 
Anglo as “his company”. Carswell (2011) quoted an unnamed director saying 
that he wanted “semi-yes” men around him. Lyons and Carey (2011) also 
quoting an unnamed director observed that one did not question Fitzpatrick and 
that you could not tell him what to do.  
Actor B (A) in this regard noted:  
“There was a feeling in house that if people had been ‘difficult’ at board 
meetings and were ones to challenge that they were not necessarily 
offered a renewal and another go on the board.” 
 Another example of pressure placed on dissenters within Anglo was provided 
by Actor C (A) with respect to a colleague of his and the pressure he was put 
under for not producing the numbers that management wanted (highlighted in 
more detail in research question 3k) above).  
Actor O (S) was a bank analyst at Davy Stockbrokers, Ireland’s largest and 
most influential domestic stockbrokers. Actor O had expressed a negative view 
on the Anglo shares and explained in interview the reaction of Anglo in that 
respect:   
“I got a call mid that year [2007] from a guy, Matt Moran [Anglo’s CFO], 
to meet me for a coffee at the Westbury. I met him and he basically said; 
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‘I hear you are being very negative on Anglo’. He had all the information 
of what I had been saying but he was unwilling to tell me, he was waiting 
for me to do it. And then subsequently Kieran and Tony [Actor O’s 
bosses at Davy] met with Sean Fitzpatrick, they came in and wanted me 
fired. It was not the case of Anglo listening to your view, it was you are 
wrong basically. 
In August of [2008] a reconciliation was made with Anglo, it was all ok, I 
was told Anglo are relaxed with you. So that allowed me to go to the 
[Anglo investor] conference in October of 2008, I went into the meeting, 
and international investors are at the meeting and before the meeting 
started the CFO, Matt Moran, called me over and said ‘can I have a 
word’, and I said ‘sure’. So we went out and he said “Look Seamus you 
are not welcome here”. I said, ‘Matt I thought it was all resolved’. He said, 
‘no, you are not welcome so I am going to walk you out’. I can’t 
remember what I called him, we had a few choice words, I walked back 
to the desk and people were wondering how come I was back and 
suddenly it got back that I had been kicked out of the meeting. To be 
honest it was a bad move on their behalf.” 
This example provides an indication of the pressure that Anglo put on 
dissenters both by the public signal of excluding him from the meeting and also 
the pressure that was exerted indirectly on Actor O with his superiors. Actor O 
notes that there was a meeting with his bosses and that “they wanted him fired”.  
Actor Q (S), however, told me that “Matt [Moran] was very aggressive in relation 
to Seamus but never actually went as far as asking us to fire him.” Actor Q 
therefore recognised the pressure that Anglo had put on the firm with respect to 
Actor O’s views but disputes the claim that Anglo actually asked for Actor O to 
be fired. This difference in opinion between Actor O and Actor Q about how far 
Anglo were prepared to go to put pressure on Actor O as a dissenter, does not 
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detract from the evidence that there was significant pressure put by Anglo on 
Actor O.    
Actor Q (S) provided a further unrelated illustration of the pressure that Davy 
were put under by Anglo;  
“Pat Kuney, who is number two at Davy and in charge of private clients, 
ran into Sean Fitzpatrick in the street. Sean practically assaulted him on 
the street about stories that people at Davy were bad mouthing Anglo. 
This particular story related to someone in our Cork office who said 
something mildly negative about Anglo on the phone who said it straight 
back to Anglo.  When we heard this we thought we had better ring Sean, 
and Kieran [a senior Davy executive] rang Sean and said you had better 
come around for a chat.  
[Interviewer interjection: When was this?] 
It was before there was pressure on the bank [so before 2007]. I need to 
get the diary out to see exactly when it was … Kieran called Sean and 
Kieran would generally not be a man who would share his meetings with 
me, but he asked if I would come to this one, and I said fine. So we sat in 
there, and there is a sofa in the office and I sat here, Sean sat there 
Kieran sat there [the interviewee gestured to describe three places 
around a rectangular table] and we started chatting and very quickly 
Sean was getting very agitated and using words like ‘treason’ and ‘lack of 
loyalty to Ireland Inc’. And when he used the word treason I said ‘that is 
going too far Sean, that is over the top’. He literally jumped over the sofa 
and he [interviewee demonstrates two clenched fist and an aggressive 
look] … it was a pity he never hit me, with his fist raised he just stopped. 
But he was very agitated, spewing, I was spat upon.”  
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The use of words like “treason” and lack of loyalty’ and the aggressive 
confrontation described above provide another good example supportive of this 
proposition. 
Merrill Lynch Investment Bank was Anglo’s corporate brokers and a close 
advisor to the company. Actor N (S) described the pressure that Anglo put on 
dissenters:  
“They would be aggressive with people, I don’t want that to seem like 
they were threatening in any way. They would have been polite in the 
way they dealt with people but they would make their point very forcibly . 
If something did not go their way there was a three line whip on their side 
and they would approach different people at different levels or several 
people at one level in your organisation and you knew that when they 
had something to achieve the message would be sent out quite clearly 
and they would have a plan about how they would go about that. They 
were very effective in giving a group tackle in what they wanted to do.” 
An illustration evidencing Actor N’s observations above occurred in March 2007 
when Merrill Lynch’s banking analyst, Phil Ingham, published a research note 
highlighting the problems in the UK commercial mortgage market citing Anglo 
as having the most significant credit risk in the UK commercial market. Anglo 
Irish complained to Merrill Lynch (ML) about the report. The result of this 
pressure was that ML retracted the original report, edited it and then re-released 
it.  
Lewis (2011) describes the reaction to Ingham’s report: “For a few hours the 
Merrill Lynch report was the hottest read in the London financial markets, until 
Merrill Lynch retraced it. Merrill was the lead underwriter of Anglo bonds and the 
corporate broker of AIB: they’d earned huge sums of money off the growth of 
Irish banks. Moments after Phil Ingham hit the SEND button on his report, the 
banks called their Merrill Lynch bankers and threatened to take their business 
elsewhere. The same executive from Anglo Irish Bank who had called to 
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scream at Morgan Kelly [Moran] called a Merrill research analyst to scream 
some more. (‘I thought your work was fucking shit!’) Ingham’s superiors at 
Merrill Lynch hauled him into meetings with in-house lawyers who rewrote the 
report, purging it of its pointed language and it’s damning quotes from market 
insiders, including their many references to Irish banks. Ingham’s immediate 
boss in the research department, a fellow named Ed Allchin, was made to 
apologize to Merrill’s investment bankers individually for the trouble he’d caused 
them. And from that moment everything Ingham wrote about Irish banks was 
rewritten and bowdlerized by Merrill Lynch’s lawyers. At the end of 2008 Merrill 
fired him” (ibid, p. 111-112)163.  
The examples above highlight pressure that Anglo exerted on those who 
worked at Anglo or who provided services to Anglo. Actor K (C) was a senior 
executive of BKIR and provided an example of the pressure that Anglo tried to 
exert on their competitors:  
“I actually had a shouting match with Fitzpatrick. At one point I happened 
to be at some function and someone asked me about deposit gathering 
and I said something to the effect that it will be more challenging for 
banks that don’t have large branch networks like Anglo Irish and literally 
Sean Fitzpatrick was on the phone yelling at me about this. He 
threatened to have me reported to the regulator, he was going to tell my 
board.”  
Fitzpatrick threats to report Actor K (C) to his board and the regulator are 
examples of pressure that a senior Anglo executive put on a dissenter outside 
of the Anglo “inner circle” of employees and advisors/providers. Another such 
                                            
163
 Actor N (S) who had worked with Ingham at the time at Merrill Lynch confirmed in interview 
that this story was correct. However he did note that he felt that Ingham’s report at the time 
lacked substance and was based on anecdotal evidence (although this anecdotal evidence did 
prove to be very accurate).    
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example of the pressure on an external dissenter was the pressure that Anglo 
put on UCD Professor Morgan Kelly. Kelly as noted previously had written a 
research note in 2007 (Kelly, 2007) which highlighted the specific risks in the 
Irish property market. Kelly noted that:  “I had a call from a senior manager of 
Anglo Irish Bank who basically yelled at me said what I was saying was entirely 
irresponsible and to shut up.” (Lynch, Adrian, 2010) 
Finally Actor G provided an anecdote with respect to how she believed that two 
of Anglo’s directors (Bradshaw and Fitzpatrick) pressurised a NED within the 
context of the boardroom of the Dublin Docklands Development Authority 
(DDDA);  
“When Sean [Fitzpatrick] and Lars [Bradshaw] were on the board of 
DDDA there was a woman NED called Angela Cavendish who had a 
banking and property background. She was raising questions and Lars 
drew her aside, she told me, and said Angela I think you should go to 
Bunny Carr, from Carr Communications, and get some assistance and 
help with your communication style. In other words, because she was not 
asking the right questions. He used social and psychological techniques 
to make out that there was something wrong with Angela. There was 
nothing wrong with Angela, she was an excellent NED, she was so good 
that they tried to use psychological techniques to tell her: ‘Angela you 
have a problem and you need to get help with your problem’. She did not 
have a problem, she was causing them problems, and they had these 
little tricks, psychological tricks to manage her. Hearing little anecdotes 
from somebody like her gives me insights into their modus operands. “ 
Actor G’s observations above are not in relation to the Anglo boardroom and it 
does not necessarily follow that these directors acted in the same way with 
respect to how they treated dissenting board members at Anglo. However, this 
anecdote can be seen in the light of the significant evidence noted above which, 
it is submitted, provides a number of examples which support the proposition 
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3n) that there was significant pressure put on dissenters from senior managers 
at Anglo. 
 
Research question 2o)  
Anglo had a self-appointed mindguard. 
Antecedents of Groupthink  
 
Decision makers constitute a cohesive group 2 a) 
Insulation of the group from outside experts 2 b) 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership 2 c) 
Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures 2 d) 
Homogeneity of members’ social backgrounds and ideologies 2 e) 
High stress from external factors 2 f) 
Low self-esteem induced by recent failures, difficulties in 
decision making tasks or moral dilemmas 
2 g) 
 
Symptoms of Groupthink  
 
Illusions of invulnerability 2 h) 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group 2 i) 
Collective rationalisation 2 j) 
Stereotyping of out-groups 2 k) 
Self-censorship 2 l) 
Illusions of unanimity 2 m) 
Direct pressure on dissenters 2 n) 
 
Self-appointed mindguards 
 
 
2 o) 
 
Self-appointed mind-guard(s) are identified by Janis as those who take it upon 
themselves to protect the group from adverse information. A mindguard 
therefore helps to preserve the unity and preservation of the group by ensuring 
that group members are not exposed to information which might challenge their 
position.  
None of O’Connor (2002), Scharff (2005) and Eaton (2001) found evidence of a 
self-appointed mindguard in their respective case studies of groupthink. In 
Anglo’s case, there is evidence that Matt Moran was Anglo’s mindguard. Moran 
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was Anglo’s chief financial officer and group executive in the lead up to the 
crisis. Although he was not a main board director, Moran was in the upper 
echelons of Anglo’s leadership hierarchy.   
As noted above, Moran called Kelly directly to complain about the research 
paper he had written on Anglo. Further, as also already highlighted, Moran had 
forced the removal of Actor O, the Davy analyst from an Anglo investor 
presentation. Carswell (2011) also highlights an example of a casual e-mail 
conversation between an independent bank analyst and Kelly and that an e-
mail comment made by Kelly to the analyst had found its way back to Moran 
who had then mailed Kelly himself to challenge him on his comments (ibid, p. 
138).  
Actor B (A) confirmed that Moran had had confrontations with Professor Kelly 
from UCD and added that:  
“At one stage Moran actually went out to University College Dublin to 
confront him in terms of some piece that he had either written or an 
interview that he had done in one of the Irish papers so there was no 
love lost there and as a result there probably was not an awful amount of 
respect either. It was an aggressive kind of set to.“ 
Actor C (A) in interview recalled a conversation he had had with an investment 
banker from Barclays after “Matt Moran had tried to bully him on something”. 
Moran’s role as the “protector” of Anglo with respect to the investment banks is 
consistent with my own dealings with Moran in his capacity as financial officer at 
Anglo. One an occasion that our equity analyst had bought out a “sell rating” on 
Anglo he called our department to complain and to threaten to take away 
business from our bank.  
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Actor A (A) observed that:  
“He [Moran] would use obscenities to describe people who would say negative 
things and at the time it was frankly difficult because we all thought they were 
wrong and we were right because we had been right for so long. I was not at 
the meeting but I heard that he was at a meeting in London and used the ‘c’ 
word to another executive at another bank, and that is outrageous. An executive 
of another bank had challenged the financial growth projections, in particular 
with regard to lending and potential capital losses.  I believe Matt even went out 
to see Morgan Kelly and was pretty aggressive with him.” 
Carswell described Moran as “the bank’s pit bull, charged with chastising bank 
analysts, financial journalists and anyone else who spoke or wrote negatively 
about the bank. He would regularly telephone critics to give them a piece of his 
mind” (ibid, p. 119). Actor E (A) further highlighted the role that Moran took in 
aggressively defending Anglo from any negative press: “His [Moran’s] position 
was that he was Drumm’s Alsatian. Instead of taking comments listening and 
seeing whether there was an issue with something he decided he was going to 
be your man’s guard dog.” 
In summary Moran does not appear to be the only senior Anglo executive that 
aggressively challenged those that questioned the Anglo model, and indeed 
examples have been provided of Fitzpatrick being aggressive in relation to both 
Actor Q (S) and Actor K (C). The Anglo executive had been described above as 
being cohesive, with strong equity holdings and a strong sense of belief in the 
Anglo story. It is, therefore, not that surprising that they reacted aggressively 
towards anyone that challenged their perception. An analysis of the evidence 
from the literature and from interview however, specifically identifies Moran as 
someone who appeared to take on the role of Anglo’s mindguard.    
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Overall summary of research question 2: The board of Anglo Irish Bank was 
affected by the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink. 
Research question one assessed whether the board of Anglo was characterised 
by the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink. A review of the antecedents 
and symptoms of groupthink found in propositions 2a) – n) found evidence 
which supported all but one of the antecedents (relating to the isolation of the 
group to outside experts) and broad support for all the symptoms of groupthink. 
The evidence which supports these propositions came from a combination of 
secondary sources such as existing literature, from the three official inquiries 
into the crisis, from the application of industry norms to the relevant research 
questions, from relevant analysis of the Anglo financial statements and a series 
of interviews with a number of actors from both inside and outside Anglo.  
A summary of the evidence gathered in respect of each of the propositions is 
tabulated below.  The purpose of this analysis is threefold. First, it highlights the 
different sources of information which I used to review the relevant research 
questions. Second, it reflects the number of observations which were made in 
respect of each research question. Third, it provides a contextual comparison 
with other established and published research on groupthink. In Appendix 5 is a 
comparative analysis which was undertaken for each of the five groupthink case 
studies identified previously in this thesis; namely Eaton (2001), Ahlstrom and 
Wang’s (2009), Yetiv (2003), Scharff (2005) and O’Connor (2002).  
A summary of my research findings: 
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Table 7.6: Summary of the evidence I observed in support of groupthink 
Proposition Industry 
norms 
Inquiries, 
Commissions 
or other 
academic 
papers and 
books  
Indirect 
interview 
Direct 
interview 
Inferred from 
relevant 
Annual 
Financial 
Statements 
2a)  (3)  (2)  (1)  (9)  (3) 
2b) Proposition not proved 
2c)    (4)  (9)  (7)  
2d)   (4)  (5)  (5)  (1) 
2e)  (4)  (3)  (3)  (10)  (1) 
2f)   (1)  (3)  (3)  
2g) Proposition not proved  
2h)    (1)  (8)  (11)  (1) 
2i)  (2)   (4)  (2)  
2j)  (1)  (2)  (2)  (1)  
2k)   (2)   (3)  (5)  (4)  
2l)  (1)  (1)  (1)  (4)  
2m)   (1)  (2)   
2n)   (1)  (1)  (7)  
2o)   (2)  (2)  (6)  
There are two identified weaknesses in respect of this analysis and in particular 
a comparison with other published research in this area. First, a simple 
comparison of the number of different observations in respect of a specific 
proposition does not take into account the relevance, depth and importance of 
the observations. It is not the number of observations that is important but 
rather the depth and relevance of the analysis itself. Second, it may be that for 
practical purposes (related perhaps to word restrictions in respect to their 
published journals) that the researchers were not able to include all of their 
observations identified in respect of each research question.  
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Whilst recognising these two weaknesses, the analysis does provide some 
comfort in respect to my proposed research. First, as highlighted previously, 
three of the five research papers (Ahlstrom and Wang (2009), Eaton (2001) and 
Scharff (2005) looked only at the symptoms of groupthink. Further, both Yetiv 
(2003) and O’Connor (2002), who analysed both the symptoms and 
antecedents of groupthink, grouped the symptoms of groupthink together and 
looked at them collectively whilst I have considered and evidenced (where 
appropriate) all seven antecedent and eight symptoms individually. This was an 
attempt to be as rigorous and systematic in the research process and to try to 
reduce the opportunities which might exist for unconscious biases and 
suspicious fits in the analysis.  
Second, I have secured evidence from a wide source of materials as is reflected 
below. The theory being that a wide and diverse source of data can provide for 
a more robust and rigorous analysis. As highlighted previously, only Yetiv 
(2003) conducted direct interviews.  Eaton (2001) in contrast gathered his data 
also exclusively from press cuttings from two newspapers over a five year 
period whilst Scharff (2005) relied very heavily on SEC reports into the fall of 
WorldCom. Further, three of the comparison case studies were made in respect 
to corporations (Scharff: WorldCom, O’Connor: Enron, Eaton: BA and Marks 
and Spencer). None of these researchers referred to the annual report and 
accounts in their analysis. In contrast my research included relevant analysis of 
the annual report and accounts in respect of nine separate observations. 
Although it has been recognised that it is not the number of observations which 
are important, there is some (small) comfort as to the rigour of my analysis 
given that my research highlighted a greater number of observations, and from 
a more diverse source, than any of the comparable case studies.   
Finally, this analysis was conducted taking into account Yetiv’s (2003) warning 
with respect to a “suspicious fit” and being subject to a confirmation bias in 
analysing the data. For each antecedent and symptom of groupthink a number 
of sources were used which provided some comfort as to the validity of the 
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data. Further, there was no information in either the source materials or the 
interviews which contradicted the research findings presented. In summary, it is 
submitted that the breadth and depth of the evidence presented above is 
sufficient for me to conclude that the board of Anglo was affected by groupthink 
in the lead up to the financial crisis.  
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7.4 Research question 3: The board of Anglo was affected by group 
polarisation.  
Group polarisation has been described previously as a means of explaining how 
groups tend to be more extreme in the direction in which they are already 
heading (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969). Group polarisation is more likely in 
homogenous group settings (Sunstein, 2009, 2000b), in situations where there 
is geographical isolation (Groch, 2001) and where there are high levels of 
confidence (Baron et al., 1996; Gerard and Orive, 1987). Social influence 
network theory (Friedkin and Johnsen, 2011, 1999) highlights the role that the 
relative influence group actors can play in the polarisation process and that 
actors with greater influence will have a greater effect on the polarisation 
process itself. An actor with a strong influence on the group, and a strong 
preference for risk, will result in extreme polarisation of the group’s position 
towards a high risk strategy. These research followings are applied below in the 
context of the Anglo case study.  
An analysis of Fitzpatrick’s own personal investments in the lead up to the crisis 
highlights Fitzpatrick’s own personal attitude towards risk. Lyon and Carey 
(2011, p. 80-90) detail a long list of investments which Fitzpatrick made on his 
own personal account.  In particular, they highlight Fitzpatrick’s (catastrophic164) 
US$12 million investment, together with fellow Anglo director Lars Bradshaw, 
into a Nigerian Oil Company. Lyon and Carey highlight the lack of due diligence 
and attention to detail that Fitzpatrick paid in this failed investment. They 
observe that Fitzpatrick had no knowledge of the oil industry and had never 
even seen the oil rig nor met his Nigerian partners before investing. Fitzpatrick, 
when asked by Lyon and Carey about the rational for the investment noted: “We 
didn’t do tremendous due diligence on it [the Nigerian oilfield] … We didn’t have 
                                            
164
 See Lyon and Carey (2011) for a comprehensive review of the Nigerian oil investment which 
resulted in  Fitzpatrick losing all of the capital he had put into this venture.  
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them [the Nigerian partners] checked out. I wasn’t interested in oil. I knew 
nothing about Nigeria. I wasn’t really interested in Nigeria” (ibid, p. 96). Other 
examples provided by Lyon and Carey as an illustration of Fitzpatrick’s attitude 
towards risk include investing in a sub-prime mortgage business in Ireland in 
2006, and a number of high risk and unprofitable  property investments in both 
Ireland and in Europe.  
Fitzpatrick, when quizzed about his attitude towards risk noted: “I am being 
terribly open with you and honest with you by saying there was nothing that was 
driving me. There were no health issues. There were no blackmails. There were 
no affairs. There was nothing in my life that was going on. I was just being 
myself” (Lyons and Carey, 2011, p. 92). In particular the comment “I was just 
being myself” indicates that Fitzpatrick considered his high level of risk 
exposure as being reflective of his general attitude towards risk and that he 
would have taken the same approach to risk in his capacity as a board member 
of Anglo.  
These investments highlight the risk appetite that Fitzpatrick, the most influential 
member of the Anglo board, was prepared to take with respect to his own 
personal investments. They may also reflect his general attitude towards risk 
that he took when transacting not only for his personal gain, but also when 
acting in his capacity as a board member at Anglo.   
Proposition 2c) above, highlighted the influence that Fitzpatrick had at Anglo. 
The evidence above moreover suggests that Fitzpatrick had a high risk 
appetite. Proposition 1e) and 1f) respectively evidenced both homogeneity and 
high levels of confidence within Anglo. Further, Ireland is of course 
geographically isolated and as noted in the analysis of the Anglo board in 
proposition 1e) above all the Anglo board members were Irish nationals. In 
summary, Anglo was a board with an influential leader with a high risk appetite 
operating in the context of a geographically isolated board characterised by 
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homogeneity and high levels of confidence, all characteristics associated with 
group polarisation.  
The existence of these factors would point towards the fact that there was group 
polarisation in the Anglo board resulting in a riskier strategy being adopted. 
However, it is impossible to “prove” group polarisation in an ex-ante case study 
given that one needs to understand the thought process and risk preferences of 
the group members before deliberations and to compare those to the post 
deliberation outcomes. As a result, group polarisation has never, to my 
knowledge, been researched in relation to an ex-ante case study. Rather, 
researchers tend to highlight the possibility of group polarisation as having 
possibly occurred in relation to their specific case study (for example (Janis, 
1972; O’Connor, 2002)).  
Similarly with respect to the Anglo board, there is no way of evidencing that 
group polarisation did exist affecting the board’s decision processes. However 
what I can observe is that decisions were taken at Anglo in the context of an 
influential leader with a high risk disposition within the context of a homogenous 
group setting in a geographically isolated environment. Thus, it is submitted, 
there is an increased likelihood that group polarisation occurred in the decision 
processes of the Anglo board in the lead up to the crisis.  Finally given the 
interconnectivity and common attributes between groupthink and group 
polarisation, as highlighted in a previous chapter, it is very possible that the 
board of Anglo suffered from both phenomena.   
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7.5 Research question 4: The directors, and in particular the NEDS of the 
Irish Banks, had limited banking knowledge and experience.  
The model of poor decision processes developed in the previous chapter 
identified low levels of firm specific and functional skill levels as being a factor 
which might affect the likelihood of a poor decision process. The reasons for 
this being twofold; first, low skill level increases the chances of poor decisions 
being made in the first instance and second, low skill level increases the 
likelihood that directors will assume that others have superior information and 
therefore squelch their own information and herd.  
Nyberg (2011) specifically identifies the lack of banking expertise within the 
Anglo board when he observes that: “the board members [of Anglo] were 
experienced and well regarded in their own fields of speciality. However, they 
were not experts in the field of banking and several therefore appear to have 
been dependent on senior management to assess the need for the reporting 
systems and procedures necessary to contain the key risks identified. 
Accordingly, there is little evidence that board directors at the time were active 
in challenging the bank’s approach or its pace of lending growth” (ibid, p. 27).  
In particular the lack of expertise in the Anglo risk committee has been 
highlighted by both Nyberg (2011) and Carswell (2011). The risk committee was 
chaired by Michael Jacob from the start of the millennium until he retired in 
2007, by Fintan Drury until he resigned in 2007 and then Lars Bradshaw until he 
was forced to resign (along with Fitzpatrick) when details of loans to directors 
were disclosed in December 2008. None of these NEDS had any banking 
experience. Jacob was a NED at communications and a construction company, 
Drury was a publicist, and Bradshaw was a retired management consultant.  
With regard to the other Irish banks, Nyberg highlighted that the board of INBS 
had only three NEDs, and that board members “had little practical banking 
experience” (ibid, p. 28). Further, Nyberg observed with respect to the other four 
domestic Irish banks that “while NEDs were successful and respected 
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individuals from various parts of Irish business, not many of them were banking 
professionals or had comparative experience” (ibid, p. 49).  
A review of the NEDs of the six Irish banks and their banking experience in 
2006 highlights Nyberg’s point: 
Table 7.7: Analysis of the relevant banking experience at the Irish banks 
(2006) 
Bank Number of NEDs Number of NEDs with 
Banking experience  
 
AIB 13 3165  
BKIR 10 2 
Anglo 6 NIL 
INBS 3 NIL 
IL&P  7 2 
EBS 7 3 
Source: AFS from 2006 of the six Irish banks. Banking experience is defined as 
an NED that had or was working in some capacity in the banking sector.   
A number of interviewees questioned the skill levels of the directors of the Irish 
bank. Specific criticism was directed by three interviewees, Actor C (A), Actor Q 
(S) and Actor P (S) towards Anglo’s finance director Willie McAteer. In 
proposition 2k) above, Carswell observed that McAteer was the only director to 
challenge at group credit committee but that he was ridiculed, reference was 
made about his age, and this was highlighted as an example of negative 
stereotyping.  
Carswell’s observation that McAteer did  challenge (but did not appear to be 
taken seriously) is in contrast to the observations of Actor C (A):  
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 Of the three AIB NEDs with banking experience, one had worked at the Central Bank of 
Ireland (so in banking but not commercial banking) and the other two had banking experience in 
Poland and the US – so no specific experience of the Irish market.  
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“I always thought Willie was a very nice man, but whenever you asked 
him to sign anything he never asked questions, which was great in terms 
of getting things through but I never saw him challenge anything. At 
credit committee Willie would have sat on that where we would have 
been buying different forms of debt, I never saw him grilling or going into 
detail and I thought he was either a really smart guy and he doesn’t need 
to go into detail and he gets it, but I just don’t know if that was the case 
whether he was really smart. It wasn’t as if he was disengaged but when 
I see the probing that people do post crisis if they are part of the decision 
making process. I also never saw him as a strategic driver.” 
Actor C (A) is referring above to McAteer’s passivity in debt credit committees 
whilst Carswell referred to his challenge in lending committee meetings. 
Carswell’s observation about McAteer providing a challenge in lending 
committees was backed up by Actor A (A) who told me, in interview, that 
McAteer was the most conservative in the lending committees he attended. It is 
possible that McAteer, for whatever reason, felt more comfortable challenging in 
a lending credit committee than in a debt committee. McAteer’s had previous 
worked at accounting firm PWC and at a leasing company, which might make 
him more comfortable challenging on the lending credit committees. 
Actor C further highlighted that he thought that McAteer “should have retired a 
couple of years ago”. Actor Q (S) and Actor P (S) both commented that they 
believed that McAteer had a drinking problem. Actor Q noted that McAteer “was 
a bit fond of the jar” and that he “was suffering from the stress. He was drinking 
too much”. Actor P noted that McAteer was “getting on and tiring, an alcoholic, 
he had drink problems”.  
In summary, the interview process provides some evidence that questions 
McAteer’s effectiveness as an executive director. Actor C noted that McAteer 
never challenged or engaged in the debt credit committee meetings whilst 
Carswell observed that in the lending committees he did not appear to be taken 
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seriously. Further, observations about McAteer appearing tired and suffering 
from stress and drink issues, if accurate, would further reduce his effectiveness. 
As highlighted previously in proposition 2e) above, McAteer was the only 
executive director at Anglo who did not come from a lending background and it 
could be argued that his lack of effectiveness was particularly important given 
the homogeneity of the other executive directors’ skill sets.  
Indeed, Actor D (A) highlighted previously that the executive directors, with the 
exception of McAteer, all had lending backgrounds and that if you “asked them 
what was going on in the financial world, what was in the financial times that 
day, about commercial mortgage securitisation, how banks manage their risks, 
not a clue”. This sense of the lack of banking skills expressed by Actor D was 
also highlighted in interview by both Actor B and Actor E (A). Actor E noted that 
there was nobody at Anglo that understood “gap risk, market risk, operational 
risk in treasury.”    
Actor E (A) further questioned the expertise of executive director Pat Whelan as 
chief risk officer166:  
“I remember when he [Pat Whelan] was appointed to the board and head 
of all the risk and I knew that this guy was not up to it. I thought this is 
really quite bizarre. He was a lender. He had been a lender previously, 
but I went out to talk to him, to test him out. I said to him: ‘Pat in your new 
role we have to have a serious discussion about market risk and liquidity 
risk’ and his eyes glazed over, he had no idea what I was talking about. 
And I mean none.  So I think there were quite a few people promoted 
and put into positions way beyond their ability and competence.” 
Actor B (A) echoed the views of Actor D (A) above and provided two examples 
which, in his view illustrated the lack of banking experience of the executive 
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 Whelan reported into Michael Jacob as head of the risk committee as highlighted above.  
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directors at Anglo. One related to a conversation he had with the head of US 
lending (Tony Campbell167) when Campbell asked Actor B (A) to explain to him 
the make-up of the capital base of Anglo. Actor B (A) noted in interview:  
“Here is to all intents and purposes a board member asking me to 
explain again the make-up of our capital base in the bank. So that is one 
example and I remember coming back and explaining that to colleagues 
much to their interest and amusement and incredulity.” 
The other example related to (an unnamed) executive director at Anglo and 
Actor B’s (A) view of his lack of understanding of risk:  
“A question of funding came up at this particular meeting but it was quite 
obvious from the question asked by the particular person, who was an 
executive director and who also had a very senior risk role in the 
company, that he did not know the difference from funding from a 
liquidity perspective and funding from a capital perspective, and that to 
my mind was interesting.” 
The examples above focus on perceived weaknesses in the executive directors 
of Anglo. Criticism was also levelled on the lack of expertise of the NEDs at 
Anglo. Carswell, in interview, noted that Fitzpatrick populated the Anglo board 
with “people that were well known in Irish corporate circles but had no banking 
experience; Anne Heraty, Ned Sullivan, Fintan Drury the PR man and Gary 
McGann.”  
Actor B (A) was particularly critical of the expertise of Anglo NED Heraty:  
“With all due respect to Anne Heraty I am sure she is a very successful 
business woman and I am sure she is a very nice individual but she 
hasn’t a rat’s notion about banking. When a new NED was appointed 
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 As highlighted previously, Campbell was a “shadow” board member.  
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invariably we were asked to put together a presentation and describe in 
fairly overview terms what the bank was about how the treasury division 
operated what we did in our respective roles. It was ladybird stuff, 
ladybird book stuff168.” 
Actor B’s view in relation to Heraty’s understanding of banking was also 
confirmed in interview by Actor D (A) and Actor H (C).  
Actor B also questioned the expertise of other Anglo NEDs:  
“I would question even the likes of Gary McGann, Ned O’Sullivan again 
extremely successful businessmen but how much did they really 
understand banking balance sheets and banking and treasury risk. I can 
remember one time being in treasury we were asked to go to a board 
meeting to make a presentation on the treasury business and in my last 
few years when I was at Anglo we had a treasury executive, I think there 
were eight of us in total on the treasury executive of which I was one, 
and we were all going to do a piece of this presentation to the board and 
again I felt it was being done in a very overview straightforward way and 
even at the meeting when we were presenting we were going through 
the motions, we were doing it because we needed to do it  but I had two 
questions in my own mind: were they interested in hearing  this and do 
they understand this, are they engaging with us? I got the sense we were 
facing a lot of glazed eyes or bored faces in the room.  
Interviewer interjection: were there any questions?  
There were a couple of questions but there were no deep searching, 
deep rooted questions. This was a presentation to the main board, exec 
and non-exec. “ 
                                            
168
 The reference by Actor B (A) above to “ladybird stuff” is a direct reference to a series of 
children books under the title Ladybird.  
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Lack of relevant expertise in banking was not unique to Anglo, as was 
highlighted by Nyberg (2011) above. Actor I (C) of EBS highlighted a lack of 
expertise amongst the EBS board when she noted: “We tried to play with the 
big boys, but we did not have the skills to do that”. ILP NED Actor H noted that 
the chairman of AIB and BKIR (Gleeson and Burrows) and the Chairwoman of 
ILP (Bowler) going into the crisis had no specific banking experience and that in 
hindsight that was a mistake. Finally, Actor J (C) specifically highlighted what he 
believed was AIB CEO’s Sheehey’s “lack of understanding of the aggregate 
view of the whole bank that was being run at 80 miles an hour.”  
In summary, there appears to be evidence supporting the assertion that the 
directors of Anglo specifically, and the Irish banks more generally, had limited 
expertise in managing the banks in the lead up to the crisis. This lack of banking 
knowledge would imply that such directors would be more susceptible to 
normative influences affecting decision processes resulting in less boardroom 
challenge, increasing the likelihood of a poor decision process.  
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7.6 Research question 5: The Irish banks herded in the lead up to the 
crisis and in particular emulated the strategy of Anglo Irish Bank. 
Nyberg (2011) concluded that herding had taken place between the Irish banks 
and highlighted herding a number of times in his report (see for example pages 
i, ii, iv, v, 7, 24, 49, 95 and 99). In the Executive Summary of his report Nyberg 
noted that the Commission frequently found examples of herding and that “as 
other banks tried to match the profitability of Anglo in particular, their behaviour 
gradually, and even at times unintentionally, became similar” (p. ii). This view 
was shared by Honohan (2010) who noted that: “Competitive pressure on the 
leading banks to protect market share was driven especially by the 
unprecedentedly rapid expansion of one bank, Anglo Irish (whose market share 
soared from 3 per cent to 18% in a decade, growing its loan book at an average 
rate of 36 per cent)” (ibid, p.27). 
Anglo’s growth was achieved on the back of a single focused strategy of 
commercial property lending. Anglo achieved not only high growth but also 
increased profitability and its market capitalisation increasing from €0.6 billion in 
2000 to its peak of €17.53 billion in July 2007. In view of this success, Nyberg 
(2011) observed that AIB and BKIR in particular escalated their commercial 
property activities in light of Anglo’s strong performance in that sector and noted 
that: “Anglo was widely admired domestically and abroad and lauded (by many 
investors, consultants, analysts and the media) as a role model for other Irish 
banks to emulate” (p. iv).  
Nyberg cites the example of an external but unnamed consultancy firm who, at 
an AIB seminar in 2007, presented Anglo as an example to which AIB should 
aspire and highlighted that AIB set up specific “Anglo win-back teams” 
specifically to try and regain market share from Anglo (p. 24)169. The existence 
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 Carswell (2011) notes that this buy back team consisted of four people and was led by 
Catherine Moroney, a senior executive at AIB. 
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of these win back teams, led by AIB’s Moroney, was confirmed in interview by 
Actor J (C), a senior executive at AIB. Actor J further commented in interview: 
“Was AIB threatened by Anglo? Yes, from our point of view every time Anglo 
produced a set of results, it was ‘god how did they manage that?’. ” 
AIB’s Actor L (C) noted that AIB felt that the comparison with Anglo was 
unavoidable when he observed:  
“We compared ourselves a lot of the time to the financial services bank 
index in Europe and what was shocking about that was that Anglo was 
right at the top of that banking matrix in Europe. You were comparing 
yourself to a very high performing German bank you might note the 
differences relate to the size of the German economy and it is 
fundamentally different. However, if you are comparing yourself to 
organisations and the best performing of that is doing business in the 
same country then it is an undeniable comparison that will drive 
behaviour. They are serving the same customer base as you and if they 
are growing very rapidly it is at least likely then they are most likely doing 
so by taking some of your business or customers so you are forced to 
make that comparison on a continuous basis …. And ultimately they 
{Anglo] operated on a sub-set of the markets we operated in and it was 
quite difficult to justify why we were not performing as well as they were.”  
Further, Carswell, Actor H (C) and Actor P (S) all highlighted to me a comment 
made by an AIB’s CEO Michael Buckley170 when he observed that: “Anglo have 
joined us for breakfast but they are now eating our lunch171” as illustrative of the 
pressure that Anglo was exerting on AIB in particular. Carswell, in interview, 
                                            
170
 Buckley resigned as CEO of AIB in June 2005, and was replaced by Eugene Sheehey.  
171
 This apparent comment by Buckley appears in a number of books (for example Carswell 
2011) but I have been unable to find the context in which the comment was made or the direct 
source of the quote itself.  
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noted that AIB “wanted to fight back and get back some of that business. So 
2003/2004 you see AIB starting to react and Buckley set up what he called a 
‘win back team’ when he said ‘I want you to find out what Anglo are doing to get 
all this business that’s making them so much money and their investors so 
much money from the stock market. And I want you to replicate that’.”  
Actor L (C) observed that that AIB was a late starter in trying to compete with 
Anglo in the commercial property market and this negatively affected the quality 
and mix of AIB’s property investments:  
“On a very specific level, AIB became more aggressively involved in 
property lending later than Anglo and to grow its property book more 
rapidly than Anglo to make an impact and it was late to the party and it 
was therefore lending against asset prices that were already very 
elevated which was a problem when the bubble burst.”  
Actor L (C) further highlighted the unfavourable mix of commercial business that 
AIB underwrote was affected by its decision to try and catch up Anglo:  
“AIB did more development lending, the balance of its development 
versus investment property lending changed in favour of development 
lending because that was the business that was available for you to lend 
against and AIB ended up doing more land development lending against 
land portfolios rather than development and it did more development 
than investment and if you think about that from a risk perspective 
residential property lending is less riskier, and development lending is 
more riskier than investment property and lending against land banks is 
more riskier. We did a lot of that.”  
Actor L’s comment above that AIB did more of the risker land development 
lending “because that was the business that was available to you” highlights the 
fact that, as a late entrant, the quality of AIB’s lending was affected by Anglo. 
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This point about the influence that Anglo had on the other banks and the quality 
of the lending they agreed to underwrite, was also made by Carswell when he 
noted in interview:  
“The issue for Anglo is that they led the charge, everyone wanted to replicate 
what they were doing. They might not have been the worst of them at the end 
but they were certainly the worst at the beginning and they were the ones to 
have started it and by leading the charge and the profits that they made in the 
period from 1999 to 2006, other banks saw that and initially were disbelieving 
and wrote them off and then after a couple of years said ‘oh my God, this is real 
they are actually making this money’ a lot of the banks came under this 
pressure. I think the case of BKIR was a very good example because BKIR was 
always a conservative bank, a very conservative establishment from their 
Protestant Anglo Irish roots, and around 2004 they have a real existential crisis 
where they said ‘what are we doing wrong that Anglo are doing right’ and we 
need to do what they are doing and we need to win back some of this market 
share.” 
As Carswell highlights above, BKIR was also under pressure to emulate the 
success of Anglo. Ross (2010) writes that Mike Soden, Bank of Ireland chief 
executive until 2004, used to ring Sean Fitzpatrick after sensational sets of 
annual figures and congratulate him: “Then Soden and his board of directors sat 
down and wondered how on earth they were going to compete. Anglo Irish 
Bank led the way and all the others followed” (ibid, p84). Carswell (2011) notes 
that there was even concern within Bank of Ireland that given Anglo’s success 
that it could secure enough support from institutional investors to mount a take-
over bid of BKIR. In 2005 at BKIR’s annual general meeting a prominent 
shareholder proposed an unsuccessful resolution that BKIR should appoint the 
then CEO of Anglo as their next Governor (Donovan and Murphy, 2013).  
  
399 
 
Actor F (C), a senior executive at BKIR whose responsibilities included investor 
relations, highlighted the pressure that institutional investors placed on BKIR to 
emulate the success of Anglo:  
“You would go out and you would talk to investors and I remember being 
struck when I went out on an equity roadshow particularly in mainland 
Europe, it wasn’t so much a London or a US thing, you would ask them if 
they owned Bank of Ireland shares they would say ‘we used to but you 
are not dynamic enough and there is better growth potential with Anglo 
and AIB than there is in your share price’. So BKIR became seen as a bit 
‘fuddy duddy’ and not particularly dynamic and in a way we grew our 
lending in the UK to some extent to make up for that but we also grew 
our lending in Ireland but in a slightly more cautious way.” 
Actor Q (S) as CEO of Ireland’s largest stockbroker Davy, also highlighted the 
pressure from institutional investors to emulate the success of Anglo in 
particular:  
“They [Anglo] had the same institutional investor base as the other 
banks. Those institutional investors are coming to Dublin, they are 
coming to see Bank [BKIR], and Allied [AIB], we are bringing them in, the 
other brokers are bringing them in, and what are they doing, Anglo are 
the heroes and investors are applauding them, and the same investors 
are saying to Bank and Allied, you are not growing nearly quickly 
enough. So in some respects they put the managements of those banks 
under pressure as did the media in terms of contrasting growth rates. 
That was part of the disaster.” 
The extent to which both AIB and Anglo looked to emulate the success of Anglo 
in its commercial property operations is reflected in the analysis that Donovan 
and Murphy (2013) conducted as reflected below: 
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Table 7.8 Residential Mortgage and Commercial Property lending by AIB 
and BKIR (2003 and 2008) 
Residential Mortgage lending by AIB and BKIR (in Euro billions) 
Bank 
 
2003 2008 Growth Rate (%) 
AIB 13.2 31.6 139% 
BKIR 30.9 60.1 96% 
Overall Total 44.1 91.7 108% 
Commercial Property lending by AIB and BKIR (in Euro billions) 
Bank 2003 2008 Growth Rate (%) 
 
AIB 11.1 47.9 332% 
BKIR 6.6 35.6 439 
Anglo 18.4 74.1 303 
Overall Total 36.1 157.6 337 
Source: Donovan and Murphy (2013, p. 67) 
The above tables reflect the increase in growth in both residential and 
commercial lending and highlight the particular growth in commercial lending 
during this period172. As the table indicates, AIB increased its residential lending 
to €31.6 billion by 2008, a 139% increase from 2003. In contrast AIB’s 
commercial property lending increased by a multiple of 2.4 of the growth in 
residential lending to €47.9 billion a 332% increase since 2003. BKIR statistics 
noted in the table above highlight a similar trend of a greater move into 
commercial lending.  
The above analysis focuses on AIB and BKIR. In addition to these two banks 
Donovan and Murphy (2013) highlight that INBS modelled itself very closely on 
Anglo, in particular its push into the commercial property market. Finally, EBS 
also made a strategic decision to enter into the commercial mortgage market in 
2005, at the peak of the growth in this market. Murphy and Devlin (2009) 
describe this decision as a case of “late onset madness” (ibid, p. 272).  
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 As highlighted in chapter 7, Anglo only underwrote loans for commercial property.  
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Nyberg (2011) notes that this was an attempt by EBS to diversify its lending 
given the increased competition in the residential mortgage market and to 
protect its status as an independent mutual in light of competition from the other 
society in the sector INBS (Nyberg, 2011). The pressure of competition on EBS 
was recognised in interview by EBS’s NED Actor I (C) when she commented 
about the pressure EBS were under when rationalising their decision to enter 
the commercial property market. She noted that the rationalisation was “if we 
don’t chase this business we are out of the market completely because we are 
getting eaten by other financial institutions and we cannot survive without it. “ 
Actor I (C) further highlighted that EBS did not, however, see INBS as their 
benchmark but rather looked to Anglo:  
“INBS were not influential and did not affect us. Anglo of all places was 
seen as competition. So we were looking in the wrong place. This is all 
with the joy of hindsight. First, why did we not see INBS as competition? 
It was seen as a maverick, an oddity, it was all about the man not the 
institution. The only time it became a threat was in terms of the 
demutualisation and their (planned) demutualisation would be a push on 
us ourselves to demutualise. So that was there to an extent. However, in 
terms of chasing business and trying to be their model, we never did that. 
We looked in other places at competitors, and we mainly saw our 
competitors as INBS in mortgages and everyone had more scale than 
us. It was ILP and BKIR/AIB for mortgages and then some people were 
recruited to do commercial lending as it was felt that we never had a 
large enough mix on our books. And when that team was bought in they 
were given a mandate and an instruction to build a book. And when they 
went out to build a book, Anglo held the best book in town and everyone 
else was picking up the bits. The perception of Anglo was very positive. 
They were to look up to, and it was also a bit of begrudgery that they 
were too smart for their own good, but yes we were trying to emulate 
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them, yes. And Anglo were seen to be the sharp ones and if we could 
have some of that as well.” 
Actor H, a NED at ILP, was another who highlighted the pressure to emulate the 
success of Anglo. In interview, Actor H noted that a new NED had challenged 
the ILP board to be more like Anglo and that the new NED had noted that 
“Anglo was showing them all how it should be done”. This comment should be 
seen in the context that ILP did not even compete in the same markets as 
Anglo, as it never underwrote commercial mortgages. The pressure to emulate 
the success of Anglo therefore appears to be very strong and even affecting 
EBS, a building society committed to mutuality with no pressure of share price 
performance and ILP, a bank that did not even compete in the same space.    
Actor Q (S) in interview observed that pressure for emulation came not only 
from institution investors but also from the media. Media pressure was also 
highlighted in interview by ILP’s Actor H (C) and EBS’s Actor I (C). Actor H 
referred to a radio programme called “Morning Ireland” (he compared it to Radio 
4 in the UK) which had a business section and would always interview the CEO 
of the banks when their half and full year results came out. He said that when 
AIB and BKIR were interviewed the first question they would always get asked 
is “how are you going to compete with Anglo?”. He used this as an example of 
the pressure banks were under in the press to compete with Anglo.  Actor I (C) 
noted that; “There was pressure from the financial press, most definitely. Ted 
McGovern [the CEO of EBS] used to feel the pressure of that a lot.” 
A review of the Irish press covering the period 2005-2006 using the search 
engine Nexis UK underlines this point. There are a number of comments in the 
press over that period lauding the performance of Anglo and comparing the 
results to the other Irish banks. A selection of such comments includes:  
• “Over the past few years, both Bank of Ireland and AIB have had 
problems translating volume growth into improved underlying 
profitability because of margin attrition … Anglo Irish Bank continues 
  
403 
 
to be the star performer of the sector, however.” (insider&apos and 
market, 2005) 
•  “No matter how much bankers at the other financial institutions pay 
themselves, it will be hard for them to match the rewards available at 
Anglo Irish Bank.” (Niall Brady, 2006) 
• “While the absolute return from Irish bank stocks has been good in 
recent years, the return relative to a strong overall equity market has 
been disappointing, with the notable exception of Anglo Irish Bank.” 
(“Outlook positive for financials,” 2006) 
Moreover when BKIR appointed a new CEO in 2004, following the resignation 
of Mike Soden, Irish Independent columnist and senate member Shane Ross 
questioned why BKIR did not approach Fitzpatrick for the job asking whether he 
was “far too dynamic” for the BKIR CEO position (“Ahoy, a toff at helm of BoI,” 
n.d.).  
Carswell (2011) quotes an unnamed chief executive whose comments sum up 
the competitive pressure and motivation that the banks were under to emulate 
the success of Anglo: “You must remember that at this time Anglo was racing 
ahead and my shareholders were asking what I was doing about this. Sadly, it 
came down to the fact that it was a bunch of people trying to compete … The 
market were saying that this was a new paradigm, a new model in banking – 
the relationship thing [the Anglo model of banking]. Why do you think every 
bank in town went with the same thing to a different degree or another? It 
wasn’t about pay or bonuses. There was a natural pride at stake” (ibid, p. 58).   
The comments above refer to “a natural pride at stake” which drove the desire 
to emulate and compete with Anglo. Nyberg, in interview, suggested that the 
motivation for emulation came from a fear of losing out: “What some people 
feared was that unless you made out like Anglo did profit wise then your owners 
might start telling you off and you would lose out, you would lose your position, 
your salary.” It is submitted that the desire to emulate the success of Anglo was 
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perhaps different for different actors, but that such emulation would have been, 
as identified above, some combination of a competitive pride and a fear of being 
left behind and losing out.  
Competitive pressures were not, however, exclusive with respect to wanting to 
emulate Anglo. The interview process also identified the pressure to compete in 
the high competitive residential mortgage market as well, particularly in light of 
the competition from both HBOS and RBS. David Went, the CEO of ILP 
summed up these pressures when he noted: “You have a decision to make, do 
you follow the competition or not, do you allow somebody who is essentially a 
suitcase banker173 to come in and take your business and at the end of the day 
that is the decisions that the Irish banks made, we had franchises and we were 
going to protect those franchises.” (Lynch, Adrian, 2010) 
Actor K (C) noted the pressure that BKIR were under to underwrite 100% 
mortgages:  
“If you look at the peak, 100% mortgages was a big deal in Ireland for lots of 
people. At BKIR our portfolio for 100% mortgages was only 5%. They [BKIR 
management] were really unhappy to do it, but they felt they had to do it 
because the market was pushing them but it wasn’t something they wanted to 
do. They are a very conservative organisation; the idea of them having 100% 
mortgages completely flew in the face of anyone in the credit committee.”  
Actor K (C) notes that “only 5%” of BKIR mortgages were 100%. A review of 
BKIR’s 2007 AFS reveals that 5% of residential mortgages would still have 
amounted to a not inconsequential €1.67 billion.  
Actor K provided an illustration of the competitive pressure when he provided 
the following anecdote:  
                                            
173
 This is a reference to foreign banks like HBOS who did not have a strong “on the ground” 
presence in Ireland.  
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“I remember when we started melting down [2008] and the 3 month libor 
rate was 100 basis points I would be running in the morning on 
Pembroke Road [Dublin] and there would be this sign that said ‘Bank of 
Ireland tracker loans + 64’174 and I would be like: why are we doing that, 
we are not making any money and the response would be ‘we can’t lose 
market share’ so there was a lot of market pressure.” 
Actor J (C) additionally noted the competitive pressure at AIB to maintain 
market share in residential mortgages at AIB, and that this was done at the 
expense of asset quality in the lead up to the crisis.  
In summary, a review of the literature and the comments in interview suggests 
that both of Ireland’s leading banks, AIB and BKIR, looked to emulate the 
success of Anglo in the commercial property market. Further, evidence in 
interview suggests that even EBS and ILP, who were not direct competitors of 
Anglo, were affected and pressurised due to Anglo’s apparent success. 
Pressure to emulate came from the financial press and from institutional 
investors and from a natural pride and fear of being left behind. Competitive 
pressures to herd were not exclusive to Anglo and the commercial property 
market but were also prevalent in the residential market. However, as 
highlighted in the analysis of the relative growth of both AIB and BKIR’s 
residential and commercial property assets, and from the evidence above, there 
was particularly strong pressure to emulate the success of Anglo.   
 
 
                                            
174
 What Actor K is describing is the bank lending money at a margin of 0.64% over the 
reference rate when it was costing BKIR 1% above the reference rate to borrow the funds to 
pay for the mortgages, in effect taking a loss of 0.36% per annum on the mortgages (before 
accounting for administrative and capital costs, counterparty and market risk associated with the 
mortgages).  
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7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter identified and discussed five separate research questions. These 
questions were developed in relation to two of the three strands of this thesis. 
First, to provide some academic rigour with respect to Nyberg’s (2011) 
assertion that the Irish banks were characterised by groupthink symptoms and 
herding in the lead up to the crisis. The analysis in research questions 2 and 5 
above, focused on Anglo and the theory developed earlier in this thesis that 
Anglo suffered from groupthink symptoms and that the other Irish banks looked 
to emulate Anglo’s strategy.  
Groupthink was measured with reference to Janis’ original construct and each 
of his seven antecedents and eight symptoms of groupthink. The decision was 
taken to follow Janis’ definition of the strong version of groupthink to reduce the 
opportunities for a suspicious fit, which can exist if a researcher can “self-select” 
the relevant antecedents and symptoms of groupthink and then apply those to a 
case study. Further, as discussed Janis’ version of groupthink has specific 
relevance in the context of the corporate board environment, This approach 
provided a clear structure and discipline for the analysis. 
Observations for each research was drawn from a very wide and extensive 
range of sources, including a series of interviews. It is accepted that the sheer 
volume of information included in the discussion of each research question may 
make the reading of this chapter “heavy going”. However it is submitted that the 
volume of the evidence provided is a consequence of the desire to counteract 
any unconscious confirmation bias I may have in this research. The thought 
process being that a very thorough and rigorous examination from as many 
different sources as possible is necessary to mitigate the risk of a suspicious fit. 
This analysis was, therefore, made with a great awareness of the risks of 
inherent confirmation biases .. However, it is accepted that there still remains a 
risk of unconscious biases affecting my research findings.  
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A summary of the research questions and the summary observations drawn are 
summarised below: 
Research question 
 
Summary 
 
Research question 1: The Anglo board was affected 
by an epistemic blind spot towards property as an 
asset class and also displayed other inherent biases 
in their decision processes. 
 
 
Support evidenced for this proposition. 
 
Research question Two: The Anglo Board was 
affected by the antecedents and symptoms of 
groupthink in the lead up to the financial crisis. 
 
 
Support evidenced for this proposition. 
 
Research question Three: The Anglo board’s 
decision process in the lead up to the crisis was 
affected by group polarisation. 
 
 
Limited support evidenced for this 
proposition. Analysis of the research 
question was affected by lack of access 
to Anglo board members. 
 
Research question Four: The directors of the Irish 
banks had limited banking knowledge and 
experience.  
 
 
Support evidenced for this proposition. 
 
Research question Five: The Irish banks herded in 
the lead up to the crisis and in particular emulated the 
strategy of Anglo. 
 
 
Support evidenced for this proposition..  
What follows below is reconciliation between the observations from the case 
study and the model itself.   
A summary of my firm specific proposed model is included below for ease of 
reference:  
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Repeat of  my completed model (firm specific)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overconfidence 
Bias 
Confirmation Bias 
Bias 
Availability Bias 
Bias 
Inherent Bias in a decision 
process 
Increased Risk of an initial poor decision  
Challenge to initial 
decision affected by 
Normative Influences 
 
Informative 
Influences 
 
Contextual Issues 
- Industry type 
- Competitive 
environment 
- Confidence in 
overall economy 
- Institutional 
pressure 
towards 
homogeneity 
- Socio-political, 
legal and 
regulatory 
environment 
-  
Skill levels 
of the 
Directors 
Increased vulnerability to a poor 
decision process 
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The applicability of the model to the Anglo case study is summarised in the 
table below:   
 
An initial poor decision process affected 
by inherent biases in decision processes 
related to overconfidence, availability and 
confirmation. An epistemic blind spot 
being an extreme form of confirmation 
bias.  
 
 
Research question 2h) above highlighted the high 
levels of confidence at Anglo and the belief that 
the Anglo board was “infallible” (quote from 
interview with Actor A).  
 
Research 1 above observed examples of 
availability biases and a strong confirmation bias 
relating to property as an asset class which 
pervaded Irish society. This emotional attachment 
to property may have led to a epistemic blind spot 
towards property at Anglo and competing banks.  
 
 
The decision processes at Anglo were 
affected by normative influences.  
 
Research question 2 reviewed all seven 
antecedents and eight symptoms of groupthink 
and the conclusion drawn was that there was 
support for Nyberg’s assertion with respect to 
groupthink as it related to the board of Anglo.  
 
Research question 3 further identified that the 
board of Anglo could have been affected by group 
polarisation, another identified normative influence 
on decision processes.   
 
The decision processes at Anglo were 
affected by informative pressures. 
 
No direct evidence was gathered which could 
evidence “internal” herding and that Anglo board 
members chose to ignore their own information 
based on the rational act of assuming that other 
directors had superior knowledge175. 
 
However, what the research did observe was 
highlighted levels of homogeneity (research 
question 2e)), a strong directional leader (research 
question 2c)) and low levels of director skill levels 
(research question 4) all characteristics associated 
with internal herding. The existence of these 
observables increases the likelihood that the board 
was affected by normative pressures on decision 
processes.  
 
The board of Anglo was characterised by 
low level of director skill levels.  
 
 
Research question 4 observed that the executive 
directors of Anglo had strong lending backgrounds 
but little or no experience about the liquidity and 
                                            
175
 The lack of access to main board directors at Anglo meant that there was no way to directly 
verify this claim.  
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treasury functions at Anglo. Further, the research 
questions identified very low levels of banking 
experience amongst the NED directors. Low 
functional skill levels increases the likelihood of 
internal herding and the initial suggestion of a poor 
decision process.  
 
Influence of contextual influences 
 
 
A number of contextual macro influences were 
identified as potentially affecting the micro decision 
processes.  
The model identified the industry type as creating 
a social identity within which individual firms 
operate and banking, and indeed the Irish banking 
industry specifically, was identified as an industry 
which had a history of failure associated with poor 
judgements, and ethical indiscretions.  
 
High levels of confidence in the overall economy 
was identified as affecting confidence at the micro 
level. The perceived success of the Celtic Tiger 
and the associated new era thinking has been 
identified and discussed, particularly in relation to 
the chapter on the Irish economic background 
leading up to the crash.  
 
High levels of competition were another contextual 
factor identified as affecting firm specific 
behaviour. Research question 5 above identified 
an extremely competitive industry in the lead up to 
the crisis.  
 
Finally, broad institutional pressures towards 
homogeneity was identified as a factor which could 
impact homogeneity within individual firms. 
Evidence highlighted that Ireland’s geographical 
isolation, its small population, and the domination 
of its two leading Universities were all contextual 
factors which encourage homogeneity within the 
micro board environment.  
 
Finally the socio-political environment in which the 
Irish banks were operating has been highlighted in 
chapter 5.  
 
Increased likelihood of a poor decision 
process with risk of associated ethical 
indiscretions.  
 
 
Anglo has been identified as being associated with 
a number of poor decision processes costing the 
Irish government in excess of €50 billion to bail out 
this “rogue” bank (Nyberg, 2011). Further, a 
number of ethical indiscretions related to the Anglo 
board have been identified and discussed in this 
thesis.  
Furthermore, the model of poor decision processes identified that the model can 
be applied at different levels and that a poor decision process at a leading firm 
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(Anglo) could lead to herding at rival banks. The Irish case study evidenced that 
there was herding by the Irish banks (research question 3) and that the skill 
levels of the directors of the Irish banks in general was low (research question 
4) which would have increased vulnerabilities to informative pressures. Further, 
the contextual factors identified as affecting the micro environment in which 
decisions are made was the same for all the Irish banks. In other words, the 
model highlights the systemic risk to a poor decision process.  
The model emphasised the interconnectivity of the related phenomena and their 
common attributes and that these phenomena can combine together to create 
an even more powerful force. Homogeneity, high levels of competition, and a 
strong directive leader are common to both normative and informative 
influences. All three of these observables were observed in the case of Anglo . 
Finally, the model recognised that there is importance not only identifying the 
observables but also in measuring the strength of the observables. This thesis 
did not undertake a comparative analysis between Anglo and other institutions 
to measure the relative “strength” of relevant observables. A comparative 
analysis which looks to apply the model in relation to both firms that failed and 
those that came through the crisis relatively unscathed would provide further 
insights into the robustness of the model itself. For practical purposes such a 
detailed comparative analysis was not feasible and is highlighted as an area for 
further research. In summary, however, evidence from the five research 
questions analysed in this chapter are supportive and consistent with the 
attributes identified in the model of poor decision processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
412 
 
Chapter 8 Policy Recommendations and Concluding Discussions  
 
8.1 Introduction 
The introduction to my thesis identified three related strands which form the 
basis for this research. The first of these relate to evidencing and developing 
the Nyberg Commission’s assertion that Anglo suffered from groupthink and 
that the Irish banks looked to emulate the success of Anglo increasing systemic 
risk in the Irish banking sector. The second related to the development of my 
model of VPDP. The third and final strand to this thesis relates to the 
recommendation of reforms which arise from the model itself.  
In this chapter I use my model of VPDP as a basis for identifying areas to 
concentrate governance reforms. I then discuss and recommend reforms which 
can reduce the chances of a poor decision process in the context of a corporate 
board. Finally, I conclude the chapter, and my thesis, with a summary 
discussions highlighting both the limitations of my research and identifying 
areas for further research.  
 
8.2 Application of my model with respect to potential reforms 
Herding, as discussed previously, is an informational pressure where subjects 
subordinate their own private information in favour of the signals they receive 
from others. Herding within a boardroom (“internal” herding) can result in a 
reduction of boardroom challenge as actors assume that others have superior 
information, suppress their own information, and follow. This lack of boardroom 
challenge related to informative pressures can create an environment where 
there are high levels of consensus which can result in the board becoming more 
cohesive and more confident in its chosen strategy. Cohesiveness and high 
levels of confidence are attributes associated with normative influences on 
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decision processes and in particular groupthink. Informational influences then 
increase the likelihood of normative pressures on decision processes. Related 
phenomena can, as highlighted previously, combine together to create an even 
more powerful force than when looked at in isolation. The connection between 
herding and groupthink and the cause and effect relationship is reflected 
diagrammatically below: 
  
Figure 8.1: Herding and Groupthink  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased 
vulnerability to 
groupthink 
Systemic risk of 
emulation of poor 
decision process by 
competitors 
Herding and groupthink 
combine together to 
increase vulnerability to a 
poor decision process 
Internal herding 
Increased 
cohesion and 
confidence 
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Given the potential cause and effect relationship between herding and 
groupthink, and the systemic significance of herding, a good starting point for 
reforms may be to look at ways of reducing internal herding, therefore 
increasing boardroom challenge, and potentially dampening board confidence 
and cohesion related to groupthink. A summary of the literature on herding from 
chapter 3 identified that herding is more likely: 
• when there is a strong influential leader 
• in homogenous group settings 
• in highly competitive scenarios 
• when the skill levels of directors is low 
The literature review further highlighted common observables between 
groupthink and herding, and that groupthink, like herding, is characterised by 
antecedents related to directive leadership and homogeneity. Moreover, boards 
which are homogeneous with similar values and ideologies are more likely to be 
characterised by the socio emotional cohesiveness that is core to Janis’s 
groupthink construct. High levels of competition are associated with both 
normative and informative influences on decision processes. External 
competition was identified as increasing an “in group” bias and exacerbating 
cohesiveness associated with groupthink. Herding was identified as being 
exacerbated when levels of competition are high. These common links between 
are reflected diagrammatically below:  
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Figure 8.2: Normative and Informative Influences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The skill levels of the directors, and the NEDs in particular, are associated with 
normative but not informative pressures to conform. Directors’ skill levels 
however affect not only the likelihood of herding (and indirectly the increased 
likelihood of groupthink) but also the likelihood of an initial poor decision being 
made176. The skill level of a director therefore “touches” two important parts of 
the proposed model. This is reflected diagrammatically  below: 
 
 
                                            
176
 An initial poor decision, or suggestion, is the starting point for the model of VPDP itself. 
Normative 
influences 
Informative 
influences 
Strong influential 
leader 
Homogeneity 
Exacerbated in highly 
competitive 
environments 
Common 
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Figure 8.3: Skill level of Directors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model identified the importance of context and that the macro environment 
has an impact on the micro environment in which boards are operating. In 
particular, the literature review highlighted that high levels of confidence in the 
broad environment in which firms are operating, will impact confidence levels 
within individual boards. High confidence levels have been linked to group 
polarisation and in heightening group extremity, and are associated with the 
illusions of invulnerability which is a symptom of groupthink.  
Low levels of 
functional and firm 
specific skills 
Leading to an 
increased likelihood 
of groupthink 
Increased likelihood 
of herding 
Increased likelihood 
of an initial poor 
decision 
Increased 
vulnerability to a 
poor decision 
process 
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Further, one of the inherent biases in decision processes which can affect an 
initial strategy recommendation relates to an overconfidence bias where actors 
overestimate their own abilities which can lead to mistakes in decision making. 
Overconfidence therefore affects both an initial decision suggestion, and is 
associated with normative influences which can then dampen the likelihood of a 
boardroom challenge. This is highlighted diagrammatically below:  
 
Figure 8.4: High levels of confidence 
 
  
 Increased cohesion 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, this chapter has identified the need for reforms associated with 
informative influences on decision processes. The rational for this being the 
close interplay between normative and informative influences and that 
informative influence can increase the likelihood of normative influences on 
Increases the vulnerability 
of a lack of challenge 
associated with normative 
influences on decision 
processes 
High levels of 
confidence 
Can create/exacerbate 
overconfidence bias 
associated with a poor 
initial decision 
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decision processes. A review of the attributes identified three factors which are 
common to both normative and informative influences, namely; directive 
leadership, homogeneity and the impact of competition. This commonality is not 
surprisingly given the constant interplay between the various factors identified 
as affecting decision processes identified in the model. The review further 
highlighted the importance of the skill levels of the directors both in affecting an 
initial strategy recommendation and the likelihood of herding and dampening of 
the challenge to an initial recommendation. Finally confidence, both in the wider 
economy, and also within the firm itself, was another factor identified as 
affecting different parts of the model. What follows below is a discussion of 
potential reforms which address the “pressure points” identified in the analysis 
above. 
 
8.3 Uncontrollable variables; competition and confidence 
The analysis above highlighted that both high levels of competition and 
confidence as factors that could influence a decision process. It is submitted 
that reform suggestions relating to both of these factors are outside the remit of 
this thesis. Competition between actors is a key cornerstone of a capitalistic 
ideology and economists dating back to Adam Smith (1863), have argued that 
competition ensures the efficient allocation of resources to the most productive 
resources. This thesis therefore is not intending to argue that competition 
should be dampened so as to reduce the opportunities for both groupthink and 
herding from occurring within boardrooms. A wider discussion on how to 
manage and regulate competition is beyond the remit of this thesis.    
However, what the literature does highlight is that high levels of competition, as 
was evidenced in the Irish banking environment, is a factor that can influence 
decision process within boards. Further the threat related to high levels of 
competition has been mentioned as a contributing factor with respect to the 
mistakes made by credit rating agencies in the lead up to the crisis (Angelides 
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et al., 2011) and has been mentioned with respect poor decision made by 
accounting firms (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2013). High levels of competition 
in a particular industry could be viewed as a red flag that identifies the 
increased susceptibility of individual firms and the industry collectively of a poor 
decision outcome. 
High levels of confidence relates to both confidence within the boardroom and 
also the general confidence that pervades the broader environment particularly 
in periods of high growth and perceived wealth creation (see for example 
Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). Confidence in the macro environment feeds into 
confidence in the micro board creating a cycle of confidence.  
Former US Federal Reserve Chairman Martin famously commented that the job 
of the regulator “is to take away the punch bowl when the party gets going” 
(Mankiw, 2007). One of the tasks of a regulatory body is to temper confidence 
in an economy to prevent the economy from “overheating” and suffering from 
“explosive euphoria” associated with speculative booms (Minsky, 1992). 
However, a debate on the techniques and merits of central bank regulation are 
beyond the remit of my thesis. All this research intends to do is to highlight that 
high levels of confidence in an economy can impact decision processes within 
individual firms, and that this could increase the vulnerability of a poor decision 
outcome from occurring.  
The discussion above refers to general confidence in the macro economy and 
that high levels of confidence in the broad macro environment will impact 
confidence on a firm specific or micro basis. However this is not the only 
determinant of confidence within individual firms. Firm specific levels of 
confidence could be affected by a number of factors. For example, recent 
successes which result in high growth and share price appreciation could 
increase management confidence in their strategy. This confidence could be 
exacerbated by the lack of a robust boardroom challenge which could make 
management more resolute and confident in the execution of their strategy. 
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High levels of confidence can, as highlighted above, be associated with 
overconfidence biases and normative influences on decision processes so that 
an ultimately poor decision goes unchallenged. The Anglo case study 
highlighted the confidence of Anglo’s management in the lead up to the crisis. 
Further, there is evidence to suggest that the boards of RBS and HBOS were 
both characterised by high degrees of confidence associated with past 
successes in the lead up to the crisis (for evidence of this see at RBS see 
Martin (2013) and at HBOS see Perman (2012)).   
High levels of confidence within individual firms are, it is submitted, another red 
flag that might indicate the susceptibility of a firm to a poor decision outcome. 
Such high confidence is however a symptom rather than an antecedent and the 
way to address this symptom is to suggest reforms which themselves might 
temper high confidence itself. This can be achieved indirectly through the 
reduction of boardroom homogeneity, which is associated with high confidence 
levels. Such reforms are discussed later in this chapter.  
In summary, both high levels of competition in a specific industry and high 
levels of macro and firm specific confidence have been identified as potential 
warning signals related to the risks of a poor decision processes. However, for 
the reasons given above, this thesis has not suggested specific or direct 
reforms which might mitigate these factors.   
 
8.4 Socio economic environment in which firms operate 
The literature review in chapter 3 highlighted that the socio-economic climate in 
which organisations operate is hugely important in creating an environment 
which influences and shapes attitudes and thoughts of boards and their 
decisions. Bank boards are largely a microcosm of the wider business related 
macrocosm. The ethical, moral, regulatory and political environment which 
existed in Ireland, as evidenced above, are contributing factors when explaining 
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why Ireland suffered disproportionately in the recent crisis. Indeed, Levine et al. 
(2000) argue that culture, and the ways of thought, tools and the artefacts of a 
group of people, is both socially constructed and socially transmitted and that it 
carries the past history of a group into the present and influences how group 
members understand their environments.  
It does not, however, follow from this that research should focus only on wider 
and broader type reforms of a socio-economic and political nature and that 
specific corporate governance research and reform recommendations are 
meaningless. Strong corporate governance and robust decision making 
procedures within boardrooms will affect the wider attitude of recklessness and 
speculation within a given network. The broader attitudes in society towards 
consumption are affected by decisions by bank boards to encourage lending 
and risk taking. A symbiotic relationship therefore exists, and reckless decision 
making within bank boards encourages an environment of risk taking and 
speculation within the wider society. At the same time, the environment in which 
the banks operate, and the overconfidence and new era thinking that might be 
built up in a network, will affected the attitudes and risk tolerances of bank 
board members. The micro and macro both affect each other and are 
inextricably linked.    
Understanding the wider socio-economic environment is an important building 
block in understanding why banks made some of their decisions in the lead up 
to the crisis. It is not, however, a panacea for explaining the reasons why, for 
example, the Irish banks became so exposed to an overvalued property market. 
There are specific structural reasons within and between boards than can 
contribute towards understanding their decision making process in the lead up 
to the Irish banking crisis. Research and reforms need to address both macro 
and micro issues. My thesis is concerned with research and reforms at the 
micro bank level (which will affect the macro environment) but also recognises 
that such research and reforms need to be accompanied by a wider socio 
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economic and political discussion.  However, a discussion of such reforms is 
considered outside the remit of this thesis.  
 
8.5 Homogeneity and Diversity within the context of corporate boards 
Homogeneity has been identified as being an attribute associate with both 
normative and informative influences on decision processes and thus 
represents an important touch point for which to focus potential reforms. The 
anecdote to homogeneity is to increase diversity within the context of the 
corporate boardroom. In theory, if boards are diverse rather than homogenous, 
its members are less likely to be subject to the social pressures of conformity. 
Diverse board members should have more creative ideas which members are 
not afraid to express, leading to greater levels of boardroom challenge.  Diverse 
boards are also less likely to be isolated and have access to a wider range of 
networks and information.  
Finally, confidence can be associated with high levels homogeneity and the lack 
of a challenge to the status quo resulting in the re-enforcement of existing 
views. Diverse groups are also more likely to have different viewpoints which 
can stifle over confidence in a group setting.  
Diversity can, in theory, therefore be an important mitigating factor in reducing 
cohesiveness, isolation, confidence and homogeneity, all factors associated 
with poor decision processes. Chapter 2 included a review of the relevant 
literature on diversity, and in particular gender diversity. The conclusions from 
this review was that diversity can be a double edged sword but that, in the 
context of the corporate boardroom, there is often a natural pull away from 
diversity and resulting cognitive conflict associated with a robust boardroom 
challenge, and a tendency for boards to be characterised by collegiality and 
homogeneity. On the subject of gender diversity, the chapter concluded that it 
does not necessarily follow that simply increasing the number of women on a 
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board will result in greater cognitive diversity. Rather, achieving true cognitive 
conflict is more complex than simply changing the gender mix of a board. 
However, the chapter concluded that gender diversity although not a panacea, 
may be a good proxy for true cognitive diversity.   
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) recognises the importance of 
diversity in the context of good governance. Indeed, the Preface to the 2014 
Governance Code highlights that: “The problems arising from ‘groupthink’ have 
been exposed in particular as a result of the financial crisis. One of the ways in 
which constructive debate can be encouraged is through having sufficient 
diversity on the board. This includes, but is not limited to, gender and race” (ibid 
para 2). Provision B2 of the Code notes that the appointment of board 
candidates “should be made on merit, against objective criteria and with due 
regard for the benefits of diversity on the board including gender”. Provision 
B.2.4 further highlights that the annual report should describe the work of the 
nominations committee and that this should include a description of the board’s 
policy on diversity, including gender. As discussed in chapter 2, the UK has 
decided against imposing a gender quota on boards 177 . The explicit 
                                            
177
 There are a number of challenges when recommending reform which would encourage 
diversity in the corporate boardroom. First, should such recommendations or reforms be 
enforced on boards or should boards be “encouraged” to promote diversity? This is, it is 
submitted, a discussion about the merits of the different means of enforcing/encouraging 
governance changes and in particular the philosophy of “comply or explain” which is central to 
the UK Code of Conduct. The UK appears committed to this philosophy and, as highlighted 
above, this is reflected in the UK’s response that gender diversification should be encouraged 
but not enforced.  
However, despite the benefits of diversity being highlighted in the Cadbury (1992) and the 
Tyson Reviews (2003) there was a lack of diversity associated with boards in the financial crisis. 
Therefore, it could be argued that a similar call from the Walker Review (2009), the Davies 
Report (2011) and the Corporate Code will also go unheeded and that the natural pull towards 
homogeneity within boardrooms is too strong. This argument would point towards the need for 
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acknowledgement in the Corporate Governance Code and the requirement for 
boards to disclose their policy on diversity are, it is submitted, helpful in 
ensuring that boards are aware of the need for diversity in the boardroom.   
However, my model of VPDP has identified the need for cognitive diversity as 
being a critical “red flag” in the model and given this, perhaps more could be 
done to stress the importance of diversity. There are a number of challenges 
when recommending reform which would encourage diversity in the corporate 
boardroom. First, should such recommendations or reforms be enforced on 
boards or should boards be “encouraged” to promote diversity? This is, it is 
submitted, a discussion about the merits of the different means of 
enforcing/encouraging governance changes and in particular the philosophy of 
“comply or explain” which is central to the UK Code of Conduct. The UK 
appears committed to this philosophy and, as highlighted above, this is reflected 
in the UK’s response that gender diversification should be encouraged but not 
enforced.  
A potential solution could be the creation of a diversity index which measures 
the diversity of a boardroom by means of a diversity scorecard. The scorecard 
could work on a points system which recognises the type of cognitive diversity 
described in this chapter. Board members could score “points” for their 
educational and industry background, their age and gender (in relation to 
existing board members) and time of service. Such a scorecard would need to 
be dynamically managed and consider the existing mix of a board into account 
when scoring diversity. For example, if all of the directors are of a similar age or 
gender, then this would need to be reflected as a scorecard “negative”.  
                                                                                                                                
legislative enforcement in the area of boardroom diversity. This would be however contrary to 
current UK libertarian philosophies with respect to governance reform and contradictory to 
recent conclusion in the Davies Report (2011). A debate on the merits of the “comply or explain” 
philosophy of corporate governance is however outside the remit of this thesis.  
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A fundamental weakness identified with respect to such an index is that 
diversity alone is inadequate to ensure a robust boardroom challenge. The 
functional and firm specific skill level of the directors was highlighted in the 
model as being an important focus point in determining a decision outcome, and 
low skill levels will increase the likelihood of an initial poor strategy decision. 
Further, low skill level will also increase the vulnerability of directors to internal 
herding. If a NED does not have the necessary levels of skill or experience then 
it is more likely that he/she will accede to the majority view based on the 
assumption that others have better information. In effect uninformed and 
unqualified NEDs will tend to herd, with no, or limited, ability to challenge 
management. Indeed, Kirkpatrick (2009) argues that one of the causes of the 
crisis was the lack of necessary experience and understanding by the NEDs on 
many boards178. In summary, a director which brings diversity to a boardroom 
but lacks the necessary skills and knowledge is still vulnerable to informative 
pressures to herd.  
Indeed it is submitted that what could be created instead is an index which 
looks to capture both diversity and director skill and knowledge. Such an index 
would recognise the relationship between diversity and knowledge and that the 
benefits from diversity can be dampened by low levels of director knowledge.  
A combined skills and diversity scorecard could be published and publicly 
available and used in a number of ways. It could potentially just be another form 
of disclosure and would highlight to regulators, investors, and to boards 
themselves the relative mix of both diversity and skill levels of their board. This 
                                            
178
 The lack of experience of many independent NEDs is highlighted also by the Walker Report 
(2009). The Walker Report has made a number of recommendations to improve the level of 
expertise and knowledge of NEDs  (ibid, p. 14). These reforms which focus on director training 
has been adopted by the UK Corporate Governance Code 2012 (see para B1, B51, B.3.2, B4.1 
and B.4.2).  
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would be in keeping with the “comply or explain” philosophy underlying UK 
governance reforms. 
The scorecard could however be more impactful in that boards would be 
required to meet a predetermined minimum score and that if boards went below 
the agreed threshold, boards would need to modify their board composition. 
This would be a more forceful suggestion in that it would impose minimum 
standards of diversity and expertise on board compositions.  
The arguments against such a suggestion are that the mix between diversity 
and knowledge cannot accurately be measured by an “arbitrary” list of criteria. 
Further, how do you go about setting a minimum level of diversity that all firms 
are to meet? Can one force a company that might be performing very well, from 
altering its board composition on the basis of a scorecard179? Indeed, it could be 
argued that regulators should not impose or enforce changes on the 
composition of public companies. Rather they should be free to decide 
themselves on the composition of their own boards. The counter argument to 
this being the importance of diversity in the context of boardroom challenge and 
the pull towards homogeneity and the influence of behavioural factors which  
may means that boards are not best placed to manage the mix of their boards. 
As such regulators need to intervene in the best interests of companies and the 
wider society.   
Regardless of whether such a combined index is enforced or not, it would, it is 
submitted, be a useful tool to highlight the importance of both diversity and 
expert knowledge in boardrooms. Such a scorecard would ensure that diversity 
and the importance of the concept retains a high profile whilst at the same time 
would highlight that diversity in isolation may not be enough to ensure a robust 
boardroom challenge. An additional benefit of such a scorecard is that it would 
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 However, as highlighted previously, a strong performing non-diversified board may still be 
vulnerable to a poor decision outcome in the future.  
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be done on a dynamic basis. As highlighted previously, diversity should be 
dynamically measured and that there is tendency of boards to become more 
cohesive and homogenous over time. A scorecard could take this into 
consideration (through the inclusion of years of service as one of the 
measurement criteria). In contrast, however, the level of expert knowledge of 
the directors will increase over time. There is an important trade-off between 
diversity which reduces over time and skill and expertise which should increase 
over time. This reflects that a constant and dynamic balancing act is required 
when looking to achieve a robust bank board. 
An analysis could be undertaken to check the robustness of such an index 
using archival data of boards in the lead up to the crisis. Such an index could be 
tested retrospectively to see if there was any correlation between the relative 
board rankings of a combined diversity and expert index   and the financial 
performance of banks in the lead up to the crisis to see if there is any 
correlation. High levels of correlation would provide further weight to the 
concept.  
Like many recommended reforms, the “devil is in the detail” and there would 
need to be much debate as to the agreement and weighting of the criteria that 
would make up the index and the weighting with respect to both knowledge and 
diversity. Ideally a board is looking for an NED who can bring both diversity and 
expert knowledge to the boardroom. Although it is accepted that there might be 
a degree of arbitrariness in the creation of such an index and that it can be 
accused of meddling in the affairs of the privately owned corporations, the 
importance of diversity and expert knowledge to robust boardroom challenge is 
arguably significant enough to override these concerns.  
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8.6 Directive Leadership 
The influence of a strong directive leader has been recognised in the model as 
a characteristic that could be associated with both groupthink and group 
polarisation and as such has been identified as another important area for 
governance provisions and reform recommendations. The UK Corporate 
governance Code (2014) recognises than an overbearing and directive leader 
can be detrimental to good decision making. Section A of the Code stresses 
that the company should be run collectively by the board and that: “No one 
individual should have unfettered powers of decisions.” Section A2.1 sets out a 
clear distinction between the chief executive and the chairman noting that they 
should not be exercised by the same individual. Further Section A.3.1 
discourages a chief executive becoming the chairman of the same company 
and that if a company decides to do this, it must consult with major 
shareholders in advance of the appointment and set out the reasons in the 
annual report180.  
Further Section B1 notes that “No one other than the committee chairman and 
members is entitled to be present at a meeting of the nomination, audit or 
remuneration committee, but others may attend at the invitation of the 
committee”. Section B1 further notes that “The Board should include an 
appropriate combination of executive and non-executive directors such that no 
individual or small groups of individuals can dominate the board’s decision 
making” (italics added).   
Janis (1972) recognised the role that a strong directive leader might play in 
creating an environment in which groupthink thrived. Janis devotes chapter 
eleven of his book Groupthink (Janis, 1972) to the subject “Preventing 
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 The Irish Corporate Governance Code for Financial Institutions (2010) is more prescriptive in 
this regard and notes that an individual who has been the CEO during the previous 5 years 
cannot become the Chairman of that institution (para 8.10). This reflects the only discernible 
difference between Irish and UK governance codes in this area and perhaps is a direct 
response to Fitzpatrick moving from CEO to Chairman at Anglo.   
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Groupthink”. In this chapter he made seven core recommendations as means of 
preventing groupthink which focus primarily on the reducing the influence of a 
directive leader. These are noted below: 
1) The group leader should encourage all group members to air 
their doubts and objections.  
2) Leaders should adopt an impartial stance rather than stating 
upfront their own preferences.  
3) Organisations should set up independent groups working under 
a different leader on the same issue with these groups then 
coming together afterwards to discuss their specific solutions. 
4) Each member of the group should discuss the group’s 
deliberations with trusted associated in his/her own unit and 
report back their reactions.  
5) Outsider experts should be invited to meetings and should be 
encouraged to challenge the views of the majority. 
6) At each meeting a member should be assigned the role of a 
devil’s advocate. 
7) Introduce a system of “multiple advocacy” which may look to 
mitigate the effects of homogenous groups. This would involve a 
selection policy for the policy groups that captured members of 
groups which had naturally divergent positions within the 
organisation. In other words, specific selection of non-
homogenous members to form groups.  
Janis, in making the recommendations above, appears to assume that 
membership of the group are fixed and as such he makes no recommendations 
related to increasing the diversity of the group itself - highlighted previously as 
an effective means of reducing both normative and informative influences on 
decision processes. Moreover, Janis’s recommendations are not directly linked 
to what he identified as the causes of groupthink and in particular cohesiveness. 
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Rather they appear to be presented partly as a wish-list with no implicit link or 
reference to the underlying causes of groupthink.  
Janis’s first recommendation that the leader must encourage members to air 
their doubts attempts to mitigate the impact that a directive leader might have 
on group processes. However in a groupthink situation often the problem is that 
group members do not have doubts. Further Janis does not comment on what 
the incentive might be for a leader to encourage a challenge from group 
members.  
A similar comment can be made about Janis’s second recommendation that 
leaders should be impartial and not state their preferences upfront. Again it is 
difficult to see why a leader that wishes to impose his beliefs would do that. 
Janis’s third recommendation that groups should set up independent bodies to 
then report back to the board has been implemented in UK Corporate 
Governance Codes through the recommendations of the creation of separate 
audit, remuneration and risk committees all chaired by an independent NEDs. 
These committees did not, to my knowledge, appear at face value to have 
made any difference in the decision process of boards in the lead up to the 
crisis.  
Janis’ recommendation that outside experts be invited to attend meetings and 
challenge views may provide the group with the cognitive diversity, identified 
previously as an important factor which could create cognitive conflict, reduce 
cohesion and the likelihood of groupthink. Further the introduction of outside 
experts will address the issue of the isolation of board members, a 
characteristic highlighted as being a key characteristic of poor decision 
processes. Indeed, one could argue that the boardroom NED is in effect an 
outside expert as envisaged by Janis. NEDs, as outside experts in many of the 
bank board in the lead up to the crisis were ineffective in preventing poor 
decisions being made. This was primarily because of two reasons. First, NEDs 
characterised by high levels of homogeneity lost their independence and 
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became too cohesive with the executive board and as such suffered from 
groupthink like symptoms. Second, NEDs lacked the level of expertise and skills 
and as such were more susceptible to informational pressures to conform and 
herd.  
The lack of effectiveness of a potential recommended reform, in this case the 
use of outside experts, highlights the interconnectivity of all the characteristics 
highlighted in the model related to poor decision processes. A recommended 
reform cannot be seen in isolation but needs to be considered in light of the 
overall environment. In principle the idea of bringing in outside experts is a good 
one, but if the overall environment is one characterised by high levels of 
cohesiveness, homogeneity and low levels of skills then it will be ineffective 
given those strong counter-forces.         
Janis’s suggestion of the creation of a devil’s advocate has received the most 
attention from researchers as a potential mitigating factor to reduce groupthink. 
Longley and Pruitt (1980) note that the appointment of a devil’s advocate could 
encourage other potential deviants to speak out more freely if they believe that 
they are not alone. Longley and Pruitt cite Asch’s (1955) “line test” in which 
conformity to an obviously incorrect answer relating to the matching of the 
length of a line, dropped from thirty three percent to five per cent when a group 
member other than the subject deviated from the norm.  
Longley and Pruitt, however, warned that if the devil advocacy had too much 
influence this could ironically result in “reverse” groupthink. Further, they 
highlighted the danger is that the role of the devil advocate will have too little 
influence, which can occur if the role becomes ritualised. This is a strong 
possibility when the role is appointed rather than naturally emerging. They 
recommend the establish of a culture where the individual who on the basis of 
decision sees himself as most in disagreement with the emerging consensus 
should speak up as the self-appointed and accepted devil’s advocate.  
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Further, Hollander’s (1960) study focuses on the position of the deviant within 
the group and concluded that it would be inappropriate for the devil’s advocate 
to be either a very high or very low status person, but rather to come from 
someone with a moderately high status. This recommendation avoids the 
problems highlighted by Longley and Pruitt cited above.   
In summary, the concept of a devil’s advocate in a boardroom context is 
appealing as a “have it all” recommendation as it provides for boardroom 
challenge but without the conflict. However research undertaken by Nemeth 
et.al. (2001) highlighted that an authentic minority position in a discussion 
results in a better decision process than using the “contrived” system of devil’s 
advocacy. Furthermore, Nemeth found that in some circumstances the use of a 
devil’s advocate actually resulted in more support for the initial position and that 
the process generated more ideas confirming the members’ initial position. The 
concept of a devil’s advocate is not, it is submitted, a perfect substitute for “real” 
cognitive conflict in a decision process. Nevertheless it might still help to 
encourage a culture of the need for open dissent and challenge within 
boardrooms.   
Kahneman (2011) argues that a system which allows a post mortem before 
important decisions are made, can be a potential deterrent to groupthink. “The 
main virtue of the post-mortem is that it legitimizes doubts. Furthermore, it 
encourages even supporters of the decision to search for possible threats that 
they had not considered earlier. The post mortem is not a panacea and does 
not provide complete protection against nasty surprises but it goes a long way 
to reducing the damage” (ibid, p. 265).  
Finally Schnall and Greenberg (2012) analysed groupthink in the context of the 
ancient court of Israel, known as the Sanhedrin, and concluded that although 
there were a number of organisational and situational factors that should have 
predisposed the Sanhedrin to the risk of groupthink there were a number of 
preventative measures in place which would have mitigated the risk of 
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groupthink. These included very specific guidelines that mandated a methodical 
review and analysis of the evidence and information presented to the court. 
Outside experts were encouraged to participate in court rulings and a system of 
devil’s advocacy was introduced into court hearing and indeed if a defendant 
refrained from defending himself, a selected member of the Sanhedrin was 
appointed to argue on his/her behalf. Further, if after only brief deliberations all 
members supported a conviction then the final verdict would be postponed until 
the next day, and group members then formed into smaller groups for a “second 
chance meeting”. Moreover, members were encouraged to speak in reverse 
order of seniority, with the most junior Sanhedrin members speaking first. This 
would minimise the pressure for both normative and informative social 
influences on junior members..    
In summary, a number of processes or techniques have been identified which 
might dampen the impact of a directive leader specifically and more broadly 
reduce the likelihood of normative influences on decision processes more 
generally. These include the creation of a devil’s advocate, encouraging 
influential leaders to speak last, allow “second chance meetings”, and 
encouraging the influence of outside experts.  
These are however techniques that can be used by boards and to increase 
boardroom challenge but are difficult to implement as reforms. Rather, these 
suggestions are more relevant to be implemented informally or mentioned as 
part of broad training that boards might undertake. The possible exception 
being that, in theory, it is possible to recommend that boards are obliged to 
appoint a devil’s advocate. However, as discussed above, this is a contrived 
solution and can actually have the opposite effect (Nemeth et al., 2001), 
especially if imposed on  boards.  
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8.7 Skill levels of Directors and education and research 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) stresses the skill level 
requirements for both executive and NED in its provisions. In the Preface to the 
Code it notes that “To achieve good governance requires continuing and high 
quality effort” (para 6 page 2). Section 2 of the Main Principles of the Code 
further highlight the requirement that board members need to have the 
appropriate level of skills and experience and the time to discharge their 
responsibilities effectively. Section B4 of the Code sets out the training and 
education that directors are supposed to take, both on joining the board and in 
regularly updating their knowledge. Finally the Code emphasise that directors 
should receive accurate, timely and clear information (para B5).  
It is submitted that one of the most effective means of reducing the likelihood of 
poor decisions occurring lies in the area of education and research. In particular 
a greater appreciation and acknowledgement of some of the normative and 
informative drivers of board decision making is critical. The Walker Review 
recognised the importance that psychological factors play in decision process 
but this was only highlighted in the appendix to the report. More research and 
exposure needs to be given to the role that psychology plays to move this into 
the main body of the report181.  Indeed, the 2014 UK Corporate Code includes 
in the preface the comment that “the problems arising from ‘groupthink’ have 
been exposed in particular as a result of the financial crisis”. This is a comment 
which has been included since the 2012 Code and perhaps reflects that fact 
that governance codes are beginning to recognise the importance of normative 
influences, such as groupthink, have on good governance.  
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 There is the beginning of the groundswell of support for greater appreciation of behavioural 
factors in economic decisions being made in UK Universities. See for example the push by 
students to change the economics syllabus in Universities. See 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/oct/24/students-post-crash-economics  
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The UK Corporate Governance Code recognises groupthink and the need for 
training for directors but it does not go far enough. The Code, it is submitted, 
should specify that the training should cover the behavioural aspects of groups 
and how psychological factors such as those identified can affect decision 
processes. Such training should also include recommendations as how these 
powerful psychological forces that effect decision processes can be avoided.  
The behavioural aspects of boards, and the impact that psychology has on 
board behaviour, needs to be explicitly recognised in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code.   
Turner and Pratkanis (1998) recommend education and training of group 
members and leaders aimed at increasing their understanding of the processes 
by which group decisions are made and increase awareness of the need to 
create an atmosphere in which critical evaluation of projects can occur. 
Cognitive biases, if acknowledged and understood, can lose their power to 
unconsciously drive our decisions (Hall, 2007). Board directors can reduce the 
likelihood of phenomena such as groupthink and group polarisation occurring 
through a better understanding of the decision processes and acceptances that 
unconscious biases can, and do, effect decisions182.  
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2013) use a visual metaphor to explain the 
importance of education with respect to identifying behavioural aspects related 
to ethical decision processes. They show their readers the picture below: 
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 Hopefully this thesis can make a small contribution in this area.  
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For many readers at first glance the picture is just a blur of dots. However if a 
reader is told that there is a Dalmatian dog in the centre of the picture, and then 
asked to try and locate the dog in the picture, then most (hopefully including 
you) can see the Dalmatian. From then on Bazerman and Tenbrunsel observe 
that it is very difficult to look at the photo and not see the Dalmatian. Bazerman 
and Tenbrunsel use this metaphor to argue that an important starting point to 
identifying behavioural aspects which affect decision processes starts with the 
identification of the phenomena themselves. Although the authors are referring 
specifically to behavioural aspects as they relate to ethical indiscretions, their 
point is also appropriate when looking at the type of phenomena identified in 
this thesis connected to poor decision processes. If this thesis can help in 
identifying the “Dalmatian” then it would have, it is submitted, have achieved a 
purpose! 
 
8.8 Recommendations to ensure NEDs are truly independent of mind 
The model has identified three key focus areas for potential reforms, namely 
diversity, skill levels of directors and directive leadership. What follows below is 
a discussion of complementary but alternative means of improving the decision 
process in boardrooms which are behavioural based.  
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The lack of boardroom challenge has been identified as being a contributing 
factor in the governance failures related to the crisis. This has raised questions 
as to whether NEDs were truly independent in the lead up to the crisis. Indeed, 
a potential conflict of interest exists in the appointment process for directors as 
it is the directors themselves that appoint new directors to the board. The Code 
has looked to try and mitigate the risk of the perpetuation of an old boys’ 
network with high levels of homogeneity by insisting that the majority of the 
nominations committee are made up of independent NEDs (code B.2.1 of the 
UK Corporate governance Code (2014)). There is still, however a risk that the 
nominations committee is influenced by homophily and the pressure to appoint 
members that will conform to the existing “in-group” of the current board.  
One possible suggestion to both the potential conflicts highlighted above is that 
an independent advisor, for example legal counsel or the firm’s auditor, could 
be involved in both deciding whether a NED does meet the independence 
criteria and could also form part of the nominations committee. This may 
ameliorate some of the existing conflict of interests highlighted above. 
Practically, it would be difficult for an advisor to opine whether a NED has been 
independent without attending board meetings and observing the behaviour of 
the NEDs in board meetings, and even then there is still of course the 
subjective decision of what determines independence. However an independent 
outsider could act as an important challenge to strong “in group” biases which 
might exist and this challenge, or even threat of challenge, might make for a 
more rigorous process in the review of director independence and in the 
appointment of directors. 
Zhao (2011) recommends greater levels of disclosure to mitigate the potential 
conflicts highlighted above. For example, the nominations committee should 
have to explain in detail the nominations process, how the candidate was found, 
how many candidates were interviewed, and why the candidate was selected. 
The theory being that this disclosure requirement would ensure some rigour and 
accountability in the selection process. This point has, however, been 
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addressed in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014, para B.2.4) which 
requires companies to provide detailed disclosure with respect to director 
appointments and the process it has used in relation to board appointments.  
Further, Zhao recommends that independent NEDs are required to make an 
annual statement to the company confirming their independence and noting any 
potential conflicts and justifying why such conflict do not affect their ability to be 
independent. In effect this recommendation puts the onus on individual directors 
to validate their independence rather than just relying on the board of directors 
collectively to decide independence. Zhao recommends that this statement be 
made on an annual basis. A positive implication of putting the onus of 
independence with individual directors themselves, would ensure that the 
importance of independence is at the forefront of any NEDs thoughts, and 
would act as reminder of the individual responsibilities of NEDs.   
Marchesani (2005) argues that too much emphasis is placed on ensuring that a 
director is independent at the time of appointment, whilst what is really critical is 
how a director displays such independence in the fulfilment of his/her duties. 
Marchesani therefore suggests a procedure whereby each new independent 
NED is required to undergo an evaluation process at the end of his/her first or 
second year of office. At such a time the current directors would determine 
whether the new director has proven himself to be sufficiently independent. 
What Marchesani is suggesting is that directors are not given independent 
status immediately but only after they have proven this in the fulfilment of their 
duties. Until they are assessed they would be on a form of “probation”.   
A natural extension of Marchesani’s suggestion would be that NEDs would be 
re-assessed after a period of say six of seven years to ensure that they had 
retained independence given the risks highlighted above that the ability to 
monitor diminishes as they become more cohesive and attraction to the group 
grows. In the current UK Code all directors are assessed collectively on a yearly 
basis and the Corporate Governance Code calls for the board to undertake a 
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formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own performance and that of its 
committees and individual directors (para B.6). However, the proposal above 
highlights attention on a specific director at critical times in his appointment, in 
the early stages and after he/she is well established in the organisation. 
It could be argued that the focus of attention on a NED to effectively “pass” a 
test of independence could ironically result in greater pressure of such director 
to conform in order to be seen favourably by the very directors who are passing 
judgement on him. In other words, such an assessment could perversely reduce 
independence of thought. However the remaining directors are supposed to be 
assessing a director on the basis of independence of mind, and it would be 
counterintuitive to decide that a director was independent when he/she is 
purposely conforming.  
In summary, two recommendations arise relating to maintaining NED 
independence. First, that NEDs are required to make an annual statement to 
the company that they are indeed independent as suggested by Zhao above. 
Reminding directors of their own responsibility with respect to maintaining 
independence of mind will ensure that the importance of independence is at the 
forefront of NEDs’ minds. Ariely (2013) has shown that when a responsibility is 
specifically highlighted to an individual this implicit reminder increases the 
likelihood that the individual will honour the commitment. Second, that directors 
are not given independent status immediately upon joining the board, but that 
independence needs to be proven after a trial period. This will further serve to 
highlight to NEDs the importance of independence in their role and that it is not 
assumed on election, but rather they need to prove such independence in 
practice. Further, the need for independence to be reconfirmed after a period of 
time, forces the board to assess whether directors have maintained this 
independence of mind in light of the pressure over time towards cohesiveness 
and collegiality which often exists in board settings.      
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  8.9 Summary of recommended reforms 
This chapter has identified a number of potential reforms which are intended to 
reduce the vulnerability of a poor decision process in the context of a corporate 
board. These recommendations flow from the model which I have developed, 
and the identification of three key “touch points” to focus these reforms. These 
touch points are in relation to reducing homogeneity, increasing the skill level of 
directors and reducing the impact of a directive leader. These were identified in 
the model as being of particular importance because of their linkages across the 
model. For example, if homogeneity can be addressed this can potentially 
mitigate both normative and informative influences on decision processes. Thus 
any reforms in this respect can reduce both influences and can also reduce the 
likelihood of related phenomena combining together to create a more powerful 
force than if looked at in isolation.  
Some of the recommendations and suggestions for reforms which have been 
made are not original but are a summary of those suggested by other 
academics. However it is submitted that the contribution that this thesis can 
make is in respect to providing an alternative lens through which these reforms 
can be understood. For example, a number of commentators have focused on 
the need for greater diversity in the context of boardrooms and my thesis is in 
no way unique in suggesting reforms which increase diversity and a robust 
boardroom challenge. However this thesis has presented the importance of the 
need to increase diversity in the context of how homogeneity can impact 
phenomena such as groupthink, herding and group polarisation and how these 
phenomena can combine together. If you can reduce homogeneity you are 
reducing the vulnerability to the each of these phenomena and also to the risk 
of them combining together in a more powerful force (Cox and Munsinger, 
1985).  
The Walker Report (2009) and the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) 
have both recognised the need to increase director skill levels. However my 
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model describes how increasing skill level in relation to two touch points of the 
model both in terms of an initial policy recommendation but also in terms of the 
effect that lack of skills can have on internal herding. Internal herding can, as 
discussed, then create an environment which fosters confidence and 
cohesiveness associated with normative influences. To my knowledge, I have 
not seen the need to encourage skill levels of directors being analysed through 
this lens.  
My thesis recognises the balance that is required between diversity and 
knowledge and that diversity alone can be insufficient to ensure a rigorous 
challenge in the boardroom. Diverse directors without a sufficient knowledge 
base are still vulnerable to informative pressures on decision processes. What 
is required is a balance between diversity and knowledge. For this reason I 
have suggested the creation of an index which looks to measure both diversity 
and expert knowledge as a potential means of highlighting the importance of 
these two characteristics. The conclusion that was drawn was that the need in 
the context of a corporate board room for both diversity and expert knowledge 
should not be seen in isolation but rather needed to be viewed collectively when 
looking to increase boardroom challenge.  
The problems with the measurement of this proposed dual knowledge/diversity 
index were discussed and it was recognised that this is an area which would 
need a greater level of consideration. Further analysis in respect of the make-up 
of an index and the opportunities to test such an index retrospectively has been 
earmarked as an area for future follow up.  
The chapter further identified and discussed a number of other reforms that 
other academics had recommended which could reduce the vulnerability to a 
poor decision outcome, highlighted in the model. The chapter concluded by 
emphasising the importance of education in achieving reforms and that a 
greater recognition is needed to bring the behavioural aspects around bank 
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boards to the forefront of corporate governance thinking. If this thesis can be 
the start of a small step to achieving this, then it has been worth it! 
A summary of the reforms recommended is provided in the following table: 
 
Recommended Reform 
Combined diversity and knowledge index 
 
An index has been suggested which looks to capture both the diversity and 
skill level of directors. Such an index could be made publicly available and 
would serve a number of purposes. First it would highlight the importance of 
both diversity and expertise particularly amongst NEDs. Second it would de-
emphasise gender diversity as a panacea to increasing boardroom challenge. 
Third such an index could be dynamically measured so that it takes into 
account the length of time that directors, and especially NEDs have served. 
Thus such an index would recognise the constant trade-off between the 
positive of high levels of skills which are gained from longevity compared to the 
potential negatives related to lower levels of diversity and cohesion.  
 
Reduce the opportunities for a directive leader dominating meetings and 
reducing the likelihood of a robust challenge. 
 
Directive leadership has been identified as being associated with both 
normative and informative influences on decision processes and as such is an 
important touch point to focus reforms. 
 
A number of strategies have been suggested by academics which might 
reduce the impact of a directive leader. These include modifying the order in 
which board members speak so that more junior members get the chance to 
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speak first. 
 
The designation of a specified “devil’s advocate” amongst board members, 
whose job it is to argue a contrary position, has been discussed as a possible 
technique that might increase board challenge generally and also potentially 
dampen the influence of a directive leader. However, on balance it was 
concluded that this was an artificial and contrived means of trying to create 
cognitive conflict.  
 
Other techniques to increase boardroom challenge recommended by 
academics included the concept of a second chance meeting and the 
encouragement of outside experts to join and opine on board processes. The 
conclusion drawn was that these were all potential techniques that boards can 
use to increase cognitive conflict.  
 
The existence of a strong influential leader should act as a warning signal to 
both regulators and boardrooms that there are risks associated with directive 
leadership. Furthermore, even if the corporation appears to be successful at 
the time, this does not mean that there is not a risk of a poor decision outcome 
occurring in the future which is not sufficiently challenged, or that the 
consequences of an already poor decision process will be felt at some stage in 
the future. 
 
Requirements to remind NEDs of their responsibilities of independence 
 
The chapter identified a number of potential recommendations that other 
academics have made in respect of highlighting to NEDs the importance of 
their independence.   
 
Further, the thesis identified that one of these recommendations could be 
developed further whereby there is individual and dynamic assessment of NED 
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independence especially after an NED has served a certain number of years in 
the office. Such assessment could include additional director training which 
emphasises and highlights the behavioural influences on decision processes.  
 
A greater awareness and understanding of the biases which affect decision 
processes is an important starting point to preventing these biases from 
affecting decision processes. It is argued that if we are collectively aware and 
are reminded of the psychological forces and inherent inbuilt biases that can 
and do impact our decisions, this awareness alone can reduce the impact that 
such forces will have on decision processes. As Hall (2007) highlighted 
cognitive biases if acknowledged and understood can lose their power to 
unconsciously drive decision processes.    
 
8.10: Conclusions, limitations and suggestions for further research 
The introduction to my thesis identified three related research strands upon 
which my thesis was based. First, was to provide some academic rigour to the 
assertions of the Nyberg Report (2011) that the Irish banks suffered from both 
groupthink and herding in the lead up to the crisis. My research focused on 
evidencing groupthink at Anglo and whether the other Irish banks looked to 
emulate Anglo’s perceived success. The literature review on groupthink 
undertaken in chapter 3 highlighted the complexity of the groupthink construct 
and the epistemological difficulties associated with groupthink measurement. A 
decision was taken to test groupthink versus a “strong” version of Janis’s 
original construct analysing both the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink. 
Evidence was gathered from a number of sources and presented in research 
question 2 of chapter 7. The conclusion from my research was that there was 
evidence to support that proposition that the board of Anglo suffered from 
groupthink tendencies in the lead up to the financial crisis. Moreover, support 
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was found in research question 5 that the Irish banks herded and in particular 
tried to emulate the success of Anglo.  
The second strand of my thesis was the building of a theoretical model which 
identifies vulnerabilities of a bank board to undertaking a poor decision process 
which can have systemic consequences. Chapter 6 detailed the theoretical 
underpinnings of the model, which draws on the literature review in chapters 2, 
and 3. My model of VPDP combines behavioural and contextual influences with 
the practical skill levels of directors. It stresses the interconnection between the 
identified phenomena and how they can, and do, combine together. Further my 
model attempts to explain vulnerabilities to a poor decision processes at three 
different levels; first with respect to an initial poor decision or recommendation, 
second with respect to the ratification of this decision by the collective board of 
directors and finally with respect to the risks that such a poor decision outcome 
is emulated by competitors. The model was applied to the Irish bank case 
study, as highlighted in chapter 7. Cautious conclusions were then drawn as to 
the relevance of the model with respect to the identified Irish case study. 
The third strand of my thesis related to the discussion of reforms which can be 
identified from the model itself. A review of the model identified a number of key 
touch points or “red flags”. Specifically, these related to high levels of 
confidence, high levels of competition, high levels of homogeneity, directive 
leadership and low director skill levels. Reforms related to high levels of 
confidence and competition were considered outside the remit of my thesis but 
a number of reforms were suggested with respect to the how to combat 
homogeneity, reduce directive leadership and increase the likelihood of a robust 
boardroom challenge.  
There are a number of identified weaknesses and limitations with respect to my 
thesis. There is no one accepted groupthink model and the researcher is 
required to make a subjective judgement as to whether a group suffered from 
groupthink tendencies. This risk is arguably exacerbated given my own 
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personal experiences with the Irish banks. The subjectivity of qualitative 
research has been discussed in my review of my research methodology in 
chapter 4. The conclusion was that subjectivity is an inherent part of interpretive 
research and should not necessarily be seen as a negative but rather as 
intrinsic to the type of research I am engaged in. However I was acutely aware 
of the risk of confirmation bias and the risk of a suspicious fit in the analysis of 
the data. I tried to mitigate this through an acute awareness of the potential for 
such a bias, a review of conflicting theories and a through a process of 
significant data triangulation and verification. I do, however, recognised that my 
finding may be affected by unconscious biases in interpretation. Further 
limitations were identified with respect to the model which I have developed. My 
model of VPDP focuses on a scenario of collaboration over control. 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) highlight the scenario where control exceeds 
collaboration and the board is characterised by distrust leading to a poor 
decision process. This potential scenario is not captured by the model, and as 
such it is not a complete model for explaining the vulnerabilities of a board to a 
poor decision process. Further my model only identifies vulnerabilities to a poor 
decision process and it does not necessarily follow that if the observables are 
present that a poor decision outcome will always occur.  
There is also the question mark of the generalisability of my research. Can my 
model be applied to other institutions and jurisdictions? My thesis touches on 
HBOS, RBS and Northern Rock as institutions that appeared to suffer from 
similar characteristics to Anglo in the lead up to the crisis183. Moreover, can the 
model be applied to banks that did not fail in the lead up to the crisis? For 
example the Australian banks came out of the financial crisis relatively 
unscathed. A cursory review of the annual financial statements of the Australian 
banks revealed boards that had relatively high levels of diversity and skill levels 
                                            
183
 Indeed my own experiences in dealing with these highlighted institutions were that their 
boards had many characteristics common with that of Anglo. 
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amongst the directors – however much greater detail of analysis is required. 
Further can the model be applied to organisations such as Enron, and 
WorldCom, both of which researchers have already evidenced groupthink? Can 
the model be applied in the recent case of UK supermarket Tesco?  
Further, how do the findings of my model of VPDP compare with alternative 
academic explanations of the poor decision processes at corporate boards? 
Stein (2013) suggests that the failure of HBOS and RBS could be attributable to 
the closeness of the organisational identities of both organisations which 
resulted in a form of sibling rivalry and a tendency for greater risk taking and 
vulnerability. Stein suggests that this same sort of rivalry might have accounted 
for the failure of AIB and BKIR. Kerr and Robinson (2011) apply a Bordieusian 
approach to leader-leader relations to explain how the leaders of HBOS and 
RBS competed against each for domination in the field which ultimately leading 
to the demise of both organisations. Finally, McConnell (2014) explains the 
failure of HBOS using a behavioural finance perspective184. These all represent 
alternative lenses for which to view failures related to poor bank decision 
processes. My research is not intended to “prove” that my model is correct and 
that these alternative theories are therefore incorrect, rather it is to add to the 
literature which looks to understand the decision making process in corporate 
boards. My contribution, it is submitted, is in stressing how normative and 
informative influences combine together and that these taken together with low 
director skill level and the importance of contextual issues can create an 
environment where there is vulnerabilities, both at the bank and industry level, 
to a poor decision process.  
Finally a number of reforms were recommended in this chapter. This included 
the creation of a knowledge/diversity index. As highlighted earlier, more thought 
                                            
184
 McConnell’s arguments are not hugely dissimilar to what I have developed in my thesis. 
However, McConnell focuses on overconfidence and groupthink. I have, however, consider 
behavioural factors alongside informative influences, lack of director skill level and the macro 
environment within which firms operate as additional factors which affect decision making. 
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is needed in the make-up of such an index. The index, once developed, might 
be applied retrospectively to see if there is any correlation between the index 
values and firm performance. All this to come ☺.  
Thank you for reading my thesis!    
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: A fuller discussion of the conclusions of the Nyberg Report (2011) 
Nyberg concluded that the causes of the Irish crisis can be attributed to two factors. 
First, the failure of the gatekeepers, narrowly defined as the auditors and the financial 
regulators. This was ascribed to the application of a naive version of the efficient 
paradigm and the belief that the markets were self-regulating and as such required a 
very “light touch” by regulatory bodies. The report noted a deferential and subservient 
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approach by both the regulator and auditors towards the banks. Second, the 
Commission attributed the failure of the decision making processes within the Irish 
banks primarily to groupthink and herding.  
The efficient market paradigm is an underlying philosophy which provided the 
intellectual underpinning for financial innovation and “light touch” regulation. The Turner 
Review (2009, para 1.4) in the UK set out the five core intellectual assumptions that 
underpin the efficient market hypothesis and the intellectual assumptions on which 
regulatory approaches are based. These are summarised below as: 
1) Market prices are good indicators of rationally evaluated economic value. 
2) The development of securitised credit has improved efficiency and financial 
stability. 
3) The risk characteristics of financial markets can be inferred from mathematical 
analysis. 
4) Market discipline can be used as an effective tool in constraining harmful risk 
taking. 
5) Financial innovation can be assumed to be beneficial since market completion 
would eliminate any such innovation that did not add value. 
Underpinning this ideology is the core belief that the markets were self-correcting and 
efficient and that as a result only light touch regulation was required. Furthermore, strict 
or intrusive regulation would not be required and indeed would be seen as harmful and 
reduce financial innovation and efficiency and that it was more beneficial and efficient 
for the financial markets to self-regulate behaviour.  
One of the most outspoken and influential supporters of this ideology was past US 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan185.  Greenspan’s ideology is highlighted in 
his testimony to US Congress in 1994 in response to a debate as to whether credit 
derivatives should be regulated when he stated: “Risks in financial markets, including 
derivatives markets, are being regulated by private parties There is nothing involved in 
federal regulation per se which makes it superior to market regulation” (cited by Sun et 
al. ((Sun et al., 2011b)).    
                                            
185
 Alan Greenspan was Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank in the U.S. from 1987 to 2006.  
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Greenspan was to subsequently question the underlying philosophy of the efficient 
market hypothesis and trust in the ability of markets to self-regulate when testifying 
before the US Senate in October 2008 when he admitted: “I made a mistake in 
presuming that the self-interests of organizations, specifically banks and others, were 
such as that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their 
equity in the firms”(cited by (Knowlton and Grynbaum, n.d.)).” 
The assumptions underlying the efficient market hypothesis have been subject to 
extensive challenge since the onset of the financial crisis186 . The adoption of the 
efficient market paradigm, and the contribution that it made towards the financial crisis, 
is well documented and detailed in the various official inquiries and the wider academic 
research into the causes of the crisis itself. The Official US Inquiry Report in its 
conclusion notes that the failures “were in no small part due to the widely accepted 
faith in the self-correcting nature of the markets and the ability of financial institutions to 
effectively police themselves” (Angelides et al., 2011, p. xviii). The UK’s Turner Review 
(2009) placed the acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis right at the heart of the 
causes of the crisis in the UK whilst the Icelandic Truth Commission (“Report of the 
Special Investigation Commission (SIC),” n.d.) Noted in great detail the neo-liberal 
attitude taken by the Icelandic regulators to the activities of the Icelandic banks. 
Furthermore, criticisms of the adoption of the efficient market hypothesis  can be found 
in the works, inter alia, of Stiglitz (2010), Friedman (2009), Davies (2010), Shiller 
(2008) and Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2012). These commentators all stress that the 
failure of the efficient market hypothesis and the inability of the market to self-regulate 
                                            
186
 Greenspan was not alone in promoting the concept of efficient markets and supporters of 
this paradigm and other supporters included Milton Friedman and Eugene Fame (both past 
recipients of the Nobel Prize for Economics). Indeed, the efficient market hypothesis is closely 
associated with the Chicago School of Economics. See Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2012) for a 
discussion of the different views of the freshwater economists (defined as those from Chicago 
and Minnesota) who championed the efficient market hypothesis and the saltwater economists 
from institutions  such as Harvard and Yale who placed much greater emphasis on human 
behavioural aspects in decision making processes and outcomes . 
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and self-correct were significant contributing factors in the lead up to the global 
financial crises.   
The misplaced belief that the markets were rational and had an innate ability to self-
correct and self-regulate shaped the behaviour of both the management of the financial 
institutions itself and the gatekeepers of the financial industry. Management assumed 
that risks related to sophisticated credit derivatives were being efficiently priced, and 
that as a result these risks were understood whilst the gatekeepers and the regulator in 
particular, applied a light touch regulatory approach to the industry in the belief of the 
financial industries’ ability to regulate itself adequately.  
The debate over the conceptual failures of the efficient market hypothesis ideology is 
well researched and has been comprehensively debated by some of the world’s most 
imminent academics and, it is submitted, that there is little that this thesis can add to 
that debate. However, it is the conclusion of the Nyberg Commission with respect to 
the role that groupthink and herding played in the Irish crisis that this thesis intends to 
make a contribution.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: A comparative case study review of how groupthink is defined  
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Case 
Study 
How Groupthink is 
measured 
Information Sources Conclusions 
 
Marks & 
Spencer, 
BA 
(Eaton, 
2001) 
Eton focused on 
providing evidence to 
meet just three of the 
symptoms of groupthink 
identified by Janis; 
namely illusions of 
invulnerability, 
stereotyping of out-
groups and the illusion 
of unanimity.  
Eton relied on content 
analysis from press reports 
from The Guardian and The 
Independent newspapers 
spanning a five year period.  
 
Eton analyses the press 
reports for both manifest 
and latent content. Manifest 
items were defined as being 
actually present whilst latent 
content being a matter of 
inference or interpretation 
on the part of the coder. 
  
Eton 
concluded that 
the content 
analysis was 
sufficient “to 
suggest that 
groupthink was 
present” (p. 
183).  
Enron 
(O’Connor, 
2002) 
O’Connor followed 
Janis’s groupthink 
construct precisely, 
identifying examples of 
both the antecedents 
O’Connor relied primarily on 
the statements of Enron 
directors made to the SEC 
Senate Inquiry which 
followed Enron’s collapse.  
O’Connor 
(2002) 
concluded that 
the Enron 
Board “may 
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and symptoms of 
groupthink. O’Connor 
stressed that not all the 
symptoms and 
antecedents of 
groupthink needed to be 
present.  
 
O’Connor further 
recognised that broader 
contextual issues need 
to be taken into 
consideration when 
assessing group 
dynamics and 
groupthink and focused 
in particular on the 
concept of “new era 
thinking” which she 
argued pervaded the 
thinking of the 
executives of Enron.  
 
 
She also used data from 
journalist interviews and 
reports and broader 
academic articles which 
highlight specific 
characteristics relating to 
what she saw as 
“boardroom norms” (p. 
1264) which she then 
applied to the Enron case 
study.  
have been 
affected by a 
significant 
impediment to 
group 
deliberation 
called 
‘groupthink’” 
(p. 1238) 
 
WorldCom 
(Scharff, 
 
Scharff focused on 
identify some, but not 
all, of the symptoms of 
 
Scharff focused almost 
exclusively on a 2003 SEC 
report into the collapse of 
 
Scharff 
concluded that: 
“In many ways, 
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2005) groupthink as identified 
by Janis.  
WorldCom for evidence 
which was linked to Janis’s 
symptoms of groupthink. 
groupthink 
may help to 
explain some 
of the issues 
and fraudulent 
activities at 
WorldCom” (p. 
109).  
 
 
Gulf Crisis 
(Yetiv, 
2003) 
 
Yetiv drew “heavily on 
the guidelines for testing 
the theory provided by 
Janis” (p. 421-22).  
 
Yetiv, like O’Connor, 
considered both the 
antecedents and 
symptoms of groupthink 
in his analysis.   
 
Yetiv reviewed documents 
at the George Bush 
Presidential Library, 
memoirs, public statements 
by key decision makers, and 
supplemented this with his 
own interviews with key 
decision makers. 
 
Yetiv 
concluded that 
“enough 
conditions of 
the theory of 
groupthink 
existed 
(although 
certainly not 
all) to say that 
President 
George Bush’s 
inner circle 
exhibited 
significant 
elements of 
groupthink (p. 
420). “ 
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France’s 
defeat to 
German in 
1940 
(Ahlstrom 
and Wang, 
2009) 
 
Ahlstrom and Wang 
noted that: “Groupthink 
is generally not 
accessible to direct 
observation and its 
presence in a group has 
to be inferred from 
recognition of its 
symptoms” (p. 162).  
 
Ahlstrom and Wang 
focused just on the eight 
symptoms of groupthink 
as identified by Janis.  
 
Ahlstrom and Wang relied 
on the extensive literature of 
French military historians for 
their information. 
 
To reduce the risks of 
confirmatory evidence bias 
and of simply selecting 
evidence that would confirm 
their initial expectation they 
required at least three 
sources of information to 
provide the same example 
to illustrate a particular 
symptom of groupthink. 
Further the interpretation of 
these sources was 
independently confirmed by 
multiple codes including one 
independent of the study.  
Further, any example that 
they used could not be used 
to illustrate more than one 
antecedent or symptom of 
groupthink.  
 
The 
researchers 
conclude that 
“the eight 
groupthink 
symptoms are 
demonstrably 
present with 
data provided 
by multiple 
examples from 
the primarily 
and secondary 
documentary 
evidence on 
this case. The 
incidence of 
these 
symptoms in 
the interwar 
years and at 
the beginning 
of WWII 
suggests that 
groupthink was 
present” (ibid, 
p. 173).  
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Appendix 3: A comparative analysis of the evidence gathered in support of 
groupthink 
 
Eaton (2001) 
Eaton analysed whether two British companies, BA and Marks and Spencer suffered 
from groupthink in the 1990’s resulting in “blocked management communications and 
leading to the fall in reputation and stock market valuations of these two companies” 
(ibid, p. 183).  Eaton focused just on the symptoms of groupthink and three specific 
areas. First, whether there was an overestimation of the abilities of the two groups (the 
illusions of invulnerability and belief in the inherent morality of the group, research 
questions 2h) and 2i)). Second whether there was a close mindedness, grouping 
together collective rationalisation and stereotypes of out-groups (research questions 2j) 
and 2k)). Third on the pressure towards uniformity, grouping together self-censorship, 
illusions of unanimity, direct pressure on dissenters and self-appointed mindguards 
(research questions 2l), 2m), 2n) and 2o). Eaton focused his analysis on press reports 
from The Guardian and The Independent newspapers covering a five year time horizon 
and in the case of Marks and Spencer referred to literature on the history of that 
organisation. When a newspaper articles contained direct quotes, these were coded as 
“direct interviews”, whilst any newspaper reports were included as “academic papers 
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and books”.  Eaton did not undertake any direct interviews, he did not analyse the 
annual financial statements of the two companies and did not infer any industry norms.  
Proposition Industry 
norms 
Inquiries, 
Commissions 
or other 
academic 
papers and 
books  
Indirect 
interview 
Direct 
interview 
Inferred 
from AFS 
2a)  
Not reviewed by Eaton.   
2b) 
2c)  
2d) 
2e) 
2f) 
2g) 
2h) and 2i)   (5)  (4)   
2j) and 2k)   (6)  (1)   
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21), 2m), 
2n) and 2o) 
  (5)  (0)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O’Connor (2002) 
O’Connor (2002) analysed groupthink in the context of Enron, evidencing both the 
antecedents and symptoms of groupthink. O’Connor grouped Janis’ seven antecedent 
of groupthink into three categories and analysed them collectively whilst she analysed 
each of the eight symptoms of groupthink individually. Evidence was obtained from a 
wide source of information, including SEC Reports on Enron, industry norms, indirect 
quotations and an analysis of the Enron financial statement. O’Connor, consistent with 
Eaton above, summarised the antecedents of groupthink into three categories, namely 
overestimation of the group (covering research questions 2h) and 2i)), close 
mindedness (covering research questions 2j) and 2k)), and pressure towards uniformity 
(covering symptom 2l) to 2o).  
O’Connor did not, as discussed previously, undertake any interviews in support of her 
research.    
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Proposition Industry 
norms 
Inquiries, 
Commissions 
or other 
academic 
papers and 
books  
Indirect 
interview 
Direct 
interview 
Inferred 
from AFS 
2a)  (4)  (10)  (4)   
2b) – 2e)    (10)  (1)   
2f) and 2g)   (5)  (3)   
2h)   (7)  (8)   
2i)   (6)  (10)   
2j)  (2)  (7)  (1)   
2k)    (3)  (4)   
2l)   (2)  (2)   
2m)   (2)  (5)   
2n)    (3)  (1)   
2o) No evidence in support of this proposition.  
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Yetiv (2003) 
Yetiv (2003) analysed groupthink in the context of the President Bush’s handling of the 
Gulf crisis. Yetiv relied on the analysis of documents at the George Bush Presidential 
library (coded below as “inquiries, commissions, or other academic papers and books) 
as well as memoirs and public statements by key decision makers (coded under 
indirect interviews) and interviews (coded under direct interviews). Yetiv followed Janis’ 
(1972) construct of groupthink, focusing on all seven of Janis’s antecedent of 
groupthink. For the symptoms of groupthink, Yetiv, consistent with Eaton and O’Connor 
condensed the seven antecedents of groupthink into three broad categories.  
Proposition Industry 
norms 
Inquiries, 
Commissions 
or other 
academic 
Indirect 
interview 
Direct 
interview 
Inferred 
from AFS 
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papers and 
books  
2a)     (1)  (1)  
2b)   (3)  (1)  (3)  
2c)    (4)  (2)   
2d)   (7)  (5)  (2)  
2e)  (1)187  (1)   (1)  
2f)   (4)  (3)  (4)  
2g) Not proved by Yetiv.  
2h) and 2i)    (1)  (2)   
2j) and 2k)    (1)   
2l), 2m), 2n) 
and 2o) 
  (4)  (4)  (2)  
 
 
                                            
187187
 Yetiv here refers to the work of Powell and DiMaggio (1983) referred to in my analysis of 
groupthink.  
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Scharff (2005) 
Scharff (2005) analysed groupthink in the context of the failures at WorldCom. Scharff 
relies (heavily) on a SEC Report into the failures of WorldCom which includes a 
number of quotes from Enron employees (coded as indirect interviews) as well as 
newspaper reports and related academic articles. Scharff focused only on the 
symptoms of groupthink in his analysis. Further he did not consider the groupthink 
symptom related to self-appointed mindguards (research question 1o)). No explanation 
was provided for this omission.  
 
Proposition Industry 
norms 
Inquiries, 
Commissions 
or other 
academic 
Indirect 
interview 
Direct 
interview 
Inferred 
from AFS 
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papers and 
books  
2a)  
 
Not reviewed by Scharff. 
2b) 
2c)  
2d) 
2e) 
2f) 
2g) 
2h)    (1)  (1)   
2i)   (2)  (2)   
2j)   (2)    
2k)    (4)  (1)   
2l)    (2)   
2m)    (2)   
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2n)   (2)    
2o) Not analysed by Scharff.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ahlstrom and Wang (2009) 
Ahlstrom and Wang’s (2009) research focused on France’s defeat to Germany in 1940 
and drew on a number of historical reference (coded below as “academic papers and 
books”) as well as diaries and retrospective eye witness accounts (coded as “indirect 
interviews). Direct interviews were not possible for the research and neither are the 
categories “industry norms” and “inferred from the annual financial statements” relevant 
for this analysis. Further Ahlstrom and Wang focused just on the symptoms of 
groupthink and as such did not consider the antecedents as I did in my analysis.  
Proposition Industry 
norms 
Inquiries, 
Commissions 
or other 
academic 
papers and 
Indirect 
interview 
Direct 
interview 
Inferred 
from AFS 
  
492 
 
books  
2a)  
 
Not reviewed by Ahlstrom and Wang. 
2b) 
2c)  
2d) 
2e) 
2f) 
2g) 
2h)    (5)  (2)   
2i)   (6)  (1)   
2j)   (5)    
2k)    (4)    
2l)   (4)  (2)   
2m)   (2)  (1)   
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2n)  (2) (2)   
2o)  (1) (2)   
 
 
 
 
